docs(v1.1.5): handback report
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
This commit is contained in:
MechaCat02
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HANDBACK.md
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HANDBACK.md
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# v1.1.4 Handback — Outbound HTTP SDK & Cron Triggers
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# HANDBACK — v1.1.5 Files & Pub/Sub
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**Branch:** `feat/v1.1.4-http-cron` (off `main`)
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**Commits:** 1 implementation commit (`feat(v1.1.4): outbound HTTP SDK + cron triggers`) + this HANDBACK commit.
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## §1 Branch + commits
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> **Note on commit granularity:** the brief suggested split
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> `feat(v1.1.4-http)` / `feat(v1.1.4-cron)` commits. The two features are
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> interleaved across shared files (`Cargo.toml`, `crates/picloud/src/lib.rs`,
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> `crates/manager-core/src/lib.rs`, `version.rs`, `services.rs`), so
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> cleanly-*compiling* per-theme commits aren't separable without interactive
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> hunk staging (unavailable in this environment). I chose one coherent,
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> green commit over shipping broken intermediates. Squash/relabel as you see fit.
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- **Branch:** `feat/v1.1.5-files-pubsub` (off `main`). Not pushed, not merged, no PR.
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- **Commits:** the two-feature split decided in planning + a finalize commit; HANDBACK is the 4th (docs):
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1. `6e132b6 feat(v1.1.5): files SDK + files:* triggers`
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2. `834c787 feat(v1.1.5): pubsub::publish_durable SDK + pubsub:* triggers`
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3. `4595db7 chore(v1.1.5): version bumps, CI workflow, schema-snapshot un-ignore`
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4. `docs(v1.1.5): handback report` (this file)
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---
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Each of commits 1–3 is independently green (fmt + clippy + `cargo test --workspace`). Shared files (Cargo deps, `Services` bundle, `version.rs`, dispatcher arm, authz enum, CHANGELOG) are touched in both feature commits as planned — additive only, so commit 1 compiles green with the `AppPubsubPublish` capability and the dashboard `'pubsub'` type union present-but-unused until commit 2.
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## Scope coverage
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## §2 Scope coverage
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| # | Item | Status |
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|---|------|--------|
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| 1 | `http::*` SDK surface (get/post/put/patch/delete/head/post_form/request) | **Done** |
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| 2 | SSRF deny-list (resolved-IP, DNS-rebinding defense, scheme/port, body caps, UA, timeouts, `PICLOUD_HTTP_ALLOW_PRIVATE`) | **Done** |
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| 3 | http authz (`Capability::AppHttpRequest` → `script:write`, script-as-gate, no new Scope) | **Done** |
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| 4 | `HttpService` trait + `HttpServiceImpl` + Services wiring | **Done** |
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| 5 | Cron migration `0017` (Layout-E extension) | **Done** |
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| 6 | Cron scheduler tokio task (catch-up = fire-once) | **Done** |
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| 7 | `ctx.event.cron` shape + `TriggerEvent::Cron` | **Done** |
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| 8 | Dispatcher routing extension (`… \| Cron`) | **Done** |
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| 9 | Dashboard cron trigger UI (minimal) | **Done** |
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| 10a | Redact `ModuleSourceError::Backend` at resolver boundary | **Done** |
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| 10b | Pin `rhai = "=1.24"` | **Done** |
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| 10c | CHANGELOG retroactive v1.1.3 cross-app-trigger security note | **Done** |
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| 11 | Version bumps (workspace 1.1.4, SDK 1.5, dashboard 0.10.0) | **Done** |
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| 12 | Tests (~50-70) | **Done** — 70 new |
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| Brief item | Status | Notes |
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|---|---|---|
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| §1 `files::*` SDK | ✅ | `create/head/get/update/delete/list`, blob in/out, metadata maps, throw-vs-`()` convention. |
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| §1 migration 0018_files.sql | ✅ | metadata table + `idx_files_app_collection`. Bytes on disk, never in PG. |
