Pairs with the ALLOW_SELF_REGISTER toggle from 0.42.0: admins can mint
accounts regardless of the toggle state, so a closed-membership
deployment still has a working enrollment path. The endpoint accepts
{ username, password, is_admin? } so admins can mint co-admins in one
call (avoiding a separate promote + extra audit row for the common
"invite a co-admin" flow).
Implementation:
- POST /api/v1/admin/users guarded by RequireAdmin
- Reuses validate_username / validate_password from api::auth (made
pub(crate)) so the admin path can never produce an account self-
register would reject and vice versa
- repo::user::admin_create_user wraps INSERT + admin_audit insert in
a single tx — same "audit reflects what committed" semantics as the
existing admin_safe_* fns
- Audit row: action="create_user", payload={username, is_admin}
Frontend:
- createAdminUser() in lib/api/admin.ts
- /admin/users grows a collapsible "Create user" form above the table
(username, password, "Make admin" checkbox). Errors surface inline;
the list reloads on success.
Backend tests: 7 new, including the headline
`create_user_works_even_when_self_register_disabled` that pins the
admin-create path is NOT gated by the public toggle.
Lets operators run a closed-membership deployment by setting
ALLOW_SELF_REGISTER=false (default true, so existing deploys are
unaffected). When off, POST /auth/register returns 403 forbidden. The
rate-limit token is consumed BEFORE the disabled check so the timing
doesn't distinguish enabled-but-rejected from disabled — closes the
toggle-state probe channel.
New public GET /auth/config returns { self_register_enabled: bool }
so the frontend can render its register affordances correctly
without conflating "disabled" with "rate-limited" (which a probe
attempt would).
Frontend: a lightweight reactive `authConfig` store loads the flag
once on root-layout mount (and again on /register direct navigation,
which bypasses the layout's onMount). Header hides the Register link
when the toggle is off; /register renders a "self-registration is
disabled — ask an administrator" notice instead of the form.
Admin-create endpoint that pairs with this toggle is intentionally
not in this PR — it lands as the next branch (feat/admin-user-create).
The toggle alone is independently useful for deployments that want
to lock down enrollment without yet wiring an admin UI.
Addresses the security-audit findings on top of the admin feature stack:
M1: /admin/mangas/:id/chapters now paginates (default limit 200, max 500).
A long-runner with thousands of chapters would otherwise produce a multi-MB
response with that many scalar subqueries per row — admin-only but a real
stall risk on one expand-click. Adds explicit pagination tests for the cap
and offset; frontend renders a "Showing first N of M" hint when the cap
clips the result.
L1: repo::user::set_is_admin renamed to set_is_admin_unchecked with a
doc-comment pointing at admin_safe_set_is_admin for production use. The
short name was a footgun — a future contributor reaching for it would
silently bypass self-protection, the last-admin invariant, and the audit
log. Used only by integration-test setup; production code goes through
the admin_safe_* paths.
CSRF posture: build_session_cookie carries a comment that the
SameSite=Lax default is the project's CSRF defense for state-changing
mutations and breaks the instant anyone adds a side-effecting GET under
/admin/*. Spells out what to do then (Strict + explicit token check).
Test counts: 43 backend admin tests + 12 vitest admin tests all green;
svelte-check 0/0 across 446 files.
Three features bundled into one release:
- rate-limit /auth/login, /register, /me/password (token bucket,
5 req/sec sustained with 10-request burst by default; 429 +
Retry-After header on hit; tracing::warn! per hit so operators
see attack patterns; AUTH_RATE_PER_SEC / AUTH_RATE_BURST env knobs)
- handle SIGTERM for graceful container stops (replaces bare
ctrl_c() with a select over ctrl_c + SignalKind::terminate() so
docker compose stop runs the daemon shutdown path instead of
letting Chromium leak past SIGKILL)
- clear session.user on 401 from any API call (setOn401Hook in
api/client.ts, registered from session.svelte.ts gated on
$app/environment::browser so the SSR bundle never installs it;
fixes "logged in but no bookmarks/collections" mid-session
expiry state)
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Five fixes bundled into one release:
- preserve user-attached tags across crawler upserts
(repo::crawler::sync_tags now scopes to added_by IS NULL; orphaned
attachments from deleted users are reaped as crawler-owned)
- gate manga PATCH and cover endpoints on uploaded_by (require_can_edit
in api::mangas; non-NULL uploaded_by must match the caller)
- equalise login response time across user-existence branches
(run argon2 against a OnceLock-cached dummy hash on the no-user
branch so timing doesn't leak username existence)
- crawler download defences (SSRF allowlist of host literals
including IPv4-mapped IPv6 ranges, 32 MiB streamed size cap,
reject non-whitelisted image types, three-way chapter-probe
classifier replaces the binary #avatar_menu check)
- tighten validation and clean up dead unload path
(attach_tag + create_token enforce 64-char caps; LocalStorage
rejects NUL bytes explicitly; reader flushFinalProgress drops
the always-405 sendBeacon path)
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Add a vertical-scroll continuous mode to the reader alongside the
existing single-page mode. A segmented toggle in the reader top bar
switches between them; in continuous mode a gap selector
(None/Small/Medium/Large → 0/12/32/64px) controls the spacing
between stacked pages. Settings page mirrors the same controls.
