Commit Graph

5 Commits

Author SHA1 Message Date
MechaCat02
8b62b137c0 fix(executor): cap per-execution durable fan-out width
`trigger_depth` bounds how DEEP a trigger/invoke chain runs, but nothing bounded
how WIDE one execution could fan out. A single anonymous request running
`for i in 0..1_000_000 { invoke_async("w", #{}) }` costs a few Rhai ops plus one
cheap outbox INSERT per iteration, so within the op / wall-clock budget it could
write ~10^5 durable rows — each dispatched as its own execution — flooding the
outbox and dispatcher (a durable-amplification DoS).

Add a per-execution ceiling on DURABLE emissions (`invoke_async`,
`pubsub::publish_durable`, `queue::enqueue`, and the shared-topic/-queue
variants), env `PICLOUD_MAX_EMISSIONS_PER_EXECUTION` (default 1000). It's a
thread-local counter wrapped by a re-entrancy-aware `EmissionBudgetScope` around
every `execute_ast`: the OUTERMOST scope resets it, so a fresh dispatched
handler (a new pooled-thread task) gets a full budget while a synchronous
`invoke()` / interceptor re-entry nested in the same call stack SHARES it (fan-
out counted across the whole synchronous chain). The outermost Drop re-zeroes
the counter so a pooled thread never leaks a count into the next task.

Pinned by an `emit_budget` unit test (outermost resets, nested shares, ceiling
trips); the invoke/queue/pubsub/workflow journeys (small counts) stay green.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-13 22:27:32 +02:00
MechaCat02
bdcd3dc7f4 fix(executor): bound Rhai→JSON materialization to prevent anonymous OOM
The per-element Rhai sandbox caps (max_string_size 64 KiB, max_array_size /
max_map_size 10 000) do NOT bound the *materialized* size: Rhai shares strings
and arrays by Rc, so a 10 000-element array of one aliased 64 KiB string is
cheap to build (~10 000 ops, far under the 1 M op budget) yet dealiases to
~640 MiB of distinct JSON. Every Dynamic→JSON conversion deep-copies the
aliases; the HTTP response body path had NO size cap at all, and the KV/docs
value caps run only AFTER full materialization — so a handful of anonymous
requests could OOM the node (32 concurrent × ~640 MiB ≈ 20 GiB) on the stated
consumer-hardware target.

Add a byte-budgeted materializer that bails the moment the budget is exceeded,
so the transient allocation is bounded regardless of aliasing:
- bridge.rs: `dynamic_to_json_capped(value, max) -> Result<Json, JsonSizeError>`
  (charges a running budget) + `MAX_JSON_MATERIALIZE_BYTES` (16 MiB hard rail,
  far above the 256 KiB business caps). `dynamic_to_json` stays infallible for
  best-effort paths (logging) but is now internally bounded — it collapses an
  over-limit value to a marker string instead of OOMing.
- Route every user-value boundary through the fail-closed capped form: KV
  set/set_if (+ the CAS `expected`), docs create/update/find, secrets set,
  http request body, workflow input, `json::stringify`, and the HTTP RESPONSE
  body (previously the one fully-uncapped exit → now a 500). `invoke` args and
  the pubsub/queue message materializers get the same byte budget in place.
- `impl From<JsonSizeError> for Box<EvalAltResult>` so SDK sites protect
  themselves with a bare `?`.

Pinned by bridge unit tests: an aliased 10 000×64 KiB array errors on the
budget rather than materializing, and the infallible wrapper yields a marker
instead of OOMing. Workspace 914 + journeys 157/157 green.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-13 21:50:16 +02:00
MechaCat02
ccd3644aa4 feat(shared-queues): group-keyed queue store + enqueue service + SDK (D3.1)
The producer side of shared durable queues:
- migration 0065 group_queue_messages (mirrors 0034, keyed by (group_id,
  collection); CASCADE on group delete).
- GroupQueueRepo/PostgresGroupQueueRepo: enqueue + the competing-consumer
  claim (FOR UPDATE SKIP LOCKED) + ack/nack/drop_exhausted/reclaim/depth.
- GroupQueueService trait (shared) + GroupQueueServiceImpl: resolve owning
  group (kind='queue') from cx.app_id's chain, require editor+
  (GroupQueueEnqueue, fails closed on anon), size-cap, enqueue.
- SDK: `queue::shared_collection("name")` -> GroupQueueHandle with
  `.enqueue(msg[, opts])` / `.depth()` / `.depth_pending()`; wired through
  Services + the picloud binary.
- authz: Capability::GroupQueueEnqueue(GroupId), editor+ / script:write.