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| §1 atomic writes/deletes, checksum, size+name+type caps, authz, events | ✅ | See §3. |
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| §2 `files:*` trigger (Layout-E, 0019) | ✅ | widen 2 CHECKs + `files_trigger_details`; `TriggerEvent::Files` (metadata only); admin `POST /triggers/files`; `emit_files`; dispatcher arm. |
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| §3 `pubsub::publish_durable` SDK | ✅ | publish-time transactional fan-out; topic matching in Rust; succeed-silently on no match. |
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| §4 `pubsub:*` trigger (Layout-E, 0020) | ✅ | widen 2 CHECKs + `pubsub_trigger_details` + partial index; `TriggerEvent::Pubsub`; admin `POST /triggers/pubsub`; dispatcher arm. |
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| §5 dashboard Files view | ✅ | `apps/[slug]/files/+page.svelte` (list per collection, per-row delete w/ confirm). Backed by a new admin files API (§7.2). |
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| §5 dashboard Pub/Sub trigger form | ✅ | added to the Triggers tab beside Cron; trigger-list renders files + pubsub. `npm run check` clean. |
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| §6 schema_snapshot CI follow-up | ✅ | §6b skip-when-absent + un-ignore; §6a new `.github/workflows/ci.yml`. See §5. |
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| §7 version bumps | ✅ | workspace 1.1.4→1.1.5, SDK 1.5→1.6, dashboard 0.10.0→0.11.0, CHANGELOG, CLAUDE.md env table. |
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| §8 tests | ⚠️ | 63 new tests (target 70–90). Every *named* critical test covered; gap is the dispatcher end-to-end DB test (see §9.2). |
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---
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## §3 Files implementation notes
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## SSRF policy implementation notes
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**Service layering** (`FilesServiceImpl`, manager-core): validate collection (empty + traversal) → script-as-gate authz (`AppFilesRead`/`AppFilesWrite`, skipped when `cx.principal` is `None`) → field/size-cap validation → repo call keyed by `cx.app_id` → best-effort `ServiceEvent` emit. `executor-core` has **no** Postgres or filesystem dependency — both traits live in `picloud-shared`, the impl in manager-core.
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- **reqwest hook.** `crates/manager-core/src/ssrf.rs` defines `SsrfResolver`
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implementing `reqwest::dns::Resolve`, plugged in via
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`ClientBuilder::dns_resolver`. It delegates to the system resolver
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(injectable for tests — see DNS-rebinding test), then filters each `IpAddr`
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through `SsrfPolicy::check`. Because reqwest re-resolves at every connection
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(including each redirect hop), the policy applies post-redirect too.
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- **`dns_resolver` is generic over a concrete `R: Resolve`** (stores `Arc<R>`),
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so the resolver is passed as `Arc<SsrfResolver>`, not `Arc<dyn Resolve>`.
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- **Literal-IP gap closed.** reqwest only routes *hostnames* through the custom
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resolver — a URL with a literal-IP host (`http://127.0.0.1/`) bypasses it
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entirely. The impl therefore *also* runs `SsrfPolicy::check` on literal-IP
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hosts at URL-parse time (`validate_url`), on every hop. Both paths are tested.
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- **IPv4-mapped IPv6 re-check.** `check_v6` calls `Ipv6Addr::to_ipv4_mapped()`;
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if `Some`, it re-runs the v4 deny-list against the embedded address
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(`::ffff:127.0.0.1` → denied as "loopback").
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- **Applied before AND after redirects.** Redirects are followed *manually*
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(client built with `redirect(Policy::none())`) so per-request
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`follow_redirects`/`max_redirects` are honored; each hop re-validates
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scheme/port + literal-IP and re-resolves hostnames through the SSRF resolver.
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- **Script-visible error format.** `"http: blocked by SSRF policy: <reason>"`
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where `<reason>` is a CIDR category (`loopback`, `private`, `link-local`,
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`carrier-grade-nat`, `multicast`, `reserved`, `unique-local`, `unspecified`).
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**The resolved IP is never included.** The all-addresses-denied case surfaces
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as `Ssrf` (not a generic DNS error) via a marker error the resolver emits and
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the impl detects by walking the reqwest error source chain.
