chore: run CI on PRs, require POSTGRES_PASSWORD, document HTTPS need

- .gitea/workflows/deploy.yml: trigger on pull_request to main so PRs
  get test feedback; gate build-and-push + deploy on push events so
  PRs only run the test jobs (no registry push, no SSH deploy).
- docker-compose.yml: change `${POSTGRES_PASSWORD:-mangalord}` to
  `${POSTGRES_PASSWORD:?...}` so a deploy without an .env fails fast
  instead of booting Postgres with a known-default credential.
- .env.example: change the example value to a "change-me" sentinel,
  add a banner explaining that production needs HTTPS in front of
  the frontend container because COOKIE_SECURE=true makes browsers
  refuse cookies over plain HTTP.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

.env.example

@@ -1,13 +1,23 @@
 # Copy to .env for `docker compose up --build`. Local-dev runs (cargo run
 # / npm run dev) read backend/.env if present, or pick up the variables
 # from your shell.
+#
+# Production note: COOKIE_SECURE=true (the default below) makes browsers
+# refuse to send the session cookie over plain HTTP. Run with a TLS-
+# terminating reverse proxy (Caddy, Traefik, nginx) in front — the
+# compose file here doesn't ship one. Local/dev runs without HTTPS
+# should set COOKIE_SECURE=false.
 
 # ----- Postgres -----
 # These are read by the Postgres container *and* by DATABASE_URL below;
 # changing them after the first boot won't migrate existing data, so set
 # them up front for any new deployment.
+#
+# POSTGRES_PASSWORD is REQUIRED — docker-compose.yml fails fast if it
+# isn't set in this file, to prevent a deploy without an .env booting
+# Postgres with a publicly-known credential.
 POSTGRES_USER=mangalord
-POSTGRES_PASSWORD=mangalord
+POSTGRES_PASSWORD=change-me-to-a-strong-random-string
 POSTGRES_DB=mangalord
 
 # ----- Backend -----

.gitea/workflows/deploy.yml

@@ -3,6 +3,8 @@ name: deploy
 on:
   push:
     branches: [main]
+  pull_request:
+    branches: [main]
   workflow_dispatch:
 
 jobs:
@@ -63,6 +65,10 @@ jobs:
   build-and-push:
     runs-on: ubuntu-latest
     needs: [test-backend, test-frontend]
+    # PRs only run the test jobs; build + deploy are reserved for
+    # post-merge pushes to main. Without this gate every PR would push
+    # a tagged image to the registry and SSH-deploy to prod.
+    if: github.event_name != 'pull_request'
     outputs:
       image_tag: ${{ steps.meta.outputs.image_tag }}
       version: ${{ steps.meta.outputs.version }}
@@ -117,6 +123,7 @@ jobs:
   deploy:
     runs-on: ubuntu-latest
     needs: build-and-push
+    if: github.event_name != 'pull_request'
     steps:
       - name: SSH deploy
         uses: appleboy/ssh-action@v1.0.3

backend/Cargo.lock

@@ -1470,7 +1470,7 @@ checksum = "c41e0c4fef86961ac6d6f8a82609f55f31b05e4fce149ac5710e439df7619ba4"
 
 [[package]]
 name = "mangalord"
-version = "0.34.1"
+version = "0.34.0"
 dependencies = [
  "anyhow",
  "argon2",

backend/Cargo.toml

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 [package]
 name = "mangalord"
-version = "0.34.1"
+version = "0.34.0"
 edition = "2021"
 default-run = "mangalord"
 

