Four high/medium findings from the audit, plus their tests:
1. **SSRF on admin-editable URLs.** `CrawlerSettings::start_url` and
`AnalysisSettings::endpoint` validated only with `Url::parse`. A
hostile or CSRF-able admin could repoint at `169.254.169.254`
(cloud metadata), `127.0.0.1:5432` (postgres), or any RFC1918 host
— and the vision worker bearer-attaches an env-managed API key to
every call. Extract `ensure_public_target` from `safety::is_safe_url`
(allowlist-free public-host check: scheme + private-IP literal +
localhost) and wire it into both fields. Docker DNS names
(`mangalord-vision`) keep passing because they're hostnames, not
IP literals. The analysis check is gated on `enabled=true` so the
dev-default `localhost:8000` stays usable until the worker is
actually turned on (toggling enabled=true later re-runs the gate).
2. **Admin CSRF fail-open default.** `ADMIN_ALLOWED_ORIGINS=` empty
silently skipped the entire CSRF check, so an operator forgetting
the env var shipped an unguarded admin surface. Cookie-auth POSTs
now fail-closed when the allowlist is empty AND when neither
`Origin` nor `Referer` accompanies the request. Two carve-outs:
`Authorization: Bearer …` callers bypass (bots can't be CSRF'd),
and requests with NO session cookie at all bypass to let the auth
extractor return a clean 401 instead of a confusing 403.
3. **Analysis HTTP clients didn't `.no_proxy()`.** The crawler client
already did. Ambient `HTTP_PROXY`/`HTTPS_PROXY` in container env
would exfiltrate page-image bytes + the bearer key through an
upstream proxy. Same for the readiness probe.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
New /admin/health rolls up signals already collected — disk/memory sensors,
dead-job + missing-cover backlogs, 24h crawl/analysis failure rates, metadata
cron freshness, and the live crawler session/browser flags — into a flat
checks list (ok/warn/critical) with an overall status and remediation links.
The overview gains a compact Health summary banner linking in.
GET /v1/admin/health evaluates the checks (DB sub-queries run concurrently via
try_join; all hit existing indexes). PUT /v1/admin/health/thresholds persists
the thresholds to app_settings (merged over compiled defaults, forward-compat
via serde(default)), validates ranges (400 on bad input), and audit-logs the
change in one transaction. New repo::crawler::last_metadata_tick_at getter and
a lightweight system::memory_percent_used (no CPU settle delay).
Pure status helpers (over_limit for gauges, exceeds for backlog counts so a
0-limit doesn't false-alarm at 0) are unit-tested; endpoint tests cover shape,
gating, persistence+audit, and validation.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
