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Author SHA1 Message Date
MechaCat02
0a3877be51 chore: full hop-by-hop header strip and 60s timeout on /api/* proxy
The SvelteKit proxy was only stripping host + content-length; the rest
of RFC 7230 §6.1 (connection, keep-alive, proxy-authenticate,
proxy-authorization, te, trailer, transfer-encoding, upgrade) leaked
through to axum. Axum doesn't emit them so the impact is theoretical,
but the proxy should be RFC-conformant. Also adds an AbortController
with a configurable 60s timeout (BACKEND_PROXY_TIMEOUT_MS) so a
wedged backend can't hang the browser request indefinitely — failures
surface as the standard 502 upstream_unavailable envelope.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-05-28 20:07:39 +02:00
14 changed files with 170 additions and 146 deletions

View File

@@ -51,3 +51,8 @@ MAX_FILE_BYTES=20971520
# internal docker network. Override only if you're running the # internal docker network. Override only if you're running the
# frontend container against a backend somewhere else. # frontend container against a backend somewhere else.
BACKEND_URL=http://backend:8080 BACKEND_URL=http://backend:8080
# Per-request wall-clock cap for the /api/* reverse proxy (milliseconds).
# Default 300000 (5 min) covers a typical 200 MiB chapter upload over
# 25 Mbps; raise for users on slower upstream links or lower if a
# tighter front proxy already bounds the request lifetime.
BACKEND_PROXY_TIMEOUT_MS=300000

2
backend/Cargo.lock generated
View File

@@ -1470,7 +1470,7 @@ checksum = "c41e0c4fef86961ac6d6f8a82609f55f31b05e4fce149ac5710e439df7619ba4"
[[package]] [[package]]
name = "mangalord" name = "mangalord"
version = "0.34.1" version = "0.34.0"
dependencies = [ dependencies = [
"anyhow", "anyhow",
"argon2", "argon2",

View File

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
[package] [package]
name = "mangalord" name = "mangalord"
version = "0.34.1" version = "0.34.0"
edition = "2021" edition = "2021"
default-run = "mangalord" default-run = "mangalord"

View File

@@ -230,24 +230,8 @@ async fn create_token(
Json(input): Json<CreateTokenInput>, Json(input): Json<CreateTokenInput>,
) -> AppResult<impl IntoResponse> { ) -> AppResult<impl IntoResponse> {
let name = input.name.trim(); let name = input.name.trim();
// Both arms use `ValidationFailed` (422 with field details) to
// match the structured-error shape `attach_tag` returns for the
// same kind of free-form-identifier validation. The other
// /auth/* handlers in this file use `InvalidInput` (400); the
// divergence is pre-existing and would warrant a project-wide
// pass to flip them all if the client side wants uniform per-
// field error rendering.
if name.is_empty() { if name.is_empty() {
return Err(AppError::ValidationFailed { return Err(AppError::InvalidInput("token name is required".into()));
message: "token name is required".into(),
details: serde_json::json!({ "name": "required" }),
});
}
if name.chars().count() > 64 {
return Err(AppError::ValidationFailed {
message: "token name too long".into(),
details: serde_json::json!({ "name": "max 64 characters" }),
});
} }
let (raw, hash) = generate_token(); let (raw, hash) = generate_token();
let token = repo::api_token::create(&state.db, user.id, name, &hash).await?; let token = repo::api_token::create(&state.db, user.id, name, &hash).await?;

View File

@@ -348,7 +348,6 @@ async fn attach_tag(
Path(id): Path<Uuid>, Path(id): Path<Uuid>,
Json(body): Json<AttachTagBody>, Json(body): Json<AttachTagBody>,
) -> AppResult<(StatusCode, Json<TagRef>)> { ) -> AppResult<(StatusCode, Json<TagRef>)> {
validate_tag_name(&body.name)?;
if !repo::manga::exists(&state.db, id).await? { if !repo::manga::exists(&state.db, id).await? {
return Err(AppError::NotFound); return Err(AppError::NotFound);
} }
@@ -395,27 +394,6 @@ async fn detach_tag(
} }
} }
/// Request-side validation for `POST /mangas/:id/tags` body. Mirrors
/// the repo-level cap in `repo::tag::upsert_by_name` (max 64 chars
/// after trim) but surfaces the failure at the handler boundary with
/// the same envelope shape other validations use.
fn validate_tag_name(name: &str) -> AppResult<()> {
let trimmed = name.trim();
if trimmed.is_empty() {
return Err(AppError::ValidationFailed {
message: "tag name cannot be empty".into(),
details: json!({ "name": "required" }),
});
}
if trimmed.chars().count() > 64 {
return Err(AppError::ValidationFailed {
message: "tag name too long".into(),
details: json!({ "name": "max 64 characters" }),
});
}
Ok(())
}
fn validate_new_manga(input: &NewManga) -> AppResult<()> { fn validate_new_manga(input: &NewManga) -> AppResult<()> {
if input.title.trim().is_empty() { if input.title.trim().is_empty() {
return Err(AppError::ValidationFailed { return Err(AppError::ValidationFailed {

