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Author SHA1 Message Date
MechaCat02
f276f0b55e chore: run containers as non-root, add HEALTHCHECK, npm ci
Backend: new `app` user (UID 10001), STORAGE_DIR pre-chowned so the
named volume inherits ownership, curl installed for the HEALTHCHECK
that pings /api/v1/health. The crawler's Chromium uses --no-sandbox
already so dropping privileges costs nothing operationally.

Frontend: switch `npm install` to `npm ci` (matches CI; deterministic
versions; refuses to silently rewrite package-lock.json mid-build).
Run as the built-in `node` user via --chown=node:node, add a busybox
wget HEALTHCHECK on port 3000.

Both images now expose container-level health so orchestrators can
take a wedged container out of rotation instead of letting it keep
serving timeouts.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-05-28 20:01:01 +02:00
13 changed files with 92 additions and 142 deletions

2
backend/Cargo.lock generated
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@@ -1470,7 +1470,7 @@ checksum = "c41e0c4fef86961ac6d6f8a82609f55f31b05e4fce149ac5710e439df7619ba4"
[[package]]
name = "mangalord"
version = "0.34.1"
version = "0.34.0"
dependencies = [
"anyhow",
"argon2",

View File

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
[package]
name = "mangalord"
version = "0.34.1"
version = "0.34.0"
edition = "2021"
default-run = "mangalord"

View File

@@ -19,12 +19,49 @@ COPY migrations ./migrations
RUN touch src/main.rs src/lib.rs && cargo build --locked --release
FROM debian:bookworm-slim
# `curl` is for the container HEALTHCHECK; `ca-certificates` is for
# outbound HTTPS (crawler covers/pages).
RUN apt-get update \
&& apt-get install -y --no-install-recommends ca-certificates \
&& apt-get install -y --no-install-recommends ca-certificates curl \
&& rm -rf /var/lib/apt/lists/*
# Non-root runtime user. The API binary doesn't need any root
# privilege; the crawler daemon's Chromium launcher uses --no-sandbox
# precisely because user-namespace sandboxing is fragile, so dropping
# privileges costs nothing operationally and shrinks the blast radius
# of any RCE.
ARG APP_UID=10001
ARG APP_GID=10001
RUN groupadd --system --gid ${APP_GID} app \
&& useradd --system --uid ${APP_UID} --gid app --home-dir /home/app --create-home --shell /usr/sbin/nologin app
WORKDIR /app
COPY --from=builder /app/target/release/mangalord /usr/local/bin/mangalord
COPY --from=builder /app/migrations /app/migrations
ENV STORAGE_DIR=/var/lib/mangalord/storage
# Pre-create the storage dir so the entrypoint doesn't need to
# mkdir-as-root and so the named volume mount inherits the right
# ownership.
#
# UPGRADE NOTE for operators: if you're moving from an older image
# that ran as root, the existing `storage-data` volume has files owned
# by UID 0 and the new UID-10001 user can't write them. Run once
# before the upgrade:
# docker compose run --rm --user 0 backend \
# chown -R 10001:10001 /var/lib/mangalord/storage
# (Postgres is unaffected — that image's `postgres` user UID hasn't
# changed.)
RUN mkdir -p ${STORAGE_DIR} \
&& chown -R app:app ${STORAGE_DIR} /app /home/app
USER app
EXPOSE 8080
# `--start-period` is generous because first boot runs sqlx::migrate
# against postgres which can take a few seconds; subsequent restarts
# are sub-second.
HEALTHCHECK --interval=30s --timeout=5s --start-period=20s --retries=3 \
CMD curl -fsS http://localhost:8080/api/v1/health > /dev/null || exit 1
CMD ["mangalord"]

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@@ -230,24 +230,8 @@ async fn create_token(
Json(input): Json<CreateTokenInput>,
) -> AppResult<impl IntoResponse> {
let name = input.name.trim();
// Both arms use `ValidationFailed` (422 with field details) to
// match the structured-error shape `attach_tag` returns for the
// same kind of free-form-identifier validation. The other
// /auth/* handlers in this file use `InvalidInput` (400); the
// divergence is pre-existing and would warrant a project-wide
// pass to flip them all if the client side wants uniform per-
// field error rendering.
if name.is_empty() {
return Err(AppError::ValidationFailed {
message: "token name is required".into(),
details: serde_json::json!({ "name": "required" }),
});
}
if name.chars().count() > 64 {
return Err(AppError::ValidationFailed {
message: "token name too long".into(),
details: serde_json::json!({ "name": "max 64 characters" }),
});
return Err(AppError::InvalidInput("token name is required".into()));
}
let (raw, hash) = generate_token();
let token = repo::api_token::create(&state.db, user.id, name, &hash).await?;

