0b2018ceca
Adds /api/v1/admin/users list / DELETE / PATCH guarded by RequireAdmin, plus the audit-log substrate every future destructive admin endpoint will reuse. Safety properties: - Cannot self-delete or self-demote (409 conflict, message calls out "yourself" so the UI can render an explanation). - Cannot remove the last admin via either DELETE or demote. The check takes pg_advisory_xact_lock(ADMIN_INVARIANT_LOCK_KEY) and re-counts admins inside the same tx, closing the parallel-demote race that a bare "if count > 1" check would let through. The HTTP-serial path to this guard is structurally unreachable (the actor would have to be the lone admin demoting themselves, which the self-guard fires on first); the parallel race test exercises it via repo calls. Audit log (admin_audit table) records the action inside the same tx as the action itself, so a rolled-back action never leaves an orphan audit row. actor_user_id is ON DELETE SET NULL so the log outlives a later-deleted admin. target_id is not a FK because future audit kinds will target non-user rows.
16 lines
443 B
Rust
16 lines
443 B
Rust
//! Admin-only endpoints. Mounted under `/api/v1/admin/*` by
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//! `crate::api::routes`. Every handler in this subtree is guarded by
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//! `RequireAdmin`, which only accepts session-cookie authentication —
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//! bot/API tokens cannot reach admin routes (see
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//! `crate::auth::extractor::RequireAdmin`).
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pub mod users;
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use axum::Router;
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use crate::app::AppState;
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pub fn routes() -> Router<AppState> {
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Router::new().merge(users::routes())
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}
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