diff --git a/backend/Cargo.lock b/backend/Cargo.lock
index 1f493cb..8bc7ff0 100644
--- a/backend/Cargo.lock
+++ b/backend/Cargo.lock
@@ -1558,7 +1558,7 @@ checksum = "c41e0c4fef86961ac6d6f8a82609f55f31b05e4fce149ac5710e439df7619ba4"
 
 [[package]]
 name = "mangalord"
-version = "0.128.23"
+version = "0.128.24"
 dependencies = [
  "anyhow",
  "argon2",
diff --git a/backend/Cargo.toml b/backend/Cargo.toml
index 42192e5..f509be6 100644
--- a/backend/Cargo.toml
+++ b/backend/Cargo.toml
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 [package]
 name = "mangalord"
-version = "0.128.23"
+version = "0.128.24"
 edition = "2021"
 default-run = "mangalord"
 
diff --git a/backend/src/bin/crawler.rs b/backend/src/bin/crawler.rs
index e15cd6e..688bf30 100644
--- a/backend/src/bin/crawler.rs
+++ b/backend/src/bin/crawler.rs
@@ -133,13 +133,16 @@ async fn main() -> anyhow::Result<()> {
     if let Some(proxy) = &proxy_url {
         http_builder = http_builder
             .proxy(reqwest::Proxy::all(proxy).with_context(|| format!("parse proxy URL: {proxy}"))?);
-    } else {
-        // DNS-rebinding guard, direct (unproxied) path only — see the matching
-        // note in `spawn_crawler_daemon` (app.rs). With a `socks5h://` proxy the
-        // target is resolved by the proxy, so this resolver would only ever
-        // reject the proxy's own private-IP host (e.g. `tor`), breaking every
-        // fetch for no security gain.
-        http_builder = http_builder.dns_resolver(mangalord::crawler::safety::safe_dns_resolver());
+    }
+    // DNS-rebinding guard: attached on the direct path AND on http(s) proxies
+    // (reqwest resolves the target itself there), skipped only for SOCKS proxies
+    // where the proxy resolves the target. Use the shared predicate so this CLI
+    // and the daemon (app.rs) stay in lockstep — previously the CLI attached the
+    // resolver only on the fully-direct path, so an http(s) proxy silently lost
+    // the rebinding guard.
+    if mangalord::crawler::safety::should_attach_safe_resolver(proxy_url.as_deref()) {
+        http_builder =
+            http_builder.dns_resolver(mangalord::crawler::safety::safe_dns_resolver());
     }
     let http = http_builder.build().context("build http client")?;
 
diff --git a/backend/src/crawler/intercept.rs b/backend/src/crawler/intercept.rs
index 474d103..480c91a 100644
--- a/backend/src/crawler/intercept.rs
+++ b/backend/src/crawler/intercept.rs
@@ -82,6 +82,11 @@ pub(crate) fn verdict(url: &str) -> Verdict {
     };
     match parsed.scheme() {
         "http" | "https" => {}
+        // Non-http(s) subresource schemes: block the ones that can reach the
+        // local filesystem or pivot to another protocol; continue the rest
+        // (data:/blob:/about: and Chrome-internal schemes) which legitimate page
+        // loads depend on — blocking those would wedge navigation.
+        "file" | "ftp" | "gopher" => return Verdict::Block,
         _ => return Verdict::Allow,
     }
     // Literal private IP / localhost / missing host → block (string check).
@@ -210,6 +215,15 @@ mod tests {
         }
     }
 
+    #[test]
+    fn verdict_blocks_dangerous_non_http_schemes() {
+        // file:/ftp:/gopher: can reach the local filesystem or pivot protocols;
+        // block them explicitly rather than falling through to Allow.
+        for url in ["file:///etc/passwd", "ftp://internal/x", "gopher://internal:70/1"] {
+            assert_eq!(verdict(url), Verdict::Block, "{url} should be blocked");
+        }
+    }
+
     #[test]
     fn verdict_blocks_private_ip_literals_and_localhost() {
         for url in [
diff --git a/backend/src/crawler/safety.rs b/backend/src/crawler/safety.rs
index 436bb30..e25b62d 100644
--- a/backend/src/crawler/safety.rs
+++ b/backend/src/crawler/safety.rs
@@ -507,6 +507,26 @@ mod tests {
         DownloadAllowlist::new().allow(host)
     }
 
+    #[test]
+    fn rejects_alternate_ipv4_encodings_of_loopback() {
+        // The `url` crate normalizes special-scheme IPv4 hosts per WHATWG, so
+        // decimal/hex/octal/short forms all collapse to 127.0.0.1 and must be
+        // rejected. This normalization is load-bearing (it's what stops these
+        // encodings smuggling past the literal-IP check) but was untested — pin
+        // it so a future URL-parser swap can't silently reopen the hole.
+        for url in [
+            "http://2130706433/", // decimal 127.0.0.1
+            "http://0x7f000001/",  // hex
+            "http://0177.0.0.1/",  // octal first octet
+            "http://127.1/",       // short form
+        ] {
+            assert!(
+                ensure_public_target(url).is_err(),
+                "{url} normalizes to loopback and must be rejected"
+            );
+        }
+    }
+
     #[test]
     fn allow_any_admits_arbitrary_public_host() {
         // Operators who can't pre-enumerate a numbered-CDN fleet
diff --git a/frontend/package.json b/frontend/package.json
index b174fc4..feb7e47 100644
--- a/frontend/package.json
+++ b/frontend/package.json
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 {
   "name": "mangalord-frontend",
-  "version": "0.128.23",
+  "version": "0.128.24",
   "private": true,
   "type": "module",
   "scripts": {