fix(audit-2026-06-11/revocation-lag): evict PrincipalCache on credential change

The PrincipalCache (token-hash -> resolved Principal, 60s TTL) had no
eviction hook, so deactivation / password change / API-key revocation
flipped the DB rows but the cache kept serving the stale principal for
up to the TTL window. Closes the audit's PrincipalCache revocation-lag
Medium and greens authz::deactivating_user_revokes_their_api_keys.

- PrincipalCache::evict_user(user_id) + evict_token(hash).
- One shared cache Arc threaded into AuthState / AdminsState /
  ApiKeysState (a per-state cache would let the middleware's own copy
  keep authenticating a revoked principal).
- Evict on: deactivation, password change (both evict_user), logout
  (evict_token, precise), single API-key delete (evict_user).
- H-E1 note: DB-write invalidation stays best-effort by design (a blip
  must not undo the rotation); the cache evict is what makes it take
  effect on the next request.
- Renamed bearer_and_cookie_produce_same_principal ->
  session_token_and_api_key_produce_same_principal (cookie auth was
  removed in C-1; the test never tested cookies).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

crates/picloud/src/lib.rs

@@ -498,12 +498,19 @@ pub async fn build_app(
         .and_then(|s| s.parse::<usize>().ok())
         .filter(|n| *n > 0)
         .unwrap_or(2);
+    // Audit 2026-06-11 (PrincipalCache revocation-lag) — one shared
+    // cache instance threaded into every state that performs auth or
+    // revocation, so an evict on the revocation side is visible to the
+    // middleware's resolve side. A per-state cache would let a revoked
+    // principal keep authenticating from the middleware's own copy.
+    let principal_cache =
+        Arc::new(picloud_manager_core::auth_middleware::PrincipalCache::new());
     let auth_state = AuthState {
         users: auth.users.clone(),
         sessions: auth.sessions.clone(),
         keys: auth.keys.clone(),
         ttl: auth.ttl,
-        principal_cache: Arc::new(picloud_manager_core::auth_middleware::PrincipalCache::new()),
+        principal_cache: principal_cache.clone(),
         login_rate_limiter: Arc::new(
             picloud_manager_core::login_rate_limit::LoginRateLimiter::new(),
         ),
@@ -514,6 +521,7 @@ pub async fn build_app(
         sessions: auth.sessions,
         keys: auth.keys.clone(),
         authz: authz.clone(),
+        principal_cache: principal_cache.clone(),
     };
     let app_members_state = AppMembersState {
         apps: apps_state.apps.clone(),
@@ -526,7 +534,10 @@ pub async fn build_app(
         authz: authz.clone(),
         users: users.clone(),
     };
-    let api_keys_state = ApiKeysState { keys: auth.keys };
+    let api_keys_state = ApiKeysState {
+        keys: auth.keys,
+        principal_cache: principal_cache.clone(),
+    };
 
     // /admin/auth/login + /logout are unguarded by design (login is how
     // you get in). /admin/auth/me applies the middleware internally so

crates/picloud/tests/authz.rs

@@ -380,12 +380,14 @@ async fn member_can_only_touch_apps_they_belong_to(pool: PgPool) {
 }
 
 // ----------------------------------------------------------------------------
-// 5. Bearer pic_ + cookie produce the same Principal
+// 5. Session-token bearer + pic_ API-key bearer produce the same Principal
+//    (cookie auth was removed in the audit 2026-06-11 C-1 fix; both paths
+//    now travel through the Authorization header).
 // ----------------------------------------------------------------------------
 
 #[ignore = "needs DATABASE_URL pointing at a running Postgres"]
 #[sqlx::test(migrations = "../manager-core/migrations")]
-async fn bearer_and_cookie_produce_same_principal(pool: PgPool) {
+async fn session_token_and_api_key_produce_same_principal(pool: PgPool) {
     let s = boot(pool).await;
     let session_token = login_token(&s.server, "owner", "owner-pw").await;