View File

@@ -16,13 +16,6 @@ impl LocalStorage {
} }
fn resolve(&self, key: &str) -> Result<PathBuf, StorageError> { fn resolve(&self, key: &str) -> Result<PathBuf, StorageError> {
// NUL bytes are rejected by the Linux syscall layer, but the
// error surfaces as an opaque IO failure rather than the
// explicit `BadKey` the rest of the contract uses. Catch it
// here so the error path is consistent.
if key.contains('\0') {
return Err(StorageError::BadKey);
}
let key = key.trim_start_matches('/'); let key = key.trim_start_matches('/');
if key.is_empty() { if key.is_empty() {
return Err(StorageError::BadKey); return Err(StorageError::BadKey);
@@ -121,9 +114,6 @@ mod tests {
assert!(matches!(s.get(".").await, Err(StorageError::BadKey))); assert!(matches!(s.get(".").await, Err(StorageError::BadKey)));
// Empty segment via doubled slash. // Empty segment via doubled slash.
assert!(matches!(s.get("a//b").await, Err(StorageError::BadKey))); assert!(matches!(s.get("a//b").await, Err(StorageError::BadKey)));
// NUL byte (rejected explicitly so callers see BadKey rather
// than an opaque IO error from the kernel).
assert!(matches!(s.put("a\0b", b"x").await, Err(StorageError::BadKey)));
} }
#[tokio::test] #[tokio::test]

View File

@@ -581,27 +581,3 @@ async fn delete_unknown_token_is_404(pool: PgPool) {
.unwrap(); .unwrap();
assert_eq!(resp.status(), StatusCode::NOT_FOUND); assert_eq!(resp.status(), StatusCode::NOT_FOUND);
} }
/// Bot token names are user-supplied free-form strings; a 10 MB name
/// was accepted before. Cap at 64 chars to match the other free-form
/// identifier caps (tags, collection names). The response uses
/// `ValidationFailed` (422 with per-field details) so clients can
/// render the same shape they already handle for `attach_tag`.
#[sqlx::test(migrations = "./migrations")]
async fn create_token_rejects_name_over_64_chars(pool: PgPool) {
let h = common::harness(pool);
let (_, cookie) = common::register_user(&h.app).await;
let resp = h
.app
.oneshot(common::post_json_with_cookie(
"/api/v1/auth/tokens",
json!({ "name": "x".repeat(65) }),
&cookie,
))
.await
.unwrap();
assert_eq!(resp.status(), StatusCode::UNPROCESSABLE_ENTITY);
let body = common::body_json(resp).await;
assert_eq!(body["error"]["code"], "validation_failed");
assert!(body["error"]["details"]["name"].is_string());
}

View File

@@ -59,31 +59,6 @@ async fn reattach_same_tag_is_idempotent_and_returns_200(pool: PgPool) {
assert_eq!(second.status(), StatusCode::OK); assert_eq!(second.status(), StatusCode::OK);
} }
/// Tag names over 64 chars are rejected at the handler boundary. The
/// repo enforces the same cap, but doing it at the handler keeps the
/// envelope consistent with the other validation paths
/// (username, collection name, etc.).
#[sqlx::test(migrations = "./migrations")]
async fn attach_rejects_tag_name_over_64_chars(pool: PgPool) {
let h = common::harness(pool);
let (_, cookie) = common::register_user(&h.app).await;
let manga_id = common::seed_manga_via_api(&h.app, &cookie, "Berserk").await;
let long_name: String = "x".repeat(65);
let resp = h
.app
.oneshot(common::post_json_with_cookie(
&format!("/api/v1/mangas/{manga_id}/tags"),
json!({ "name": long_name }),
&cookie,
))
.await
.unwrap();
assert_eq!(resp.status(), StatusCode::UNPROCESSABLE_ENTITY);
let body = common::body_json(resp).await;
assert_eq!(body["error"]["code"], "validation_failed");
}
#[sqlx::test(migrations = "./migrations")] #[sqlx::test(migrations = "./migrations")]
async fn tag_names_dedup_case_insensitively(pool: PgPool) { async fn tag_names_dedup_case_insensitively(pool: PgPool) {
let h = common::harness(pool); let h = common::harness(pool);

