feat(v1.1.6): realtime channels + v1.1.5 follow-ups + version bumps

Server-side realtime SSE on per-app pub/sub topics, plus the three
v1.1.5 follow-ups and the version bumps.

Realtime:
- topics registry (0021) + admin endpoints + Capability::AppTopicManage
  (-> app:admin; no new scope).
- GET /realtime/topics/{topic} SSE endpoint (orchestrator-core data
  plane): Host -> app, RealtimeAuthority gate (404 missing/internal,
  401 bad/absent token), broadcast::Receiver stream + heartbeat.
- RealtimeBroadcaster / RealtimeEvent / RealtimeAuthority traits
  (picloud-shared); InProcessBroadcaster + GC (orchestrator-core);
  DB-backed RealtimeAuthorityImpl (manager-core). Publish path fans out
  to in-process subscribers after the durable outbox commit (best-effort,
  panic-isolated).
- HMAC subscriber tokens (subscriber_token.rs) + app_secrets table (0022)
  + pubsub::subscriber_token SDK (schema 1.6 -> 1.7). TTL clamp + env
  overrides.
- Dashboard Topics tab (register/list/edit/delete, prominent external
  badge, flip confirmation).

v1.1.5 follow-ups:
- Empty blobs accepted (NewFile/FileUpdate::validate) + round-trip test.
- Orphan *.tmp.* sweeper (spawn_files_orphan_sweep).
- Dispatcher e2e tests, one per trigger kind (DATABASE_URL-gated).

Versions: workspace 1.1.6, SDK 1.7, dashboard 0.12.0. Schema-snapshot
golden re-blessed.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
This commit is contained in:
MechaCat02
2026-06-04 20:18:50 +02:00
parent d064681c49
commit fcbcc576a2
35 changed files with 4333 additions and 63 deletions

