feat(apply): make the per-env approval gate hermetic (§3 M3 / Track A M1)

The per-env approval policy was applier-supplied — a hand-crafted request
that omitted `project.environments` was ungated, and flipping a gate to
`confirm = false` in the same request un-gated it. Persist the policy
server-side and enforce against `persisted ∪ declared`.

- Migration 0067: `project_environments (project_id, env_name, confirm)`,
  CASCADE on the project. Written declaratively (delete-then-insert) inside
  `upsert_project_tx`, same tx as the project row + node claim.
- `ProjectRepository::get_environments_by_slug` (read side) +
  `ApplyService::effective_env_policy` union the persisted policy with the
  request's declared one (confirm if EITHER says so — monotonic).
- `env_gate_check` now evaluates the effective policy; the three handlers load
  it before the gate. `plan.approvals_required` is the effective gated set, so
  CI sees a persisted gate even when the manifest omits it.
- The union rule closes both bypasses: an omitted policy still trips a
  persisted gate, and an ungating apply must itself pass the gate (the
  declarative replace then takes effect next time) — TOCTOU-safe.

Pinned by env_approval::{persisted_policy_gates_a_request_that_omits_it,
flipping_a_gate_to_false_in_the_same_request_still_gates} +
projects_repo::get_environments_by_slug_returns_persisted_policy. Schema golden
reblessed.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

crates/manager-core/migrations/0067_project_environments.sql

@@ -0,0 +1,25 @@
+-- §3 M3 (hermetic gate): persist the per-env approval policy server-side.
+--
+-- Before this table the policy lived ONLY in the apply request
+-- (`ProjectDecl.environments`), so a hand-crafted request that omitted it was
+-- ungated — the server had nothing authoritative to check against. This makes
+-- the gate hermetic: the confirm-required set is stored per project and the
+-- server enforces against `persisted ∪ declared` (an env is gated if EITHER the
+-- stored row OR the request says so), so an omitted or flipped-to-false policy
+-- can no longer bypass a gate a prior apply established.
+--
+-- One owner (the project), a single boolean policy per environment name — no
+-- polymorphic owner and no environment_scope (unlike `vars`/`secrets`, which
+-- are data the apply targets; this is metadata ABOUT the apply). CASCADE on the
+-- project mirrors 0066's philosophy: un-claiming/deleting a project drops its
+-- policy, it does not linger to gate a tree the project no longer owns.
+
+CREATE TABLE project_environments (
+    project_id UUID    NOT NULL REFERENCES projects(id) ON DELETE CASCADE,
+    -- The environment name as declared in `[project.environments]` (e.g.
+    -- "production"); matched against the apply's `--env`.
+    env_name   TEXT    NOT NULL,
+    -- TRUE => applying to this env is gated (needs `--approve <env>` + admin).
+    confirm    BOOLEAN NOT NULL,
+    PRIMARY KEY (project_id, env_name)
+);

