feat: password change endpoint with full session rotation

Adds the pre-1.0 password-change story flagged by the audit. Browser
users and bot owners both go through PATCH /api/v1/auth/me/password
with the current + new password in the body.

Implementation in `api::auth::change_password`:
- CurrentUser-gated: 401 if unauthenticated.
- Verifies current_password against the stored argon2 hash. Wrong
  current → 401 unauthenticated, matching the login contract.
- new_password runs through the same `validate_password` used at
  registration (≥8 chars). Weak → 400 invalid_input.
- On success, wraps the swap in a single transaction:
  - UPDATE users.password_hash with a fresh argon2 hash.
  - DELETE every session for this user (signs out other devices —
    any cookie stolen before the change is dead now).
  - INSERT a new session and mint a fresh cookie so the caller stays
    logged in.
- 204 + Set-Cookie on success.

Bot tokens (api_tokens) are intentionally left alone. They're explicit
opt-in credentials that the user can already audit and revoke
individually via DELETE /auth/tokens/{id}; rotating them on every
password change would surprise CI scripts.

Repo refactor: `repo::session::create` accepts `impl PgExecutor<'_>`
(same pattern feat/uploads used for chapters), and a new
`session::delete_all_for_user` covers the "sign out everywhere"
write. The existing `delete_by_token_hash` (used by logout) is
unchanged.

Coverage in tests/api_auth.rs (4 cases):
- change_password_rotates_sessions_and_swaps_credentials — happy path
  asserts the new cookie differs from the original, that both the
  original cookie AND a second-device cookie become invalid, that the
  new cookie keeps working, that login with the old password fails
  (401) and login with the new password succeeds.
- change_password_rejects_wrong_current_with_401 — wrong current
  password returns 401 unauthenticated.
- change_password_rejects_weak_new_password — new_password "short"
  returns 400 invalid_input.
- change_password_requires_authentication — no cookie returns 401.

README updated with the new endpoint in the auth table.

Lockstep version bump to 0.10.0.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

README.md

@@ -96,6 +96,7 @@ Everything is namespaced under `/api/v1/`. `/api/*` outside the version prefix i
 | POST   | `/api/v1/auth/login`                                    | Same shape; rotates to a fresh session.                |
 | POST   | `/api/v1/auth/logout`                                   | Invalidates the session, clears the cookie.            |
 | GET    | `/api/v1/auth/me`                                       | Current user, or 401 if anonymous.                     |
+| PATCH  | `/api/v1/auth/me/password`                              | `{current_password,new_password}` → 401 on wrong current; on success deletes **all** of the user's sessions and mints a fresh one for the caller. Bot tokens stay (use DELETE /tokens/{id} to revoke). |
 | POST   | `/api/v1/auth/tokens`                                   | `{name}` → bot bearer token (returned once).           |
 | DELETE | `/api/v1/auth/tokens/{id}`                              | Revoke a bot token (owner-only).                       |
 | POST   | `/api/v1/mangas`                                        | Multipart: `metadata` JSON + optional `cover` image.   |

backend/Cargo.toml

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 [package]
 name = "mangalord"
-version = "0.9.4"
+version = "0.10.0"
 edition = "2021"
 
 [lib]

backend/src/api/auth.rs

@@ -7,7 +7,7 @@
 use axum::extract::{Path, State};
 use axum::http::StatusCode;
 use axum::response::IntoResponse;
-use axum::routing::{delete, get, post};
+use axum::routing::{delete, get, patch, post};
 use axum::{Json, Router};
 use axum_extra::extract::cookie::{Cookie, CookieJar, SameSite};
 use chrono::{Duration, Utc};
@@ -29,6 +29,7 @@ pub fn routes() -> Router<AppState> {
         .route("/auth/login", post(login))
         .route("/auth/logout", post(logout))
         .route("/auth/me", get(me))
+        .route("/auth/me/password", patch(change_password))
         .route("/auth/tokens", post(create_token))
         .route("/auth/tokens/:id", delete(delete_token))
 }
@@ -49,6 +50,12 @@ pub struct CreateTokenInput {
     pub name: String,
 }
 
+#[derive(Debug, Deserialize)]
+pub struct ChangePassword {
+    pub current_password: String,
+    pub new_password: String,
+}
+
 #[derive(Debug, Serialize)]
 pub struct CreatedTokenResponse {
     #[serde(flatten)]
@@ -111,6 +118,49 @@ async fn me(CurrentUser(user): CurrentUser) -> AppResult<Json<AuthResponse>> {
     Ok(Json(AuthResponse { user }))
 }
 
