test(quota): pin docs ceiling, group docs byte race, and files disk-ordering rollback

Extends the atomic_write suite with three write-path gaps:
- an app cannot exceed PICLOUD_APP_DOCS_MAX_ROWS (create-only, update
  net-zero, delete frees a slot) via a real PostgresDocsWriter;
- concurrent writers cannot push a group past its docs total-bytes quota
  (16 racers against a 450-byte ceiling under pg_advisory_xact_lock);
- a files create with a broken outbox leaves no row AND no blob on disk,
  while a files delete with a broken outbox keeps both the row and the
  readable blob (the disk-ordering invariant).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
This commit is contained in:
MechaCat02
2026-07-15 20:12:45 +02:00
parent 345db4a076
commit 977abc25d0

View File

@@ -22,15 +22,15 @@
use std::sync::Arc;
use picloud_manager_core::atomic_write::{
FilesWriter, GroupDocsTarget, GroupDocsWriter, GroupFilesQuota, GroupFilesWriter,
GroupKvTarget, GroupKvWriter, KvWriter, PostgresFilesWriter, PostgresGroupDocsWriter,
PostgresGroupFilesWriter, PostgresGroupKvWriter, PostgresKvWriter,
DocsWriter, FilesWriter, GroupDocsTarget, GroupDocsWriter, GroupFilesQuota, GroupFilesWriter,
GroupKvTarget, GroupKvWriter, KvWriter, PostgresDocsWriter, PostgresFilesWriter,
PostgresGroupDocsWriter, PostgresGroupFilesWriter, PostgresGroupKvWriter, PostgresKvWriter,
};
use picloud_manager_core::files_repo::{FilesConfig, FilesRepo, FsFilesRepo};
use picloud_manager_core::quota::GroupWriteQuota;
use picloud_shared::{
AppId, ExecutionId, FileUpdate, FilesError, GroupDocsError, GroupFilesError, GroupId,
GroupKvError, KvError, NewFile, RequestId, ScriptId, SdkCallCx,
AppId, DocsError, ExecutionId, FileUpdate, FilesError, GroupDocsError, GroupFilesError,
GroupId, GroupKvError, KvError, NewFile, RequestId, ScriptId, SdkCallCx,
};
use sqlx::PgPool;
use uuid::Uuid;
@@ -159,6 +159,59 @@ async fn kv_count(pool: &PgPool, app: Uuid) -> i64 {
n
}
async fn files_count(pool: &PgPool, app: Uuid) -> i64 {
let (n,): (i64,) = sqlx::query_as("SELECT COUNT(*) FROM files WHERE app_id = $1")
.bind(app)
.fetch_one(pool)
.await
.expect("count files");
n
}
/// Like `setup`, but the watching trigger is `kind='files'` so a files write into
/// `collection` produces an outbox fan-out (which `break_outbox_for` can fail).
async fn setup_files(pool: &PgPool, collection: &str) -> Fixture {
let f = setup(pool, "unwatched").await; // app/group/admin, KV trigger on a name we won't use
let uniq = Uuid::new_v4().simple().to_string();
let (script,): (Uuid,) = sqlx::query_as(
"INSERT INTO scripts (app_id, name, source) VALUES ($1, $2, '') RETURNING id",
)
.bind(f.app)
.bind(format!("fh-{uniq}"))
.fetch_one(pool)
.await
.expect("script");
let (admin,): (Uuid,) = sqlx::query_as(
"INSERT INTO admin_users (username, password_hash) VALUES ($1, 'x') RETURNING id",
)
.bind(format!("fa-{uniq}"))
.fetch_one(pool)
.await
.expect("admin");
let (trigger,): (Uuid,) = sqlx::query_as(
"INSERT INTO triggers ( \
app_id, script_id, kind, retry_max_attempts, retry_backoff, \
retry_base_ms, registered_by_principal \
) VALUES ($1, $2, 'files', 3, 'exponential', 1000, $3) RETURNING id",
)
.bind(f.app)
.bind(script)
.bind(admin)
.fetch_one(pool)
.await
.expect("files trigger");
sqlx::query(
"INSERT INTO files_trigger_details (trigger_id, collection_glob, ops) \
VALUES ($1, $2, '{}')",
)
.bind(trigger)
.bind(collection)
.execute(pool)
.await
.expect("files_trigger_details");
f
}
async fn outbox_count(pool: &PgPool, app: Uuid) -> i64 {
let (n,): (i64,) = sqlx::query_as("SELECT COUNT(*) FROM outbox WHERE app_id = $1")
.bind(app)
@@ -484,6 +537,72 @@ async fn concurrent_writers_cannot_push_a_group_past_its_docs_row_quota() {
.expect("cleanup");
}
/// Group docs BYTE quota under concurrency — the one group quota that was only
/// covered single-threaded. The lock is keyed per-(group, KIND), so docs-bytes
/// could plausibly diverge from docs-rows and KV-bytes; race it directly. Mirrors
/// the group-KV byte race: ~100-byte docs, a ceiling that fits about 4, and a
/// `max_value_bytes` low enough that the upper-bound fast path can't short-circuit
/// the projected-total scan.
