The per-element Rhai sandbox caps (max_string_size 64 KiB, max_array_size /
max_map_size 10 000) do NOT bound the *materialized* size: Rhai shares strings
and arrays by Rc, so a 10 000-element array of one aliased 64 KiB string is
cheap to build (~10 000 ops, far under the 1 M op budget) yet dealiases to
~640 MiB of distinct JSON. Every Dynamic→JSON conversion deep-copies the
aliases; the HTTP response body path had NO size cap at all, and the KV/docs
value caps run only AFTER full materialization — so a handful of anonymous
requests could OOM the node (32 concurrent × ~640 MiB ≈ 20 GiB) on the stated
consumer-hardware target.
Add a byte-budgeted materializer that bails the moment the budget is exceeded,
so the transient allocation is bounded regardless of aliasing:
- bridge.rs: `dynamic_to_json_capped(value, max) -> Result<Json, JsonSizeError>`
(charges a running budget) + `MAX_JSON_MATERIALIZE_BYTES` (16 MiB hard rail,
far above the 256 KiB business caps). `dynamic_to_json` stays infallible for
best-effort paths (logging) but is now internally bounded — it collapses an
over-limit value to a marker string instead of OOMing.
- Route every user-value boundary through the fail-closed capped form: KV
set/set_if (+ the CAS `expected`), docs create/update/find, secrets set,
http request body, workflow input, `json::stringify`, and the HTTP RESPONSE
body (previously the one fully-uncapped exit → now a 500). `invoke` args and
the pubsub/queue message materializers get the same byte budget in place.
- `impl From<JsonSizeError> for Box<EvalAltResult>` so SDK sites protect
themselves with a bare `?`.
Pinned by bridge unit tests: an aliased 10 000×64 KiB array errors on the
budget rather than materializing, and the infallible wrapper yields a marker
instead of OOMing. Workspace 914 + journeys 157/157 green.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
`http.rs` hand-rolled its own `block_on` + `map_http_err`, and `secrets.rs` /
`email.rs` / `users.rs` each carried a byte-identical `runtime_err` — five
`#[allow(clippy::unnecessary_box_returns)]` across four files for one pattern.
Move `runtime_err` to `bridge.rs` beside `block_on` (single home, single allow)
and have the three bridges import it. `http.rs` now calls the shared
`bridge::block_on("http", …)` (same "http:"-prefixed error, so messages are
unchanged) and its `err` validation helper delegates to `bridge::runtime_err`.
Deletes 4 duplicate fns and 3 of the 5 allows; no behavior change (pinned by
the executor-core SDK contract tests).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Whitespace + import-grouping fixups in the 9 SDK modules touched by
F-Q-002. No behavior change.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Replace ten near-identical `block_on` helpers (one per SDK module)
with a single shared `sdk::bridge::block_on(service: &str, fut)`.
The helper takes a service-prefix string and a future whose error
implements Display, so each module's `KvError`/`DocsError`/etc.
still self-formats.
Migrated:
- kv, docs, pubsub, users, dead_letters, secrets, files, email
- queue.rs has two helpers; the inline-shaped enqueue path and the
block_on_u64 (u64→i64) wrapper are left in place — the latter
could use the shared helper but the local form is one less call
site per finding overlap. Will revisit on a later pass if needed.
- http.rs is intentionally NOT migrated: it has per-variant error
mapping via `map_http_err` that the generic helper can't express.
Net: -218 / +97 lines across the 9 migrated files. Single source of
truth for the runtime-handle lookup and error wrapping.
AUDIT.md anchor: F-Q-002.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Encrypted per-app secrets, reachable from scripts as
secrets::{get,set,delete,list}(name) and managed from the dashboard
Secrets tab. Values are AES-256-GCM-sealed with the process master key
(picloud_shared::crypto) before they touch Postgres; the repo only ever
sees ciphertext + nonce. JSON round-trip preserves Rhai types.
- migration 0023_secrets.sql (PRIMARY KEY (app_id, name)).
- SecretsService trait (picloud-shared) + SecretsServiceImpl + repo
(manager-core), wired into the Services bundle and Rhai engine.
- Capability::AppSecretsRead/Write (→ script:read / script:write); no
new Scope variants (seven-scope commitment).
- Admin API GET/POST/DELETE /apps/{id}/secrets (list returns names +
updated_at, never values).
- build_app now takes a MasterKey, sourced from PICLOUD_SECRET_KEY in
main.rs; test callers pass a fixed test key.
- 64 KB value cap (PICLOUD_SECRET_MAX_VALUE_BYTES); no ServiceEvent
emission (secret writes don't fire triggers, by design).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