crates/manager-core/src/apply_api.rs

@@ -231,10 +231,13 @@ async fn apply_handler(
 ) -> Result<Json<ApplyReport>, ApplyError> {
     let app_id = resolve_app_id(svc.apps.as_ref(), &id_or_slug).await?;
     require_app_node_writes(&svc, &principal, app_id, &req.bundle, req.prune).await?;
-    // §3 M3: server-authoritative per-env approval gate. If the target env is
+    // §3 M3: server-authoritative per-env approval gate, evaluated against the
-    // confirm-required and approved, the override additionally requires ADMIN on
+    // persisted ∪ declared policy (hermetic — an omitted policy can't bypass a
-    // the node (a step up from the editor write caps above) + is audited.
+    // gate a prior apply established). If gated and approved, the override
-    if env_gate_check(req.project.as_ref(), req.env.as_deref(), &req.approved_envs)? {
+    // additionally requires ADMIN on the node (a step up from the editor write
+    // caps above) + is audited.
+    let policy = svc.effective_env_policy(req.project.as_ref()).await?;
+    if env_gate_check(&policy, req.env.as_deref(), &req.approved_envs)? {
         require(svc.authz.as_ref(), &principal, Capability::AppAdmin(app_id))
             .await
             .map_err(map_authz)?;
@@ -317,8 +320,10 @@ async fn group_apply_handler(
     let group_id = resolve_group_id(svc.groups.as_ref(), &id_or_slug).await?;
     svc.require_group_node_writes(&principal, group_id, &req.bundle, req.prune)
         .await?;
-    // §3 M3: per-env approval gate — an approved gated apply requires GroupAdmin.
+    // §3 M3: per-env approval gate (persisted ∪ declared) — an approved gated
-    if env_gate_check(req.project.as_ref(), req.env.as_deref(), &req.approved_envs)? {
+    // apply requires GroupAdmin.
+    let policy = svc.effective_env_policy(req.project.as_ref()).await?;
+    if env_gate_check(&policy, req.env.as_deref(), &req.approved_envs)? {
         require(
             svc.authz.as_ref(),
             &principal,
@@ -401,10 +406,11 @@ async fn tree_apply_handler(
     Json(req): Json<TreeApplyRequest>,
 ) -> Result<Json<ApplyReport>, ApplyError> {
     authz_tree(&svc, &principal, &req.bundle, Some(req.prune)).await?;
-    // §3 M3: server-authoritative per-env approval gate. On an approved gated
+    // §3 M3: server-authoritative per-env approval gate (persisted ∪ declared).
-    // apply, require ADMIN on EVERY declared node (a step up from the editor
+    // On an approved gated apply, require ADMIN on EVERY declared node (a step up
-    // write caps authz_tree checks) + audit.
+    // from the editor write caps authz_tree checks) + audit.
-    if env_gate_check(req.project.as_ref(), req.env.as_deref(), &req.approved_envs)? {
+    let policy = svc.effective_env_policy(req.project.as_ref()).await?;
+    if env_gate_check(&policy, req.env.as_deref(), &req.approved_envs)? {
         require_admin_on_every_node(&svc, &principal, &req.bundle).await?;
         audit_gated_apply(&principal, req.env.as_deref(), req.bundle.nodes.len());
     }
@@ -425,21 +431,23 @@ async fn tree_apply_handler(
     Ok(Json(report))
 }
 
-/// §3 M3: the per-env approval gate, re-derived from the project's policy on the
+/// §3 M3 (hermetic gate): the per-env approval gate, evaluated against the
-/// wire (the CLI's client-side check is convenience; THIS is authoritative).
+/// EFFECTIVE policy (`persisted ∪ declared`, built by
-/// Returns `Ok(true)` when the target env is confirm-required AND approved — the
+/// `ApplyService::effective_env_policy`) — the persisted side is authoritative,
-/// caller must then require admin + audit. `Ok(false)` when not gated (no
+/// so a request that omits or weakens the policy can't bypass a gate a prior
-/// project, no env, or `confirm = false`). `Err(ApprovalRequired)` when gated
+/// apply established. Returns `Ok(true)` when the target env is confirm-required
-/// and NOT in `approved_envs` (a blanket `--yes` never lands here).
+/// AND approved — the caller must then require admin + audit. `Ok(false)` when
+/// not gated (no env, or `confirm = false` everywhere). `Err(ApprovalRequired)`
+/// when gated and NOT in `approved_envs` (a blanket `--yes` never lands here).
 fn env_gate_check(
-    project: Option<&ProjectDecl>,
+    policy: &std::collections::BTreeMap<String, bool>,
     env: Option<&str>,
     approved_envs: &[String],
 ) -> Result<bool, ApplyError> {
-    let (Some(project), Some(env)) = (project, env) else {
+    let Some(env) = env else {
         return Ok(false);
     };
-    if !project.confirm_required(env) {
+    if !policy.get(env).copied().unwrap_or(false) {
         return Ok(false);
     }
     if approved_envs.iter().any(|e| e == env) {