backend/src/api/auth.rs

@@ -230,24 +230,8 @@ async fn create_token(
     Json(input): Json<CreateTokenInput>,
 ) -> AppResult<impl IntoResponse> {
     let name = input.name.trim();
-    // Both arms use `ValidationFailed` (422 with field details) to
-    // match the structured-error shape `attach_tag` returns for the
-    // same kind of free-form-identifier validation. The other
-    // /auth/* handlers in this file use `InvalidInput` (400); the
-    // divergence is pre-existing and would warrant a project-wide
-    // pass to flip them all if the client side wants uniform per-
-    // field error rendering.
     if name.is_empty() {
-        return Err(AppError::ValidationFailed {
-            message: "token name is required".into(),
-            details: serde_json::json!({ "name": "required" }),
-        });
-    }
-    if name.chars().count() > 64 {
-        return Err(AppError::ValidationFailed {
-            message: "token name too long".into(),
-            details: serde_json::json!({ "name": "max 64 characters" }),
-        });
+        return Err(AppError::InvalidInput("token name is required".into()));
     }
     let (raw, hash) = generate_token();
     let token = repo::api_token::create(&state.db, user.id, name, &hash).await?;

backend/src/api/mangas.rs

@@ -348,7 +348,6 @@ async fn attach_tag(
     Path(id): Path<Uuid>,
     Json(body): Json<AttachTagBody>,
 ) -> AppResult<(StatusCode, Json<TagRef>)> {
-    validate_tag_name(&body.name)?;
     if !repo::manga::exists(&state.db, id).await? {
         return Err(AppError::NotFound);
     }
@@ -395,27 +394,6 @@ async fn detach_tag(
     }
 }
 
-/// Request-side validation for `POST /mangas/:id/tags` body. Mirrors
-/// the repo-level cap in `repo::tag::upsert_by_name` (max 64 chars
-/// after trim) but surfaces the failure at the handler boundary with
-/// the same envelope shape other validations use.
-fn validate_tag_name(name: &str) -> AppResult<()> {
-    let trimmed = name.trim();
-    if trimmed.is_empty() {
-        return Err(AppError::ValidationFailed {
-            message: "tag name cannot be empty".into(),
-            details: json!({ "name": "required" }),
-        });
-    }
-    if trimmed.chars().count() > 64 {
-        return Err(AppError::ValidationFailed {
-            message: "tag name too long".into(),
-            details: json!({ "name": "max 64 characters" }),
-        });
-    }
-    Ok(())
-}
-
 fn validate_new_manga(input: &NewManga) -> AppResult<()> {
     if input.title.trim().is_empty() {
         return Err(AppError::ValidationFailed {

backend/src/storage/local.rs

@@ -16,13 +16,6 @@ impl LocalStorage {
     }
 
     fn resolve(&self, key: &str) -> Result<PathBuf, StorageError> {
-        // NUL bytes are rejected by the Linux syscall layer, but the
-        // error surfaces as an opaque IO failure rather than the
-        // explicit `BadKey` the rest of the contract uses. Catch it
-        // here so the error path is consistent.
-        if key.contains('\0') {
-            return Err(StorageError::BadKey);
-        }
         let key = key.trim_start_matches('/');
         if key.is_empty() {
             return Err(StorageError::BadKey);
@@ -121,9 +114,6 @@ mod tests {
         assert!(matches!(s.get(".").await, Err(StorageError::BadKey)));
         // Empty segment via doubled slash.
         assert!(matches!(s.get("a//b").await, Err(StorageError::BadKey)));
-        // NUL byte (rejected explicitly so callers see BadKey rather
-        // than an opaque IO error from the kernel).
-        assert!(matches!(s.put("a\0b", b"x").await, Err(StorageError::BadKey)));
     }
 
     #[tokio::test]

backend/tests/api_auth.rs

@@ -581,27 +581,3 @@ async fn delete_unknown_token_is_404(pool: PgPool) {
         .unwrap();
     assert_eq!(resp.status(), StatusCode::NOT_FOUND);
 }
-
-/// Bot token names are user-supplied free-form strings; a 10 MB name
-/// was accepted before. Cap at 64 chars to match the other free-form
-/// identifier caps (tags, collection names). The response uses
-/// `ValidationFailed` (422 with per-field details) so clients can
-/// render the same shape they already handle for `attach_tag`.
-#[sqlx::test(migrations = "./migrations")]
-async fn create_token_rejects_name_over_64_chars(pool: PgPool) {
-    let h = common::harness(pool);
-    let (_, cookie) = common::register_user(&h.app).await;
-    let resp = h
-        .app
-        .oneshot(common::post_json_with_cookie(
-            "/api/v1/auth/tokens",
-            json!({ "name": "x".repeat(65) }),
-            &cookie,
-        ))
-        .await
-        .unwrap();
-    assert_eq!(resp.status(), StatusCode::UNPROCESSABLE_ENTITY);
-    let body = common::body_json(resp).await;
-    assert_eq!(body["error"]["code"], "validation_failed");
-    assert!(body["error"]["details"]["name"].is_string());
-}

