feat: password change endpoint with full session rotation
Adds the pre-1.0 password-change story flagged by the audit. Browser
users and bot owners both go through PATCH /api/v1/auth/me/password
with the current + new password in the body.
Implementation in `api::auth::change_password`:
- CurrentUser-gated: 401 if unauthenticated.
- Verifies current_password against the stored argon2 hash. Wrong
current → 401 unauthenticated, matching the login contract.
- new_password runs through the same `validate_password` used at
registration (≥8 chars). Weak → 400 invalid_input.
- On success, wraps the swap in a single transaction:
- UPDATE users.password_hash with a fresh argon2 hash.
- DELETE every session for this user (signs out other devices —
any cookie stolen before the change is dead now).
- INSERT a new session and mint a fresh cookie so the caller stays
logged in.
- 204 + Set-Cookie on success.
Bot tokens (api_tokens) are intentionally left alone. They're explicit
opt-in credentials that the user can already audit and revoke
individually via DELETE /auth/tokens/{id}; rotating them on every
password change would surprise CI scripts.
Repo refactor: `repo::session::create` accepts `impl PgExecutor<'_>`
(same pattern feat/uploads used for chapters), and a new
`session::delete_all_for_user` covers the "sign out everywhere"
write. The existing `delete_by_token_hash` (used by logout) is
unchanged.
Coverage in tests/api_auth.rs (4 cases):
- change_password_rotates_sessions_and_swaps_credentials — happy path
asserts the new cookie differs from the original, that both the
original cookie AND a second-device cookie become invalid, that the
new cookie keeps working, that login with the old password fails
(401) and login with the new password succeeds.
- change_password_rejects_wrong_current_with_401 — wrong current
password returns 401 unauthenticated.
- change_password_rejects_weak_new_password — new_password "short"
returns 400 invalid_input.
- change_password_requires_authentication — no cookie returns 401.
README updated with the new endpoint in the auth table.
Lockstep version bump to 0.10.0.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
This commit is contained in:
@@ -169,6 +169,29 @@ pub fn post_json_with_bearer(
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.unwrap()
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}
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pub fn patch_json(uri: &str, body: serde_json::Value) -> Request<Body> {
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Request::builder()
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.method("PATCH")
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.uri(uri)
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.header(header::CONTENT_TYPE, "application/json")
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.body(Body::from(body.to_string()))
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.unwrap()
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}
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pub fn patch_json_with_cookie(
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uri: &str,
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body: serde_json::Value,
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cookie: &str,
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) -> Request<Body> {
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Request::builder()
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.method("PATCH")
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.uri(uri)
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.header(header::CONTENT_TYPE, "application/json")
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.header(header::COOKIE, cookie)
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.body(Body::from(body.to_string()))
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.unwrap()
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}
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pub fn delete_with_cookie(uri: &str, cookie: &str) -> Request<Body> {
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Request::builder()
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.method("DELETE")
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