crates/manager-core/src/apply_service.rs

@@ -895,6 +895,49 @@ impl ApplyService {
             .await
     }
 
+    /// §3 M3 (hermetic gate): the EFFECTIVE per-env approval policy for an
+    /// apply/plan — `env_name -> confirm`, computed as `persisted ∪ declared`
+    /// (an env is confirm-required if EITHER the stored policy OR the request's
+    /// `[project.environments]` marks it so). Loading the persisted side is what
+    /// makes the gate hermetic: a request that omits (or flips-to-false) a policy
+    /// a prior apply persisted still trips the gate. Empty when no project is
+    /// declared. A persisted-read failure surfaces as `Backend` (fail-closed —
+    /// we never silently drop a gate).
+    pub async fn effective_env_policy(
+        &self,
+        project: Option<&ProjectDecl>,
+    ) -> Result<std::collections::BTreeMap<String, bool>, ApplyError> {
+        let Some(project) = project else {
+            return Ok(std::collections::BTreeMap::new());
+        };
+        let mut effective = self
+            .projects
+            .get_environments_by_slug(&project.slug)
+            .await
+            .map_err(|e| ApplyError::Backend(e.to_string()))?;
+        for (env, pol) in &project.environments {
+            // Union on confirm: a declared gate strengthens, never weakens.
+            let entry = effective.entry(env.clone()).or_insert(false);
+            *entry = *entry || pol.confirm;
+        }
+        Ok(effective)
+    }
+
+    /// The sorted names of every effectively-gated env (`effective_env_policy`
+    /// filtered to `confirm`), surfaced as `plan.approvals_required`.
+    async fn effective_gated_envs(
+        &self,
+        project: Option<&ProjectDecl>,
+    ) -> Result<Vec<String>, ApplyError> {
+        let policy = self.effective_env_policy(project).await?;
+        let mut gated: Vec<String> = policy
+            .into_iter()
+            .filter_map(|(env, confirm)| confirm.then_some(env))
+            .collect();
+        gated.sort_unstable();
+        Ok(gated)
+    }
+
     /// Owner-generic plan (Phase 5): diff `bundle` against an app OR group node.
     /// A group node has only scripts + vars — routes/triggers are rejected, and
     /// the app-only inherited-target + route-host validation is skipped.
@@ -936,7 +979,7 @@ impl ApplyService {
             // `apply` can refuse if the node changed underneath it (§4.2).
             state_token: state_token_with_names(&current, &current_names),
             ownership,
-            approvals_required: project.map(ProjectDecl::gated_envs).unwrap_or_default(),
+            approvals_required: self.effective_gated_envs(project).await?,
         })
     }
 
@@ -1772,7 +1815,7 @@ impl ApplyService {
         Ok(TreePlanResult {
             nodes,
             state_token: token,
-            approvals_required: project.map(ProjectDecl::gated_envs).unwrap_or_default(),
+            approvals_required: self.effective_gated_envs(project).await?,
         })
     }
 
@@ -4072,6 +4115,28 @@ async fn upsert_project_tx(
     .fetch_one(&mut **tx)
     .await
     .map_err(|e| ApplyError::Backend(e.to_string()))?;
+    // §3 M3 (hermetic gate): persist the declared per-env approval policy as the
+    // authoritative source. Declarative replace (delete-then-insert) so a
+    // removed env drops out — the gate reads `persisted ∪ declared`, so an
+    // ungating still has to pass the prior gate at apply time (see
+    // `apply_api::env_gate_check`). Same tx as the project row + node claim.
+    sqlx::query("DELETE FROM project_environments WHERE project_id = $1")
+        .bind(id)
+        .execute(&mut **tx)
+        .await
+        .map_err(|e| ApplyError::Backend(e.to_string()))?;
+    for (env_name, pol) in &decl.environments {
+        sqlx::query(
+            "INSERT INTO project_environments (project_id, env_name, confirm) \
+             VALUES ($1, $2, $3)",
+        )
+        .bind(id)
+        .bind(env_name)
+        .bind(pol.confirm)
+        .execute(&mut **tx)
+        .await
+        .map_err(|e| ApplyError::Backend(e.to_string()))?;
+    }
     Ok(id.into())
 }
 

crates/manager-core/src/project_repo.rs

@@ -26,6 +26,15 @@ pub trait ProjectRepository: Send + Sync {
     async fn list_with_counts(&self) -> Result<Vec<(Project, i64)>, ProjectRepositoryError>;
     async fn get_by_id(&self, id: ProjectId) -> Result<Option<Project>, ProjectRepositoryError>;
     async fn get_by_slug(&self, slug: &str) -> Result<Option<Project>, ProjectRepositoryError>;
+    /// §3 M3 (hermetic gate): the persisted per-env approval policy for the
+    /// project with this slug — `env_name -> confirm`. Empty when the project is
+    /// unregistered or declares no gated envs. The apply/plan path unions this
+    /// with the request's declared policy so an omitted policy can't bypass a
+    /// gate a prior apply persisted (see `apply_api::env_gate_check`).
+    async fn get_environments_by_slug(
+        &self,
+        slug: &str,
+    ) -> Result<std::collections::BTreeMap<String, bool>, ProjectRepositoryError>;
 }
 
 pub struct PostgresProjectRepository {
@@ -86,6 +95,22 @@ impl ProjectRepository for PostgresProjectRepository {
         .await?;
         Ok(row.map(Into::into))
     }
+
+    async fn get_environments_by_slug(
+        &self,
+        slug: &str,
+    ) -> Result<std::collections::BTreeMap<String, bool>, ProjectRepositoryError> {
+        let rows = sqlx::query_as::<_, (String, bool)>(
+            "SELECT pe.env_name, pe.confirm \
+             FROM project_environments pe \
+             JOIN projects p ON p.id = pe.project_id \
+             WHERE p.slug = $1",
+        )
+        .bind(slug)
+        .fetch_all(&self.pool)
+        .await?;
+        Ok(rows.into_iter().collect())
+    }
 }
 
