Commit Graph

3 Commits

Author SHA1 Message Date
MechaCat02
b9dd75684e fix(correctness): pagination tiebreakers, dedup race, duration gating (0.87.6)
Three medium correctness fixes:

1. **Pagination ORDER BY missing tiebreakers** — four admin list queries
   sorted by a timestamp or `chapters.number` with no stable secondary
   sort. Add `id` tiebreakers across `repo::admin_view`,
   `repo::admin_audit`, `repo::bookmark`.

2. **`enqueue_pages` NOT EXISTS read-then-insert race** — concurrent
   admin clicks could land duplicate analyze_page jobs. Migration 0031
   adds a partial unique index mirroring 0014; query relies on
   `ON CONFLICT DO NOTHING`.

3. **`record_duration` overwrote a prior done row's duration on a
   non-terminal failed retry of a force-re-analyze.** Gate the call
   on "did this attempt actually write a row?".

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-06-22 21:34:39 +02:00
MechaCat02
31013cc893 feat(admin): audit-log viewer
Surface the admin_audit table (written by every mutating admin action but
previously unreadable) as a new /admin/audit tab. New repo::admin_audit::list
(LEFT JOIN users for the actor's username, filter by action/target_kind/actor/
since, at DESC via admin_audit_at_idx) behind GET /v1/admin/audit, mirroring the
crawler history endpoint's paged/clamped idiom.

Frontend: a self-contained AuditTable (target-kind + window + action filters,
expandable JSON payload, AbortController-cancelled fetches, loading/error/empty
states) and shared fmtAgo() in format.ts.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-06-19 11:26:09 +02:00
MechaCat02
0b2018ceca feat(api): admin user management endpoints with audit log (0.38.0)
Adds /api/v1/admin/users list / DELETE / PATCH guarded by RequireAdmin,
plus the audit-log substrate every future destructive admin endpoint
will reuse.

Safety properties:
- Cannot self-delete or self-demote (409 conflict, message calls out
  "yourself" so the UI can render an explanation).
- Cannot remove the last admin via either DELETE or demote. The check
  takes pg_advisory_xact_lock(ADMIN_INVARIANT_LOCK_KEY) and re-counts
  admins inside the same tx, closing the parallel-demote race that a
  bare "if count > 1" check would let through. The HTTP-serial path to
  this guard is structurally unreachable (the actor would have to be
  the lone admin demoting themselves, which the self-guard fires on
  first); the parallel race test exercises it via repo calls.

Audit log (admin_audit table) records the action inside the same tx
as the action itself, so a rolled-back action never leaves an orphan
audit row. actor_user_id is ON DELETE SET NULL so the log outlives a
later-deleted admin. target_id is not a FK because future audit kinds
will target non-user rows.
2026-05-30 21:35:35 +02:00