feat(groups): tree repos, hierarchy-aware RBAC, admin API

Server-side foundation for Phase-2 groups (no group-owned resources yet):

Shared types:
- GroupId, Group; App gains group_id; AppRole::{precedence,max} for
  folding the highest effective role across the membership chain.

Repos:
- group_repo: tree CRUD with reparent (ancestor-walk cycle guard under a
  coarse instance-wide structural advisory lock; slug frozen; bumps
  structure_version) and delete=RESTRICT (refuses non-empty groups).
- group_members_repo: per-(user, group) role grants, mirroring app_members.

Hierarchy-aware authz (§5.3):
- AuthzRepo gains effective_app_role / effective_group_role (default to
  direct membership / none, so the ~18 existing test stubs are untouched);
  the Postgres impl resolves each via one depth-bounded recursive CTE that
  MAXes the app's own row with every ancestor group_members row.
- can(): the Member path now folds inherited group roles, so a group_admin
  on any ancestor is implicitly app_admin beneath it. New Capability
  variants InstanceCreateGroup / Group{Read,Write,Admin}; group caps carry
  no app_id (bound API keys can't manage groups). 8 new unit tests.

Admin API:
- groups_api: group CRUD + reparent (admin at both source and destination
  parent, §5.6) + per-group members, all capability-gated.
- apps: POST /apps takes an optional parent group (default root); app
  responses carry group_id; my_role now reflects the effective role.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
This commit is contained in:
MechaCat02
2026-06-24 19:59:00 +02:00
parent 2b27012f56
commit a432091191
16 changed files with 1826 additions and 53 deletions