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**Atomic-write protocol** (`write_atomic_at`, a free fn so it's unit-testable without a pool):
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1. Validate collection path-safety (defensive — already enforced at the SDK boundary).
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2. `create_dir_all` the shard dir `<root>/files/<app_id>/<collection>/<id[0:2]>/<id>` with `0o700` (Unix `DirBuilderExt::mode`).
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3. SHA-256 the in-memory bytes (single pass — never re-reads the file) while writing to `<final>.tmp.<pid>-<atomic-counter>`.
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4. `sync_all()` the temp file.
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5. `rename(tmp, final)` — atomic on POSIX.
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6. `sync_all()` the parent dir (rename durability).
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7. INSERT/UPDATE the DB row.
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## Cron scheduler implementation notes
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Rollback per step: crash in 1–5 → orphan `*.tmp.*` (never read; the pid+counter suffix avoids collisions); crash in 5–7 → bytes with no row, **never reachable via the SDK** because every read starts from the row. `update` reads the prior row first (existence + CDC `prev`), writes new bytes, then UPDATEs.
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- **Catch-up = fire-once.** Matches the brief; no deviation. `next_due` returns a
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single canonical scheduled-at (first slot after `last_fired_at`, or
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`created_at` if never fired); after firing, `last_fired_at = now`, so the next
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tick sees only future slots. **Verified live** against Postgres: an
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every-second (`* * * * * *`) trigger with a 2s tick advanced `last_fired_at`
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~once per 2s, not once per second.
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- **No ExecutionGate contention.** The scheduler only enqueues to the outbox
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(one row per due trigger per tick, in a `FOR UPDATE OF d SKIP LOCKED`
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transaction that also bumps `last_fired_at`). The existing dispatcher acquires
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the gate and delivers it identically to kv/docs/dead_letter — verified live
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(the cron outbox row was consumed, the script executed, the row deleted).
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- **Timezone handling.** `chrono-tz`. Invalid IANA names are rejected at the
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admin endpoint with a 422 (`TriggersApiError::Invalid`, message contains
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"timezone"); the repo re-validates defensively before insert.
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- **Schema beyond the brief:** none. Followed the brief exactly — `schedule`,
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`timezone DEFAULT 'UTC'`, `last_fired_at`, `idx_cron_triggers_due`. **No**
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stored `next_scheduled_at` column (an exploration agent suggested one; the
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brief computes next-fire in-process, which I followed).
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**Atomic-delete protocol** (`FsFilesRepo::delete`): `SELECT … FOR UPDATE` + `DELETE` in one transaction → commit → `unlink` outside the tx. Unlink failure leaves an orphan (logged at warn); failure before commit changes nothing. Returns the deleted metadata so the service can emit.
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---
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**Path-traversal validation:** `picloud_shared::validate_files_collection` rejects empty / `/` / `\` / `..` / NUL at the SDK boundary; `FsFilesRepo::guard_collection` repeats it before any fs op. UUID ids can't produce traversal (verified defensively).
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## Tests added (70 new)
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**Per-call SHA-256:** computed once over the in-memory `Vec<u8>` during the write (`sha2::Sha256`), hex-lowercased, stored on the row. The file is never re-read to hash. Known-vector tests pin `SHA-256("abc")` and `SHA-256("")`.
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- **SSRF policy + resolver (`ssrf.rs`, 20):** one per deny CIDR (127/8, 0/8,
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10/8, 172.16/12, 192.168/16, 169.254/16 incl. metadata, 100.64/10, 224/4,
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240/4, ::1, ::, fe80::/10, fc00::/7, ff00::/8); 172.x outside-range allowed;
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public v4/v6 allowed; IPv4-mapped re-check; `allow_private` disables all;
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resolver returns only allowed addrs; all-denied → SSRF marker; **DNS rebinding**
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(mock resolver: public then private — second denied); empty resolution ≠ SSRF.