 #[derive(sqlx::FromRow)]

crates/manager-core/tests/expected_schema.txt

@@ -318,6 +318,11 @@ table: outbox
   claimed_by: text NULL
   created_at: timestamp with time zone NOT NULL default=now()
 
+table: project_environments
+  project_id: uuid NOT NULL
+  env_name: text NOT NULL
+  confirm: boolean NOT NULL
+
 table: projects
   id: uuid NOT NULL default=gen_random_uuid()
   slug: text NOT NULL
@@ -603,6 +608,9 @@ indexes on outbox:
   idx_outbox_due: public.outbox USING btree (next_attempt_at) WHERE (claimed_at IS NULL)
   outbox_pkey: public.outbox USING btree (id)
 
+indexes on project_environments:
+  project_environments_pkey: public.project_environments USING btree (project_id, env_name)
+
 indexes on projects:
   projects_pkey: public.projects USING btree (id)
   projects_slug_key: public.projects USING btree (slug)
@@ -847,6 +855,10 @@ constraints on outbox:
   [FOREIGN KEY] outbox_app_id_fkey: FOREIGN KEY (app_id) REFERENCES apps(id) ON DELETE CASCADE
   [PRIMARY KEY] outbox_pkey: PRIMARY KEY (id)
 
+constraints on project_environments:
+  [FOREIGN KEY] project_environments_project_id_fkey: FOREIGN KEY (project_id) REFERENCES projects(id) ON DELETE CASCADE
+  [PRIMARY KEY] project_environments_pkey: PRIMARY KEY (project_id, env_name)
+
 constraints on projects:
   [FOREIGN KEY] projects_created_by_fkey: FOREIGN KEY (created_by) REFERENCES admin_users(id) ON DELETE SET NULL
   [PRIMARY KEY] projects_pkey: PRIMARY KEY (id)
@@ -992,3 +1004,4 @@ constraints on vars:
   0064: shared topic queue kinds
   0065: group queues
   0066: projects
+  0067: project environments

crates/manager-core/tests/projects_repo.rs

@@ -104,3 +104,47 @@ async fn list_with_owner_and_ancestors_surface_ownership() {
         .expect("get_by_id");
     assert_eq!(by_id.map(|p| p.slug), Some(proj_slug));
 }
+
+#[tokio::test]
+async fn get_environments_by_slug_returns_persisted_policy() {
+    // §3 M3 hermetic gate: the persisted per-env policy round-trips by project
+    // slug. Backs `ApplyService::effective_env_policy` (the `persisted` half).
+    let Some(pool) = pool_or_skip().await else {
+        return;
+    };
+    let projects = PostgresProjectRepository::new(pool.clone());
+
+    let proj_slug = uniq("penv");
+    let (proj_id,): (Uuid,) =
+        sqlx::query_as("INSERT INTO projects (slug, name) VALUES ($1, $1) RETURNING id")
+            .bind(&proj_slug)
+            .fetch_one(&pool)
+            .await
+            .expect("insert project");
+    for (env, confirm) in [("production", true), ("staging", false)] {
+        sqlx::query(
+            "INSERT INTO project_environments (project_id, env_name, confirm) VALUES ($1, $2, $3)",
+        )
+        .bind(proj_id)
+        .bind(env)
+        .bind(confirm)
+        .execute(&pool)
+        .await
+        .expect("insert env policy");
+    }
+
+    let policy = projects
+        .get_environments_by_slug(&proj_slug)
+        .await
+        .expect("get_environments_by_slug");
+    assert_eq!(policy.get("production"), Some(&true));
+    assert_eq!(policy.get("staging"), Some(&false));
+    assert_eq!(policy.len(), 2);
+
+    // An unknown slug yields an empty policy (no gate).
+    let empty = projects
+        .get_environments_by_slug("no-such-project")
+        .await
+        .expect("get_environments_by_slug");
+    assert!(empty.is_empty());
+}