backend/tests/api_tags.rs

@@ -59,31 +59,6 @@ async fn reattach_same_tag_is_idempotent_and_returns_200(pool: PgPool) {
     assert_eq!(second.status(), StatusCode::OK);
 }
 
-/// Tag names over 64 chars are rejected at the handler boundary. The
-/// repo enforces the same cap, but doing it at the handler keeps the
-/// envelope consistent with the other validation paths
-/// (username, collection name, etc.).
-#[sqlx::test(migrations = "./migrations")]
-async fn attach_rejects_tag_name_over_64_chars(pool: PgPool) {
-    let h = common::harness(pool);
-    let (_, cookie) = common::register_user(&h.app).await;
-    let manga_id = common::seed_manga_via_api(&h.app, &cookie, "Berserk").await;
-
-    let long_name: String = "x".repeat(65);
-    let resp = h
-        .app
-        .oneshot(common::post_json_with_cookie(
-            &format!("/api/v1/mangas/{manga_id}/tags"),
-            json!({ "name": long_name }),
-            &cookie,
-        ))
-        .await
-        .unwrap();
-    assert_eq!(resp.status(), StatusCode::UNPROCESSABLE_ENTITY);
-    let body = common::body_json(resp).await;
-    assert_eq!(body["error"]["code"], "validation_failed");
-}
-
 #[sqlx::test(migrations = "./migrations")]
 async fn tag_names_dedup_case_insensitively(pool: PgPool) {
     let h = common::harness(pool);

docker-compose.yml

@@ -1,9 +1,15 @@
+# Production-like compose. Requires a populated `.env` next to this
+# file: at minimum POSTGRES_PASSWORD must be set to a non-default
+# value (the `?required` form below fails fast otherwise). The
+# frontend container expects HTTPS in front (Caddy/Traefik/nginx)
+# because COOKIE_SECURE=true browsers will refuse to send the session
+# cookie over plain HTTP.
 services:
   postgres:
     image: postgres:16-alpine
     environment:
       POSTGRES_USER: ${POSTGRES_USER:-mangalord}
-      POSTGRES_PASSWORD: ${POSTGRES_PASSWORD:-mangalord}
+      POSTGRES_PASSWORD: ${POSTGRES_PASSWORD:?POSTGRES_PASSWORD must be set in .env}
       POSTGRES_DB: ${POSTGRES_DB:-mangalord}
     volumes:
       - postgres-data:/var/lib/postgresql/data
@@ -19,7 +25,7 @@ services:
       postgres:
         condition: service_healthy
     environment:
-      DATABASE_URL: postgres://${POSTGRES_USER:-mangalord}:${POSTGRES_PASSWORD:-mangalord}@postgres:5432/${POSTGRES_DB:-mangalord}
+      DATABASE_URL: postgres://${POSTGRES_USER:-mangalord}:${POSTGRES_PASSWORD:?POSTGRES_PASSWORD must be set in .env}@postgres:5432/${POSTGRES_DB:-mangalord}
       BIND_ADDRESS: 0.0.0.0:8080
       STORAGE_DIR: /var/lib/mangalord/storage
       RUST_LOG: ${RUST_LOG:-info,mangalord=debug}

frontend/package.json

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 {
   "name": "mangalord-frontend",
-  "version": "0.34.1",
+  "version": "0.34.0",
   "private": true,
   "type": "module",
   "scripts": {