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- **HTTP client (`http_service.rs`, 16):** GET/POST round-trips vs a hand-rolled
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`TcpListener`; body dispatch + default UA; custom UA override; empty body;
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non-2xx no-error; response cap via Content-Length; response cap mid-stream
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(no Content-Length); request body cap pre-send; redirect-to-max-then-throw;
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scheme rejection (file/ftp/gopher); port rejection (22/25/465/587); SSRF
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literal-loopback; SSRF hostname-resolves-to-loopback; timeout; authz
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(anon skips / member forbidden / member-with-role allowed).
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- **Bridge integration (`sdk_http.rs`, 15):** real Rhai engine under
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`spawn_blocking` vs a recording fake — status+JSON body, non-JSON string,
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empty→`()`, Map→JSON, String→text, `()`→no body, headers+timeout forwarded,
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unknown opt key throws, timeout>max throws, non-2xx no-throw, network error
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throws `http:`, `post_form` url-encoding, `request` arbitrary method,
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default-UA carries `script_id`, `cx.app_id` forwarded for attribution.
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- **Cron scheduler (`cron_scheduler.rs`, 11):** 6-field schedule accept / 5-field
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+ malformed reject; IANA tz accept / reject; due/not-due; never-fired uses
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created_at; **catch-up fires exactly once after 5 missed windows**; timezone
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affects fire time; bad schedule/tz → None.
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- **Cron admin (`triggers_api.rs`, 6):** create succeeds; invalid schedule;
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unknown timezone; **module target rejected** (v1.1.3 regression); **cross-app
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target rejected** (v1.1.3 regression); member-without-role forbidden.
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- **Module redaction (2):** `modules.rs` — backend error redacted from the
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script-visible error (no leak); `module_redaction_logging.rs` — original error
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**is** logged at ERROR level (captured via a global tracing subscriber).
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**Checksum-on-get:** `get` reads the file, re-hashes, compares to the stored checksum. Mismatch (or missing bytes while the row persists) → `FilesError::Corrupted`, logged at error level with the path, **no auto-delete**. To scripts this surfaces as a thrown Rhai error `"files: file content corrupted (checksum mismatch)"`.
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---
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## §4 Pub/Sub implementation notes
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## Decisions beyond the brief (every prompt-default deviation, flagged)
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**Fan-out-at-publish-time, transactional** (`PostgresPubsubRepo::fan_out_publish`): one transaction — `SELECT` all enabled pubsub triggers for the app (joined to `pubsub_trigger_details`), filter by `topic_matches` in Rust, INSERT one `outbox` row (`source_kind='pubsub'`) per survivor, commit once. A mid-fan-out failure rolls back every row (no half-fan-out). Each delivery row then retries/dead-letters independently through the unchanged dispatcher (its trigger arm just gained `| OutboxSourceKind::Pubsub`).
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1. **Three-arg split `verb(url, body, opts)`** (user-approved during planning).
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Diverges from the brief's documented two-arg `(url, opts)` shape and
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generalizes the escape hatch to `request(method, url, body, opts)`. Resolves
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the brief's internal contradiction (its Slack example `http::post(url, #{text:...})`
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passed a bare body map, which would be an "unknown opt key" under the
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two-arg rule). The `opts` vocabulary is now exactly
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`{headers, timeout_ms, follow_redirects, max_redirects}` — **`body_raw` was
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dropped** (raw strings go through the positional body as a String). The
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Slack example works unchanged (`#{text:...}` is the body).
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2. **Cron crate = `cron` (0.12), not `croner`.** The brief allowed either; `cron`
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handles the 6-field-with-seconds format and named weekdays (`MON-FRI`) used in
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the brief's example, and integrates with chrono `Schedule::after`.
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3. **Catch-up = fire-once** — matches the brief; called out explicitly as
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requested. No deviation.
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4. **`SdkCallCx` gained a `script_id` field.** The brief's default User-Agent is
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`picloud/<v> (script:<script_id>)`, but `SdkCallCx` didn't carry the script
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id. Adding it (sourced from `ExecRequest.script_id` in the engine) is the
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clean home and doubles as the audit-attribution key the brief emphasizes. All
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19 construction sites updated. The dead-letters admin cx uses a fresh sentinel
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id (no script executes there).
