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Mangalord/frontend/src/hooks.server.ts
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fix: per-IP auth rate limiting instead of one global bucket
A single global token bucket let one attacker at the sustained rate 429
every user's login/register/change-password. Key buckets by client IP: the
SvelteKit proxy now stamps the real peer address onto X-Forwarded-For
(overriding any client-supplied value, anti-spoof), and axum reads it via a
ClientIp extractor — but only when AUTH_TRUSTED_PROXY is set, else it falls
back to the shared bucket (today's behavior). The per-IP map is bounded
(10k IPs, idle buckets pruned) so a spoofed-IP spray can't grow it.

AUTH_TRUSTED_PROXY defaults false (safe for a directly-exposed backend);
compose sets it true since the proxy is the single trusted hop.

Bump to 0.124.12.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-08 07:07:06 +02:00

204 lines
8.6 KiB
TypeScript

import type { Handle } from '@sveltejs/kit';
// Reverse-proxy `/api/*` requests through to the backend container.
//
// Mangalord's compose runs SvelteKit (this process) on :3000 and axum on
// :8080. The browser only ever talks to :3000, so cookies stay
// same-origin and `CORS_ALLOWED_ORIGINS` can stay empty in the default
// deploy. The backend hostname comes from `BACKEND_URL` (compose wires
// `http://backend:8080`); for `npm run dev` we fall back to the same
// localhost target the vite proxy uses, which keeps the dev story
// consistent even if someone bypasses the vite proxy.
const BACKEND_URL = process.env.BACKEND_URL ?? 'http://localhost:8080';
/**
* Hop-by-hop headers per RFC 7230 §6.1. These are scoped to a single
* transport-level connection and must not be forwarded by a proxy.
* Plus `host` and `content-length`: `host` would mislead the backend
* about its origin, and `content-length` is recomputed by the upstream
* fetch from the body stream.
*/
const HOP_BY_HOP_HEADERS = [
'host',
'content-length',
'connection',
'keep-alive',
'proxy-authenticate',
'proxy-authorization',
'te',
'trailer',
'transfer-encoding',
'upgrade'
];
/**
* Return a copy of `src` with the hop-by-hop headers removed. Applied to
* BOTH the proxied request and the proxied response: per RFC 7230 §6.1 a
* proxy must not forward connection-scoped headers in either direction.
* On the response side this also drops the upstream `content-length` /
* `transfer-encoding`, which the runtime recomputes for the re-streamed
* body — forwarding the upstream values risks a framing mismatch.
* Exported for unit-test coverage.
*/
export function stripHopByHopHeaders(src: Headers): Headers {
const out = new Headers(src);
for (const h of HOP_BY_HOP_HEADERS) out.delete(h);
return out;
}
/**
* Stamp the real client address onto `x-forwarded-for` for the upstream
* request so axum can key its per-IP auth rate limiter on the actual client
* (the backend only honours this when `AUTH_TRUSTED_PROXY=true`). We
* **override** rather than append, and drop any incoming `x-forwarded-for` /
* `x-real-ip`, so a browser can't spoof its own IP to dodge the limit — this
* proxy is the single trusted hop. A missing/blank address leaves the headers
* untouched (backend then falls back to its shared bucket). Exported for
* unit-test coverage.
*/
export function setForwardedFor(headers: Headers, clientAddress: string | undefined): Headers {
headers.delete('x-real-ip');
if (clientAddress && clientAddress.trim() !== '') {
headers.set('x-forwarded-for', clientAddress.trim());
} else {
headers.delete('x-forwarded-for');
}
return headers;
}
/**
* Cap each proxied request at 5 minutes. The bound exists to surface
* a wedged backend (stuck on a slow DB query, deadlocked, etc.) as a
* 502 rather than letting the browser request hang indefinitely.
*
* The default leans toward the slow-upload end of the spectrum: at a
* 1 Mbps upstream, a 200 MiB chapter upload (the default
* `MAX_REQUEST_BYTES` cap) needs ~27 minutes; 300 s covers the more
* realistic 25 Mbps urban-broadband case (~64 s for the same upload)
* with comfortable headroom. Operators serving very slow clients
* should raise `BACKEND_PROXY_TIMEOUT_MS`; operators behind a
* tighter upstream proxy may want to lower it. A future improvement
* is an idle-based timeout (reset per chunk) instead of this