View File

@@ -27,7 +27,7 @@
//! external user-facing label.
use async_trait::async_trait;
use picloud_shared::{AppId, AppRole, InstanceRole, Principal, Scope, UserId};
use picloud_shared::{AppId, AppRole, GroupId, InstanceRole, Principal, Scope, UserId};
/// Things a caller can attempt to do. Each app-scoped variant carries
/// the `AppId` of the resource the action targets — handlers compute
@@ -37,6 +37,19 @@ use picloud_shared::{AppId, AppRole, InstanceRole, Principal, Scope, UserId};
pub enum Capability {
/// Create a new app. Owner / admin only.
InstanceCreateApp,
/// Create a new group (root-level). Owner / admin only — a Member
/// creates subgroups under a group they group-admin (gated by
/// `GroupAdmin(parent)` at the handler), not via this instance cap.
InstanceCreateGroup,
/// Read group metadata + list its subgroups/apps. Viewer+ on the
/// group (inherited from any ancestor); implicit for admin / owner.
GroupRead(GroupId),
/// Rename / edit group metadata, move apps into it. Editor+ on the
/// group.
GroupWrite(GroupId),
/// Group settings: delete, reparent, manage group members. group_admin
/// on the group (inherited from any ancestor).
GroupAdmin(GroupId),
/// Create / update / delete admin_users rows (other than self
/// password change, which is a separate flow). Owner / admin.
InstanceManageUsers,
@@ -154,9 +167,16 @@ impl Capability {
#[must_use]
pub const fn app_id(self) -> Option<AppId> {
match self {
Self::InstanceCreateApp | Self::InstanceManageUsers | Self::InstanceManageSettings => {
None
}
Self::InstanceCreateApp
| Self::InstanceManageUsers
| Self::InstanceManageSettings
| Self::InstanceCreateGroup
// Group-scoped caps carry a GroupId, not an AppId. They return
// None here so a bound API key (which can only target its one
// app) is denied group management at the binding layer.
| Self::GroupRead(_)
| Self::GroupWrite(_)
| Self::GroupAdmin(_) => None,
Self::AppRead(id)
| Self::AppWriteScript(id)
| Self::AppWriteRoute(id)
@@ -193,15 +213,17 @@ impl Capability {
#[must_use]
pub const fn required_scope(self) -> Scope {
match self {
Self::InstanceCreateApp | Self::InstanceManageUsers | Self::InstanceManageSettings => {
Scope::InstanceAdmin
}
Self::InstanceCreateApp
| Self::InstanceManageUsers
| Self::InstanceManageSettings
| Self::InstanceCreateGroup => Scope::InstanceAdmin,
Self::AppRead(_)
| Self::AppKvRead(_)
| Self::AppDocsRead(_)
| Self::AppFilesRead(_)
| Self::AppSecretsRead(_)
| Self::AppUsersRead(_) => Scope::ScriptRead,
| Self::AppUsersRead(_)
| Self::GroupRead(_) => Scope::ScriptRead,
Self::AppWriteScript(_)
| Self::AppKvWrite(_)
| Self::AppDocsWrite(_)
@@ -219,7 +241,9 @@ impl Capability {
Self::AppAdmin(_)
| Self::AppManageTriggers(_)
| Self::AppDeadLetterManage(_)
| Self::AppTopicManage(_) => Scope::AppAdmin,
| Self::AppTopicManage(_)
| Self::GroupWrite(_)
| Self::GroupAdmin(_) => Scope::AppAdmin,
Self::AppLogRead(_) => Scope::LogRead,
}
}
@@ -230,11 +254,41 @@ impl Capability {
/// means unit tests can stub it.
#[async_trait]
pub trait AuthzRepo: Send + Sync {
/// Direct `app_members` row for (user, app). The single-row lookup
/// used by member-management surfaces and as the fallback below.
async fn membership(
&self,
user_id: UserId,
app_id: AppId,
) -> Result<Option<AppRole>, AuthzError>;
/// Highest *effective* role on `app_id` (hierarchy-aware RBAC, §5.3):
/// the app's own `app_members` row folded with every `group_members`
/// row on any ancestor group, max-by-authority. This is what `can()`
/// consults so a `group_admin` on an ancestor is implicitly app_admin
/// on the app.
///
/// Default = direct membership only (no inheritance), so the many test
/// stubs that model no group tree keep their existing behavior; the
/// Postgres repo overrides this with an ancestor-walking CTE.
async fn effective_app_role(
&self,
user_id: UserId,
app_id: AppId,
) -> Result<Option<AppRole>, AuthzError> {
self.membership(user_id, app_id).await
}
/// Highest effective role on a *group* node — the group's own
/// ancestor walk over `group_members`. Gates the group-management
/// capabilities. Default = no grant; the Postgres repo overrides it.
async fn effective_group_role(
&self,
_user_id: UserId,
_group_id: GroupId,
) -> Result<Option<AppRole>, AuthzError> {
Ok(None)
}
}
/// Repo errors surface here so handlers can map them to 500 without
@@ -353,7 +407,20 @@ async fn role_grants(
match principal.instance_role {
InstanceRole::Owner => Ok(true),
InstanceRole::Admin => Ok(admin_grants(cap)),
InstanceRole::Member => member_grants(repo, principal.user_id, cap).await,
InstanceRole::Member => match cap {
// Group-management caps resolve against the group ancestor
// walk (a group_admin on an ancestor is implicitly admin of