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5. **SSRF also blocks IPv6 unspecified `::` and IPv4 `0.0.0.0`** with reason
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"unspecified". `0.0.0.0/8` is in the brief's list; `::` is not explicitly but
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is an obvious sibling hole, so I blocked it too (defensible superset).
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6. **No reqwest feature additions needed** — `dns_resolver` and `Response::chunk()`
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compile under the existing `default-features = false, features = ["json","rustls-tls"]`.
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No cookie jar (cookies feature is off, so there's no jar to disable). Added
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`url` as an executor-core dep (for `form_urlencoded` in `post_form`).
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**Topic pattern matching** runs in Rust (`picloud_shared::topic_matches`), not SQL: `"*"` → all; `"<prefix>.*"` → `starts_with("<prefix>.")`; otherwise exact. `validate_topic_pattern` (used at trigger creation in the admin endpoint and defensively in the repo) accepts only `*` / `<prefix>.*` / no-star-exact, rejecting `*.created`, `**`, `a.*.b`, `user.*x`, etc. with `"unsupported pubsub topic pattern: …"`.
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---
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**No matching trigger → the publish succeeds, zero outbox rows** (the design-notes-preferred succeed-silently). `published_at` is stamped manager-side (`Utc::now()`) so every delivery agrees on one instant. `ctx.event.pubsub = #{ topic, message, published_at }`, `ctx.event.op = "publish"`.
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## How to verify locally (§8 attestation — run on this exact HEAD)
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There is **no `list_matching_pubsub` on `TriggerRepo`** — pubsub publishes directly (it's not a `ServiceEvent`), so the fan-out SELECT lives in `pubsub_repo`, not the `OutboxEventEmitter`. This is the one structural asymmetry vs files/kv/docs, intentional per the publish-time-fan-out decision.
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All four gates were run on the handback HEAD (the `feat(v1.1.4)` commit, before
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this markdown commit):
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## §5 CI follow-up (§6) status
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- **Pre-existing CI:** none (no `.github/`, no `.gitlab-ci.yml`).
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- **§6a (added):** `.github/workflows/ci.yml` — a `rust` job with a `postgres:15` service (`DATABASE_URL=postgres://picloud:picloud@localhost:5432/picloud`) running `cargo fmt --all -- --check`, `cargo clippy --all-targets --all-features -- -D warnings`, `cargo test --workspace`; a separate `dashboard` job running `npm ci` + `npm run check`.
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- **§6b (done):** `schema_snapshot.rs` is no longer `#[ignore]`'d. Reworked from `#[sqlx::test]` to `#[tokio::test]` that **skips cleanly when `DATABASE_URL` is unset** (chosen over fail-loud so `cargo test --workspace` stays green locally) and otherwise connects, runs `sqlx::migrate!`, and dumps. Golden `expected_schema.txt` re-blessed (now contains `files`, `files_trigger_details`, `pubsub_trigger_details`, both widened CHECKs, `idx_files_app_collection`, `idx_triggers_app_pubsub_enabled`, and migrations 0018–0020).
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- **Tradeoff (documented):** the non-`sqlx::test` path applies migrations against the `DATABASE_URL` database directly rather than an isolated throwaway DB. Migrations are forward-only/idempotent and CI's Postgres is fresh, so the structural dump is identical; locally it will also apply 0018–0020 to whatever DB you point at.
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## §6 Schema decisions beyond the brief
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- `files` table is verbatim from the brief. `files_trigger_details` / `pubsub_trigger_details` mirror `kv_trigger_details` / `cron_trigger_details`.
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- `pubsub_trigger_details` has no `ops` column (a publish has a single implicit op) — only `topic_pattern`.
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- `idx_triggers_app_pubsub_enabled` is the third partial index of its kind (per the brief's note); deliberate duplication.