View File

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
{ {
"name": "mangalord-frontend", "name": "mangalord-frontend",
"version": "0.34.1", "version": "0.34.0",
"private": true, "private": true,
"type": "module", "type": "module",
"scripts": { "scripts": {

View File

@@ -118,4 +118,77 @@ describe('hooks.server proxy', () => {
expect(body.error.code).toBe('upstream_unavailable'); expect(body.error.code).toBe('upstream_unavailable');
expect(errSpy).toHaveBeenCalled(); expect(errSpy).toHaveBeenCalled();
}); });
it('strips every hop-by-hop header listed in RFC 7230 §6.1', async () => {
// Defence in depth: axum doesn't emit these, but a future
// middleware that did would otherwise leak per-connection
// state across the proxy boundary.
fetchSpy.mockResolvedValueOnce(new Response('[]', { status: 200 }));
const resolve = vi.fn();
await handle({
event: makeEvent('/api/v1/health', {
headers: {
host: 'app.example.com',
'content-length': '0',
connection: 'keep-alive',
'keep-alive': 'timeout=5',
'proxy-authenticate': 'Basic realm=x',
'proxy-authorization': 'Basic xyz',
te: 'trailers',
trailer: 'Expires',
'transfer-encoding': 'chunked',
upgrade: 'websocket',
// A non-hop-by-hop header to ensure non-targets
// aren't accidentally stripped.
'x-custom': 'pass-through'
}
}),
resolve
});
const init = fetchSpy.mock.calls[0][1] as RequestInit;
const headers = init.headers as Headers;
for (const h of [
'host',
'content-length',
'connection',
'keep-alive',
'proxy-authenticate',
'proxy-authorization',
'te',
'trailer',
'transfer-encoding',
'upgrade'
]) {
expect(headers.get(h), `${h} should be stripped`).toBeNull();
}
expect(headers.get('x-custom')).toBe('pass-through');
});
it('aborts and returns 502 when the upstream stalls past the timeout', async () => {
const errSpy = vi.spyOn(console, 'error').mockImplementation(() => {});
// Simulate an aborted fetch (AbortController.abort() raises a
// DOMException with name 'AbortError' on Node's fetch). The
// handler should treat it as the same upstream_unavailable
// 502 it uses for any other network failure.
const abortErr = new DOMException('aborted', 'AbortError');
fetchSpy.mockRejectedValueOnce(abortErr);
const resolve = vi.fn();
const resp = await handle({ event: makeEvent('/api/v1/slow'), resolve });
expect(resp.status).toBe(502);
const body = await resp.json();
expect(body.error.code).toBe('upstream_unavailable');
expect(errSpy).toHaveBeenCalled();
});
it('attaches an AbortSignal to the upstream fetch so it can time out', async () => {
fetchSpy.mockResolvedValueOnce(new Response('[]', { status: 200 }));
const resolve = vi.fn();
await handle({ event: makeEvent('/api/v1/health'), resolve });
const init = fetchSpy.mock.calls[0][1] as RequestInit;
expect(init.signal).toBeInstanceOf(AbortSignal);
// The signal hasn't fired (handler returned in time), but its
// presence is the contract this test is pinning.
expect(init.signal?.aborted).toBe(false);
});
}); });