Backend: new user_preferences table (one row per user, lazily
inserted, ON DELETE CASCADE) and GET/PATCH /api/v1/auth/me/preferences
gated by the existing CurrentUser extractor. Allowed values are
enforced both by API validation and table-level CHECK constraints.
Eight integration tests cover defaults, persistence, partial
updates, validation errors, auth, per-user isolation, and cascade.
Frontend: a new preferences store mirrors the theme-store pattern
with a localStorage shadow so anonymous browsers get a consistent
experience and logged-in users don't flash defaults while the
server response is in flight. Server values that the frontend
doesn't recognize (forward-compat) are ignored rather than poisoning
the UI; non-401 PATCH errors revert the optimistic local update;
logout clears the shadow so user A's settings don't follow user B
on a shared browser.
In continuous mode native scrolling handles Space/PageDown/arrows;
Home/End remain wired and call scrollIntoView() so jumping to chapter
bounds stays one keystroke. Single-page mode (chevrons, arrow-key
pagination, next-page preload) is unchanged.
Versions bumped 0.13.0 → 0.14.0 in lockstep.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Adds the pre-1.0 password-change story flagged by the audit. Browser
users and bot owners both go through PATCH /api/v1/auth/me/password
with the current + new password in the body.
Implementation in `api::auth::change_password`:
- CurrentUser-gated: 401 if unauthenticated.
- Verifies current_password against the stored argon2 hash. Wrong
current → 401 unauthenticated, matching the login contract.
- new_password runs through the same `validate_password` used at
registration (≥8 chars). Weak → 400 invalid_input.
- On success, wraps the swap in a single transaction:
- UPDATE users.password_hash with a fresh argon2 hash.
- DELETE every session for this user (signs out other devices —
any cookie stolen before the change is dead now).
- INSERT a new session and mint a fresh cookie so the caller stays
logged in.
- 204 + Set-Cookie on success.
Bot tokens (api_tokens) are intentionally left alone. They're explicit
opt-in credentials that the user can already audit and revoke
individually via DELETE /auth/tokens/{id}; rotating them on every
password change would surprise CI scripts.
Repo refactor: `repo::session::create` accepts `impl PgExecutor<'_>`
(same pattern feat/uploads used for chapters), and a new
`session::delete_all_for_user` covers the "sign out everywhere"
write. The existing `delete_by_token_hash` (used by logout) is
unchanged.
Coverage in tests/api_auth.rs (4 cases):
- change_password_rotates_sessions_and_swaps_credentials — happy path
asserts the new cookie differs from the original, that both the
original cookie AND a second-device cookie become invalid, that the
new cookie keeps working, that login with the old password fails
(401) and login with the new password succeeds.
- change_password_rejects_wrong_current_with_401 — wrong current
password returns 401 unauthenticated.
- change_password_rejects_weak_new_password — new_password "short"
returns 400 invalid_input.
- change_password_requires_authentication — no cookie returns 401.
README updated with the new endpoint in the auth table.
Lockstep version bump to 0.10.0.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Adds the full auth flow. Reads stay public; writes (currently only POST
/api/v1/mangas) require a CurrentUser. Both browsers and bot scripts hit
the same endpoints — they just present credentials differently.
Migration 0002_auth.sql introduces users.password_hash, a sessions
table, and an api_tokens table. Sessions and api_tokens store only
sha256(raw_token) — the raw value lives in the cookie or the
Authorization header.
New endpoints under /api/v1/auth/:
- POST /register — argon2id hash, creates a session, sets cookie.
- POST /login — verifies, rotates to a fresh session (old ones expire
naturally so other devices stay signed in).
- POST /logout — deletes the server-side session row + clears the
cookie via Max-Age=0.
- GET /me — current user via the new CurrentUser extractor.
- POST /tokens — issue a bot bearer token; raw value returned exactly
once at creation.
- DELETE /tokens/{id} — owner-only: 404 if unknown, 403 if it exists
but belongs to another user, 204 on success.
The CurrentUser axum extractor resolves cookie first, then
Authorization: Bearer; failure → AppError::Unauthenticated (401). New
AppError variants Unauthenticated/Forbidden/Conflict carry the matching
envelope codes; the top-level match in `code()` stays exhaustive.
Backend integration coverage in tests/api_auth.rs: register sets a
HttpOnly SameSite=Lax cookie and never leaks password_hash; duplicate
username → 409; weak password → 400; login rotates the cookie; wrong
password / unknown user → 401; /me with vs without cookie; logout
invalidates the cookie; bot-token roundtrip via Bearer; user A cannot
delete user B's token (403); unknown delete → 404.
Frontend:
- lib/api/auth.ts — typed wrappers; me() returns null on 401.
- lib/session.svelte.ts — per-tab user state with a seq counter to
guard against an in-flight /me clobbering a fresh setUser.
- lib/api/client.ts — request<T> returns undefined for 204.
- routes/login + routes/register — forms with action="javascript:void(0)"
so the no-JS path is a no-op (avoids the hydration-race where a
pre-attach click would submit via the browser default).
- routes/+layout.svelte — session-aware nav: spinner → user + Logout,
or Login / Register.
- e2e/auth-flow.spec.ts — login flips the layout, logout flips back;
bad credentials surface the API error message.
Config grows AuthConfig (cookie_secure, cookie_domain, session_ttl_days)
and CORS_ALLOWED_ORIGINS. CORS middleware is mounted in app::build and
stays a no-op (same-origin) until origins are listed.
Lockstep version bump to 0.3.0.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
