H1: auth extractor re-reads the live user row — trusts the DB role (not the
JWT claim) and rejects banned users mid-session. e2e proves a demoted
host loses powers and a banned host is locked out and can't self-unban.
H2: client_ip takes the right-most XFF hop (the one Caddy appends); spoofed
left-most entries are ignored, restoring IP-based throttles.
H3: Caddy excludes /api/v1/stream from `encode` so SSE isn't buffered.
H4: upload — quota increment + row insert + hashtag links now one txn.
H5: feed keyset pagination tiebroken on (created_at, id) + composite index
(migration 010); feed_delta bounded with LIMIT.
H7: LightboxModal keys its comment load off upload.id, ending the
SSE-driven refetch storm.
H8: CSP via SvelteKit kit.csp (svelte.config.js) hardens the localStorage
token model against injection.
Migration 010 also adds the latent comment/comment_hashtag indexes.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
99 lines
3.7 KiB
TypeScript
99 lines
3.7 KiB
TypeScript
/**
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* USER_JOURNEYS.md §9 — ban / unban / promote / demote. Driven mostly through
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* the API because the host dashboard UI changes shape often; integration
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* coverage of the buttons lives in a separate UI-focused spec.
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*/
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import { test, expect } from '../../fixtures/test';
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test.describe('Host — moderation API', () => {
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test('ban with hide_uploads=true sets the right flags', async ({ api, host, guest }) => {
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const target = await guest('Banned1');
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await api.banUser(host.jwt, target.userId, true);
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const users = await api.listUsers(host.jwt);
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const row = users.find((u: any) => u.id === target.userId);
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expect(row?.is_banned).toBe(true);
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expect(row?.uploads_hidden).toBe(true);
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});
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test('ban without hiding leaves uploads_hidden=false', async ({ api, host, guest }) => {
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const target = await guest('Banned2');
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await api.banUser(host.jwt, target.userId, false);
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const users = await api.listUsers(host.jwt);
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const row = users.find((u: any) => u.id === target.userId);
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expect(row?.is_banned).toBe(true);
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expect(row?.uploads_hidden).toBe(false);
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});
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test('banned user cannot call /upload', async ({ api, host, guest }) => {
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const target = await guest('Banned3');
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await api.banUser(host.jwt, target.userId, false);
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// Direct fetch — multipart body shape is just a marker; the auth middleware should reject before parsing.
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const res = await fetch((process.env.E2E_FRONTEND_URL ?? 'http://localhost:3101') + '/api/v1/upload', {
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method: 'POST',
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headers: { Authorization: `Bearer ${target.jwt}` },
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body: new FormData(),
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});
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expect(res.status).toBe(403);
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});
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test('host can promote a guest to host', async ({ api, host, guest }) => {
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const target = await guest('Promoted');
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await api.setRole(host.jwt, target.userId, 'host');
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const users = await api.listUsers(host.jwt);
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const row = users.find((u: any) => u.id === target.userId);
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expect(row?.role).toBe('host');
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});
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});
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/**
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* Regression for the review's H1: role & ban used to be trusted from the JWT and
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* never re-checked against the DB, so a demoted/banned host kept full powers for
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* the life of their token (up to 30d) and a banned host could even unban
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* themselves. The auth extractor now re-reads the live user row, so these take
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* effect on the *existing* session with no re-login.
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*/
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test.describe('Host — live role/ban revocation (H1)', () => {
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test('a demoted host loses host powers on their existing session', async ({
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api,
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adminToken,
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guest,
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}) => {
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const u = await guest('DemoteMidSession');
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await api.setRole(adminToken, u.userId, 'host');
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// Fresh host token (role is encoded at mint time).
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const { body } = await api.recover(u.displayName, u.pin);
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const hostJwt = body.jwt;
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// Sanity: the token currently has host powers.
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await api.listUsers(hostJwt);
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// Demote via admin — the host does NOT re-login.
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await api.setRole(adminToken, u.userId, 'guest');
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// Same token is now rejected because the middleware trusts the DB role.
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await expect(api.listUsers(hostJwt)).rejects.toThrow();
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});
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test('a banned host is locked out immediately on their existing session', async ({
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api,
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adminToken,
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host,
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}) => {
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// Sanity: host token works.
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await api.listUsers(host.jwt);
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await api.banUser(adminToken, host.userId, false);
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// Banned users are rejected by the auth extractor before any handler runs.
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await expect(api.listUsers(host.jwt)).rejects.toThrow();
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});
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test('a banned host cannot unban themselves', async ({ api, adminToken, host }) => {
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await api.banUser(adminToken, host.userId, false);
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await expect(
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api.unbanUser(host.jwt, host.userId, { expectedStatus: [204] })
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).rejects.toThrow();
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});
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});
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