View File

@@ -0,0 +1,338 @@
//! `RealtimeAuthorityImpl` — the DB-backed SSE subscribe gate (v1.1.6).
//!
//! Backs the [`picloud_shared::RealtimeAuthority`] trait the SSE handler
//! in orchestrator-core calls. All `topics`-table reads and signing-key
//! material stay inside this impl so the data-plane crate never touches
//! the key.
//!
//! Verdict mapping (see [`SubscribeDenied`]):
//! * topic missing OR not externally subscribable → `NotFound` (404).
//! Both collapse to 404 so the endpoint can't probe internal topics.
//! * `auth_mode = 'public'` → allow.
//! * `auth_mode = 'token'` → verify the HMAC token (present, signed by
//! this app's key, unexpired, scoped to this topic) → allow, else
//! `Unauthorized` (401, generic — never says which check failed).
//!
//! Signing keys never change in v1.1.6 (no rotation API), so a small
//! in-memory cache avoids a per-subscribe DB read once an app's key has
//! been seen. The cache is purely an optimization — a cold miss reads
//! the row.
use std::collections::HashMap;
use std::sync::{Arc, Mutex};
use async_trait::async_trait;
use picloud_shared::{subscriber_token, AppId, RealtimeAuthority, SubscribeDenied};
use crate::app_secrets_repo::AppSecretsRepo;
use crate::topic_repo::{TopicAuthMode, TopicRepo};
pub struct RealtimeAuthorityImpl {
topics: Arc<dyn TopicRepo>,
secrets: Arc<dyn AppSecretsRepo>,
key_cache: Mutex<HashMap<AppId, Vec<u8>>>,
}
impl RealtimeAuthorityImpl {
#[must_use]
pub fn new(topics: Arc<dyn TopicRepo>, secrets: Arc<dyn AppSecretsRepo>) -> Self {
Self {
topics,
secrets,
key_cache: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
}
}
/// Fetch the app's signing key, consulting the cache first. Returns
/// `None` when the app has no key (no token ever minted) — which the
/// caller maps to `Unauthorized`.
async fn signing_key(&self, app_id: AppId) -> Result<Option<Vec<u8>>, SubscribeDenied> {
if let Ok(cache) = self.key_cache.lock() {
if let Some(k) = cache.get(&app_id) {
return Ok(Some(k.clone()));
}
}
let key = self
.secrets
.signing_key(app_id)
.await
.map_err(|e| SubscribeDenied::Backend(e.to_string()))?;
if let Some(ref k) = key {
if let Ok(mut cache) = self.key_cache.lock() {
cache.insert(app_id, k.clone());
}
}
Ok(key)
}
}
#[async_trait]
impl RealtimeAuthority for RealtimeAuthorityImpl {
async fn authorize_subscribe(
&self,
app_id: AppId,
topic: &str,
token: Option<&str>,
) -> Result<(), SubscribeDenied> {
let registered = self
.topics
.get(app_id, topic)
.await
.map_err(|e| SubscribeDenied::Backend(e.to_string()))?;
// Missing topic AND internal-only topic both 404 — don't leak
// which internal topics exist.
let Some(t) = registered.filter(|t| t.external_subscribable) else {
return Err(SubscribeDenied::NotFound);
};
match t.auth_mode {
TopicAuthMode::Public => Ok(()),
TopicAuthMode::Token => {
let token = token.ok_or(SubscribeDenied::Unauthorized)?;
let key = self
.signing_key(app_id)
.await?
.ok_or(SubscribeDenied::Unauthorized)?;
let now = chrono::Utc::now().timestamp();
let claims = subscriber_token::verify(&key, token, now)
.map_err(|_| SubscribeDenied::Unauthorized)?;
// Per-app key already makes a cross-app token fail the
// signature check; this is belt-and-suspenders.
if claims.app_id != app_id || !claims.allows_topic(topic) {
return Err(SubscribeDenied::Unauthorized);
}
Ok(())
}
}
}
}
#[cfg(test)]
mod tests {
use super::*;
use crate::app_secrets_repo::AppSecretsRepoError;
use crate::topic_repo::{Topic, TopicRepoError};
use chrono::Utc;
use picloud_shared::subscriber_token::{sign, TokenClaims};
struct FakeTopics(Vec<(AppId, Topic)>);
#[async_trait]
impl TopicRepo for FakeTopics {
async fn create(
&self,
_: AppId,
_: &str,
_: bool,
_: TopicAuthMode,
) -> Result<Topic, TopicRepoError> {
unimplemented!()
}
async fn list(&self, _: AppId) -> Result<Vec<Topic>, TopicRepoError> {
unimplemented!()
}
async fn get(&self, app_id: AppId, name: &str) -> Result<Option<Topic>, TopicRepoError> {
Ok(self
.0
.iter()
.find(|(a, t)| *a == app_id && t.name == name)
.map(|(_, t)| t.clone()))
}
async fn update(
