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fix(manager-core): F-S-001 cap kv/docs/pubsub/queue payload sizes (default 256 KB)

Browse Source 
Files (per-file cap), secrets (64 KB default), and email (25 MB default)
already enforce limits; kv::set, docs::create/update, pubsub::publish_durable
and queue::enqueue accepted any JSON value straight to a JSONB column with
no size validation. An anonymous public-HTTP script could fill disk via
queue::enqueue or amplify a single publish into N outbox rows × payload bytes.

Adds four new error variants:
- KvError::ValueTooLarge { limit, actual }
- DocsError::ValueTooLarge { limit, actual }
- PubsubError::MessageTooLarge { limit, actual }
- QueueError::PayloadTooLarge { limit, actual }

Each stateful service grows a `max_value_bytes` field with:
- Conservative 256 KB default (DEFAULT_KV_MAX_VALUE_BYTES etc.).
- New `with_max_*` constructor preserving the old `new()` signature.
- Env-knob reader (`*_max_*_from_env()`) — mirrors SecretsConfig::from_env.

Validation runs at the entry point BEFORE authz so an anonymous DoS doesn't
pay a membership lookup per attempt.

Wired via env knobs:
- PICLOUD_KV_MAX_VALUE_BYTES
- PICLOUD_DOCS_MAX_VALUE_BYTES
- PICLOUD_PUBSUB_MAX_MESSAGE_BYTES
- PICLOUD_QUEUE_MAX_PAYLOAD_BYTES

Documented in CLAUDE.md runtime config table.

New unit test in queue_service verifying the cap fires before authz.

AUDIT.md anchor: F-S-001. Depends on F-Q-004 (Backend variant).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
This commit is contained in:
MechaCat02
2026-06-07 20:00:36 +02:00
parent 5c50ce2e11
commit e29ac1c03d
10 changed files with 243 additions and 13 deletions
Download Patch File Download Diff File Expand all files Collapse all files

47
crates/manager-core/src/docs_service.rs
View File

@@ -34,10 +34,31 @@ use crate::authz::{self, AuthzRepo, Capability};
use crate::docs_filter::{parse_filter, FilterParseError};
use crate::docs_repo::{DocsRepo, DocsRepoError};
/// Default per-document JSON-encoded data cap (256 KB). Override with
/// `PICLOUD_DOCS_MAX_VALUE_BYTES`.
pub const DEFAULT_DOCS_MAX_VALUE_BYTES: usize = 256 * 1024;
/// Read `PICLOUD_DOCS_MAX_VALUE_BYTES`; invalid values fall back to the
/// conservative default with a warning.
#[must_use]
pub fn docs_max_value_bytes_from_env() -> usize {
if let Ok(v) = std::env::var("PICLOUD_DOCS_MAX_VALUE_BYTES") {
match v.trim().parse::<usize>() {
Ok(n) if n > 0 => return n,
_ => tracing::warn!(
value = %v,
"ignoring invalid PICLOUD_DOCS_MAX_VALUE_BYTES (want a positive integer)"
),
}
}
DEFAULT_DOCS_MAX_VALUE_BYTES
}
pub struct DocsServiceImpl {
repo: Arc<dyn DocsRepo>,
authz: Arc<dyn AuthzRepo>,
events: Arc<dyn ServiceEventEmitter>,
max_value_bytes: usize,
}
impl DocsServiceImpl {
@@ -46,14 +67,38 @@ impl DocsServiceImpl {
repo: Arc<dyn DocsRepo>,
authz: Arc<dyn AuthzRepo>,
events: Arc<dyn ServiceEventEmitter>,
) -> Self {
Self::with_max_value_bytes(repo, authz, events, DEFAULT_DOCS_MAX_VALUE_BYTES)
}
#[must_use]
pub fn with_max_value_bytes(
repo: Arc<dyn DocsRepo>,
authz: Arc<dyn AuthzRepo>,
events: Arc<dyn ServiceEventEmitter>,
max_value_bytes: usize,
) -> Self {
Self {
repo,
authz,
events,
max_value_bytes,
}
}
fn check_data_size(&self, data: &serde_json::Value) -> Result<(), DocsError> {
let encoded_len = serde_json::to_vec(data)
.map(|v| v.len())
.map_err(|e| DocsError::Backend(format!("encode doc data: {e}")))?;
if encoded_len > self.max_value_bytes {
return Err(DocsError::ValueTooLarge {
limit: self.max_value_bytes,
actual: encoded_len,
});
}
Ok(())
}
async fn check_read(&self, cx: &SdkCallCx) -> Result<(), DocsError> {
authz::script_gate(
&*self.authz,
@@ -116,6 +161,7 @@ impl DocsService for DocsServiceImpl {
) -> Result<DocId, DocsError> {
validate_collection(collection)?;
validate_data(&data)?;
self.check_data_size(&data)?;
self.check_write(cx).await?;
let row = self
.repo
@@ -193,6 +239,7 @@ impl DocsService for DocsServiceImpl {
) -> Result<(), DocsError> {
validate_collection(collection)?;
validate_data(&data)?;
self.check_data_size(&data)?;
self.check_write(cx).await?;
let previous = self
.repo