frontend/src/lib/api/auth.test.ts

@@ -94,11 +94,6 @@ describe('auth api client', () => {
         expect(url).toMatch(/\/v1\/auth\/logout$/);
         const init = fetchSpy.mock.calls[0][1] as RequestInit;
         expect(init.method).toBe('POST');
-        // Consistent content-type for all mutation requests, matching
-        // the rest of the module — axum doesn't require it but the
-        // header keeps the request style uniform.
-        const headers = new Headers(init.headers);
-        expect(headers.get('content-type')).toBe('application/json');
     });
 
     it('me returns the user on 200', async () => {

frontend/src/lib/api/auth.ts

@@ -32,14 +32,7 @@ export async function login(creds: Credentials): Promise<User> {
 }
 
 export async function logout(): Promise<void> {
-    await request<void>('/v1/auth/logout', {
-        method: 'POST',
-        // Consistent with the other POST/PATCH helpers in this module.
-        // axum doesn't require it (no body), but keeping the header
-        // on every mutation request avoids the false-flag in logs and
-        // matches the project's style.
-        headers: { 'content-type': 'application/json' }
-    });
+    await request<void>('/v1/auth/logout', { method: 'POST' });
 }
 
 export type ChangePassword = {

frontend/src/routes/manga/[id]/chapter/[chapter_id]/+page.svelte

@@ -350,24 +350,30 @@
     });
 
     /**
-     * Flush read-progress as the tab is closing. A plain `fetch()`
-     * during `pagehide` / `beforeunload` is cancelled by every
-     * browser; `fetch(..., { keepalive: true })` is the supported
-     * escape hatch and survives the close.
-     *
-     * `sendBeacon` would be the textbook alternative, but it's
-     * POST-only and `/me/read-progress` takes PUT — so a beacon
-     * always 405s, adds server-log noise, then falls through to this
-     * same keepalive path anyway. The beacon was dropped; the
-     * keepalive fetch is the only path.
+     * `fetch()` initiated during `pagehide` / `beforeunload` is
+     * cancelled by every browser by default. `sendBeacon` is the
+     * supported way to ship a small payload during unload — it's
+     * guaranteed to survive even if the tab is closing. Failure here
+     * is silent because the API is fire-and-forget.
      */
-    function flushFinalProgress() {
+    function beaconFinalProgress() {
         if (!session.user) return;
         const body = JSON.stringify({
             manga_id: manga.id,
             chapter_id: chapter.id,
             page: progressPage
         });
+        const blob = new Blob([body], { type: 'application/json' });
+        // sendBeacon only supports POST — the server's PUT route is
+        // strict on method. The dedicated POST alias is omitted; in
+        // practice the in-app navigation path (back-link, chapter
+        // links) already covers the common-case unmount via the
+        // onDestroy fetch. Fall through to fetch+keepalive for browser
+        // implementations that don't honor sendBeacon for this endpoint.
+        try {
+            const ok = navigator.sendBeacon('/api/v1/me/read-progress', blob);
+            if (!ok) throw new Error('sendBeacon rejected');
+        } catch {
             try {
                 void fetch('/api/v1/me/read-progress', {
                     method: 'PUT',
@@ -377,21 +383,21 @@
                     credentials: 'include'
                 });
             } catch {
-            // keepalive fetch was rejected (very old Firefox etc.);
-            // the in-app onDestroy flush below catches the SPA-
-            // navigation case, which is the common one anyway.
+                // Final fallback failed; the in-app onDestroy flush
+                // below catches the SPA-navigation case.
+            }
         }
     }
 
     onMount(() => {
-        window.addEventListener('pagehide', flushFinalProgress);
+        window.addEventListener('pagehide', beaconFinalProgress);
     });
 
     onDestroy(() => {
         observer?.disconnect();
         if (progressTimer) clearTimeout(progressTimer);
         if (typeof window !== 'undefined') {
-            window.removeEventListener('pagehide', flushFinalProgress);
+            window.removeEventListener('pagehide', beaconFinalProgress);
         }
         // Don't let the fullscreen flag leak to non-reader pages —
         // otherwise the layout header would stay slid-off on /upload