import type { Handle } from '@sveltejs/kit'; // Reverse-proxy `/api/*` requests through to the backend container. // // Mangalord's compose runs SvelteKit (this process) on :3000 and axum on // :8080. The browser only ever talks to :3000, so cookies stay // same-origin and `CORS_ALLOWED_ORIGINS` can stay empty in the default // deploy. The backend hostname comes from `BACKEND_URL` (compose wires // `http://backend:8080`); for `npm run dev` we fall back to the same // localhost target the vite proxy uses, which keeps the dev story // consistent even if someone bypasses the vite proxy. const BACKEND_URL = process.env.BACKEND_URL ?? 'http://localhost:8080'; /** * Hop-by-hop headers per RFC 7230 §6.1. These are scoped to a single * transport-level connection and must not be forwarded by a proxy. * Plus `host` and `content-length`: `host` would mislead the backend * about its origin, and `content-length` is recomputed by the upstream * fetch from the body stream. */ const HOP_BY_HOP_HEADERS = [ 'host', 'content-length', 'connection', 'keep-alive', 'proxy-authenticate', 'proxy-authorization', 'te', 'trailer', 'transfer-encoding', 'upgrade' ]; /** * Return a copy of `src` with the hop-by-hop headers removed. Applied to * BOTH the proxied request and the proxied response: per RFC 7230 §6.1 a * proxy must not forward connection-scoped headers in either direction. * On the response side this also drops the upstream `content-length` / * `transfer-encoding`, which the runtime recomputes for the re-streamed * body — forwarding the upstream values risks a framing mismatch. * Exported for unit-test coverage. */ export function stripHopByHopHeaders(src: Headers): Headers { const out = new Headers(src); for (const h of HOP_BY_HOP_HEADERS) out.delete(h); return out; } /** * Stamp the real client address onto `x-forwarded-for` for the upstream * request so axum can key its per-IP auth rate limiter on the actual client * (the backend only honours this when `AUTH_TRUSTED_PROXY=true`). We * **override** rather than append, and drop any incoming `x-forwarded-for` / * `x-real-ip`, so a browser can't spoof its own IP to dodge the limit — this * proxy is the single trusted hop. A missing/blank address leaves the headers * untouched (backend then falls back to its shared bucket). Exported for * unit-test coverage. */ export function setForwardedFor(headers: Headers, clientAddress: string | undefined): Headers { headers.delete('x-real-ip'); if (clientAddress && clientAddress.trim() !== '') { headers.set('x-forwarded-for', clientAddress.trim()); } else { headers.delete('x-forwarded-for'); } return headers; } /** * Cap each proxied request at 5 minutes. The bound exists to surface * a wedged backend (stuck on a slow DB query, deadlocked, etc.) as a * 502 rather than letting the browser request hang indefinitely. * * The default leans toward the slow-upload end of the spectrum: at a * 1 Mbps upstream, a 200 MiB chapter upload (the default * `MAX_REQUEST_BYTES` cap) needs ~27 minutes; 300 s covers the more * realistic 25 Mbps urban-broadband case (~64 s for the same upload) * with comfortable headroom. Operators serving very slow clients * should raise `BACKEND_PROXY_TIMEOUT_MS`; operators behind a * tighter upstream proxy may want to lower it. A future improvement * is an idle-based timeout (reset per chunk) instead of this * wall-clock budget — that's a fair bit more code, deferred. * * SSE streams (`Accept: text/event-stream`) are exempt — see * `shouldBypassProxyTimeout`. A wall-clock abort on a long-lived * stream would tear the connection down every 5 min and force the * browser to reconnect, which flickers the admin dashboard. */ const PROXY_TIMEOUT_MS = (() => { const raw = process.env.BACKEND_PROXY_TIMEOUT_MS; const n = raw ? Number(raw) : 300_000; return Number.isFinite(n) && n > 0 ? n : 300_000; })(); /** * Whether the proxy should skip its wall-clock timeout for this * request. SSE clients open a single connection and stay subscribed * for the lifetime of the page; aborting on a wall-clock budget would * tear down the live admin dashboard every 5 min. Exported for unit * test coverage. */ export function shouldBypassProxyTimeout(headers: Headers): boolean { const accept = headers.get('accept') ?? ''; return accept.toLowerCase().includes('text/event-stream'); } export const handle: Handle = async ({ event, resolve }) => { if (event.url.pathname.startsWith('/api/')) { const target = `${BACKEND_URL}${event.url.pathname}${event.url.search}`; const headers = stripHopByHopHeaders(event.request.headers); // Forward the real client IP for the backend's per-IP auth rate // limiter, overriding any client-supplied value (anti-spoof). // `getClientAddress()` throws if the adapter can't determine it — fall // back to stripping the header so no spoofed value survives. let clientAddress: string | undefined; try { clientAddress = event.getClientAddress(); } catch { clientAddress = undefined; } setForwardedFor(headers, clientAddress); // AbortController times the upstream fetch out so a backend // wedged on a slow DB query doesn't keep the browser request // hanging forever. The `signal` is also wired into the // RequestInit so the body stream is cancelled cleanly. For // SSE streams the timer is suppressed so a long-lived stream // isn't torn down on the 5-minute mark — see T1 in the audit. const bypassTimeout = shouldBypassProxyTimeout(event.request.headers); const ctrl = new AbortController(); const timeoutHandle = bypassTimeout ? null : setTimeout(() => ctrl.abort(), PROXY_TIMEOUT_MS); // Chain the SvelteKit client's disconnect signal into the upstream // fetch so closing an admin tab tears down the backend SSE // subscription immediately. Without this, the backend's // `broadcast::Receiver` + spawned tokio task leak per closed tab // until backend restart — every page refresh adds another. // `AbortSignal.any` would be cleaner but it's Node 20.3+; chain a // listener so we work on older runtimes (vitest's bundled jsdom // env included). If the client signal is already aborted (e.g. // very fast reload), fire ctrl immediately. if (event.request.signal.aborted) { ctrl.abort(); } else { event.request.signal.addEventListener('abort', () => ctrl.abort(), { once: true }); } const init: RequestInit & { duplex?: 'half' } = { method: event.request.method, headers, redirect: 'manual', signal: ctrl.signal }; if (event.request.method !== 'GET' && event.request.method !== 'HEAD') { init.body = event.request.body; // Node's fetch requires `duplex: 'half'` when streaming a // request body; otherwise the stream is rejected. init.duplex = 'half'; } let upstream: Response; try { upstream = await fetch(target, init); } catch (e) { // Network-layer failure (DNS / connection refused / TLS // handshake / abort by timeout) — most commonly "backend // container restarting". SvelteKit's default 500 would be // an HTML page that client.ts can't .json(), which masks // the real cause. Emit the standard envelope with a // dedicated code instead. console.error('Proxy to backend failed:', e); if (timeoutHandle) clearTimeout(timeoutHandle); return new Response( JSON.stringify({ error: { code: 'upstream_unavailable', message: 'backend unreachable' } }), { status: 502, headers: { 'content-type': 'application/json' } } ); } if (timeoutHandle) clearTimeout(timeoutHandle); return new Response(upstream.body, { status: upstream.status, statusText: upstream.statusText, // Strip hop-by-hop headers on the way back too — the upstream's // transfer-encoding / content-length / connection headers must // not ride along on the re-streamed response. headers: stripHopByHopHeaders(upstream.headers) }); } return resolve(event); };