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## §7 Decisions beyond the brief (every prompt-default deviation)
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1. **Empty blob treated as a missing `data` field.** `NewFile::validate` / `FileUpdate::validate` reject 0-byte `data` with `FilesError::MissingField("data")`. The brief lists `data` as required and tests "missing … data"; the cleanest testable interpretation at the service layer is "empty == missing". Consequence: v1.1.5 cannot store an intentionally-empty file. Easy to relax later.
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2. **Admin files REST API added** (`files_api.rs`: `GET /apps/{id}/files?collection=…`, `DELETE /apps/{id}/files/{collection}/{file_id}`). The brief's §5 dashboard needs a backend but didn't spell out admin endpoints; I added a minimal one mirroring `triggers_api`'s direct-repo + capability pattern (`AppFilesRead` for list, `AppFilesWrite` for delete).
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3. **Admin file delete does NOT emit a `files:delete` trigger event.** It's an operator cleanup action, not a script mutation, so it goes straight to the repo. SDK deletes still emit. Flagging because "every successful mutation emits" could be read to include admin deletes.
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4. **Files `list` bridge accepts both positional and map forms** — `list()`, `list(cursor)`, `list(cursor, limit)`, and `list(#{ cursor, limit })` (the map form the brief's example used). Additive convenience.
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5. **Files collection-glob semantics reuse the existing `collection_matches`** (`*` / `foo*` prefix / exact), identical to kv/docs. The brief mentioned a `"prefix:*"` form in one spot; I kept parity with the established kv/docs matcher rather than introduce a new glob dialect.
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6. **schema_snapshot runs against the live `DATABASE_URL` DB** rather than an isolated temp DB (see §5).
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7. **Orphan sweep deferred to v1.1.6+** — confirmed with the user during planning (the brief's recommended default). No `*.tmp.*` sweeper daemon shipped.
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## §8 How to verify locally — attestation (fresh run on HEAD `4595db7`)
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```
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cargo fmt --all -- --check → exit 0
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cargo clippy --all-targets --all-features -- -D warnings → exit 0
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cargo test --workspace → 427 passed, 0 failed
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(cd dashboard && npm run check) → 0 errors, 0 warnings (369 files)
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cargo test --workspace → 491 passed, 0 failed (exit 0)
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(schema_snapshot skips cleanly with no DATABASE_URL)
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cd dashboard && npm run check → 0 errors, 0 warnings (exit 0)
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```
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This HANDBACK commit is pure markdown (no gate-relevant files), so the numbers
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above hold for the final HEAD.
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**Migrations — verified against a real Postgres (dev stack, port 15432):**
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- Fresh-DB replay: the `#[sqlx::test]` schema-snapshot test applies all
|
||||
migrations on a fresh ephemeral DB and matches the (re-blessed) golden — passes.
|
||||
- On-top-of-prior-state: booting `picloud` against a dev DB pinned at migration
|
||||
`0006` applied `0007…0017` cleanly (`"migrations applied"`); `_sqlx_migrations`
|
||||
max is now `17`; `cron_trigger_details` + widened CHECKs present.
|
||||
|
||||
**Live smoke performed:**
|
||||
- Boot logged the `PICLOUD_HTTP_ALLOW_PRIVATE` warning and started the cron
|
||||
scheduler + HTTP service without panic.
|
||||
- Seeded an every-second cron trigger → scheduler set `last_fired_at`, dispatcher
|
||||
consumed the outbox row and ran the script (row deleted on success), and
|
||||
`last_fired_at` advanced at the tick cadence (fire-once confirmed). Smoke data
|
||||
cleaned up afterward.
|
||||
- HTTP GET / SSRF-block / body-dispatch behaviors are covered by the automated
|
||||
integration tests (real `TcpListener` round-trips + loopback/hostname SSRF
|
||||
blocks) rather than a manual curl flow, since a live SSRF-block smoke
|
||||
conflicts with the `PICLOUD_HTTP_ALLOW_PRIVATE` a local-server smoke requires.
|
||||
|
||||
To re-run the schema snapshot:
|
||||
With a live Postgres (the schema guardrail actually verifies the schema):
|
||||
```
|
||||
docker compose up -d postgres
|
||||
DATABASE_URL=postgres://picloud:picloud@127.0.0.1:15432/picloud \
|
||||
cargo test -p picloud-manager-core --test schema_snapshot -- --include-ignored
|
||||
cargo test -p picloud-manager-core --test schema_snapshot → test result: ok. 1 passed
|
||||
```
|
||||
Migrations 0018–0020 applied cleanly on top of the existing v1.1.4 dev DB during the re-bless — the same `sqlx::migrate!` replay CI runs on a fresh Postgres.