#[tokio::test(flavor = "multi_thread", worker_threads = 4)]
async fn concurrent_writers_cannot_push_a_group_past_its_docs_byte_quota() {
let Some(pool) = pool_or_skip().await else {
return;
};
let group = mk_group(&pool).await;
let writer = Arc::new(PostgresGroupDocsWriter::new(pool.clone()));
let quota = GroupWriteQuota {
max_total_bytes: 450,
max_rows: u64::MAX,
max_value_bytes: 200,
};
let app = Uuid::new_v4();
let mut set = tokio::task::JoinSet::new();
for i in 0..16 {
let w = Arc::clone(&writer);
set.spawn(async move {
let cx = cx(app);
w.create(
&cx,
GroupDocsTarget {
group_id: GroupId::from(group),
collection: "articles",
},
serde_json::json!({ "blob": "x".repeat(90), "n": i }),
quota,
)
.await
});
}
while let Some(r) = set.join_next().await {
match r.expect("task") {
Ok(_) | Err(GroupDocsError::TotalBytesQuotaExceeded { .. }) => {}
Err(e) => panic!("unexpected error: {e}"),
}
}
let (bytes,): (i64,) = sqlx::query_as(
"SELECT COALESCE(SUM(octet_length(data::text)), 0)::BIGINT \
FROM group_docs WHERE group_id = $1",
)
.bind(group)
.fetch_one(&pool)
.await
.expect("bytes");
assert!(
bytes <= 450,
"stored docs bytes ({bytes}) must not exceed the 450-byte ceiling — \
concurrent writers must serialize on the docs-bytes lock"
);
assert!(bytes > 0, "some writers should have succeeded");
sqlx::query("DELETE FROM groups WHERE id = $1")
.bind(group)
.execute(&pool)
.await
.expect("cleanup");
}
/// Group FILES had the worst version of the race: the ceiling is disk (10 GiB by
/// default) and a single file may be 100 MB, so a fleet of concurrent uploads
/// each seeing the same pre-write total could overshoot by GIGABYTES of real
@@ -636,6 +755,56 @@ async fn an_app_cannot_exceed_its_key_ceiling_but_updates_stay_free() {
assert_eq!(kv_count(&pool, f.app).await, 3);
}
/// The per-app DOCS row ceiling (`PICLOUD_APP_DOCS_MAX_ROWS`). The KV ceiling was
/// pinned; docs — create-only, and written with a different check (`>=` BEFORE the
/// insert, vs KV's `>` after) — was not, so an off-by-one or a dropped check would
/// have been invisible.
#[tokio::test(flavor = "multi_thread", worker_threads = 2)]
async fn an_app_cannot_exceed_its_docs_ceiling() {
let Some(pool) = pool_or_skip().await else {
return;
};
let f = setup(&pool, "unwatched").await;
let writer = PostgresDocsWriter::new(pool.clone(), 3);
let cx = cx(f.app);
let mut ids = Vec::new();
for i in 0..3 {
ids.push(
writer
.create(&cx, "c", serde_json::json!({ "n": i }))
.await
.expect("under the ceiling"),
);
}
let err = writer
.create(&cx, "c", serde_json::json!({ "n": 3 }))
.await
.expect_err("a fourth doc must be refused");
assert!(matches!(err, DocsError::QuotaExceeded { .. }), "got {err}");
// An UPDATE replaces in place — net-zero rows — so it stays allowed at the
// ceiling.
writer
.update(&cx, "c", ids[0], serde_json::json!({ "n": "updated" }))
.await
.expect("an update at the ceiling is net-zero rows and must be allowed");
// Deleting frees a slot.