42
crates/manager-core/src/kv_service.rs
View File

@@ -25,10 +25,32 @@ use picloud_shared::{
use crate::authz::{self, AuthzRepo, Capability};
use crate::kv_repo::{KvRepo, KvRepoError};
/// Default per-key JSON-encoded value cap (256 KB). Override with
/// `PICLOUD_KV_MAX_VALUE_BYTES`.
pub const DEFAULT_KV_MAX_VALUE_BYTES: usize = 256 * 1024;
/// Read `PICLOUD_KV_MAX_VALUE_BYTES`; invalid values fall back to the
/// conservative default with a warning. Public so the picloud binary can
/// thread it through `KvServiceImpl::new`.
#[must_use]
pub fn kv_max_value_bytes_from_env() -> usize {
if let Ok(v) = std::env::var("PICLOUD_KV_MAX_VALUE_BYTES") {
match v.trim().parse::<usize>() {
Ok(n) if n > 0 => return n,
_ => tracing::warn!(
value = %v,
"ignoring invalid PICLOUD_KV_MAX_VALUE_BYTES (want a positive integer)"
),
}
}
DEFAULT_KV_MAX_VALUE_BYTES
}
pub struct KvServiceImpl {
repo: Arc<dyn KvRepo>,
authz: Arc<dyn AuthzRepo>,
events: Arc<dyn ServiceEventEmitter>,
max_value_bytes: usize,
}
impl KvServiceImpl {
@@ -37,11 +59,22 @@ impl KvServiceImpl {
repo: Arc<dyn KvRepo>,
authz: Arc<dyn AuthzRepo>,
events: Arc<dyn ServiceEventEmitter>,
) -> Self {
Self::with_max_value_bytes(repo, authz, events, DEFAULT_KV_MAX_VALUE_BYTES)
}
#[must_use]
pub fn with_max_value_bytes(
repo: Arc<dyn KvRepo>,
authz: Arc<dyn AuthzRepo>,
events: Arc<dyn ServiceEventEmitter>,
max_value_bytes: usize,
) -> Self {
Self {
repo,
authz,
events,
max_value_bytes,
}
}
@@ -102,6 +135,15 @@ impl KvService for KvServiceImpl {
value: serde_json::Value,
) -> Result<(), KvError> {
validate_collection(collection)?;
let encoded_len = serde_json::to_vec(&value)
.map(|v| v.len())
.map_err(|e| KvError::Backend(format!("encode value: {e}")))?;
if encoded_len > self.max_value_bytes {
return Err(KvError::ValueTooLarge {
limit: self.max_value_bytes,
actual: encoded_len,
});
}
self.check_write(cx).await?;
let previous = self
.repo

39
crates/manager-core/src/pubsub_service.rs
View File

@@ -70,6 +70,26 @@ fn load_i64(dst: &mut i64, key: &str) {
}
}
/// Default per-message JSON-encoded payload cap (256 KB). Override with
/// `PICLOUD_PUBSUB_MAX_MESSAGE_BYTES`.
pub const DEFAULT_PUBSUB_MAX_MESSAGE_BYTES: usize = 256 * 1024;
/// Read `PICLOUD_PUBSUB_MAX_MESSAGE_BYTES`; invalid values fall back to
/// the conservative default with a warning.
#[must_use]
pub fn pubsub_max_message_bytes_from_env() -> usize {
if let Ok(v) = std::env::var("PICLOUD_PUBSUB_MAX_MESSAGE_BYTES") {
match v.trim().parse::<usize>() {
Ok(n) if n > 0 => return n,
_ => tracing::warn!(
value = %v,
"ignoring invalid PICLOUD_PUBSUB_MAX_MESSAGE_BYTES (want a positive integer)"
),
}
}
DEFAULT_PUBSUB_MAX_MESSAGE_BYTES
}
pub struct PubsubServiceImpl {
repo: Arc<dyn PubsubRepo>,
authz: Arc<dyn AuthzRepo>,
@@ -80,6 +100,7 @@ pub struct PubsubServiceImpl {
topics: Option<Arc<dyn TopicRepo>>,
secrets: Option<Arc<dyn AppSecretsRepo>>,
token_config: SubscriberTokenConfig,
max_message_bytes: usize,
}
impl PubsubServiceImpl {
@@ -92,9 +113,16 @@ impl PubsubServiceImpl {
topics: None,
secrets: None,
token_config: SubscriberTokenConfig::conservative(),
max_message_bytes: DEFAULT_PUBSUB_MAX_MESSAGE_BYTES,
}
}
#[must_use]
pub fn with_max_message_bytes(mut self, n: usize) -> Self {
self.max_message_bytes = n;
self
}
/// Attach the v1.1.6 realtime surface: the in-process broadcaster
/// (publish fan-out to SSE subscribers), the topic registry +
/// app-secrets repo (subscriber-token minting), and the TTL config.
@@ -142,6 +170,17 @@ impl PubsubService for PubsubServiceImpl {
if topic.trim().is_empty() {
return Err(PubsubError::EmptyTopic);
}
// Reject oversized messages BEFORE the authz check so an
// anonymous public-script DoS doesn't pay the membership lookup.
let encoded_len = serde_json::to_vec(&message)
.map(|v| v.len())
.map_err(|e| PubsubError::Rejected(format!("encode message: {e}")))?;
if encoded_len > self.max_message_bytes {
return Err(PubsubError::MessageTooLarge {
limit: self.max_message_bytes,
actual: encoded_len,
});
}
self.check_publish(cx).await?;
// `published_at` is stamped once on the manager side so every

