Ports the M3 milestone from the superseded feat/hierarchies branch onto main's
evolved apply engine. A group node is authoritatively managed by at most one
project-root; `pic apply --dir` claims, conflicts, takes over, and (with
--prune) structurally reaps owned nodes.
- Migration 0066: `projects(id, key UNIQUE)` + promote the inert
`groups.owner_project` (0047) to a real FK (ON DELETE SET NULL) + index.
- CLI mints a stable, gitignored project key in `.picloud/project.json`
(`pic init`, or lazily on first tree plan/apply) and presents it on every
tree request; `pic apply --dir --takeover` flag; `pic plan --dir` surfaces
ownership conflicts + structural-prune candidates read-only.
- Server: prepare_tree resolves ownership read-only (token folds each group's
owner key, so a claim/takeover by another repo between plan and apply trips
StateMoved). apply_tree upserts the project in-tx, claims unclaimed declared
groups, and takes over owned ones under `--takeover`. --prune reaps
owned-but-undeclared groups leaf-first (delete_group_tx RESTRICT — never
another repo's or a UI-owned node).
- Authz (§7.4, ownership ⟂ RBAC): takeover requires GroupAdmin per contested
node — enforced in authz_tree (pre-tx) AND re-verified in-tx at the ownership
decision, so --force (which waives the staleness token) can't open a
takeover-without-admin window. The attacker-supplied project key is
length/charset-validated server-side.
Adaptation to main (which lacks the superseded branch's M2 declarative group
create/reparent): groups pre-exist, so ownership stamps existing declared
nodes rather than claim-on-create; the declarative attach-point is deferred.
Review fixes (adversarial pass, 3 findings, all closed):
- HIGH: an empty `[group]` node was claimed capability-free — require a
baseline GroupScriptsWrite (editor) on every group apply node, so claiming
ownership needs write authority (Ownership ⟂ RBAC).
- MEDIUM: structural prune would silently CASCADE a group's §11.6 shared
collections + secrets (which postdate M3's original design). Guard: a prune
candidate holding shared data/secrets is KEPT with a warning (plus its
candidate ancestors, so a preserved child never aborts a parent delete).
- LOW: a corrupt `.picloud/project.json` silently re-minted a new key
(orphaning ownership) — now fails loudly if the file exists but won't parse.
Tests: tests/ownership.rs (claim → conflict → takeover → flip; non-admin
takeover → 403; prune-owned-only; prune-refuses-to-cascade-shared-data);
format_conflicts + validate_project_key unit tests; schema golden reblessed.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Remediation after an independent review of the two feature commits.
pic init:
- Fix the headline `pic init --dir <new-dir>` flow: slug derivation used
`canonicalize()`, which fails on a not-yet-created directory → empty
slug → bail. Derive from the path's own final component first, falling
back to canonicalize only for `.`. Add a test that exercised the gap
(the existing tests all passed an explicit slug).
- `ensure_gitignored` no longer overwrites an existing-but-unreadable
`.gitignore` (only a genuinely-absent file is treated as empty).
Bound-plan staleness:
- Token trigger coverage now mirrors the diff exactly via
`current_trigger_identity`: dead-letter triggers (which the diff
ignores and the manifest can't represent) and the currently-inert
`enabled` flag are no longer hashed, so an out-of-band dead-letter
change can't force a spurious `--force`. Add a test.
- Correct two overclaiming comments: the check shares the diff's
pool-read apply-vs-interactive-write window (it is not tx-scoped), and
the token deliberately mirrors the diff's inputs.
- `.picloud/` self-ignores via a `*` `.gitignore` written alongside the
plan token, so projects created with `pic pull`/`plan` (not just
`init`) keep it out of git.
- `clear_plan` is now app-scoped: it won't discard a token recorded for a
different app sharing the directory.
Tested: manager-core lib 364 + cli bins 31 + 14 project-tool journeys
green; clippy -D warnings clean.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
`pic plan` now records a fingerprint of the live state it diffed against;
`pic apply` replays it and the server refuses (HTTP 409) if the app
changed underneath the reviewed plan — the §4.2 "apply exactly what you
reviewed" guarantee, in its content-addressed form (no migration, no
changes to interactive write paths).
Server (manager-core):
- `state_token(CurrentState)`: deterministic FNV-1a fingerprint over what
the diff keys on — script name+version (version bumps on any edit),
route identity+binding/attrs, trigger membership+enabled, secret names.
Order-independent; a collision can only yield a false "unchanged", never
a false refusal.
- `plan` returns it (flattened onto the plan JSON, so the wire stays
additive); `apply` takes an optional `expected_token` and, under the
apply lock before any write, returns `StateMoved` (409) on mismatch.
CLI:
- `.picloud/` link state (`linkstate`): `pic plan` writes the token scoped
to the app slug; `pic apply` replays it, then clears it on success (the
token is single-use — the next apply re-plans). `--force` skips the
check; apply with no recorded plan still works standalone (today's
behavior). `.picloud/` is already gitignored by `pic init`.
The tree-structure version (the other half of §4.2's counter) stays a
deliberate no-op until groups exist — it only guards reparent/structural
moves, which don't exist single-app.
Tested: state_token unit test (stable/order-independent/sensitive) + a
staleness journey (plan → out-of-band deploy → apply refuses → --force
applies); manager-core lib 363 + cli bins 31 + 13 journeys green; clippy
-D warnings clean.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
