chore: audit-flagged cleanups (no behaviour change)

Four small follow-ups from the 0.9.0 audit, none of them
user-visible:

- Migration 0007 drops `chapters_manga_idx`. The 0001 schema declared
  both `UNIQUE (manga_id, number)` and `CREATE INDEX chapters_manga_idx
  ON (manga_id, number)`, but Postgres maintains an identical index
  for the unique constraint automatically — the explicit one was just
  paying for a second per-write update. Query plans are unchanged
  because the planner already preferred the constraint's index.
- `upload::parse_image` sniffs from the first 64 bytes instead of the
  full image buffer. `infer` only looks at magic bytes anyway, so
  scanning 20 MiB is wasted work. Functionally identical; cheaper in
  the hot path.
- AVIF was on the whitelist but had no test fixture. New `avif_bytes`
  helper produces a minimal `ftyp avif` header that `infer` recognises,
  and a new `accepts_avif` unit test covers the path end-to-end.
- Frontend `request()` sets `credentials: 'include'`. Same-origin
  callers see no change (default was already `'same-origin'`), but the
  first user who configures `CORS_ALLOWED_ORIGINS` for a cross-origin
  deployment gets working cookies without having to chase a runtime
  ApiError trail.

No version bump.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
This commit is contained in:
MechaCat02
2026-05-16 23:32:02 +02:00
parent 2df4084c56
commit d81aca42a0
3 changed files with 39 additions and 2 deletions

View File

@@ -0,0 +1,7 @@
-- `chapters_manga_idx` over (manga_id, number) duplicates the implicit
-- index Postgres maintains for the `UNIQUE (manga_id, number)`
-- constraint from 0001 — same leading columns, same ordering, same
-- selectivity. Dropping the explicit one saves a per-write index
-- update without changing query plans.
DROP INDEX IF EXISTS chapters_manga_idx;

View File

@@ -21,7 +21,11 @@ pub fn parse_image(bytes: Vec<u8>, max_size: usize, field_name: &str) -> AppResu
"{field_name} exceeds {max_size}-byte cap" "{field_name} exceeds {max_size}-byte cap"
))); )));
} }
let kind = infer::get(&bytes).ok_or_else(|| { // `infer` only looks at magic bytes in the first dozen-or-so bytes;
// hand it a small head slice rather than walking the whole 20-MiB
// image buffer when sniffing.
let head = &bytes[..bytes.len().min(64)];
let kind = infer::get(head).ok_or_else(|| {
AppError::UnsupportedMediaType(format!("{field_name}: unrecognised image format")) AppError::UnsupportedMediaType(format!("{field_name}: unrecognised image format"))
})?; })?;
let (mime, ext) = match kind.mime_type() { let (mime, ext) = match kind.mime_type() {
@@ -56,6 +60,20 @@ mod tests {
b"%PDF-1.4\n%\xc4\xe5".to_vec() b"%PDF-1.4\n%\xc4\xe5".to_vec()
} }
fn avif_bytes() -> Vec<u8> {
// Minimal `ftyp avif` header that `infer` recognises. A real
// AVIF would continue with `mdat`/`meta` boxes; the magic bytes
// alone are enough for sniffing.
vec![
0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x18, // box size = 24
b'f', b't', b'y', b'p', // box type
b'a', b'v', b'i', b'f', // major brand
0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, // minor version
b'm', b'i', b'f', b'1', // compatible brand
b'a', b'v', b'i', b'f', // compatible brand
]
}
#[test] #[test]
fn accepts_png() { fn accepts_png() {
let img = parse_image(png_bytes(), 1024, "cover").unwrap(); let img = parse_image(png_bytes(), 1024, "cover").unwrap();
@@ -70,6 +88,13 @@ mod tests {
assert_eq!(img.ext, "jpg"); assert_eq!(img.ext, "jpg");
} }
#[test]
fn accepts_avif() {
let img = parse_image(avif_bytes(), 1024, "cover").unwrap();
assert_eq!(img.mime, "image/avif");
assert_eq!(img.ext, "avif");
}
#[test] #[test]
fn rejects_non_image_with_unsupported_media_type() { fn rejects_non_image_with_unsupported_media_type() {
let err = parse_image(pdf_bytes(), 1024, "cover").unwrap_err(); let err = parse_image(pdf_bytes(), 1024, "cover").unwrap_err();

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@@ -26,7 +26,12 @@ export class ApiError extends Error {
type ErrorEnvelope = { error?: { code?: unknown; message?: unknown } }; type ErrorEnvelope = { error?: { code?: unknown; message?: unknown } };
export async function request<T>(path: string, init?: RequestInit): Promise<T> { export async function request<T>(path: string, init?: RequestInit): Promise<T> {
const res = await fetch(`${BASE}${path}`, init); // Forward credentials (session cookie) explicitly so cross-origin
// deployments — those configured via CORS_ALLOWED_ORIGINS — keep
// working. For same-origin requests this is a no-op compared to the
// default 'same-origin', so the same-origin happy path is
// unchanged.
const res = await fetch(`${BASE}${path}`, { credentials: 'include', ...init });
if (!res.ok) { if (!res.ok) {
let code = 'http_error'; let code = 'http_error';
let message = `${res.status} ${res.statusText}`; let message = `${res.status} ${res.statusText}`;