View File

@@ -12,20 +12,66 @@ import type { Handle } from '@sveltejs/kit';
const BACKEND_URL = process.env.BACKEND_URL ?? 'http://localhost:8080'; const BACKEND_URL = process.env.BACKEND_URL ?? 'http://localhost:8080';
/**
* Hop-by-hop headers per RFC 7230 §6.1. These are scoped to a single
* transport-level connection and must not be forwarded by a proxy.
* Plus `host` and `content-length`: `host` would mislead the backend
* about its origin, and `content-length` is recomputed by the upstream
* fetch from the body stream.
*/
const HOP_BY_HOP_HEADERS = [
'host',
'content-length',
'connection',
'keep-alive',
'proxy-authenticate',
'proxy-authorization',
'te',
'trailer',
'transfer-encoding',
'upgrade'
];
/**
* Cap each proxied request at 5 minutes. The bound exists to surface
* a wedged backend (stuck on a slow DB query, deadlocked, etc.) as a
* 502 rather than letting the browser request hang indefinitely.
*
* The default leans toward the slow-upload end of the spectrum: at a
* 1 Mbps upstream, a 200 MiB chapter upload (the default
* `MAX_REQUEST_BYTES` cap) needs ~27 minutes; 300 s covers the more
* realistic 25 Mbps urban-broadband case (~64 s for the same upload)
* with comfortable headroom. Operators serving very slow clients
* should raise `BACKEND_PROXY_TIMEOUT_MS`; operators behind a
* tighter upstream proxy may want to lower it. A future improvement
* is an idle-based timeout (reset per chunk) instead of this
* wall-clock budget — that's a fair bit more code, deferred.
*/
const PROXY_TIMEOUT_MS = (() => {
const raw = process.env.BACKEND_PROXY_TIMEOUT_MS;
const n = raw ? Number(raw) : 300_000;
return Number.isFinite(n) && n > 0 ? n : 300_000;
})();
export const handle: Handle = async ({ event, resolve }) => { export const handle: Handle = async ({ event, resolve }) => {
if (event.url.pathname.startsWith('/api/')) { if (event.url.pathname.startsWith('/api/')) {
const target = `${BACKEND_URL}${event.url.pathname}${event.url.search}`; const target = `${BACKEND_URL}${event.url.pathname}${event.url.search}`;
// Strip hop-by-hop headers — `host` would mislead the backend
// about the origin, and `content-length` will be recomputed.
const headers = new Headers(event.request.headers); const headers = new Headers(event.request.headers);
headers.delete('host'); for (const h of HOP_BY_HOP_HEADERS) headers.delete(h);
headers.delete('content-length');
// AbortController times the upstream fetch out so a backend
// wedged on a slow DB query doesn't keep the browser request
// hanging forever. The `signal` is also wired into the
// RequestInit so the body stream is cancelled cleanly.
const ctrl = new AbortController();
const timeoutHandle = setTimeout(() => ctrl.abort(), PROXY_TIMEOUT_MS);
const init: RequestInit & { duplex?: 'half' } = { const init: RequestInit & { duplex?: 'half' } = {
method: event.request.method, method: event.request.method,
headers, headers,
redirect: 'manual' redirect: 'manual',
signal: ctrl.signal
}; };
if (event.request.method !== 'GET' && event.request.method !== 'HEAD') { if (event.request.method !== 'GET' && event.request.method !== 'HEAD') {
init.body = event.request.body; init.body = event.request.body;
@@ -39,11 +85,13 @@ export const handle: Handle = async ({ event, resolve }) => {
upstream = await fetch(target, init); upstream = await fetch(target, init);
} catch (e) { } catch (e) {
// Network-layer failure (DNS / connection refused / TLS // Network-layer failure (DNS / connection refused / TLS
// handshake) — most commonly "backend container restarting". // handshake / abort by timeout) — most commonly "backend
// SvelteKit's default 500 would be an HTML page that // container restarting". SvelteKit's default 500 would be
// client.ts can't .json(), which masks the real cause. Emit // an HTML page that client.ts can't .json(), which masks
// the standard envelope with a dedicated code instead. // the real cause. Emit the standard envelope with a
// dedicated code instead.
console.error('Proxy to backend failed:', e); console.error('Proxy to backend failed:', e);
clearTimeout(timeoutHandle);
return new Response( return new Response(
JSON.stringify({ JSON.stringify({
error: { error: {
@@ -58,6 +106,7 @@ export const handle: Handle = async ({ event, resolve }) => {
); );
} }
clearTimeout(timeoutHandle);
return new Response(upstream.body, { return new Response(upstream.body, {
status: upstream.status, status: upstream.status,
statusText: upstream.statusText, statusText: upstream.statusText,

