The account page pointed users at a "bot-token list" that didn't exist: there
was no GET endpoint, no UI route, and the client type lacked expiry. Add
GET /v1/auth/tokens (caller-scoped, token_hash never serialised), extend the
auth client with listTokens/expires_at and createToken expiry, and add a
/profile/tokens page to list, create (revealing the raw bearer once), and
revoke tokens. Link the account-page copy to it.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
The change-password endpoint returns 401 for a wrong *current* password,
the same status the global on401 hook uses to detect an expired session.
The hook fired first and cleared session.user, so the account form's
"still signed in?" guard always saw null and bounced the user to /login
instead of surfacing the error inline.
Add a per-call `suppressOn401` option to `request`; changePassword opts
in, so a 401 there stays inline and the session is left intact.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
When `PRIVATE_MODE=true`, every API path except a small allowlist
(`/health`, `/auth/{config,login,logout,register}`) requires a valid
session cookie or bearer token — anonymous reads are rejected with
401. Self-registration is force-disabled in private mode regardless
of `ALLOW_SELF_REGISTER`, so a locked-down instance flips with a
single switch (admins still mint accounts via `POST /admin/users`).
The backend gate is a tower middleware that reuses the existing
`CurrentUser` extractor, so the cookie + bearer paths cannot drift
from per-handler auth. `/auth/config` now exposes the flag plus the
effective `self_register_enabled` value so the frontend can render
the navbar correctly on the first paint.
On the frontend, a new universal root `+layout.ts` fetches the
config and redirects anonymous visitors to `/login?next=<path>`
before page-specific loads fire. The redirect is UX only — the
backend middleware is the source of truth, so crafted requests
still 401.
Defaults stay public (`PRIVATE_MODE=false`); existing deployments
need no env change.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Lets operators run a closed-membership deployment by setting
ALLOW_SELF_REGISTER=false (default true, so existing deploys are
unaffected). When off, POST /auth/register returns 403 forbidden. The
rate-limit token is consumed BEFORE the disabled check so the timing
doesn't distinguish enabled-but-rejected from disabled — closes the
toggle-state probe channel.
New public GET /auth/config returns { self_register_enabled: bool }
so the frontend can render its register affordances correctly
without conflating "disabled" with "rate-limited" (which a probe
attempt would).
Frontend: a lightweight reactive `authConfig` store loads the flag
once on root-layout mount (and again on /register direct navigation,
which bypasses the layout's onMount). Header hides the Register link
when the toggle is off; /register renders a "self-registration is
disabled — ask an administrator" notice instead of the form.
Admin-create endpoint that pairs with this toggle is intentionally
not in this PR — it lands as the next branch (feat/admin-user-create).
The toggle alone is independently useful for deployments that want
to lock down enrollment without yet wiring an admin UI.
Adds the SvelteKit /admin route tree backed by the admin endpoints
landed in PR 1-4. Pages: Overview (alerts + summary cards), Users
(list / promote-demote / delete), Mangas (list with sync state +
expandable per-chapter state), System (live disk/mem/cpu bars,
refreshing every 5s).
Security model: the backend's RequireAdmin extractor is the actual
boundary. /admin/+layout.ts calls getSystemStats() at load and
translates the response — 401 → redirect to /login, 403 → throw
SvelteKit error(403) which renders the framework error page. The
header's "Admin" link is hidden unless `session.user?.is_admin`,
but that's UX only.
Carries `is_admin: boolean` through to the frontend User TS type so
the header check works and so admin tables can show role per row.
Vitest covers lib/api/admin.ts (10 tests: list/delete/PATCH for
users, sync-state filter for mangas, nested chapter route, system
disk-nullable case). Playwright is intentionally deferred until the
routes stabilise — admin UI is operator-only and changes shape often
in v0.
