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fix(security): server-authoritative approval gate + auth/session/file hardening

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Remediate the HIGH and security-relevant findings from the 2026-07-11 audit.

H1 — the per-env approval gate is now server-authoritative. The governing
project is resolved from the target node's nearest-claimed ancestor
(`governing_env_policy`/`_tree` + `governing_project_id` +
`ProjectRepository::get_environments_by_id`), independent of the client-supplied
`[project]`. Omitting or spoofing the project block can no longer skip a gate the
owning project established; a to-create group resolves its declared parent's
chain so a fresh subtree node inherits the gate. Fails closed on any read error.

H2 — the API-key prefix slice (`&rest[..8]`) is now the boundary-safe
`rest.get(..8)`, so an attacker-supplied multibyte bearer can't panic the request
task (unauthenticated per-request DoS). Regression test added.

C1 — admin sessions gain an absolute lifetime cap (migration 0070,
`PICLOUD_SESSION_ABSOLUTE_TTL_HOURS`, default 30d): `lookup` filters it, `touch`
clamps the sliding bump to it, so a continuously-used or stolen-but-warm token
self-expires. Mirrors the data-plane app-user cap.

C2 — `Cache-Control: no-store` on the login and API-key-mint responses (the two
that return a raw credential), so a proxy/CDN/browser cache can't retain it.

B8 — file downloads are header-safe: `sanitize_stored_filename` guarantees a
valid `HeaderValue` (no panic on a control-char name) and BOTH the per-app and
group download paths now set attachment + `X-Content-Type-Options: nosniff` +
a restrictive CSP, closing a group-path stored-XSS gap.

Also folds in the server-side plan-warning plumbing (`plan_warnings`,
`PlanResult::warnings`) and the `app_only_reject` message helper that the CLI
plan-preview change builds on, plus operator security notes (reads-open shared-
topic SSE; the `--env` label is advisory, not a boundary).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
This commit is contained in:
MechaCat02
2026-07-11 23:47:35 +02:00
parent b8b047368e
commit 86448beb06
18 changed files with 593 additions and 125 deletions
Download Patch File Download Diff File Expand all files Collapse all files

23
crates/manager-core/src/auth_api.rs
View File

@@ -156,12 +156,19 @@ async fn login(
};
let token = generate_session_token();
let expires_at = Utc::now()
+ ChronoDuration::from_std(state.ttl).unwrap_or_else(|_| ChronoDuration::hours(24));
let now = Utc::now();
// C1: an admin session dies at the EARLIER of its sliding window and its
// absolute cap. At create the sliding window is shorter, so `expires_at`
// starts as `now + ttl`; the absolute cap `now + absolute_ttl` is stored so
// the sliding `touch` can clamp to it as the session ages.
let expires_at =
now + ChronoDuration::from_std(state.ttl).unwrap_or_else(|_| ChronoDuration::hours(24));
let absolute_expires_at = now
+ ChronoDuration::from_std(state.absolute_ttl).unwrap_or_else(|_| ChronoDuration::days(30));
if let Err(err) = state
.sessions
.create(user_id, &token.hash, expires_at)
.create(user_id, &token.hash, expires_at, absolute_expires_at)
.await
{
tracing::error!(?err, "admin_sessions insert failed");
@@ -174,6 +181,7 @@ async fn login(
(
StatusCode::OK,
no_store_headers(),
Json(LoginResponse {
user: AdminUserDto {
id: user_row.id,
@@ -188,6 +196,15 @@ async fn login(
.into_response()
}
/// `Cache-Control: no-store` for a response carrying a raw credential (a session
/// token, an API key). Prevents a browser / proxy / CDN cache from retaining the
/// secret where a later client could read it back. (C2)
pub(crate) fn no_store_headers() -> HeaderMap {
let mut headers = HeaderMap::new();
headers.insert(header::CACHE_CONTROL, HeaderValue::from_static("no-store"));
headers
}
async fn logout(State(state): State<AuthState>, req: Request<Body>) -> Response {
// Pull token without requiring a valid session (logout is idempotent).
let token = extract_token_for_logout(&req);