writer.delete(&cx, "c", ids[0]).await.expect("delete");
writer
.create(&cx, "c", serde_json::json!({ "n": 3 }))
.await
.expect("room after a delete");
let (n,): (i64,) = sqlx::query_as("SELECT COUNT(*) FROM docs WHERE app_id = $1")
.bind(f.app)
.fetch_one(&pool)
.await
.expect("count");
assert_eq!(n, 3);
}
#[tokio::test(flavor = "multi_thread", worker_threads = 4)]
async fn concurrent_uploads_cannot_push_an_app_past_its_disk_ceiling() {
let Some(pool) = pool_or_skip().await else {
@@ -737,3 +906,106 @@ async fn concurrent_uploads_cannot_push_an_app_past_its_disk_ceiling() {
let _ = std::fs::remove_dir_all(&root);
}
/// The files disk/transaction ORDERING invariant (CLAUDE.md write-path rules):
/// create/update write the blob first and unlink it on rollback; delete commits
/// the metadata removal first and unlinks after — "the reverse would destroy the
/// bytes of a row a rollback keeps." The disk mechanics were tested but never with
/// a transaction actually rolling back. This drives both directions with the
/// outbox fault injection.
#[tokio::test(flavor = "multi_thread", worker_threads = 2)]
async fn files_rollback_respects_the_disk_ordering() {
let Some(pool) = pool_or_skip().await else {
return;
};
let f = setup_files(&pool, "assets").await;
let root = std::env::temp_dir().join(format!("picloud-fr-{}", Uuid::new_v4().simple()));
let writer = PostgresFilesWriter::new(pool.clone(), root.clone(), u64::MAX);
let repo = FsFilesRepo::new(
pool.clone(),
FilesConfig {
root: root.clone(),
max_file_size_bytes: 1024 * 1024,
},
);
let mk = |n: u8| NewFile {
name: format!("f{n}.bin"),
content_type: "application/octet-stream".into(),
data: vec![b'x'; 100],
};
// --- CREATE rollback: a fan-out failure must leave NO orphan blob. --------
let tag = Uuid::new_v4().simple().to_string();
break_outbox_for(&pool, f.app, &tag).await;
let err = writer
.create(&cx(f.app), "assets", mk(0))
.await
.expect_err("a create whose fan-out fails must error");
unbreak_outbox(&pool, &tag).await;
assert!(format!("{err}").contains("event emit"), "got {err}");
assert_eq!(
files_count(&pool, f.app).await,
0,
"the metadata row must be rolled back"
);
// No blob may remain on disk — a create writes the bytes inside the tx and
// must unlink them when it rolls back, or they leak forever (the sweeper only
// reaps *.tmp.*, not finalized blobs).
let disk = count_files_on_disk(&root);
assert_eq!(
disk, 0,
"a rolled-back create must leave no orphan blob, found {disk}"
);
// --- DELETE rollback: a fan-out failure must KEEP the blob readable. -------
let id = writer
.create(&cx(f.app), "assets", mk(1))
.await
.expect("healthy create lands");
assert_eq!(files_count(&pool, f.app).await, 1);
let tag2 = Uuid::new_v4().simple().to_string();
break_outbox_for(&pool, f.app, &tag2).await;
let err = writer
.delete(&cx(f.app), "assets", id)
.await
.expect_err("a delete whose fan-out fails must error");
unbreak_outbox(&pool, &tag2).await;
assert!(format!("{err}").contains("event emit"), "got {err}");
assert_eq!(
files_count(&pool, f.app).await,
1,
"the row must survive the rolled-back delete"
);
// The blob must STILL be readable (checksum-verified). Inverting the delete
// order — unlink before commit — would leave this row pointing at bytes that
// no longer exist, i.e. silent data loss surfacing later as Corrupted.
let survivor = repo
.get(AppId::from(f.app), "assets", id)
.await
.expect("a rolled-back delete must not destroy the blob")
.expect("the file must still exist");
assert_eq!(survivor, vec![b'x'; 100]);
let _ = std::fs::remove_dir_all(&root);
}
/// Count finalized blob files (not `*.tmp.*`) anywhere under a files root.
fn count_files_on_disk(root: &std::path::Path) -> usize {
fn walk(dir: &std::path::Path, acc: &mut usize) {
let Ok(entries) = std::fs::read_dir(dir) else {
return;
};
for e in entries.flatten() {
let p = e.path();
if p.is_dir() {
walk(&p, acc);
} else if !p.to_string_lossy().contains(".tmp.") {
*acc += 1;
}
}
}
let mut n = 0;
walk(root, &mut n);
n
}