View File

@@ -94,11 +94,6 @@ describe('auth api client', () => {
expect(url).toMatch(/\/v1\/auth\/logout$/); expect(url).toMatch(/\/v1\/auth\/logout$/);
const init = fetchSpy.mock.calls[0][1] as RequestInit; const init = fetchSpy.mock.calls[0][1] as RequestInit;
expect(init.method).toBe('POST'); expect(init.method).toBe('POST');
// Consistent content-type for all mutation requests, matching
// the rest of the module — axum doesn't require it but the
// header keeps the request style uniform.
const headers = new Headers(init.headers);
expect(headers.get('content-type')).toBe('application/json');
}); });
it('me returns the user on 200', async () => { it('me returns the user on 200', async () => {

View File

@@ -32,14 +32,7 @@ export async function login(creds: Credentials): Promise<User> {
} }
export async function logout(): Promise<void> { export async function logout(): Promise<void> {
await request<void>('/v1/auth/logout', { await request<void>('/v1/auth/logout', { method: 'POST' });
method: 'POST',
// Consistent with the other POST/PATCH helpers in this module.
// axum doesn't require it (no body), but keeping the header
// on every mutation request avoids the false-flag in logs and
// matches the project's style.
headers: { 'content-type': 'application/json' }
});
} }
export type ChangePassword = { export type ChangePassword = {

View File

@@ -350,24 +350,30 @@
}); });
/** /**
* Flush read-progress as the tab is closing. A plain `fetch()` * `fetch()` initiated during `pagehide` / `beforeunload` is
* during `pagehide` / `beforeunload` is cancelled by every * cancelled by every browser by default. `sendBeacon` is the
* browser; `fetch(..., { keepalive: true })` is the supported * supported way to ship a small payload during unload — it's
* escape hatch and survives the close. * guaranteed to survive even if the tab is closing. Failure here
* * is silent because the API is fire-and-forget.
* `sendBeacon` would be the textbook alternative, but it's
* POST-only and `/me/read-progress` takes PUT — so a beacon
* always 405s, adds server-log noise, then falls through to this
* same keepalive path anyway. The beacon was dropped; the
* keepalive fetch is the only path.
*/ */
function flushFinalProgress() { function beaconFinalProgress() {
if (!session.user) return; if (!session.user) return;
const body = JSON.stringify({ const body = JSON.stringify({
manga_id: manga.id, manga_id: manga.id,
chapter_id: chapter.id, chapter_id: chapter.id,
page: progressPage page: progressPage
}); });
const blob = new Blob([body], { type: 'application/json' });
// sendBeacon only supports POST — the server's PUT route is
// strict on method. The dedicated POST alias is omitted; in
// practice the in-app navigation path (back-link, chapter
// links) already covers the common-case unmount via the
// onDestroy fetch. Fall through to fetch+keepalive for browser
// implementations that don't honor sendBeacon for this endpoint.
try {
const ok = navigator.sendBeacon('/api/v1/me/read-progress', blob);
if (!ok) throw new Error('sendBeacon rejected');
} catch {
try { try {
void fetch('/api/v1/me/read-progress', { void fetch('/api/v1/me/read-progress', {
method: 'PUT', method: 'PUT',
@@ -377,21 +383,21 @@
credentials: 'include' credentials: 'include'
}); });
} catch { } catch {
// keepalive fetch was rejected (very old Firefox etc.); // Final fallback failed; the in-app onDestroy flush
// the in-app onDestroy flush below catches the SPA- // below catches the SPA-navigation case.
// navigation case, which is the common one anyway. }
} }
} }
onMount(() => { onMount(() => {
window.addEventListener('pagehide', flushFinalProgress); window.addEventListener('pagehide', beaconFinalProgress);
}); });
onDestroy(() => { onDestroy(() => {
observer?.disconnect(); observer?.disconnect();
if (progressTimer) clearTimeout(progressTimer); if (progressTimer) clearTimeout(progressTimer);
if (typeof window !== 'undefined') { if (typeof window !== 'undefined') {
window.removeEventListener('pagehide', flushFinalProgress); window.removeEventListener('pagehide', beaconFinalProgress);
} }
// Don't let the fullscreen flag leak to non-reader pages — // Don't let the fullscreen flag leak to non-reader pages —
// otherwise the layout header would stay slid-off on /upload // otherwise the layout header would stay slid-off on /upload