// the descendant group). Routed before member_grants because
// group caps carry no app_id.
Capability::GroupRead(g) | Capability::GroupWrite(g) | Capability::GroupAdmin(g) => {
group_member_grants(repo, principal.user_id, cap, g).await
}
// Creating a root-level group is an instance act — members
// can't. (Subgroup creation is gated on GroupAdmin(parent) at
// the handler, which routes through the arm above.)
Capability::InstanceCreateGroup => Ok(false),
_ => member_grants(repo, principal.user_id, cap).await,
},
}
}
@@ -377,12 +444,41 @@ async fn member_grants(
let Some(app_id) = cap.app_id() else {
return Ok(false);
};
let Some(role) = repo.membership(user_id, app_id).await? else {
// Effective (inherited) role: the app's own membership folded with any
// ancestor group membership. A group_admin on an ancestor group is
// implicitly app_admin here.
let Some(role) = repo.effective_app_role(user_id, app_id).await? else {
return Ok(false);
};
Ok(role_satisfies(role, cap))
}
/// Member-path resolution for the group-management capabilities. Resolves
/// the caller's effective role on the group (ancestor walk over
/// `group_members`) and checks it covers the requested group action.
async fn group_member_grants(
repo: &dyn AuthzRepo,
user_id: UserId,
cap: Capability,
group_id: GroupId,
) -> Result<bool, AuthzError> {
let Some(role) = repo.effective_group_role(user_id, group_id).await? else {
return Ok(false);
};
Ok(group_role_satisfies(role, cap))
}
/// Does the effective group `AppRole` cover the group capability?
/// viewer→read, editor→write, group_admin(=AppAdmin)→admin.
const fn group_role_satisfies(role: AppRole, cap: Capability) -> bool {
match cap {
Capability::GroupRead(_) => true, // any role can read
Capability::GroupWrite(_) => matches!(role, AppRole::Editor | AppRole::AppAdmin),
Capability::GroupAdmin(_) => matches!(role, AppRole::AppAdmin),
_ => false,
}
}
/// Does the per-app `AppRole` cover the capability? Viewer can read;
/// Editor adds script/route/log mutations; AppAdmin adds settings,
/// domain claims, and delete. Roles form a strict subset chain, so
@@ -471,16 +567,61 @@ mod tests {
use std::collections::HashMap;
use tokio::sync::Mutex;
/// In-memory `AuthzRepo` so the unit tests don't need a database.
/// In-memory `AuthzRepo` so the unit tests don't need a database. Models
/// direct app memberships PLUS a group tree (app→group, group→parent)
/// and group memberships, so the hierarchy-aware resolution can be
/// exercised without Postgres — mirroring the recursive-CTE behavior.
#[derive(Default)]
struct InMemoryAuthzRepo {
memberships: Mutex<HashMap<(UserId, AppId), AppRole>>,
app_group: Mutex<HashMap<AppId, GroupId>>,
group_parent: Mutex<HashMap<GroupId, Option<GroupId>>>,
group_memberships: Mutex<HashMap<(UserId, GroupId), AppRole>>,
}
impl InMemoryAuthzRepo {
async fn grant(&self, user: UserId, app: AppId, role: AppRole) {
self.memberships.lock().await.insert((user, app), role);
}
/// Register a group node and its parent (`None` = root).
async fn add_group(&self, group: GroupId, parent: Option<GroupId>) {
self.group_parent.lock().await.insert(group, parent);
}
/// Place an app under a group.
async fn put_app(&self, app: AppId, group: GroupId) {
self.app_group.lock().await.insert(app, group);
}
/// Grant a group-level role.
async fn grant_group(&self, user: UserId, group: GroupId, role: AppRole) {
self.group_memberships
.lock()
.await
.insert((user, group), role);
}
/// Fold every ancestor group membership starting at `group`,
/// max-by-authority, into `acc`.
async fn fold_group_chain(
&self,
user_id: UserId,
mut group: Option<GroupId>,
mut acc: Option<AppRole>,
) -> Option<AppRole> {
let memberships = self.group_memberships.lock().await;
let parents = self.group_parent.lock().await;
let mut hops = 0u32;
while let Some(g) = group {
if let Some(r) = memberships.get(&(user_id, g)).copied() {
acc = Some(acc.map_or(r, |a| a.max(r)));
}
hops += 1;
if hops > 64 {
break;
}
group = parents.get(&g).copied().flatten();
}
acc
}
}
#[async_trait]
@@ -497,6 +638,29 @@ mod tests {
.get(&(user_id, app_id))
.copied())
}
async fn effective_app_role(
&self,
user_id: UserId,
app_id: AppId,
) -> Result<Option<AppRole>, AuthzError> {
let direct = self
.memberships
.lock()
.await
.get(&(user_id, app_id))
.copied();
let start = self.app_group.lock().await.get(&app_id).copied();
Ok(self.fold_group_chain(user_id, start, direct).await)
}
async fn effective_group_role(
&self,
user_id: UserId,
group_id: GroupId,
) -> Result<Option<AppRole>, AuthzError> {
Ok(self.fold_group_chain(user_id, Some(group_id), None).await)
}
}
fn principal(role: InstanceRole) -> Principal {
@@ -857,12 +1021,183 @@ mod tests {
);
}
// ------------------------------------------------------------------