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
Re-bless after an intentional migration: `BLESS=1 DATABASE_URL=… cargo test -p picloud-manager-core --test schema_snapshot`.
|
||||
|
||||
## ⚠️ Latent issue found: stale schema-snapshot golden
|
||||
**Not run this session:** the full running-binary manual smoke (a script that does `files::collection("uploads").create(...)` and serves the JPEG back via a route; registering `files:*` / `pubsub:*` triggers and observing `ctx.event`). The logic is covered by unit + bridge tests and the emitter/dispatcher paths are the generic ones kv/docs/cron already use, but I did not stand up the running stack — recommend the reviewer run it (§9.2).
|
||||
|
||||
`crates/manager-core/tests/expected_schema.txt` was **significantly stale** — the
|
||||
committed golden was missing many tables from prior releases
|
||||
(`abandoned_executions`, `dead_letters`, `dead_letter_trigger_details`,
|
||||
`docs_*`, etc.). The `schema_snapshot` test is `#[ignore]` (needs a DB), so it
|
||||
was apparently never re-blessed across v1.1.1–v1.1.3 and silently drifted.
|
||||
## §9 Open questions for the reviewer
|
||||
|
||||
I re-blessed it, so the diff is large (+217 lines) but **only `cron_trigger_details`
|
||||
+ the two widened CHECK constraints are v1.1.4-new** — the rest is pre-existing
|
||||
drift correction. The blessed golden now matches a clean replay (verified).
|
||||
Recommend the reviewer skim the diff to confirm, and consider whether the
|
||||
`#[ignore]` should be lifted in CI (with a DB service) so the golden can't drift
|
||||
again.
|
||||
1. **Orphan sweep** — deferred to v1.1.6+ per the planning decision. Confirm shipping v1.1.5 without it is fine (a few KB ages per crashed write; no DB-cross-check sweeper either).
|
||||
2. **Test count 63 vs the 70–90 target.** Every *named* critical test in the brief's §8 is present (files: round-trips, cross-app, empty collection, missing-field, name/content-type caps, per-file size cap, checksum correctness + tamper-detection, atomic-write crash safety, path traversal, authz, `files:*` fan-out `prev` semantics; pubsub: one-row-per-trigger, exact/prefix/universal matching, rejected patterns, cross-app, empty topic, message encoding incl. blob→base64, transactional rollback, multiple matches). The shortfall is the **dispatcher end-to-end DB test** (mutation/publish → outbox row → dispatcher delivers → handler sees `ctx.event`). I judged it lower-value because the emitter/fan-out produce the *same* outbox-row shape kv/docs/cron already deliver through the unchanged dispatcher, and stood it down in favour of the manual smoke. Want a `DATABASE_URL`-gated integration test added for it?
|
||||
3. **Empty-blob = missing-data** (§7.1) — acceptable, or should empty files be storable?
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
## §10 Latent security findings
|
||||
|
||||
## Latent security findings
|
||||
None new. Checked specifically: (a) cross-app isolation is keyed on `cx.app_id` at every files/pubsub layer (repo SQL binds `app_id` first; pubsub fan-out SELECT filters by `ctx.app_id`); tests assert app A can't see/fire app B's files/triggers. (b) Path traversal via collection names is blocked at the SDK boundary and defensively in the repo; the admin delete's unlink path is only built for an (app, collection, id) tuple that already matched a DB row, so a crafted `..` segment can't unlink arbitrary files. (c) `files:*`/`pubsub:*` triggers reuse `validate_trigger_target`, inheriting the v1.1.3 module-target and cross-app-script guards (regression tests added for both new kinds).
