test(secrets): group-secret inheritance + masked-read journeys
Two end-to-end journeys via `pic` against a real server: * `group_secret_is_injected_then_app_value_overrides` — a group-owned secret is injected into a descendant app's script through `secrets::get` (decrypted under the group AAD), then an app-owned secret of the same name shadows it (decrypted under the app AAD). Drives the resolver + both owner-AAD open paths against Postgres. * `group_secret_value_is_masked_from_app_devs` — the §5.3 boundary: an app dev (editor on the app, no group role) is denied the secret VALUE (403) yet still sees it EXISTS, masked, in `config/effective` (status set, owner group, no value); a group_admin reads the value. Proves an app runs with config its own devs cannot read. Also updates the existing app-secrets `ls` journey for the new `env` column (group secrets are env-scoped). Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
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@@ -35,7 +35,7 @@ fn set_ls_rm_round_trip() {
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.expect("secrets ls");
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let stdout = String::from_utf8(out.stdout).unwrap();
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let header = stdout.lines().next().expect("header");
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assert_eq!(common::cells(header), vec!["name", "updated_at"]);
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assert_eq!(common::cells(header), vec!["name", "env", "updated_at"]);
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assert!(
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stdout.lines().skip(1).any(|l| l.starts_with("api_key")),
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"api_key missing from ls: {stdout}"
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