feat(auth): admin role with cookie-only RequireAdmin extractor (0.37.0)

Adds an `is_admin` flag on users plus the substrate every later PR in the admin feature builds on: - migration 0018 adds the column with default false - `repo::user::bootstrap_admin` creates or promotes the user named by `ADMIN_USERNAME` at startup, hashing `ADMIN_PASSWORD` only when the row is new — never overwriting an existing hash, so an operator can rotate the admin password via the UI without env-var conflict - `CurrentSessionUser` extractor accepts only the session cookie; `RequireAdmin` composes over it and additionally requires `user.is_admin`. Bearer tokens are intentionally excluded so an admin's bot token never inherits admin authority (privilege-escalation surface that bites every "API keys reuse user perms" auth design) - demotion is instant: `RequireAdmin` re-reads the user row each request `/api/v1/auth/me` now exposes `is_admin`; no other response embeds `User`, so no privacy fanout to audit.
2026-05-30 21:26:26 +02:00
parent 9925f54695
commit ab8b7acc34
9 changed files with 409 additions and 11 deletions
--- a/backend/tests/api_admin_role.rs
+++ b/backend/tests/api_admin_role.rs
@@ -0,0 +1,257 @@
+//! PR 1 (feat/admin-role) integration tests.
+//!
+//! Covers: `bootstrap_admin` semantics, `is_admin` exposed on /auth/me,
+//! and the `RequireAdmin` extractor's 401/403/200 matrix — including the
+//! load-bearing decision that Bearer-authed callers can NEVER reach an
+//! admin-guarded route, even when the underlying user IS admin.
+
+mod common;
+
+use std::sync::Arc;
+
+use axum::http::StatusCode;
+use axum::routing::get;
+use axum::{Json, Router};
+use serde_json::json;
+use sqlx::PgPool;
+use tempfile::TempDir;
+use tower::ServiceExt;
+
+use mangalord::api;
+use mangalord::app::AppState;
+use mangalord::auth::extractor::RequireAdmin;
+use mangalord::auth::rate_limit::AuthRateLimiter;
+use mangalord::config::{AuthConfig, UploadConfig};
+use mangalord::repo;
+use mangalord::storage::{LocalStorage, Storage};
+
+/// Test-only handler guarded by `RequireAdmin`. Lets the test suite assert
+/// the extractor's behaviour end-to-end without depending on an admin
+/// endpoint existing yet (those land in PR 2+).
+async fn admin_only_handler(RequireAdmin(user): RequireAdmin) -> Json<serde_json::Value> {
+    Json(json!({ "username": user.username, "is_admin": user.is_admin }))
+}
+
+/// Build a router that exposes the production /api/v1/* AND a test-only
+/// `/_test/admin_only` route guarded by `RequireAdmin`. Pool is consumed;
+/// callers that want to inspect the DB after a request should clone it.
+fn admin_test_router(pool: PgPool) -> (Router, TempDir) {
+    let storage_dir = tempfile::tempdir().expect("tempdir");
+    let storage: Arc<dyn Storage> = Arc::new(LocalStorage::new(storage_dir.path()));
+    let auth = AuthConfig {
+        cookie_secure: false,
+        ..AuthConfig::default()
+    };
+    let auth_limiter = Arc::new(AuthRateLimiter::new(auth.rate_limit));
+    let state = AppState {
+        db: pool,
+        storage,
+        auth,
+        upload: UploadConfig::default(),
+        auth_limiter,
+    };
+    let app = Router::new()
+        .nest("/api/v1", api::routes())
+        .route("/_test/admin_only", get(admin_only_handler))
+        .with_state(state);
+    (app, storage_dir)
+}
+
+// ---- bootstrap_admin -------------------------------------------------------
+
+#[sqlx::test(migrations = "./migrations")]
+async fn bootstrap_creates_admin_when_user_missing(pool: PgPool) {
+    repo::user::bootstrap_admin(&pool, "root", "hunter2hunter2")
+        .await
+        .expect("bootstrap on empty DB");
+
+    let user = repo::user::find_by_username(&pool, "root")
+        .await
+        .unwrap()
+        .expect("root user exists after bootstrap");
+    assert!(user.is_admin, "bootstrap must set is_admin = true on creation");
+
+    // Password hash must verify the env-supplied password (and not be empty).
+    assert!(
+        mangalord::auth::password::verify_password("hunter2hunter2", &user.password_hash),
+        "bootstrap-created user must accept the env-supplied password"
+    );
+}
+
+#[sqlx::test(migrations = "./migrations")]
+async fn bootstrap_promotes_existing_user_without_touching_password(pool: PgPool) {
+    // Pre-existing user, not admin. Use the real register path so the
+    // hash format matches production exactly.
+    let (app, _td) = admin_test_router(pool.clone());
+    let resp = app
+        .oneshot(common::post_json(
+            "/api/v1/auth/register",
+            json!({ "username": "preexisting", "password": "originalpw1234" }),
+        ))
+        .await
+        .unwrap();
+    assert_eq!(resp.status(), StatusCode::CREATED);
+
+    let before = repo::user::find_by_username(&pool, "preexisting")
+        .await
+        .unwrap()
+        .unwrap();
+    assert!(!before.is_admin);
+    let original_hash = before.password_hash.clone();
+
+    // Bootstrap with a DIFFERENT password — must not overwrite the hash.