crates/picloud-cli/tests/env_approval.rs

@@ -4,13 +4,16 @@
 //! to such an env with `pic apply --env <e>` is refused unless it is explicitly
 //! `--approve <e>`d — and a blanket `--yes` does NOT cover it (§4.2, "CI must
 //! opt in per environment"). An unlisted or `confirm = false` env applies
-//! freely. The CLI gates client-side (fast fail) AND the SERVER re-derives the
+//! freely. The CLI gates client-side (fast fail) AND the SERVER enforces it — a
-//! policy from the request and enforces it — a confirm-required apply is refused
+//! confirm-required apply is refused (409) unless approved, and an approved
-//! (409) unless approved, and an approved override additionally requires ADMIN on
+//! override additionally requires ADMIN on every declared node (a step up from
-//! every declared node (a step up from editor write caps) and is audited. This
+//! editor write caps) and is audited.
-//! closes the patched/older-CLI bypass (a client that still declares the project
+//!
-//! but skips the local check); a request that omits the policy is inherently
+//! §3 M3 HERMETIC gate: the policy is PERSISTED server-side (`project_environments`,
-//! ungated (the policy is applier-supplied, not persisted server state).
+//! 0067) on every apply, and the gate evaluates against `persisted ∪ declared` —
+//! so a request that OMITS the policy (or flips a gate to `false`) can no longer
+//! bypass a gate a prior apply established. This closes both the patched/older-CLI
+//! bypass AND the hand-crafted-request bypass.
 
 use std::fs;
 use std::path::Path;
@@ -337,3 +340,129 @@ fn approving_a_gated_apply_requires_admin() {
         "the approval denial should be an authz error:\n{err}"
     );
 }
+
+#[ignore = "needs DATABASE_URL pointing at a running Postgres"]
+#[test]
+fn persisted_policy_gates_a_request_that_omits_it() {
+    // §3 M3 HERMETIC: once an apply persists a `confirm = true` env, a LATER raw
+    // request that OMITS the policy entirely (empty `environments`) is STILL
+    // gated — the server enforces against the persisted policy, not just the
+    // wire. This is the hand-crafted-request bypass the earlier CLI-only gate
+    // could not close.
+    let Some(fx) = common::fixture_or_skip() else {
+        return;
+    };
+    let env = common::admin_env(fx);
+    let group = common::unique_slug("eah-grp");
+    let project = common::unique_slug("eah-proj");
+    let _g = GroupGuard::new(&env.url, &env.token, &group);
+    common::pic_as(&env)
+        .args(["groups", "create", &group])
+        .assert()
+        .success();
+
+    let http = reqwest::blocking::Client::new();
+    let apply = |environments: serde_json::Value, approved: serde_json::Value| {
+        http.post(format!("{}/api/v1/admin/tree/apply", env.url))
+            .bearer_auth(&env.token)
+            .json(&serde_json::json!({
+                "bundle": { "nodes": [{ "kind": "group", "slug": group, "bundle": {} }] },
+                "project": { "slug": project, "environments": environments },
+                "env": "production",
+                "approved_envs": approved,
+                "prune": false,
+            }))
+            .send()
+            .expect("tree apply")
+    };
+
+    // First apply DECLARES + APPROVES the gate → persists `production=true`.
+    let seed = apply(
+        serde_json::json!({ "production": { "confirm": true } }),
+        serde_json::json!(["production"]),
+    );
+    assert!(
+        seed.status().is_success(),
+        "the seeding apply (declared + approved) must succeed (got {}: {})",
+        seed.status(),
+        seed.text().unwrap_or_default()
+    );
+
+    // Now a request that OMITS the policy and does NOT approve → still 409,
+    // because the persisted policy still gates `production`.
+    let omit = apply(serde_json::json!({}), serde_json::json!([]));
+    assert_eq!(
+        omit.status().as_u16(),
+        409,
+        "a persisted gate must hold even when the request omits the policy (got {}: {})",
+        omit.status(),
+        omit.text().unwrap_or_default()
+    );
+
+    // Approving it clears the persisted gate (admin token holds GroupAdmin).
+    let ok = apply(serde_json::json!({}), serde_json::json!(["production"]));
+    assert!(
+        ok.status().is_success(),
+        "approving the persisted gate must let it through (got {}: {})",
+        ok.status(),
+        ok.text().unwrap_or_default()
+    );
+}
+
+#[ignore = "needs DATABASE_URL pointing at a running Postgres"]
+#[test]
+fn flipping_a_gate_to_false_in_the_same_request_still_gates() {
+    // §3 M3 HERMETIC (monotonic rule): the gate evaluates against
+    // `persisted ∪ declared`, so declaring `confirm = false` for an env a prior
+    // apply persisted as `true` does NOT un-gate it in the same request — the
+    // ungating apply must itself pass the gate. This closes the flip-to-false
+    // bypass.
+    let Some(fx) = common::fixture_or_skip() else {
+        return;
+    };
+    let env = common::admin_env(fx);
+    let group = common::unique_slug("eaf-grp");
+    let project = common::unique_slug("eaf-proj");
+    let _g = GroupGuard::new(&env.url, &env.token, &group);
+    common::pic_as(&env)
+        .args(["groups", "create", &group])
+        .assert()
+        .success();
+
+    let http = reqwest::blocking::Client::new();
+    let apply = |environments: serde_json::Value, approved: serde_json::Value| {
+        http.post(format!("{}/api/v1/admin/tree/apply", env.url))
+            .bearer_auth(&env.token)
+            .json(&serde_json::json!({
+                "bundle": { "nodes": [{ "kind": "group", "slug": group, "bundle": {} }] },
+                "project": { "slug": project, "environments": environments },
+                "env": "production",
+                "approved_envs": approved,
+                "prune": false,
+            }))
+            .send()
+            .expect("tree apply")
+    };
+
+    // Persist `production=true`.
+    assert!(apply(
+        serde_json::json!({ "production": { "confirm": true } }),
+        serde_json::json!(["production"]),
+    )
+    .status()
+    .is_success());
+
+    // Same request flips it to false but does NOT approve → still 409 (the
+    // persisted `true` wins under the union rule).
+    let flip = apply(
+        serde_json::json!({ "production": { "confirm": false } }),
+        serde_json::json!([]),
+    );
+    assert_eq!(
+        flip.status().as_u16(),
+        409,
+        "flipping a persisted gate to false must not un-gate it in the same request (got {}: {})",
+        flip.status(),
+        flip.text().unwrap_or_default()
+    );
+}

