Pairs with the ALLOW_SELF_REGISTER toggle from 0.42.0: admins can mint
accounts regardless of the toggle state, so a closed-membership
deployment still has a working enrollment path. The endpoint accepts
{ username, password, is_admin? } so admins can mint co-admins in one
call (avoiding a separate promote + extra audit row for the common
"invite a co-admin" flow).
Implementation:
- POST /api/v1/admin/users guarded by RequireAdmin
- Reuses validate_username / validate_password from api::auth (made
pub(crate)) so the admin path can never produce an account self-
register would reject and vice versa
- repo::user::admin_create_user wraps INSERT + admin_audit insert in
a single tx — same "audit reflects what committed" semantics as the
existing admin_safe_* fns
- Audit row: action="create_user", payload={username, is_admin}
Frontend:
- createAdminUser() in lib/api/admin.ts
- /admin/users grows a collapsible "Create user" form above the table
(username, password, "Make admin" checkbox). Errors surface inline;
the list reloads on success.
Backend tests: 7 new, including the headline
`create_user_works_even_when_self_register_disabled` that pins the
admin-create path is NOT gated by the public toggle.
Addresses the security-audit findings on top of the admin feature stack:
M1: /admin/mangas/:id/chapters now paginates (default limit 200, max 500).
A long-runner with thousands of chapters would otherwise produce a multi-MB
response with that many scalar subqueries per row — admin-only but a real
stall risk on one expand-click. Adds explicit pagination tests for the cap
and offset; frontend renders a "Showing first N of M" hint when the cap
clips the result.
L1: repo::user::set_is_admin renamed to set_is_admin_unchecked with a
doc-comment pointing at admin_safe_set_is_admin for production use. The
short name was a footgun — a future contributor reaching for it would
silently bypass self-protection, the last-admin invariant, and the audit
log. Used only by integration-test setup; production code goes through
the admin_safe_* paths.
CSRF posture: build_session_cookie carries a comment that the
SameSite=Lax default is the project's CSRF defense for state-changing
mutations and breaks the instant anyone adds a side-effecting GET under
/admin/*. Spells out what to do then (Strict + explicit token check).
Test counts: 43 backend admin tests + 12 vitest admin tests all green;
svelte-check 0/0 across 446 files.
- admin_safe_set_is_admin: short-circuit when target.is_admin == value,
before writing audit. PATCH {is_admin: true} on someone already admin
previously wrote a misleading "promote_user" row even though the UPDATE
was a no-op.
- list_chapters (/admin/mangas/:id/chapters): explicit exists() check on
manga_id, returns 404 instead of 200 [] for a typo'd / deleted manga.
- ChapterSyncState priority: the Failed branch now requires page_count = 0,
so a chapter with pages on disk AND a historical dead job (from a
re-download attempt that crashed) stays Synced. The old order
contradicted Synced's documented "downloaded at some point" contract.
Doc comments updated alongside the SQL.
Three new regression tests pin the behaviour.
Adds /api/v1/admin/users list / DELETE / PATCH guarded by RequireAdmin,
plus the audit-log substrate every future destructive admin endpoint
will reuse.
Safety properties:
- Cannot self-delete or self-demote (409 conflict, message calls out
"yourself" so the UI can render an explanation).
- Cannot remove the last admin via either DELETE or demote. The check
takes pg_advisory_xact_lock(ADMIN_INVARIANT_LOCK_KEY) and re-counts
admins inside the same tx, closing the parallel-demote race that a
bare "if count > 1" check would let through. The HTTP-serial path to
this guard is structurally unreachable (the actor would have to be
the lone admin demoting themselves, which the self-guard fires on
first); the parallel race test exercises it via repo calls.
Audit log (admin_audit table) records the action inside the same tx
as the action itself, so a rolled-back action never leaves an orphan
audit row. actor_user_id is ON DELETE SET NULL so the log outlives a
later-deleted admin. target_id is not a FK because future audit kinds
will target non-user rows.
