feat: argon2id passwords, session cookies, bot bearer tokens

Adds the full auth flow. Reads stay public; writes (currently only POST
/api/v1/mangas) require a CurrentUser. Both browsers and bot scripts hit
the same endpoints — they just present credentials differently.

Migration 0002_auth.sql introduces users.password_hash, a sessions
table, and an api_tokens table. Sessions and api_tokens store only
sha256(raw_token) — the raw value lives in the cookie or the
Authorization header.

New endpoints under /api/v1/auth/:
- POST /register — argon2id hash, creates a session, sets cookie.
- POST /login — verifies, rotates to a fresh session (old ones expire
  naturally so other devices stay signed in).
- POST /logout — deletes the server-side session row + clears the
  cookie via Max-Age=0.
- GET  /me — current user via the new CurrentUser extractor.
- POST /tokens — issue a bot bearer token; raw value returned exactly
  once at creation.
- DELETE /tokens/{id} — owner-only: 404 if unknown, 403 if it exists
  but belongs to another user, 204 on success.

The CurrentUser axum extractor resolves cookie first, then
Authorization: Bearer; failure → AppError::Unauthenticated (401). New
AppError variants Unauthenticated/Forbidden/Conflict carry the matching
envelope codes; the top-level match in `code()` stays exhaustive.

Backend integration coverage in tests/api_auth.rs: register sets a
HttpOnly SameSite=Lax cookie and never leaks password_hash; duplicate
username → 409; weak password → 400; login rotates the cookie; wrong
password / unknown user → 401; /me with vs without cookie; logout
invalidates the cookie; bot-token roundtrip via Bearer; user A cannot
delete user B's token (403); unknown delete → 404.

Frontend:
- lib/api/auth.ts — typed wrappers; me() returns null on 401.
- lib/session.svelte.ts — per-tab user state with a seq counter to
  guard against an in-flight /me clobbering a fresh setUser.
- lib/api/client.ts — request<T> returns undefined for 204.
- routes/login + routes/register — forms with action="javascript:void(0)"
  so the no-JS path is a no-op (avoids the hydration-race where a
  pre-attach click would submit via the browser default).
- routes/+layout.svelte — session-aware nav: spinner → user + Logout,
  or Login / Register.
- e2e/auth-flow.spec.ts — login flips the layout, logout flips back;
  bad credentials surface the API error message.

Config grows AuthConfig (cookie_secure, cookie_domain, session_ttl_days)
and CORS_ALLOWED_ORIGINS. CORS middleware is mounted in app::build and
stays a no-op (same-origin) until origins are listed.

Lockstep version bump to 0.3.0.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

frontend/package.json

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 {
   "name": "mangalord-frontend",
-  "version": "0.2.0",
+  "version": "0.3.0",
   "private": true,
   "type": "module",
   "scripts": {