65
crates/manager-core/src/queue_service.rs
View File

@@ -15,16 +15,50 @@ use picloud_shared::{EnqueueOpts, QueueError, QueueMessageId, QueueService, SdkC
use crate::authz::{self, AuthzRepo, Capability};
use crate::queue_repo::{NewQueueMessage, QueueRepo};
/// Default per-message JSON-encoded payload cap (256 KB). Override with
/// `PICLOUD_QUEUE_MAX_PAYLOAD_BYTES`.
pub const DEFAULT_QUEUE_MAX_PAYLOAD_BYTES: usize = 256 * 1024;
/// Read `PICLOUD_QUEUE_MAX_PAYLOAD_BYTES`; invalid values fall back to
/// the conservative default with a warning.
#[must_use]
pub fn queue_max_payload_bytes_from_env() -> usize {
if let Ok(v) = std::env::var("PICLOUD_QUEUE_MAX_PAYLOAD_BYTES") {
match v.trim().parse::<usize>() {
Ok(n) if n > 0 => return n,
_ => tracing::warn!(
value = %v,
"ignoring invalid PICLOUD_QUEUE_MAX_PAYLOAD_BYTES (want a positive integer)"
),
}
}
DEFAULT_QUEUE_MAX_PAYLOAD_BYTES
}
/// Production impl: authz gate → repo. Trivial wrapper.
pub struct QueueServiceImpl {
repo: Arc<dyn QueueRepo>,
authz: Arc<dyn AuthzRepo>,
max_payload_bytes: usize,
}
impl QueueServiceImpl {
#[must_use]
pub fn new(repo: Arc<dyn QueueRepo>, authz: Arc<dyn AuthzRepo>) -> Self {
Self { repo, authz }
Self::with_max_payload_bytes(repo, authz, DEFAULT_QUEUE_MAX_PAYLOAD_BYTES)
}
#[must_use]
pub fn with_max_payload_bytes(
repo: Arc<dyn QueueRepo>,
authz: Arc<dyn AuthzRepo>,
max_payload_bytes: usize,
) -> Self {
Self {
repo,
authz,
max_payload_bytes,
}
}
}
@@ -40,6 +74,17 @@ impl QueueService for QueueServiceImpl {
if queue_name.is_empty() {
return Err(QueueError::EmptyName);
}
// Reject oversized payloads BEFORE the authz check so an
// anonymous public-script DoS doesn't pay the membership lookup.
let encoded_len = serde_json::to_vec(&payload)
.map(|v| v.len())
.map_err(|e| QueueError::Rejected(format!("encode payload: {e}")))?;
if encoded_len > self.max_payload_bytes {
return Err(QueueError::PayloadTooLarge {
limit: self.max_payload_bytes,
actual: encoded_len,
});
}
let max_attempts = opts.max_attempts.unwrap_or(3);
if !(1..=20).contains(&max_attempts) {
return Err(QueueError::InvalidOpts(
@@ -311,6 +356,24 @@ mod tests {
assert!(captured.deliver_after.is_none());
}
#[tokio::test]
async fn oversized_payload_is_rejected_before_authz() {
let repo = Arc::new(CapturingRepo {
last: tokio::sync::Mutex::new(None),
});
let svc = QueueServiceImpl::with_max_payload_bytes(repo, Arc::new(AlwaysAllowAuthz), 16);
let cx = anon_cx();
let payload = serde_json::json!({ "blob": "x".repeat(200) });
let err = svc
.enqueue(&cx, "jobs", payload, EnqueueOpts::default())
.await
.unwrap_err();
assert!(
matches!(err, QueueError::PayloadTooLarge { .. }),
"expected PayloadTooLarge, got {err:?}"
);
}
struct DenyAllAuthz;
#[async_trait]
impl AuthzRepo for DenyAllAuthz {