docs/design/groups-and-project-tool.md

@@ -844,12 +844,19 @@ handlers (single app, single group, tree); the env policy folds into the **tree*
 between plan and apply trips `StateMoved`); single-node `apply --file` now sends the GOVERNING project (own block
 else nearest ancestor's), so a leaf apply carries the root's policy; `plan` surfaces `approvals_required`. Pinned by
 `tests/env_approval.rs::{server_enforces_the_gate_against_a_non_stock_client, approving_a_gated_apply_requires_admin}`.
-**Threat-model note (honest scope):** this closes the "patched/older CLI that still declares the project but skips
+
-the local check" bypass, and admin-gates + audits the override. It is NOT a hermetic authorization boundary against
+**HERMETIC (shipped — Track A M1, 2026-07-11):** the policy is now PERSISTED server-side — `project_environments`
-a hand-crafted request that OMITS the policy (or the `env` label) — the policy is applier-supplied, not persisted
+(migration `0067`, `(project_id, env_name, confirm)`, CASCADE) is written declaratively inside every apply's
-server state, so an omitted policy is inherently ungated. **Full closure (deferred):** persist the env policy
+`upsert_project_tx`, and the gate evaluates against the **effective policy = persisted ∪ declared**
-server-side (a `project_environments` source of truth) + a server-determined env, so enforcement is independent of
+(`ApplyService::effective_env_policy` unions `ProjectRepository::get_environments_by_slug` with the request's
-what the request declares. **Also deferred:** env-as-app mapping + declarative server-side `@E` config scoping.
+`[project.environments]`). An env is confirm-required if EITHER the stored row OR the request marks it so, which
+closes both remaining bypasses: a hand-crafted request that OMITS the policy still trips a persisted gate, and
+flipping a gate to `confirm = false` in the same request does NOT un-gate it (the ungating apply must itself pass
+the gate; the declarative replace then takes effect for next time — a monotonic, TOCTOU-safe rule). `plan`'s
+`approvals_required` is likewise the effective set, so CI sees a persisted gate even when the manifest omits it.
+Pinned by `tests/env_approval.rs::{persisted_policy_gates_a_request_that_omits_it,
+flipping_a_gate_to_false_in_the_same_request_still_gates}` + `tests/projects_repo.rs::get_environments_by_slug_returns_persisted_policy`.
+**Still deferred (separate, not a gate hole):** env-as-app mapping + declarative server-side `@E` config scoping.
 
 **§6/§3 group-tree Tier 1 (M1 create · M2 divergence/reparent · M3 per-env approval) is COMPLETE.**