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Mangalord/backend/src/auth/rate_limit.rs
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feat: harden auth, shutdown, and session bundle (0.35.0)
Three features bundled into one release:

- rate-limit /auth/login, /register, /me/password (token bucket,
  5 req/sec sustained with 10-request burst by default; 429 +
  Retry-After header on hit; tracing::warn! per hit so operators
  see attack patterns; AUTH_RATE_PER_SEC / AUTH_RATE_BURST env knobs)
- handle SIGTERM for graceful container stops (replaces bare
  ctrl_c() with a select over ctrl_c + SignalKind::terminate() so
  docker compose stop runs the daemon shutdown path instead of
  letting Chromium leak past SIGKILL)
- clear session.user on 401 from any API call (setOn401Hook in
  api/client.ts, registered from session.svelte.ts gated on
  $app/environment::browser so the SSR bundle never installs it;
  fixes "logged in but no bookmarks/collections" mid-session
  expiry state)

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-05-28 20:27:21 +02:00

180 lines
6.1 KiB
Rust

//! Per-process token-bucket rate limiter for the auth endpoints.
//!
//! Protects `/auth/login`, `/auth/register`, and `/auth/me/password`
//! from credential stuffing / password spraying / username probing.
//!
//! The current deploy puts SvelteKit's hooks.server.ts proxy in front
//! of axum without forwarding the original client IP (no
//! `X-Forwarded-For`), so per-IP buckets would all collapse to the
//! proxy container's address. Until the proxy learns to forward the
//! peer address, a single global bucket gives equivalent protection
//! against mass-attack patterns and trades a small DoS surface
//! (legitimate users sharing the limit) for simplicity.
//!
//! Each `AppState` carries its own [`AuthRateLimiter`] instance, so
//! tests run in isolated buckets and won't bleed across `#[sqlx::test]`
//! cases that share a process.
use std::sync::Mutex;
use std::time::Instant;
/// Tunable limits. `per_sec == 0` disables the limiter — used by the
/// test harness and by anyone who wants to opt out via env config.
#[derive(Clone, Copy, Debug)]
pub struct RateLimitConfig {
pub per_sec: u32,
pub burst: u32,
}
impl Default for RateLimitConfig {
/// Disabled by default. The production `AuthConfig::from_env`
/// overrides to a real limit; the test harness keeps the default
/// so existing tests don't flake against shared buckets.
fn default() -> Self {
Self {
per_sec: 0,
burst: 0,
}
}
}
/// Production defaults: 5 requests/sec sustained, 10-request burst.
/// Tight enough to make brute force impractical, loose enough that a
/// real user mistyping their password three times in a row doesn't
/// hit it.
pub const PRODUCTION_PER_SEC: u32 = 5;
pub const PRODUCTION_BURST: u32 = 10;
struct Bucket {
tokens: f64,
last_refill: Instant,
}
/// Outcome of [`AuthRateLimiter::try_acquire`]. When `Denied`, the
/// caller can use `retry_after_secs` for a `Retry-After: N` header
/// (RFC 6585 §4) so well-behaved clients back off correctly rather
/// than retrying in a tight loop.
#[derive(Debug, Clone, Copy, PartialEq, Eq)]
pub enum AcquireResult {
Allowed,
Denied { retry_after_secs: u64 },
}
/// Single-bucket token-bucket limiter. `try_acquire` is cheap (one
/// mutex acquire, no allocations) so the auth path doesn't pay a real
/// cost for the check.
pub struct AuthRateLimiter {
cfg: RateLimitConfig,
bucket: Mutex<Bucket>,
}
impl AuthRateLimiter {
pub fn new(cfg: RateLimitConfig) -> Self {
Self {
cfg,
bucket: Mutex::new(Bucket {
tokens: cfg.burst as f64,
last_refill: Instant::now(),
}),
}
}
/// Consume one token if available. Returns `Denied` with a
/// rounded-up seconds-until-refill so the caller can emit a
/// `Retry-After` header.
pub fn try_acquire(&self) -> AcquireResult {
if self.cfg.per_sec == 0 {
return AcquireResult::Allowed;
}
let now = Instant::now();
let mut bucket = self.bucket.lock().expect("rate limiter mutex poisoned");
let elapsed = now.duration_since(bucket.last_refill).as_secs_f64();
bucket.tokens =
(bucket.tokens + elapsed * f64::from(self.cfg.per_sec)).min(f64::from(self.cfg.burst));
bucket.last_refill = now;
if bucket.tokens >= 1.0 {
bucket.tokens -= 1.0;
AcquireResult::Allowed
} else {
// ceil((1 - tokens) / per_sec), minimum 1 — a `Retry-After: 0`
// would tell clients to retry immediately, which is what we're
// actively trying to discourage.
let deficit = 1.0 - bucket.tokens;
let wait_secs = (deficit / f64::from(self.cfg.per_sec)).ceil() as u64;
AcquireResult::Denied {
retry_after_secs: wait_secs.max(1),
}
}
}
}
#[cfg(test)]
mod tests {
use super::*;
#[test]
fn disabled_limiter_always_allows() {
let rl = AuthRateLimiter::new(RateLimitConfig {
per_sec: 0,
burst: 0,
});
for _ in 0..1000 {
assert_eq!(rl.try_acquire(), AcquireResult::Allowed);
}
}
#[test]
fn burst_lets_through_initial_window_then_blocks() {
// 0 refill, burst 3 → first three pass, fourth blocks.
let rl = AuthRateLimiter::new(RateLimitConfig {
per_sec: 1,
burst: 3,
});
assert_eq!(rl.try_acquire(), AcquireResult::Allowed);
assert_eq!(rl.try_acquire(), AcquireResult::Allowed);
assert_eq!(rl.try_acquire(), AcquireResult::Allowed);
match rl.try_acquire() {
AcquireResult::Denied { retry_after_secs } => {
// Bucket is at ~0 tokens, refill rate 1/sec → ~1s wait.
assert!(
retry_after_secs >= 1,
"retry_after must be at least 1s, got {retry_after_secs}"
);
}
AcquireResult::Allowed => panic!("fourth request must be denied"),
}
}
#[test]
fn tokens_refill_over_time() {
// 10/sec → after ~120ms we should have at least one token back.
let rl = AuthRateLimiter::new(RateLimitConfig {
per_sec: 10,
burst: 1,
});
assert_eq!(rl.try_acquire(), AcquireResult::Allowed);
assert!(matches!(rl.try_acquire(), AcquireResult::Denied { .. }));
std::thread::sleep(std::time::Duration::from_millis(150));
assert_eq!(
rl.try_acquire(),
AcquireResult::Allowed,
"token should have refilled"
);
}
#[test]
fn retry_after_scales_inversely_with_refill_rate() {
// 1/sec → wait ~1s after burst exhausted.
// 10/sec → wait <1s, but we clamp to a minimum of 1s.
let slow = AuthRateLimiter::new(RateLimitConfig {
per_sec: 1,
burst: 1,
});
slow.try_acquire();
match slow.try_acquire() {
AcquireResult::Denied { retry_after_secs } => assert_eq!(retry_after_secs, 1),
_ => panic!("expected Denied"),
}
}
}