Remediate the HIGH and security-relevant findings from the 2026-07-11 audit.
H1 — the per-env approval gate is now server-authoritative. The governing
project is resolved from the target node's nearest-claimed ancestor
(`governing_env_policy`/`_tree` + `governing_project_id` +
`ProjectRepository::get_environments_by_id`), independent of the client-supplied
`[project]`. Omitting or spoofing the project block can no longer skip a gate the
owning project established; a to-create group resolves its declared parent's
chain so a fresh subtree node inherits the gate. Fails closed on any read error.
H2 — the API-key prefix slice (`&rest[..8]`) is now the boundary-safe
`rest.get(..8)`, so an attacker-supplied multibyte bearer can't panic the request
task (unauthenticated per-request DoS). Regression test added.
C1 — admin sessions gain an absolute lifetime cap (migration 0070,
`PICLOUD_SESSION_ABSOLUTE_TTL_HOURS`, default 30d): `lookup` filters it, `touch`
clamps the sliding bump to it, so a continuously-used or stolen-but-warm token
self-expires. Mirrors the data-plane app-user cap.
C2 — `Cache-Control: no-store` on the login and API-key-mint responses (the two
that return a raw credential), so a proxy/CDN/browser cache can't retain it.
B8 — file downloads are header-safe: `sanitize_stored_filename` guarantees a
valid `HeaderValue` (no panic on a control-char name) and BOTH the per-app and
group download paths now set attachment + `X-Content-Type-Options: nosniff` +
a restrictive CSP, closing a group-path stored-XSS gap.
Also folds in the server-side plan-warning plumbing (`plan_warnings`,
`PlanResult::warnings`) and the `app_only_reject` message helper that the CLI
plan-preview change builds on, plus operator security notes (reads-open shared-
topic SSE; the `--env` label is advisory, not a boundary).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
The PrincipalCache (token-hash -> resolved Principal, 60s TTL) had no
eviction hook, so deactivation / password change / API-key revocation
flipped the DB rows but the cache kept serving the stale principal for
up to the TTL window. Closes the audit's PrincipalCache revocation-lag
Medium and greens authz::deactivating_user_revokes_their_api_keys.
- PrincipalCache::evict_user(user_id) + evict_token(hash).
- One shared cache Arc threaded into AuthState / AdminsState /
ApiKeysState (a per-state cache would let the middleware's own copy
keep authenticating a revoked principal).
- Evict on: deactivation, password change (both evict_user), logout
(evict_token, precise), single API-key delete (evict_user).
- H-E1 note: DB-write invalidation stays best-effort by design (a blip
must not undo the rotation); the cache evict is what makes it take
effect on the next request.
- Renamed bearer_and_cookie_produce_same_principal ->
session_token_and_api_key_produce_same_principal (cookie auth was
removed in C-1; the test never tested cookies).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* auth: generate_api_key() mints pic_<base32(32 bytes)>, splits the
indexed 8-char prefix, and Argon2-hashes the body. Adds the
data-encoding workspace dep for unpadded base32.
* api_keys_api: POST /api/v1/admin/api-keys (mint, returns raw_token
exactly once), GET (caller's own, no raw), DELETE {id} (caller's
own; 404 deliberately covers both 'missing' and 'not yours').
Mint validation rejects bound keys carrying instance:* scopes (422).
* AdminsState gains the api keys repo; PATCH set_active(false) now
expires every active key for that user alongside session wipe —
Phase 3.5 deactivation symmetry.
* picloud lib wires PostgresApiKeyRepository through AuthDeps into
AdminsState + ApiKeysState; api_keys_router merges into the
guarded_admin layer.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