+/// `PATCH /api/v1/auth/me/password` — change the current user's password.
+///
+/// Verifies `current_password` against the stored argon2 hash (401 on
+/// mismatch, matching the login contract). Validates `new_password`
+/// against the same min-length rule used at registration. On success,
+/// inside a single transaction:
+///   - UPDATE users.password_hash with the new argon2 hash
+///   - DELETE all existing sessions for this user (signs out other
+///     devices; the stolen-cookie attack surface is closed)
+///   - INSERT a fresh session and return it as a new cookie so the
+///     caller stays logged in
+///
+/// Bot tokens (`api_tokens`) are left alone: the user opted into them
+/// explicitly and can revoke individually via DELETE /auth/tokens/{id}.
+async fn change_password(
+    State(state): State<AppState>,
+    CurrentUser(user): CurrentUser,
+    jar: CookieJar,
+    Json(input): Json<ChangePassword>,
+) -> AppResult<impl IntoResponse> {
+    if !verify_password(&input.current_password, &user.password_hash) {
+        return Err(AppError::Unauthenticated);
+    }
+    validate_password(&input.new_password)?;
+
+    let new_hash = hash_password(&input.new_password)?;
+
+    let mut tx = state.db.begin().await?;
+    sqlx::query("UPDATE users SET password_hash = $1 WHERE id = $2")
+        .bind(&new_hash)
+        .bind(user.id)
+        .execute(&mut *tx)
+        .await?;
+    repo::session::delete_all_for_user(&mut *tx, user.id).await?;
+    let (raw, hash) = generate_token();
+    let expires_at = Utc::now() + Duration::days(state.auth.session_ttl_days);
+    repo::session::create(&mut *tx, user.id, &hash, expires_at).await?;
+    tx.commit().await?;
+
+    let jar = jar.add(build_session_cookie(raw, &state.auth));
+    Ok((StatusCode::NO_CONTENT, jar))
+}
+
 async fn create_token(
     State(state): State<AppState>,
     CurrentUser(user): CurrentUser,

backend/src/repo/session.rs

@@ -2,14 +2,17 @@
 //! the raw value never hits the DB.
 
 use chrono::{DateTime, Utc};
-use sqlx::PgPool;
+use sqlx::{PgExecutor, PgPool};
 use uuid::Uuid;
 
 use crate::domain::Session;
 use crate::error::AppResult;
 
-pub async fn create(
+/// Accepts any `PgExecutor` so callers can pass `&PgPool` for simple
-    pool: &PgPool,
+/// inserts or `&mut *tx` to run inside a transaction (e.g., password
+/// change rotates the user's sessions atomically with the hash UPDATE).
+pub async fn create<'e, E: PgExecutor<'e>>(
+    executor: E,
     user_id: Uuid,
     token_hash: &[u8],
     expires_at: DateTime<Utc>,
@@ -24,11 +27,22 @@ pub async fn create(
     .bind(user_id)
     .bind(token_hash)
     .bind(expires_at)
-    .fetch_one(pool)
+    .fetch_one(executor)
     .await?;
     Ok(row)
 }
 
+pub async fn delete_all_for_user<'e, E: PgExecutor<'e>>(
+    executor: E,
+    user_id: Uuid,
+) -> AppResult<()> {
+    sqlx::query("DELETE FROM sessions WHERE user_id = $1")
+        .bind(user_id)
+        .execute(executor)
+        .await?;
+    Ok(())
+}
+
 /// Returns the session iff `token_hash` matches and it hasn't expired.
 pub async fn find_active(pool: &PgPool, token_hash: &[u8]) -> AppResult<Option<Session>> {
     let row = sqlx::query_as::<_, Session>(

backend/tests/api_auth.rs

@@ -233,6 +233,153 @@ async fn logout_clears_session(pool: PgPool) {
     assert_eq!(resp.status(), StatusCode::UNAUTHORIZED);
 }
 
