fix(audit-2026-06-11/revocation-lag): evict PrincipalCache on credential change
The PrincipalCache (token-hash -> resolved Principal, 60s TTL) had no eviction hook, so deactivation / password change / API-key revocation flipped the DB rows but the cache kept serving the stale principal for up to the TTL window. Closes the audit's PrincipalCache revocation-lag Medium and greens authz::deactivating_user_revokes_their_api_keys. - PrincipalCache::evict_user(user_id) + evict_token(hash). - One shared cache Arc threaded into AuthState / AdminsState / ApiKeysState (a per-state cache would let the middleware's own copy keep authenticating a revoked principal). - Evict on: deactivation, password change (both evict_user), logout (evict_token, precise), single API-key delete (evict_user). - H-E1 note: DB-write invalidation stays best-effort by design (a blip must not undo the rotation); the cache evict is what makes it take effect on the next request. - Renamed bearer_and_cookie_produce_same_principal -> session_token_and_api_key_produce_same_principal (cookie auth was removed in C-1; the test never tested cookies). Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
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@@ -195,6 +195,11 @@ async fn logout(State(state): State<AuthState>, req: Request<Body>) -> Response
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if let Err(err) = state.sessions.delete(&hash).await {
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tracing::error!(?err, "admin_sessions delete failed");
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}
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// Audit 2026-06-11 (PrincipalCache revocation-lag) — drop just
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// this token from the cache so the logged-out session can't keep
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// authenticating for the cache TTL. Other sessions for the same
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// user are left untouched.
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state.principal_cache.evict_token(&hash);
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}
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StatusCode::NO_CONTENT.into_response()
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}
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