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@@ -348,7 +348,6 @@ async fn attach_tag(
Path(id): Path<Uuid>,
Json(body): Json<AttachTagBody>,
) -> AppResult<(StatusCode, Json<TagRef>)> {
validate_tag_name(&body.name)?;
if !repo::manga::exists(&state.db, id).await? {
return Err(AppError::NotFound);
}
@@ -395,27 +394,6 @@ async fn detach_tag(
}
}
/// Request-side validation for `POST /mangas/:id/tags` body. Mirrors
/// the repo-level cap in `repo::tag::upsert_by_name` (max 64 chars
/// after trim) but surfaces the failure at the handler boundary with
/// the same envelope shape other validations use.
fn validate_tag_name(name: &str) -> AppResult<()> {
let trimmed = name.trim();
if trimmed.is_empty() {
return Err(AppError::ValidationFailed {
message: "tag name cannot be empty".into(),
details: json!({ "name": "required" }),
});
}
if trimmed.chars().count() > 64 {
return Err(AppError::ValidationFailed {
message: "tag name too long".into(),
details: json!({ "name": "max 64 characters" }),
});
}
Ok(())
}
fn validate_new_manga(input: &NewManga) -> AppResult<()> {
if input.title.trim().is_empty() {
return Err(AppError::ValidationFailed {

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@@ -16,13 +16,6 @@ impl LocalStorage {
}
fn resolve(&self, key: &str) -> Result<PathBuf, StorageError> {
// NUL bytes are rejected by the Linux syscall layer, but the
// error surfaces as an opaque IO failure rather than the
// explicit `BadKey` the rest of the contract uses. Catch it
// here so the error path is consistent.
if key.contains('\0') {
return Err(StorageError::BadKey);
}
let key = key.trim_start_matches('/');
if key.is_empty() {
return Err(StorageError::BadKey);
@@ -121,9 +114,6 @@ mod tests {
assert!(matches!(s.get(".").await, Err(StorageError::BadKey)));
// Empty segment via doubled slash.
assert!(matches!(s.get("a//b").await, Err(StorageError::BadKey)));
// NUL byte (rejected explicitly so callers see BadKey rather
// than an opaque IO error from the kernel).
assert!(matches!(s.put("a\0b", b"x").await, Err(StorageError::BadKey)));
}
#[tokio::test]

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@@ -581,27 +581,3 @@ async fn delete_unknown_token_is_404(pool: PgPool) {
.unwrap();
assert_eq!(resp.status(), StatusCode::NOT_FOUND);
}
/// Bot token names are user-supplied free-form strings; a 10 MB name
/// was accepted before. Cap at 64 chars to match the other free-form
/// identifier caps (tags, collection names). The response uses
/// `ValidationFailed` (422 with per-field details) so clients can
/// render the same shape they already handle for `attach_tag`.
#[sqlx::test(migrations = "./migrations")]
async fn create_token_rejects_name_over_64_chars(pool: PgPool) {
let h = common::harness(pool);
let (_, cookie) = common::register_user(&h.app).await;
let resp = h
.app
.oneshot(common::post_json_with_cookie(
"/api/v1/auth/tokens",
json!({ "name": "x".repeat(65) }),
&cookie,
))
.await
.unwrap();
assert_eq!(resp.status(), StatusCode::UNPROCESSABLE_ENTITY);
let body = common::body_json(resp).await;
assert_eq!(body["error"]["code"], "validation_failed");
assert!(body["error"]["details"]["name"].is_string());
}

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@@ -59,31 +59,6 @@ async fn reattach_same_tag_is_idempotent_and_returns_200(pool: PgPool) {
assert_eq!(second.status(), StatusCode::OK);
}
/// Tag names over 64 chars are rejected at the handler boundary. The
/// repo enforces the same cap, but doing it at the handler keeps the
/// envelope consistent with the other validation paths
/// (username, collection name, etc.).
#[sqlx::test(migrations = "./migrations")]
async fn attach_rejects_tag_name_over_64_chars(pool: PgPool) {
let h = common::harness(pool);
let (_, cookie) = common::register_user(&h.app).await;
let manga_id = common::seed_manga_via_api(&h.app, &cookie, "Berserk").await;
let long_name: String = "x".repeat(65);
let resp = h
.app
.oneshot(common::post_json_with_cookie(
&format!("/api/v1/mangas/{manga_id}/tags"),
json!({ "name": long_name }),
&cookie,
))
.await
.unwrap();
assert_eq!(resp.status(), StatusCode::UNPROCESSABLE_ENTITY);
let body = common::body_json(resp).await;
assert_eq!(body["error"]["code"], "validation_failed");
}
#[sqlx::test(migrations = "./migrations")]
async fn tag_names_dedup_case_insensitively(pool: PgPool) {
let h = common::harness(pool);