+#[sqlx::test(migrations = "./migrations")]
+async fn change_password_rotates_sessions_and_swaps_credentials(pool: PgPool) {
+    let h = common::harness(pool);
+    let (username, cookie) = common::register_user(&h.app).await;
+
+    // Log in a second time to seed a "second device" session that
+    // should also be invalidated by the password change.
+    let second_resp = h
+        .app
+        .clone()
+        .oneshot(common::post_json(
+            "/api/v1/auth/login",
+            json!({ "username": username, "password": "hunter2hunter2" }),
+        ))
+        .await
+        .unwrap();
+    let second_cookie = common::extract_session_cookie(&second_resp).unwrap();
+    assert_ne!(cookie, second_cookie);
+
+    // Change the password.
+    let resp = h
+        .app
+        .clone()
+        .oneshot(common::patch_json_with_cookie(
+            "/api/v1/auth/me/password",
+            json!({
+                "current_password": "hunter2hunter2",
+                "new_password": "freshpassfreshpass"
+            }),
+            &cookie,
+        ))
+        .await
+        .unwrap();
+    assert_eq!(resp.status(), StatusCode::NO_CONTENT);
+    let rotated_cookie =
+        common::extract_session_cookie(&resp).expect("password change must mint a new cookie");
+    assert_ne!(cookie, rotated_cookie, "session must rotate");
+
+    // Both original cookies are dead (other devices signed out).
+    for stale in [&cookie, &second_cookie] {
+        let resp = h
+            .app
+            .clone()
+            .oneshot(common::get_with_cookie("/api/v1/auth/me", stale))
+            .await
+            .unwrap();
+        assert_eq!(
+            resp.status(),
+            StatusCode::UNAUTHORIZED,
+            "stale cookie {stale} should be invalid"
+        );
+    }
+
+    // The rotated cookie is live.
+    let resp = h
+        .app
+        .clone()
+        .oneshot(common::get_with_cookie("/api/v1/auth/me", &rotated_cookie))
+        .await
+        .unwrap();
+    assert_eq!(resp.status(), StatusCode::OK);
+
+    // Old password no longer logs in.
+    let resp = h
+        .app
+        .clone()
+        .oneshot(common::post_json(
+            "/api/v1/auth/login",
+            json!({ "username": username, "password": "hunter2hunter2" }),
+        ))
+        .await
+        .unwrap();
+    assert_eq!(resp.status(), StatusCode::UNAUTHORIZED);
+
+    // New password does.
+    let resp = h
+        .app
+        .oneshot(common::post_json(
+            "/api/v1/auth/login",
+            json!({ "username": username, "password": "freshpassfreshpass" }),
+        ))
+        .await
+        .unwrap();
+    assert_eq!(resp.status(), StatusCode::OK);
+}
+
+#[sqlx::test(migrations = "./migrations")]
+async fn change_password_rejects_wrong_current_with_401(pool: PgPool) {
+    let h = common::harness(pool);
+    let (_, cookie) = common::register_user(&h.app).await;
+
+    let resp = h
+        .app
+        .oneshot(common::patch_json_with_cookie(
+            "/api/v1/auth/me/password",
+            json!({
+                "current_password": "definitelyNotIt",
+                "new_password": "freshpassfreshpass"
+            }),
+            &cookie,
+        ))
+        .await
+        .unwrap();
+    assert_eq!(resp.status(), StatusCode::UNAUTHORIZED);
+    let body = common::body_json(resp).await;
+    assert_eq!(body["error"]["code"], "unauthenticated");
+}
+
+#[sqlx::test(migrations = "./migrations")]
+async fn change_password_rejects_weak_new_password(pool: PgPool) {
+    let h = common::harness(pool);
+    let (_, cookie) = common::register_user(&h.app).await;
+
+    let resp = h
+        .app
+        .oneshot(common::patch_json_with_cookie(
+            "/api/v1/auth/me/password",
+            json!({
+                "current_password": "hunter2hunter2",
+                "new_password": "short"
+            }),
+            &cookie,
+        ))
+        .await
+        .unwrap();
+    assert_eq!(resp.status(), StatusCode::BAD_REQUEST);
+    let body = common::body_json(resp).await;
+    assert_eq!(body["error"]["code"], "invalid_input");
+}
+
+#[sqlx::test(migrations = "./migrations")]
+async fn change_password_requires_authentication(pool: PgPool) {
+    let h = common::harness(pool);
+    let resp = h
+        .app
+        .oneshot(common::patch_json(
+            "/api/v1/auth/me/password",
+            json!({
+                "current_password": "hunter2hunter2",
+                "new_password": "freshpassfreshpass"
+            }),
+        ))
+        .await
+        .unwrap();
+    assert_eq!(resp.status(), StatusCode::UNAUTHORIZED);
+}
+
 #[sqlx::test(migrations = "./migrations")]
 async fn me_rejects_expired_session(pool: PgPool) {
     use chrono::{Duration, Utc};

backend/tests/common/mod.rs

@@ -169,6 +169,29 @@ pub fn post_json_with_bearer(
         .unwrap()
 }
 
+pub fn patch_json(uri: &str, body: serde_json::Value) -> Request<Body> {
+    Request::builder()
+        .method("PATCH")
+        .uri(uri)
+        .header(header::CONTENT_TYPE, "application/json")
+        .body(Body::from(body.to_string()))
+        .unwrap()
+}
+
+pub fn patch_json_with_cookie(
+    uri: &str,
+    body: serde_json::Value,
+    cookie: &str,
+) -> Request<Body> {
+    Request::builder()
+        .method("PATCH")
+        .uri(uri)
+        .header(header::CONTENT_TYPE, "application/json")
+        .header(header::COOKIE, cookie)
+        .body(Body::from(body.to_string()))
+        .unwrap()
+}
+
 pub fn delete_with_cookie(uri: &str, cookie: &str) -> Request<Body> {
     Request::builder()
         .method("DELETE")

frontend/package.json

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 {
   "name": "mangalord-frontend",
-  "version": "0.9.4",
+  "version": "0.10.0",
   "private": true,
   "type": "module",
   "scripts": {