Deterministic test proves competing consumers claim each message exactly
once. Consumption wiring (materialized consumers + dispatcher branch) lands
in D3.2.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-02 22:08:21 +02:00
MechaCat02
c3baa87415 chore(v1.1.9): clippy clean — workspace -D warnings
Surfaced + fixed during the F3 attestation:

- executor-core/sdk/queue.rs: drop redundant .map(|()| ()) call sites;
  enqueue_blocking discards QueueMessageId via .map(|_id| ()) (intentional)
- executor-core/sdk/retry.rs: hoist use std::collections::hash_map::DefaultHasher
  + use std::hash::Hasher to the top of the file (clippy::items_after_statements);
  replace `as i64` casts with i64::try_from + clear comment about jitter
  bound (clippy::cast_possible_wrap)
- executor-core/sdk/invoke.rs: move _LIMITS_IS_COPY const before #[cfg(test)]
  mod tests (clippy::items_after_test_module)
- manager-core/dispatcher.rs: dispatch_one_queue gains #[allow(too_many_lines)]
  (it's the queue tick's whole logic — split makes it less readable than
  the lint); .map(...).unwrap_or(default) → .map_or(default, ...)
- picloud/lib.rs: Limits { trigger_depth_max, ..Limits::default() } via
  struct-update instead of let-mut-assign (clippy::field_reassign_with_default)
- tests: r#"..."# → r"..." where there are no `"` inside (clippy::needless_raw_string_hashes);
  combine InvokeTarget::Name | InvokeTarget::Path arms with identical bodies
  in sdk_invoke.rs (clippy::match_same_arms)

cargo fmt --all -- --check 2>&1 | tail -3: no output (exit 0)
cargo clippy --workspace --all-targets --all-features -- -D warnings:
  Finished `dev` profile [unoptimized + debuginfo] target(s) in 0.41s
Workspace lib smoke: 432 passing (306 manager-core + 74 executor-core + 34 shared + 18 orchestrator-core).
DB-gated E2E (against docker compose postgres on localhost:15432):
  queue_e2e: 4 ok / invoke_e2e: 4 ok / retry_e2e: 3 ok / migration_queue_messages: 4 ok / schema_snapshot: 1 ok

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-06-07 11:02:22 +02:00
MechaCat02
cae2269932 feat(v1.1.9): queue:: Rhai SDK module
executor-core/sdk/queue.rs registers the queue:: namespace into the
per-call Rhai engine:

  queue::enqueue("name", message)               -> ()
  queue::enqueue("name", message, opts)         -> ()  // opts: Map
  queue::depth("name")                          -> i64
  queue::depth_pending("name")                  -> i64

No handle pattern (queues are the grouping unit, mirroring pubsub).
Opts map accepts optional delay_ms (i64) and max_attempts (u32);
unknown keys are silently ignored to match Rhai's Map semantics.

Bridge details:
- captures Arc<dyn QueueService> + Arc<SdkCallCx> per closure (cheap
  clone)
- block_on via TokioHandle::try_current() — same pattern pubsub/kv use
- message → JSON via a local message_to_json that base64-encodes Blobs
  at any depth (mirrors pubsub) and REJECTS FnPtr / closures with a
  clear error (queue messages must survive Postgres round-trip)
- depth / depth_pending clamp u64 → i64::MAX (Rhai's INT is i64)

register_all gains queue::register(...) positionally after pubsub.

Unit tests (executor-core --lib): blob → base64, nested-map round-trip,
FnPtr rejection, opts parsing (partial / max_attempts only / non-integer
delay rejection).

Integration tests (executor-core/tests/sdk_queue.rs, 6 binaries):
enqueue map payload, enqueue with opts threads through, blob base64
encodes, depth returns service value, FnPtr in payload throws, empty
queue_name throws.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-06-06 19:33:06 +02:00