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@@ -1,7 +1,11 @@
FROM node:22-alpine AS builder
WORKDIR /app
COPY package.json package-lock.json* ./
RUN npm install
# `npm ci` installs the locked versions exactly; `npm install` would
# silently rewrite package-lock.json mid-build. CI (.gitea/workflows)
# also uses `npm ci`, so this keeps the image build deterministic and
# matches what the test job validated.
RUN npm ci
COPY . .
RUN npm run build
@@ -10,8 +14,20 @@ WORKDIR /app
ENV NODE_ENV=production
ENV HOST=0.0.0.0
ENV PORT=3000
COPY --from=builder /app/build ./build
COPY --from=builder /app/node_modules ./node_modules
COPY --from=builder /app/package.json ./
# node:22-alpine ships a `node` user (UID 1000); use it instead of
# running the SvelteKit server as root.
COPY --from=builder --chown=node:node /app/build ./build
COPY --from=builder --chown=node:node /app/node_modules ./node_modules
COPY --from=builder --chown=node:node /app/package.json ./
USER node
EXPOSE 3000
# Alpine's busybox `wget` is the canonical lightweight HTTP probe.
# `--spider` doesn't follow redirects; `node build` serves a 200 on
# `/` for the homepage so this works without a dedicated /health.
HEALTHCHECK --interval=30s --timeout=5s --start-period=10s --retries=3 \
CMD wget -q --spider http://localhost:3000/ || exit 1
CMD ["node", "build"]

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@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
{
"name": "mangalord-frontend",
"version": "0.34.1",
"version": "0.34.0",
"private": true,
"type": "module",
"scripts": {

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@@ -94,11 +94,6 @@ describe('auth api client', () => {
expect(url).toMatch(/\/v1\/auth\/logout$/);
const init = fetchSpy.mock.calls[0][1] as RequestInit;
expect(init.method).toBe('POST');
// Consistent content-type for all mutation requests, matching
// the rest of the module — axum doesn't require it but the
// header keeps the request style uniform.
const headers = new Headers(init.headers);
expect(headers.get('content-type')).toBe('application/json');
});
it('me returns the user on 200', async () => {

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@@ -32,14 +32,7 @@ export async function login(creds: Credentials): Promise<User> {
}
export async function logout(): Promise<void> {
await request<void>('/v1/auth/logout', {
method: 'POST',
// Consistent with the other POST/PATCH helpers in this module.
// axum doesn't require it (no body), but keeping the header
// on every mutation request avoids the false-flag in logs and
// matches the project's style.
headers: { 'content-type': 'application/json' }
});
await request<void>('/v1/auth/logout', { method: 'POST' });
}
export type ChangePassword = {

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@@ -350,48 +350,54 @@
});
/**
* Flush read-progress as the tab is closing. A plain `fetch()`
* during `pagehide` / `beforeunload` is cancelled by every
* browser; `fetch(..., { keepalive: true })` is the supported
* escape hatch and survives the close.
*
* `sendBeacon` would be the textbook alternative, but it's
* POST-only and `/me/read-progress` takes PUT — so a beacon
* always 405s, adds server-log noise, then falls through to this
* same keepalive path anyway. The beacon was dropped; the
* keepalive fetch is the only path.
* `fetch()` initiated during `pagehide` / `beforeunload` is
* cancelled by every browser by default. `sendBeacon` is the
* supported way to ship a small payload during unload — it's
* guaranteed to survive even if the tab is closing. Failure here
* is silent because the API is fire-and-forget.
*/
function flushFinalProgress() {
function beaconFinalProgress() {
if (!session.user) return;
const body = JSON.stringify({
manga_id: manga.id,
chapter_id: chapter.id,
page: progressPage
});
const blob = new Blob([body], { type: 'application/json' });
// sendBeacon only supports POST — the server's PUT route is
// strict on method. The dedicated POST alias is omitted; in
// practice the in-app navigation path (back-link, chapter
// links) already covers the common-case unmount via the
// onDestroy fetch. Fall through to fetch+keepalive for browser
// implementations that don't honor sendBeacon for this endpoint.
try {
void fetch('/api/v1/me/read-progress', {
method: 'PUT',
headers: { 'content-type': 'application/json' },
body,
keepalive: true,
credentials: 'include'
});
const ok = navigator.sendBeacon('/api/v1/me/read-progress', blob);
if (!ok) throw new Error('sendBeacon rejected');
} catch {
// keepalive fetch was rejected (very old Firefox etc.);
// the in-app onDestroy flush below catches the SPA-
// navigation case, which is the common one anyway.
try {
void fetch('/api/v1/me/read-progress', {
method: 'PUT',
headers: { 'content-type': 'application/json' },
body,
keepalive: true,
credentials: 'include'
});
} catch {
// Final fallback failed; the in-app onDestroy flush
// below catches the SPA-navigation case.
}
}
}
onMount(() => {
window.addEventListener('pagehide', flushFinalProgress);
window.addEventListener('pagehide', beaconFinalProgress);
});
onDestroy(() => {
observer?.disconnect();
if (progressTimer) clearTimeout(progressTimer);
if (typeof window !== 'undefined') {
window.removeEventListener('pagehide', flushFinalProgress);
window.removeEventListener('pagehide', beaconFinalProgress);
}
// Don't let the fullscreen flag leak to non-reader pages —
// otherwise the layout header would stay slid-off on /upload