+    repo::user::bootstrap_admin(&pool, "preexisting", "envpw_should_be_ignored")
+        .await
+        .expect("bootstrap on existing user");
+
+    let after = repo::user::find_by_username(&pool, "preexisting")
+        .await
+        .unwrap()
+        .unwrap();
+    assert!(after.is_admin, "bootstrap must promote existing user");
+    assert_eq!(
+        after.password_hash, original_hash,
+        "bootstrap must NOT overwrite the existing password hash"
+    );
+    assert!(
+        mangalord::auth::password::verify_password("originalpw1234", &after.password_hash),
+        "original password must still verify after bootstrap"
+    );
+}
+
+#[sqlx::test(migrations = "./migrations")]
+async fn bootstrap_is_idempotent(pool: PgPool) {
+    repo::user::bootstrap_admin(&pool, "root", "hunter2hunter2")
+        .await
+        .expect("first bootstrap");
+    repo::user::bootstrap_admin(&pool, "root", "hunter2hunter2")
+        .await
+        .expect("second bootstrap is no-op");
+
+    // Exactly one row, still admin.
+    let (count,): (i64,) = sqlx::query_as("SELECT COUNT(*) FROM users WHERE username = $1")
+        .bind("root")
+        .fetch_one(&pool)
+        .await
+        .unwrap();
+    assert_eq!(count, 1);
+}
+
+// ---- /api/v1/auth/me exposes is_admin --------------------------------------
+
+#[sqlx::test(migrations = "./migrations")]
+async fn auth_me_response_includes_is_admin(pool: PgPool) {
+    let (app, _td) = admin_test_router(pool.clone());
+    let (_username, cookie) = common::register_user(&app).await;
+    let resp = app
+        .oneshot(common::get_with_cookie("/api/v1/auth/me", &cookie))
+        .await
+        .unwrap();
+    assert_eq!(resp.status(), StatusCode::OK);
+    let body = common::body_json(resp).await;
+    assert_eq!(
+        body["user"]["is_admin"], false,
+        "freshly-registered users default to is_admin=false"
+    );
+}
+
+// ---- RequireAdmin: 401 / 403 / 200 matrix ----------------------------------
+
+#[sqlx::test(migrations = "./migrations")]
+async fn require_admin_rejects_unauthenticated(pool: PgPool) {
+    let (app, _td) = admin_test_router(pool);
+    let resp = app
+        .oneshot(common::get("/_test/admin_only"))
+        .await
+        .unwrap();
+    assert_eq!(resp.status(), StatusCode::UNAUTHORIZED);
+}
+
+#[sqlx::test(migrations = "./migrations")]
+async fn require_admin_rejects_non_admin_cookie(pool: PgPool) {
+    let (app, _td) = admin_test_router(pool);
+    let (_username, cookie) = common::register_user(&app).await;
+    let resp = app
+        .oneshot(common::get_with_cookie("/_test/admin_only", &cookie))
+        .await
+        .unwrap();
+    assert_eq!(resp.status(), StatusCode::FORBIDDEN);
+    let body = common::body_json(resp).await;
+    assert_eq!(body["error"]["code"], "forbidden");
+}
+
+#[sqlx::test(migrations = "./migrations")]
+async fn require_admin_accepts_admin_cookie(pool: PgPool) {
+    let (app, _td) = admin_test_router(pool.clone());
+    let (username, cookie) = common::register_user(&app).await;
+    // Promote via the repo (the admin-users API doesn't exist yet).
+    let u = repo::user::find_by_username(&pool, &username)
+        .await
+        .unwrap()
+        .unwrap();
+    repo::user::set_is_admin(&pool, u.id, true).await.unwrap();
+
+    let resp = app
+        .oneshot(common::get_with_cookie("/_test/admin_only", &cookie))
+        .await
+        .unwrap();
+    assert_eq!(resp.status(), StatusCode::OK);
+    let body = common::body_json(resp).await;
+    assert_eq!(body["username"], username);
+    assert_eq!(body["is_admin"], true);
+}
+
+#[sqlx::test(migrations = "./migrations")]
+async fn require_admin_rejects_bearer_token_even_for_admin_user(pool: PgPool) {
+    // Key privilege-escalation test: an API token belonging to an admin user
+    // must NOT grant admin authority. Bot tokens are excluded from admin
+    // routes by design (the RequireAdmin extractor only accepts session
+    // cookies). See cross-cutting decision #1 in the PR plan.
+    let (app, _td) = admin_test_router(pool.clone());
+    let (username, cookie) = common::register_user(&app).await;
+
+    // Promote to admin and mint an API token (the existing /auth/tokens
+    // endpoint authenticates via the same cookie).
+    let u = repo::user::find_by_username(&pool, &username)
+        .await
+        .unwrap()
+        .unwrap();
+    repo::user::set_is_admin(&pool, u.id, true).await.unwrap();
+
+    let resp = app
+        .clone()
+        .oneshot(common::post_json_with_cookie(
+            "/api/v1/auth/tokens",
+            json!({ "name": "test-bot" }),
+            &cookie,
+        ))
+        .await
+        .unwrap();
+    assert_eq!(resp.status(), StatusCode::CREATED);
+    let body = common::body_json(resp).await;
+    let token = body["bearer"]
+        .as_str()
+        .expect("raw bearer token in response")
+        .to_string();
+
+    // Sanity: the bearer DOES work on a non-admin endpoint (proves the
+    // token is valid, isolating the failure below to the admin guard).
+    let resp = app
+        .clone()
+        .oneshot(common::get_with_bearer("/api/v1/auth/me", &token))
+        .await
+        .unwrap();
+    assert_eq!(resp.status(), StatusCode::OK);
+
+    // Same token, same admin user, but on the admin-guarded route → 401
+    // (no session cookie present at all from the extractor's POV).
+    let resp = app
+        .oneshot(common::get_with_bearer("/_test/admin_only", &token))
+        .await
+        .unwrap();
+    assert_eq!(
+        resp.status(),
+        StatusCode::UNAUTHORIZED,
+        "Bearer-authed admin must NOT pass the RequireAdmin guard"
+    );
+}