Argon2id hashing (~15-50ms, 19 MiB) ran synchronously inside async
handlers, stalling every task sharing those runtime worker threads under
concurrent auth load. Add spawn_blocking wrappers hash_password_async /
verify_password_async and switch all async call sites; sync primitives
stay for the login timing-equaliser and unit tests. Bump to 0.124.1.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Pairs with the ALLOW_SELF_REGISTER toggle from 0.42.0: admins can mint
accounts regardless of the toggle state, so a closed-membership
deployment still has a working enrollment path. The endpoint accepts
{ username, password, is_admin? } so admins can mint co-admins in one
call (avoiding a separate promote + extra audit row for the common
"invite a co-admin" flow).
Implementation:
- POST /api/v1/admin/users guarded by RequireAdmin
- Reuses validate_username / validate_password from api::auth (made
pub(crate)) so the admin path can never produce an account self-
register would reject and vice versa
- repo::user::admin_create_user wraps INSERT + admin_audit insert in
a single tx — same "audit reflects what committed" semantics as the
existing admin_safe_* fns
- Audit row: action="create_user", payload={username, is_admin}
Frontend:
- createAdminUser() in lib/api/admin.ts
- /admin/users grows a collapsible "Create user" form above the table
(username, password, "Make admin" checkbox). Errors surface inline;
the list reloads on success.
Backend tests: 7 new, including the headline
`create_user_works_even_when_self_register_disabled` that pins the
admin-create path is NOT gated by the public toggle.
Adds /api/v1/admin/users list / DELETE / PATCH guarded by RequireAdmin,
plus the audit-log substrate every future destructive admin endpoint
will reuse.
Safety properties:
- Cannot self-delete or self-demote (409 conflict, message calls out
"yourself" so the UI can render an explanation).
- Cannot remove the last admin via either DELETE or demote. The check
takes pg_advisory_xact_lock(ADMIN_INVARIANT_LOCK_KEY) and re-counts
admins inside the same tx, closing the parallel-demote race that a
bare "if count > 1" check would let through. The HTTP-serial path to
this guard is structurally unreachable (the actor would have to be
the lone admin demoting themselves, which the self-guard fires on
first); the parallel race test exercises it via repo calls.
Audit log (admin_audit table) records the action inside the same tx
as the action itself, so a rolled-back action never leaves an orphan
audit row. actor_user_id is ON DELETE SET NULL so the log outlives a
later-deleted admin. target_id is not a FK because future audit kinds
will target non-user rows.