Five fixes bundled into one release:
- preserve user-attached tags across crawler upserts
(repo::crawler::sync_tags now scopes to added_by IS NULL; orphaned
attachments from deleted users are reaped as crawler-owned)
- gate manga PATCH and cover endpoints on uploaded_by (require_can_edit
in api::mangas; non-NULL uploaded_by must match the caller)
- equalise login response time across user-existence branches
(run argon2 against a OnceLock-cached dummy hash on the no-user
branch so timing doesn't leak username existence)
- crawler download defences (SSRF allowlist of host literals
including IPv4-mapped IPv6 ranges, 32 MiB streamed size cap,
reject non-whitelisted image types, three-way chapter-probe
classifier replaces the binary #avatar_menu check)
- tighten validation and clean up dead unload path
(attach_tag + create_token enforce 64-char caps; LocalStorage
rejects NUL bytes explicitly; reader flushFinalProgress drops
the always-405 sendBeacon path)
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 <noreply@anthropic.com>
The 0.10.0 backend endpoint had no UI caller — the audit flagged it
as either-ship-a-form-or-remove-the-endpoint dead code. Shipping the
form, plus the bearer-token-keeps-working regression test the audit
asked for to pin the docstring contract.
Backend:
- New test change_password_via_bearer_leaves_bearer_working asserts
that PATCH /me/password called with Authorization: Bearer wipes
cookie sessions but leaves the bearer (api_token) intact and usable
— matches the docstring claim that bot tokens are opt-in to revoke.
Frontend:
- lib/api/auth.ts: new changePassword(input) wrapping PATCH
/v1/auth/me/password. Vitest covers happy 204, 401 unauthenticated
(wrong current), 400 invalid_input (weak new) — same envelope
parsing shape used elsewhere.
- routes/settings/+page.svelte: minimal form with current /
new / confirm fields, derived passwordsMatch + canSubmit guards
(submit stays disabled until current is filled, new is ≥8 chars,
new == confirm). Shows the API's message inline on failure.
Documents the "other devices signed out, bot tokens stay" UX in a
short hint.
- routes/+layout.svelte: new "Settings" link in the session-aware
nav (between username and Logout) for authed users only.
- e2e/settings.spec.ts (5 cases): nav link reaches the form,
successful change shows confirmation + clears the form, 401
surfaces inline, password mismatch keeps submit disabled, anonymous
user gets a sign-in prompt instead of the form.
Lockstep version bump to 0.11.0.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Adds the full auth flow. Reads stay public; writes (currently only POST
/api/v1/mangas) require a CurrentUser. Both browsers and bot scripts hit
the same endpoints — they just present credentials differently.
Migration 0002_auth.sql introduces users.password_hash, a sessions
table, and an api_tokens table. Sessions and api_tokens store only
sha256(raw_token) — the raw value lives in the cookie or the
Authorization header.
New endpoints under /api/v1/auth/:
- POST /register — argon2id hash, creates a session, sets cookie.
- POST /login — verifies, rotates to a fresh session (old ones expire
naturally so other devices stay signed in).
- POST /logout — deletes the server-side session row + clears the
cookie via Max-Age=0.
- GET /me — current user via the new CurrentUser extractor.
- POST /tokens — issue a bot bearer token; raw value returned exactly
once at creation.
- DELETE /tokens/{id} — owner-only: 404 if unknown, 403 if it exists
but belongs to another user, 204 on success.
The CurrentUser axum extractor resolves cookie first, then
Authorization: Bearer; failure → AppError::Unauthenticated (401). New
AppError variants Unauthenticated/Forbidden/Conflict carry the matching
envelope codes; the top-level match in `code()` stays exhaustive.
Backend integration coverage in tests/api_auth.rs: register sets a
HttpOnly SameSite=Lax cookie and never leaks password_hash; duplicate
username → 409; weak password → 400; login rotates the cookie; wrong
password / unknown user → 401; /me with vs without cookie; logout
invalidates the cookie; bot-token roundtrip via Bearer; user A cannot
delete user B's token (403); unknown delete → 404.
Frontend:
- lib/api/auth.ts — typed wrappers; me() returns null on 401.
- lib/session.svelte.ts — per-tab user state with a seq counter to
guard against an in-flight /me clobbering a fresh setUser.
- lib/api/client.ts — request<T> returns undefined for 204.
- routes/login + routes/register — forms with action="javascript:void(0)"
so the no-JS path is a no-op (avoids the hydration-race where a
pre-attach click would submit via the browser default).
- routes/+layout.svelte — session-aware nav: spinner → user + Logout,
or Login / Register.
- e2e/auth-flow.spec.ts — login flips the layout, logout flips back;
bad credentials surface the API error message.
Config grows AuthConfig (cookie_secure, cookie_domain, session_ttl_days)
and CORS_ALLOWED_ORIGINS. CORS middleware is mounted in app::build and
stays a no-op (same-origin) until origins are listed.
Lockstep version bump to 0.3.0.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
