0b2018ceca
Adds /api/v1/admin/users list / DELETE / PATCH guarded by RequireAdmin, plus the audit-log substrate every future destructive admin endpoint will reuse. Safety properties: - Cannot self-delete or self-demote (409 conflict, message calls out "yourself" so the UI can render an explanation). - Cannot remove the last admin via either DELETE or demote. The check takes pg_advisory_xact_lock(ADMIN_INVARIANT_LOCK_KEY) and re-counts admins inside the same tx, closing the parallel-demote race that a bare "if count > 1" check would let through. The HTTP-serial path to this guard is structurally unreachable (the actor would have to be the lone admin demoting themselves, which the self-guard fires on first); the parallel race test exercises it via repo calls. Audit log (admin_audit table) records the action inside the same tx as the action itself, so a rolled-back action never leaves an orphan audit row. actor_user_id is ON DELETE SET NULL so the log outlives a later-deleted admin. target_id is not a FK because future audit kinds will target non-user rows.
16 lines
366 B
Rust
16 lines
366 B
Rust
use chrono::{DateTime, Utc};
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use serde::Serialize;
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use sqlx::FromRow;
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use uuid::Uuid;
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#[derive(Debug, Clone, Serialize, FromRow)]
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pub struct AdminAuditEntry {
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pub id: Uuid,
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pub actor_user_id: Option<Uuid>,
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pub action: String,
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pub target_kind: String,
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pub target_id: Option<Uuid>,
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pub payload: serde_json::Value,
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pub at: DateTime<Utc>,
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}
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