From f4189fc52fd4363eee36028f7b8d9fdc99da5e24 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: MechaCat02 <fabian@diekaulbachs.de>
Date: Sun, 7 Jun 2026 20:40:52 +0200
Subject: [PATCH] fix(manager-core): F-S-006 cap API-key candidate set at 16
 (Argon2 CPU amplifier)
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verify_api_key Argon2-verifies every candidate sharing the 8-char
prefix. With unlimited candidates, an attacker who can provision many
keys against one indexed prefix could force the server into per-request
M×Argon2 — a few hundred concurrent connections trivially DoSes the
manager since the verify runs before any concurrency cap.

Cap the candidate set at MAX_API_KEY_CANDIDATES = 16; log a warn when
truncation kicks in so operators can spot it. With 32-byte random key
bodies the natural collision rate is negligible, so truncation under
benign load shouldn't happen — its presence is the alarm.

Switching the verify hash from Argon2 to SHA-256 (the audit's other
suggested fix) is a larger refactor (new hash column, backfill, dual-
hash verify during migration) and is left for a follow-up.

AUDIT.md anchor: F-S-006 (cap; hash swap deferred).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
---
 crates/manager-core/src/auth_middleware.rs | 19 ++++++++++++++++++-
 1 file changed, 18 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

diff --git a/crates/manager-core/src/auth_middleware.rs b/crates/manager-core/src/auth_middleware.rs
index f3d6d89..459bf6e 100644
--- a/crates/manager-core/src/auth_middleware.rs
+++ b/crates/manager-core/src/auth_middleware.rs
@@ -263,7 +263,7 @@ async fn verify_api_key(state: &AuthState, rest: &str) -> Result<Option<Principa
     }
     let prefix = &rest[..API_KEY_PREFIX_LEN];
 
-    let candidates = match state.keys.find_active_by_prefix(prefix).await {
+    let mut candidates = match state.keys.find_active_by_prefix(prefix).await {
         Ok(v) => v,
         Err(err) => {
             tracing::error!(?err, "api_keys lookup failed");
@@ -271,6 +271,23 @@ async fn verify_api_key(state: &AuthState, rest: &str) -> Result<Option<Principa
         }
     };
 
+    // F-S-006: bound the candidate set. Prefix collisions are
+    // statistically rare for a 32-byte random body, but the 8-char
+    // index space is small enough that an attacker who provisions
+    // many keys against one indexed prefix could amplify each public
+    // bearer-tagged request into M×Argon2 verifies. Cap at MAX and
+    // log the truncation so operators can spot it.
+    const MAX_API_KEY_CANDIDATES: usize = 16;
+    if candidates.len() > MAX_API_KEY_CANDIDATES {
+        tracing::warn!(
+            prefix,
+            total = candidates.len(),
+            kept = MAX_API_KEY_CANDIDATES,
+            "api_keys prefix-bucket overflow; truncating candidate verify set"
+        );
+        candidates.truncate(MAX_API_KEY_CANDIDATES);
+    }
+
     // F-P-002: Argon2id verify is CPU-bound (~tens of ms each at OWASP
     // defaults). Move it off the Tokio async worker so a hot user with
     // N prefix-colliding keys doesn't park the worker for N×Argon2.