&self,
_: AppId,
_: &str,
_: Option<bool>,
_: Option<TopicAuthMode>,
) -> Result<Option<Topic>, TopicRepoError> {
unimplemented!()
}
async fn delete(&self, _: AppId, _: &str) -> Result<bool, TopicRepoError> {
unimplemented!()
}
}
struct FakeSecrets(AppId, Vec<u8>);
#[async_trait]
impl AppSecretsRepo for FakeSecrets {
async fn get_or_create_signing_key(
&self,
_: AppId,
) -> Result<Vec<u8>, AppSecretsRepoError> {
Ok(self.1.clone())
}
async fn signing_key(&self, app_id: AppId) -> Result<Option<Vec<u8>>, AppSecretsRepoError> {
Ok((app_id == self.0).then(|| self.1.clone()))
}
}
fn topic(name: &str, external: bool, mode: TopicAuthMode) -> Topic {
Topic {
name: name.to_string(),
external_subscribable: external,
auth_mode: mode,
created_at: Utc::now(),
updated_at: Utc::now(),
}
}
fn authority(
topics: Vec<(AppId, Topic)>,
key_app: AppId,
key: Vec<u8>,
) -> RealtimeAuthorityImpl {
RealtimeAuthorityImpl::new(
Arc::new(FakeTopics(topics)),
Arc::new(FakeSecrets(key_app, key)),
)
}
#[tokio::test]
async fn missing_topic_is_not_found() {
let app = AppId::new();
let a = authority(vec![], app, vec![0u8; 32]);
assert_eq!(
a.authorize_subscribe(app, "ghost", None).await,
Err(SubscribeDenied::NotFound)
);
}
#[tokio::test]
async fn internal_only_topic_is_not_found() {
let app = AppId::new();
let a = authority(
vec![(app, topic("internal", false, TopicAuthMode::Public))],
app,
vec![0u8; 32],
);
assert_eq!(
a.authorize_subscribe(app, "internal", None).await,
Err(SubscribeDenied::NotFound)
);
}
#[tokio::test]
async fn public_topic_allows_without_token() {
let app = AppId::new();
let a = authority(
vec![(app, topic("news", true, TopicAuthMode::Public))],
app,
vec![0u8; 32],
);
assert!(a.authorize_subscribe(app, "news", None).await.is_ok());
}
#[tokio::test]
async fn token_topic_without_token_is_unauthorized() {
let app = AppId::new();
let a = authority(
vec![(app, topic("chat", true, TopicAuthMode::Token))],
app,
vec![7u8; 32],
);
assert_eq!(
a.authorize_subscribe(app, "chat", None).await,
Err(SubscribeDenied::Unauthorized)
);
}
#[tokio::test]
async fn token_topic_with_valid_token_allows() {
let app = AppId::new();
let key = vec![9u8; 32];
let a = authority(
vec![(app, topic("chat", true, TopicAuthMode::Token))],
app,
key.clone(),
);
let token = sign(
&key,
&TokenClaims {
app_id: app,
topics: vec!["chat".into()],
iat: Utc::now().timestamp(),
exp: Utc::now().timestamp() + 60,
},
);
assert!(a
.authorize_subscribe(app, "chat", Some(&token))
.await
.is_ok());
}
#[tokio::test]
async fn token_for_other_topic_is_unauthorized() {
let app = AppId::new();
let key = vec![9u8; 32];
let a = authority(
vec![(app, topic("chat", true, TopicAuthMode::Token))],
app,
key.clone(),
);
let token = sign(
&key,
&TokenClaims {
app_id: app,
topics: vec!["other".into()],
iat: Utc::now().timestamp(),
exp: Utc::now().timestamp() + 60,
},
);
assert_eq!(
a.authorize_subscribe(app, "chat", Some(&token)).await,
Err(SubscribeDenied::Unauthorized)
);
}
#[tokio::test]
async fn expired_token_is_unauthorized() {
let app = AppId::new();
let key = vec![9u8; 32];
let a = authority(
vec![(app, topic("chat", true, TopicAuthMode::Token))],
app,
key.clone(),
);
let token = sign(
&key,
&TokenClaims {
app_id: app,
topics: vec!["chat".into()],
iat: Utc::now().timestamp() - 120,
exp: Utc::now().timestamp() - 60,
},
);
assert_eq!(
a.authorize_subscribe(app, "chat", Some(&token)).await,
Err(SubscribeDenied::Unauthorized)
);
}
#[tokio::test]
async fn token_signed_by_other_app_key_is_unauthorized() {
let app_a = AppId::new();
let app_b = AppId::new();
let key_a = vec![1u8; 32];
let key_b = vec![2u8; 32];
// Authority for app B; its key is key_b.
let a = authority(
vec![(app_b, topic("chat", true, TopicAuthMode::Token))],
app_b,
key_b,
);
// Token signed by app A's key, claiming app A.
let token = sign(
&key_a,
&TokenClaims {
app_id: app_a,
topics: vec!["chat".into()],
iat: Utc::now().timestamp(),
exp: Utc::now().timestamp() + 60,
},
);
assert_eq!(
a.authorize_subscribe(app_b, "chat", Some(&token)).await,
Err(SubscribeDenied::Unauthorized)
);
}
}