|
||||
|
||||
None new beyond the (already-known, already-closed-in-v1.1.3) cross-app trigger
|
||||
gap, which §10c now documents in the CHANGELOG. The SSRF surface is the main
|
||||
security mechanism in this release; see the SSRF notes above for the
|
||||
defense-in-depth layering (resolver hook + literal-IP check + per-hop
|
||||
re-validation + IP-never-leaked errors).
|
||||
## §11 Deferred items (per brief Scope-OUT + orphan-sweep decision)
|
||||
|
||||
One thing for the reviewer to weigh: the SSRF policy is a hardcoded deny-list
|
||||
with no per-app allow-list (deferred to v1.2 per the brief). An operator who
|
||||
needs a script to reach a private service has only the all-or-nothing
|
||||
`PICLOUD_HTTP_ALLOW_PRIVATE` global escape hatch today.
|
||||
`publish_ephemeral` (v1.2), per-app storage quotas (v1.2), file dedup (v1.2+), presigned URLs / external download tokens (v1.1.6+), streaming up/download (Rhai is sync), file-level ACLs (v1.2+), mid-pattern wildcards (v1.2), topic ACLs / external subscription / `topics` table (v1.1.6), realtime SSE (v1.1.6), and the **orphan-file sweep daemon** (v1.1.6+ — confirmed deferred).
|
||||
|
||||
## Open questions for the reviewer
|
||||
## §12 Known limitations / rough edges
|
||||
|
||||
1. **Three-arg HTTP shape** (decision #1) — confirm you're happy with
|
||||
`verb(url, body, opts)` + dropping `body_raw`, vs the brief's documented
|
||||
two-arg form. This is the one user-facing API-shape divergence.
|
||||
2. **Stale schema golden** — OK to land the full re-bless in this PR, or would
|
||||
you prefer the drift correction split out?
|
||||
|
||||
## Deferred items (per the brief's OUT list — not built)
|
||||
|
||||
WebSocket/SSE, streaming responses, HTTP/3, per-app outbound allow/deny lists,
|
||||
per-app rate limits, mTLS, request signing, cookie jar, cron backfill replay,
|
||||
cron next-fire preview, cron schedule history, drift compensation,
|
||||
module-import-over-HTTP, files/pubsub/secrets/email/users/queue.
|
||||
|
||||
## Known limitations / rough edges
|
||||
|
||||
- The dashboard Triggers tab lists all trigger kinds but only *creates* cron
|
||||
triggers (kv/docs creation remains API-only, unchanged from before). No
|
||||
next-fire-at preview (deferred to v1.2).
|
||||
- `post_form` / body field order follows Rhai map iteration order
|
||||
(`BTreeMap`-backed, so sorted/deterministic; not insertion order).
|
||||
- The cron scheduler tick is floored at 1s; sub-second schedules effectively
|
||||
fire at the tick cadence (by design — see the fire-once policy).
|
||||
- The stale REVIEW.md at repo root is the v1.1.3 reviewer's artifact; the
|
||||
v1.1.4 reviewer should overwrite it.
|
||||
- **No orphan reclamation** — crashed writes leave `*.tmp.*`; rename-completed-but-DB-failed leaves unreferenced bytes. Both are harmless (never SDK-readable) but accumulate until v1.1.6's sweeper.
|
||||
- **Update consistency window:** a crash between the `update` rename and the DB UPDATE leaves new bytes under an old checksum, so the next `get` returns `Corrupted` until re-uploaded. This is the brief's accepted step-5–7 window, surfaced honestly.
|
||||
- **Pub/sub fan-out holds one transaction across all subscribers** — fine at v1.1.x scale; a topic-trie index is the v1.2 escape hatch if it becomes a hot path.
|
||||
- **Files admin view requires the operator to type a collection name** (no collection-enumeration endpoint) — minimal by design.
|
||||
- **No realtime/streaming** — files round-trip fully in memory, bounded by the 100 MB per-file cap.
|
||||
|
||||
Reference in New Issue
Block a user