fix(dashboard): rejection-sample password-gen to remove modulo bias

Switches to Uint8 rejection sampling against the largest multiple of
the charset length that fits in a byte. Eliminates the ~16 ppm
overweight the previous `% N` over Uint32 would otherwise leave on the
first 38 chars. Adds a vitest distribution check.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
This commit is contained in:
MechaCat02
2026-05-28 19:37:18 +02:00
parent c4fa53052d
commit 70b66451d6
2 changed files with 70 additions and 4 deletions

View File

@@ -8,6 +8,11 @@
// entropy at 16 chars (~95 bits) to be uncopyable by hand mistakes,
// avoidant of characters that ship awkwardly through chat clients
// (no quotes, slashes, or backticks).
//
// Sampling: rejection sampling against a Uint8 stream. The naive
// `byte % CHARSET.length` would slightly overweight the first
// (256 mod N) chars; with N = 71 that's ~16 ppm of bias which is
// safe at 16 chars but easy to remove.
const CHARSET = 'ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZabcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz0123456789!#$%&*+-?@';
@@ -15,11 +20,18 @@ export function generatePassword(length = 16): string {
if (length < 8) {
throw new Error('password length must be at least 8');
}
const buf = new Uint32Array(length);
crypto.getRandomValues(buf);
const n = CHARSET.length;
// Largest multiple of `n` that fits in a Uint8 — bytes ≥ MAX get
// rejected to remove modulo bias.
const max = 256 - (256 % n);
const buf = new Uint8Array(length);
let out = '';
for (let i = 0; i < length; i++) {
out += CHARSET[buf[i] % CHARSET.length];
while (out.length < length) {
crypto.getRandomValues(buf);
for (let i = 0; i < buf.length && out.length < length; i++) {
const byte = buf[i];
if (byte < max) out += CHARSET[byte % n];
}
}
return out;
}