// Hierarchy-aware RBAC (Phase 2 groups)
// ------------------------------------------------------------------
#[tokio::test]
async fn group_admin_on_ancestor_is_implicit_app_admin() {
let repo = InMemoryAuthzRepo::default();
let acme = GroupId::new();
let app = AppId::new();
repo.add_group(acme, None).await;
repo.put_app(app, acme).await;
let p = principal(InstanceRole::Member);
// No app_members row — authority comes purely from the group.
repo.grant_group(p.user_id, acme, AppRole::AppAdmin).await;
for cap in [
Capability::AppRead(app),
Capability::AppWriteScript(app),
Capability::AppAdmin(app),
] {
assert!(
can(&repo, &p, cap).await.unwrap().is_allow(),
"inherited group_admin denied {cap:?}"
);
}
}
#[tokio::test]
async fn inherited_role_takes_the_max_of_direct_and_ancestor() {
let repo = InMemoryAuthzRepo::default();
let acme = GroupId::new();
let app = AppId::new();
repo.add_group(acme, None).await;
repo.put_app(app, acme).await;
let p = principal(InstanceRole::Member);
// Direct viewer on the app, app_admin via the ancestor group:
// the higher (app_admin) wins.
repo.grant(p.user_id, app, AppRole::Viewer).await;
repo.grant_group(p.user_id, acme, AppRole::AppAdmin).await;
assert!(can(&repo, &p, Capability::AppAdmin(app))
.await
.unwrap()
.is_allow());
}
#[tokio::test]
async fn group_role_inherits_down_a_multi_level_tree() {
let repo = InMemoryAuthzRepo::default();
let root = GroupId::new();
let team = GroupId::new();
let app = AppId::new();
repo.add_group(root, None).await;
repo.add_group(team, Some(root)).await;
repo.put_app(app, team).await;
// Editor two levels up flows down to the app as editor.
let p = principal(InstanceRole::Member);
repo.grant_group(p.user_id, root, AppRole::Editor).await;
assert!(can(&repo, &p, Capability::AppWriteScript(app))
.await
.unwrap()
.is_allow());
assert_eq!(
can(&repo, &p, Capability::AppAdmin(app)).await.unwrap(),
Decision::Deny,
"editor must not get app_admin"
);
}
#[tokio::test]
async fn group_membership_grants_no_instance_capabilities() {
let repo = InMemoryAuthzRepo::default();
let acme = GroupId::new();
repo.add_group(acme, None).await;
let p = principal(InstanceRole::Member);
repo.grant_group(p.user_id, acme, AppRole::AppAdmin).await;
for cap in [
Capability::InstanceCreateApp,
Capability::InstanceCreateGroup,
Capability::InstanceManageUsers,
] {
assert_eq!(
can(&repo, &p, cap).await.unwrap(),
Decision::Deny,
"group_admin must not grant instance cap {cap:?}"
);
}
}
#[tokio::test]
async fn group_admin_walks_ancestors_for_group_caps() {
let repo = InMemoryAuthzRepo::default();
let root = GroupId::new();
let team = GroupId::new();
repo.add_group(root, None).await;
repo.add_group(team, Some(root)).await;
let p = principal(InstanceRole::Member);
repo.grant_group(p.user_id, root, AppRole::AppAdmin).await;
// group_admin at root ⇒ admin of the descendant group.
assert!(can(&repo, &p, Capability::GroupAdmin(team))
.await
.unwrap()
.is_allow());
assert!(can(&repo, &p, Capability::GroupWrite(team))
.await
.unwrap()
.is_allow());
// An unrelated member gets nothing.
let outsider = principal(InstanceRole::Member);
assert_eq!(
can(&repo, &outsider, Capability::GroupRead(team))
.await
.unwrap(),
Decision::Deny
);
}
#[tokio::test]
async fn admin_implicitly_manages_the_whole_group_tree() {
let repo = InMemoryAuthzRepo::default();
let g = GroupId::new();
let p = principal(InstanceRole::Admin);
for cap in [
Capability::InstanceCreateGroup,
Capability::GroupRead(g),
Capability::GroupWrite(g),
Capability::GroupAdmin(g),
] {
assert!(
can(&repo, &p, cap).await.unwrap().is_allow(),
"admin denied group cap {cap:?}"
);
}
}
#[tokio::test]
async fn bound_key_cannot_manage_groups() {
let repo = InMemoryAuthzRepo::default();
let g = GroupId::new();
let p = Principal {
user_id: AdminUserId::new(),
instance_role: InstanceRole::Owner,
scopes: Some(vec![Scope::AppAdmin]),
app_binding: Some(AppId::new()),
};
// Group caps carry no app_id, so a bound key is denied at the
// binding layer regardless of role/scope.
assert_eq!(
can(&repo, &p, Capability::GroupAdmin(g)).await.unwrap(),
Decision::Deny
);
}
#[test]
fn app_role_max_is_authority_ordered() {
assert_eq!(AppRole::Viewer.max(AppRole::AppAdmin), AppRole::AppAdmin);
assert_eq!(AppRole::Editor.max(AppRole::Viewer), AppRole::Editor);
assert_eq!(AppRole::AppAdmin.max(AppRole::Editor), AppRole::AppAdmin);
}
#[test]
fn capability_app_id_extraction() {
let app = AppId::new();
assert_eq!(Capability::InstanceCreateApp.app_id(), None);
assert_eq!(Capability::AppRead(app).app_id(), Some(app));
assert_eq!(Capability::AppAdmin(app).app_id(), Some(app));
// Group caps are not app-scoped.
assert_eq!(Capability::GroupAdmin(GroupId::new()).app_id(), None);
assert_eq!(Capability::InstanceCreateGroup.app_id(), None);
}
#[test]