fix(admin): security-audit findings — paginate chapters, lock down unchecked helper (0.41.2)

Addresses the security-audit findings on top of the admin feature stack:

M1: /admin/mangas/:id/chapters now paginates (default limit 200, max 500).
A long-runner with thousands of chapters would otherwise produce a multi-MB
response with that many scalar subqueries per row — admin-only but a real
stall risk on one expand-click. Adds explicit pagination tests for the cap
and offset; frontend renders a "Showing first N of M" hint when the cap
clips the result.

L1: repo::user::set_is_admin renamed to set_is_admin_unchecked with a
doc-comment pointing at admin_safe_set_is_admin for production use. The
short name was a footgun — a future contributor reaching for it would
silently bypass self-protection, the last-admin invariant, and the audit
log. Used only by integration-test setup; production code goes through
the admin_safe_* paths.

CSRF posture: build_session_cookie carries a comment that the
SameSite=Lax default is the project's CSRF defense for state-changing
mutations and breaks the instant anyone adds a side-effecting GET under
/admin/*. Spells out what to do then (Strict + explicit token check).

Test counts: 43 backend admin tests + 12 vitest admin tests all green;
svelte-check 0/0 across 446 files.
This commit is contained in:
MechaCat02
2026-05-30 22:23:55 +02:00
parent aa2159ca06
commit f6728dc71a
13 changed files with 214 additions and 47 deletions

View File

@@ -25,6 +25,18 @@ pub fn routes() -> Router<AppState> {
.route("/admin/mangas/:id/chapters", get(list_chapters))
}
#[derive(Debug, Deserialize, Default)]
pub struct ListChaptersParams {
#[serde(default = "default_chapter_limit")]
pub limit: i64,
#[serde(default)]
pub offset: i64,
}
fn default_chapter_limit() -> i64 {
200
}
#[derive(Debug, Deserialize, Default)]
pub struct ListMangasParams {
#[serde(default)]
@@ -76,12 +88,23 @@ async fn list_chapters(
State(state): State<AppState>,
_admin: RequireAdmin,
Path(manga_id): Path<Uuid>,
) -> AppResult<Json<Vec<AdminChapterRow>>> {
Query(params): Query<ListChaptersParams>,
) -> AppResult<Json<PagedResponse<AdminChapterRow>>> {
// Explicit existence check so a typo / deleted manga returns 404
// rather than a misleading "no chapters" 200.
if !repo::manga::exists(&state.db, manga_id).await? {
return Err(AppError::NotFound);
}
let rows = repo::admin_view::list_chapters_with_sync_state(&state.db, manga_id).await?;
Ok(Json(rows))
// Cap at 500 to bound the per-row scalar-subquery cost on
// long-runners with thousands of chapters; default 200 covers
// typical browsing without paging round-trips.
let limit = params.limit.clamp(1, 500);
let offset = params.offset.max(0);
let q = repo::admin_view::ListAdminChaptersQuery {
manga_id,
limit,
offset,
};
let (items, total) = repo::admin_view::list_chapters_with_sync_state(&state.db, &q).await?;
Ok(Json(PagedResponse::with_total(items, limit, offset, total)))
}

View File

@@ -309,6 +309,18 @@ async fn start_session(
Ok(jar.add(build_session_cookie(raw, &state.auth)))
}
// CSRF posture: `SameSite=Lax` is the project's primary CSRF defense.
// Browsers refuse to attach this cookie to cross-site POST / PATCH /
// DELETE requests, which covers every state-changing endpoint (auth
// mutations, uploads, bookmarks, collections, admin user management,
// etc. — all JSON over POST/PATCH/DELETE). Lax DOES still attach the
// cookie on top-level cross-site GETs, so this defense breaks the
// instant anyone adds a state-changing GET. If you reach for one,
// switch to `SameSite=Strict` here AND add an explicit CSRF-token
// check on the new endpoint. The Bearer-token branch in the
// extractor is unaffected (bots authenticate with the token header,
// not the cookie) and admin routes reject Bearer entirely — see
// `auth::extractor::RequireAdmin`.
fn build_session_cookie(raw: String, cfg: &AuthConfig) -> Cookie<'static> {
let mut builder = Cookie::build((SESSION_COOKIE_NAME, raw))
.http_only(true)