diff --git a/crates/manager-core/tests/session_absolute_ttl.rs b/crates/manager-core/tests/session_absolute_ttl.rs
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..3c33341
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+++ b/crates/manager-core/tests/session_absolute_ttl.rs
@@ -0,0 +1,117 @@
+//! The admin-session ABSOLUTE TTL cap (audit 2026-07-11 C1, migration 0070).
+//!
+//! `PICLOUD_SESSION_ABSOLUTE_TTL_HOURS` is the whole mitigation for a stolen-but-
+//! warm admin token — the highest-value credential in the system. A session's
+//! sliding `expires_at` is bumped on every use, but it is clamped at
+//! `login_time + absolute_ttl`, so even a continuously-used or stolen token self-
+//! expires. Nothing tested it (grepping `absolute_expires_at` across all tests
+//! returned zero hits).
+//!
+//! The AUTHORITATIVE enforcement is the lookup filter: `admin_session_repo`'s
+//! `lookup` selects `... AND absolute_expires_at > NOW()`, so a row past its cap
+//! is invisible no matter how far into the future `touch` has pushed `expires_at`.
+//! The middleware's `sliding.min(absolute_expires_at)` clamp is defense-in-depth
+//! on top; the lookup filter is what actually expires the token, and it is what
+//! these tests pin. Deleting the `absolute_expires_at > NOW()` predicate — the
+//! plausible regression — makes every past-cap assertion below fail.
+//!
+//! Skips cleanly when `DATABASE_URL` is unset.
+
+use chrono::{Duration, Utc};
+use picloud_manager_core::admin_session_repo::{
+    AdminSessionRepository, PostgresAdminSessionRepository,
+};
+use picloud_shared::AdminUserId;
+use uuid::Uuid;
+
+async fn mk_admin(pool: &sqlx::PgPool) -> AdminUserId {
+    let uniq = Uuid::new_v4().simple().to_string();
+    let (id,): (Uuid,) = sqlx::query_as(
+        "INSERT INTO admin_users (username, password_hash) VALUES ($1, 'x') RETURNING id",
+    )
+    .bind(format!("sat-{uniq}"))
+    .fetch_one(pool)
+    .await
+    .expect("insert admin");
+    id.into()
+}
+
+/// A session within BOTH windows resolves; one past its absolute cap does NOT —
+/// even though its sliding `expires_at` is still in the future. That gap (future
+/// `expires_at`, past `absolute_expires_at`) is exactly the stolen-but-warm token
+/// the cap exists to kill.
+#[tokio::test]
+async fn a_session_past_its_absolute_cap_does_not_resolve() {
+    let Some(pool) = picloud_test_support::test_pool("session_absolute_ttl").await else {
+        return;
+    };
+    let repo = PostgresAdminSessionRepository::new(pool.clone());
+    let user = mk_admin(&pool).await;
+    let now = Utc::now();
+
+    // Warm and within its cap — resolves.
+    repo.create(
+        user,
+        "hash-live",
+        now + Duration::hours(1),
+        now + Duration::hours(24),
+    )
+    .await
+    .expect("create live");
+    let live = repo.lookup("hash-live").await.expect("lookup live");
+    assert!(live.is_some(), "a session within both windows must resolve");
+    assert_eq!(live.unwrap().user_id, user);
+
+    // Sliding window still open (expires_at in the future), but the ABSOLUTE cap
+    // has passed. Must NOT resolve — this is the whole guarantee.
+    repo.create(
+        user,
+        "hash-capped",
+        now + Duration::hours(1),
+        now - Duration::minutes(1),
+    )
+    .await
+    .expect("create capped");
+    assert!(
+        repo.lookup("hash-capped")
+            .await
+            .expect("lookup capped")
+            .is_none(),
+        "a warm session (future expires_at) past its absolute cap must self-expire"
+    );
+}
+
+/// `touch` cannot resurrect a past-cap session. Even after the sliding window is
+/// bumped far into the future, the lookup's absolute filter keeps the row hidden —
+/// so a continuously-used stolen token cannot slide past its cap.
+#[tokio::test]
+async fn touch_cannot_extend_a_session_past_its_absolute_cap() {
+    let Some(pool) = picloud_test_support::test_pool("session_absolute_ttl").await else {
+        return;
+    };
+    let repo = PostgresAdminSessionRepository::new(pool.clone());
+    let user = mk_admin(&pool).await;
+    let now = Utc::now();
+
+    // Absolute cap already passed; sliding window open.
+    repo.create(
+        user,
+        "hash-warm",
+        now + Duration::hours(1),
+        now - Duration::minutes(1),
+    )
+    .await
+    .expect("create warm");
+
+    // Simulate the sliding-window bump with an UNCLAMPED value a year out — i.e.
+    // the exact thing the middleware clamp is meant to prevent. Even so:
+    repo.touch("hash-warm", now + Duration::days(365))
+        .await
+        .expect("touch");
+
+    assert!(
+        repo.lookup("hash-warm").await.expect("lookup").is_none(),
+        "even an unclamped touch a year out cannot resurrect a past-cap session — \
+         the lookup's absolute_expires_at filter is the backstop"
+    );
+}