* wall-clock budget — that's a fair bit more code, deferred.
*
* SSE streams (`Accept: text/event-stream`) are exempt — see
* `shouldBypassProxyTimeout`. A wall-clock abort on a long-lived
* stream would tear the connection down every 5 min and force the
* browser to reconnect, which flickers the admin dashboard.
*/
const PROXY_TIMEOUT_MS = (() => {
const raw = process.env.BACKEND_PROXY_TIMEOUT_MS;
const n = raw ? Number(raw) : 300_000;
return Number.isFinite(n) && n > 0 ? n : 300_000;
})();
/**
* Whether the proxy should skip its wall-clock timeout for this
* request. SSE clients open a single connection and stay subscribed
* for the lifetime of the page; aborting on a wall-clock budget would
* tear down the live admin dashboard every 5 min. Exported for unit
* test coverage.
*/
export function shouldBypassProxyTimeout(headers: Headers): boolean {
const accept = headers.get('accept') ?? '';
return accept.toLowerCase().includes('text/event-stream');
}
export const handle: Handle = async ({ event, resolve }) => {
if (event.url.pathname.startsWith('/api/')) {
const target = `${BACKEND_URL}${event.url.pathname}${event.url.search}`;
const headers = stripHopByHopHeaders(event.request.headers);
// Forward the real client IP for the backend's per-IP auth rate
// limiter, overriding any client-supplied value (anti-spoof).
// `getClientAddress()` throws if the adapter can't determine it — fall
// back to stripping the header so no spoofed value survives.
let clientAddress: string | undefined;
try {
clientAddress = event.getClientAddress();
} catch {
clientAddress = undefined;
}
setForwardedFor(headers, clientAddress);
// AbortController times the upstream fetch out so a backend
// wedged on a slow DB query doesn't keep the browser request
// hanging forever. The `signal` is also wired into the
// RequestInit so the body stream is cancelled cleanly. For
// SSE streams the timer is suppressed so a long-lived stream
// isn't torn down on the 5-minute mark — see T1 in the audit.
const bypassTimeout = shouldBypassProxyTimeout(event.request.headers);
const ctrl = new AbortController();
const timeoutHandle = bypassTimeout
? null
: setTimeout(() => ctrl.abort(), PROXY_TIMEOUT_MS);
// Chain the SvelteKit client's disconnect signal into the upstream
// fetch so closing an admin tab tears down the backend SSE
// subscription immediately. Without this, the backend's
// `broadcast::Receiver` + spawned tokio task leak per closed tab
// until backend restart — every page refresh adds another.
// `AbortSignal.any` would be cleaner but it's Node 20.3+; chain a
// listener so we work on older runtimes (vitest's bundled jsdom
// env included). If the client signal is already aborted (e.g.
// very fast reload), fire ctrl immediately.
if (event.request.signal.aborted) {
ctrl.abort();
} else {
event.request.signal.addEventListener('abort', () => ctrl.abort(), {
once: true
});
}
const init: RequestInit & { duplex?: 'half' } = {
method: event.request.method,
headers,
redirect: 'manual',
signal: ctrl.signal
};
if (event.request.method !== 'GET' && event.request.method !== 'HEAD') {
init.body = event.request.body;
// Node's fetch requires `duplex: 'half'` when streaming a
// request body; otherwise the stream is rejected.
init.duplex = 'half';
}
let upstream: Response;
try {
upstream = await fetch(target, init);
} catch (e) {
// Network-layer failure (DNS / connection refused / TLS
// handshake / abort by timeout) — most commonly "backend
// container restarting". SvelteKit's default 500 would be
// an HTML page that client.ts can't .json(), which masks
// the real cause. Emit the standard envelope with a
// dedicated code instead.
console.error('Proxy to backend failed:', e);
if (timeoutHandle) clearTimeout(timeoutHandle);
return new Response(
JSON.stringify({
error: {
code: 'upstream_unavailable',
message: 'backend unreachable'
}
}),
{
status: 502,
headers: { 'content-type': 'application/json' }
}
);
}
if (timeoutHandle) clearTimeout(timeoutHandle);
return new Response(upstream.body, {
status: upstream.status,
statusText: upstream.statusText,
// Strip hop-by-hop headers on the way back too — the upstream's
// transfer-encoding / content-length / connection headers must
// not ride along on the re-streamed response.
headers: stripHopByHopHeaders(upstream.headers)
});
}
return resolve(event);
};