The test creates a script in the default app earlier in the body, so a
plain DELETE /apps/default hits the soft no-cascade guard and 409s
before the capability check runs. The intent is to validate that admin
holds AppAdmin everywhere, not to exercise the cascade contract — pass
?force=true so we reach the gate we're trying to test.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Aligns the canonical capability rules with how the dashboard now shadows
its UI. Instance admins become implicit app_admin on every app (only
InstanceManageSettings stays owner-only), and the script-delete handler
moves from AppWriteScript to AppAdmin so editors can save but not delete.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
- `membership_makes_app_appear_in_members_app_list` previously seeded
the membership via the repo helper; switch to the public POST
endpoint so the test actually exercises the full HTTP round-trip
the dashboard depends on.
- Add `add_member_with_missing_user_id_is_rejected` to pin the
Axum-JsonRejection 4xx contract on malformed POST bodies.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Adds 16 integration tests against a real Postgres covering the new
/api/v1/admin/apps/{id_or_slug}/members surface:
- list / add / patch / remove against an explicit member row
- 409 on duplicate, 422 on inactive target, 422 on owner/admin target
- 404 on PATCH without an existing row; 204 idempotent DELETE
- viewer-as-bob receives 403 on every mutating verb
- both slug and UUID paths resolve to the same body
- bob-with-app_admin can manage the member list, including removing
himself (load-bearing for the no-last-app-admin-guard decision)
- granting a `member` user a viewer membership makes the app appear
in their `GET /admin/apps` list (was empty before)
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
GET /api/v1/admin/apps/{id_or_slug} now returns an `AppRole`-typed
`my_role` alongside the existing app fields, computed server-side from
the Principal: `Owner → app_admin` and `Admin → editor` (both
implicit per blueprint §11.6), `Member → app_members.role` (looked up
via the existing `AuthzRepo::membership` already in `AppsState`).
The dashboard uses this single field to decide whether to render
admin-only surfaces (Members tab, etc.) instead of duplicating the
implicit-grant rules on the client side — keeps API and UI gate logic
identical with one round-trip.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
The /admins create/patch endpoints now plumb email through to the
repo so the dashboard's invite + edit forms aren't silently dropping
it on the floor. Discovered during smoke testing — the database
column existed and was exposed in the response DTO, but neither
the request DTO nor the repo's create() accepted it.
CreateAdminRequest gains optional email; PatchAdminRequest gains
email with JSON Merge Patch semantics:
absent → don't change
null → clear (write NULL)
"<string>" → set to that value
The tri-state needs Option<Option<String>> with a tiny custom
deserializer; serde collapses absent and null otherwise.
normalize_email() trims, treats blanks as None, and rejects
obviously bogus values (no '@', >254 chars) with a 422. Real
email verification is a future concern.
Repo trait gains an email parameter on create() and a new
update_email() method. The unique-violation branch in create now
inspects constraint() to distinguish duplicate username from
duplicate email.
Integration test exercises create-with-email, PATCH null clears,
PATCH value sets, PATCH without email key no-ops on email.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Pure formatting pass — no behavior changes. Catches the line-wrapping
drift across the new authz / api_keys / middleware / handler edits
that piled up during the implementation.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Covers the matrix laid out in the plan:
* bootstrap admin lands as Owner
* owner / admin / member access matrices on the default app
* bearer pic_ key and cookie session resolve to the same Principal
* read-only key cannot write (scope intersection)
* bound key cannot escape its app
* member listing isolation at SQL for /admin/apps + /admin/scripts
* deactivating a user expires every API key for them
* mint rejects bound key carrying instance:* scopes (422)
* list_active_owners returns the right set for the startup warning
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
