A project's root manifest can mark environments confirm-required; applying to
one needs an explicit `pic apply --dir --env <e> --approve <e>` (a blanket
`--yes` does NOT cover it), the act is admin-gated and audited, and the policy
folds into the bound-plan token. The last unbuilt piece of the project-tool
track (§4.2/§6).
- manifest: `[project]` block → `ManifestProject { environments[{name,confirm}] }`,
valid only on the tree's ROOT manifest (rejected elsewhere by build_tree).
- discover: build_tree emits `project` into the bundle from the root manifest.
- apply_service: `TreeBundle.project` + `ProjectPolicy`; policy folds into the
state_token (a policy edit between plan and apply trips StateMoved); plan
surfaces `approvals_required`; new `ApplyError::ApprovalRequired` → 409.
- apply_api: `enforce_env_approval` (after authz_tree) — refuses a gated env
not in `approved_envs`, and on approval requires admin (AppAdmin/GroupAdmin)
on every declared node + audits. The server re-derives the policy from the
bundle (CLI check is convenience; server is authoritative).
- CLI: `--approve <env>` (repeatable); `resolve_approvals` refuses a gated env
non-interactively, prompts on a TTY (retype the env name); plan renders gated
envs. Single-node `apply --file --env <e>` REFUSES a confirm-required env
(can't carry the admin-gated approval) and directs to `--dir` — closing the
bypass found in review rather than silently skipping the gate.
- approval journey + manifest/ProjectPolicy unit tests. No migration (policy
lives in the manifest, like takeover/blast-radius).
- doc §11 Phase 5 + §12: approval gating shipped; gate is a `--dir` feature.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
§4.5 of the groups/project-tool design. A group declares a route ONCE; the
tree apply fans it out into one concrete per-app_id route on every descendant
app — instantiation, not inheritance (the cross-app isolation boundary is
unchanged; expanded rows stay app-owned).
- Migration 0053: `route_templates` table (group-owned) + `routes.from_template`
provenance column + index.
- `template_repo.rs`: tx-aware CRUD + chain-load (mirrors group_repo/route_repo).
- Manifest: `[group]` `[[route_templates]]`; build_bundle emits them; rejected
on an app node (422).
- Apply: group nodes reconcile template rows (create/update/delete via the
plan); tree Phase B expands each chain template into a concrete route per
descendant app node — placeholders {app_slug}/{env}/{var:NAME} resolved per
app (unknown var/placeholder = hard error), script bound nearest-owner-wins.
Idempotent via from_template (diffed create/update-as-replace/delete; re-apply
is no-churn, --prune reaps expansions). Collision with a hand-declared route,
or between two templates, is a hard error. Each RESOLVED expansion is
validated like a hand-declared route (reserved-path, path/host parse,
host-claim) so a {var:}-injected path or unclaimed strict host can't slip in.
- Plan: route-template diff at the group node + blast-radius (descendant app
count in this apply); state_token folds each template (edit trips StateMoved).
- Authz: declaring → GroupScriptsWrite; an app receiving expansions →
AppWriteRoute (gated even with no hand-declared routes).
- Tests: tests/templates.rs (fan-out + per-slug + idempotent-stable-ids +
prune-reap + collision-rejected); placeholder/validation unit tests; schema
golden reblessed.
Reviewed (no CRITICAL/HIGH; isolation core verified sound). Closed the two
validation-parity MEDIUMs (host-claim + reserved-path/pattern on expansions)
and added an out-of-apply-descendant prune warning. Scope: expansion targets
app nodes in the tree apply (not yet cross-repo descendants); {var:NAME} uses
committed vars. M4b (trigger templates) reuses this engine next.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
§7 of the groups/project-tool design. A group node is now authoritatively
managed by exactly one project-root; `pic apply --dir` claims, conflicts,
takes over, and (with --prune) structurally reaps owned nodes.
- Migration 0052: `projects(id, key UNIQUE)` + promote the inert
`groups.owner_project` (0047) to a real FK (ON DELETE SET NULL) + index.
- CLI mints a stable, gitignored project key in `.picloud/project.json`
(`pic init`, or lazily on first tree plan/apply) and presents it on every
tree request; `pic apply --dir --takeover` flag.
- Server: prepare_tree resolves ownership read-only (plan surfaces conflicts
+ prune candidates; token folds each group's owner key). apply_tree upserts
the project in-tx, claims created groups on insert, reconciles existing-group
ownership under the per-node advisory lock (first-commit-wins), and prunes
owned-but-undeclared groups leaf-first (delete=RESTRICT, never another repo's
or a UI-owned node).
- Authz (§7.4, ownership ⟂ RBAC): takeover requires GroupAdmin per contested
node — enforced in authz_tree (pre-tx) AND re-verified in-tx at the ownership
decision, so --force (which waives the staleness token) can't open a
takeover-without-admin window. The attacker-supplied project key is
length/charset-validated server-side.
- Tests: tests/ownership.rs (claim → conflict → takeover → flip; non-admin
takeover → 403; prune-owned-only); format_conflicts unit test; schema golden
reblessed. tree_shape M2 journey updated to reparent in-place (a fresh dir is
now a distinct project and would correctly conflict).
Closes the M3 milestone; reviewed (4 findings: 1 authz-bypass via --force +
key validation + 2 LOW, all fixed). M4 (trigger/route templates) remains.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
M2 of the remaining-hierarchies work. `pic apply --dir` now owns the org-tree
SHAPE, not just node content: a `[group]` manifest for a group that doesn't
exist is CREATED under its declared parent, and an existing group whose declared
parent changed is REPARENTED — all inside the single tree-apply transaction
(create + reparent; structural prune is deferred to M3 with the ownership layer).
group_repo: extract transaction-aware structural mutations — `create_group_tx`,
`reparent_group_tx` (the ancestor-walk cycle guard, now reading through the tx so
it sees in-tx writes), `delete_group_tx`, and `acquire_structural_lock_tx`. The
trait `create`/`reparent`/`delete` delegate to them (one SQL definition,
behavior-preserving: the coarse structural advisory lock + structure_version
bump + delete=RESTRICT all preserved).
apply_service: `TreeNode` gains `parent_slug` + `name`. `prepare_tree` classifies
group nodes into existing (resolved id, maybe reparent) vs to-create (absent →
deferred), returning a `PreparedTree { prepared, creates, reparents, token }`.
`apply_tree` adds Phase 0 (`reconcile_tree_structure_tx`): create absent groups
parent-first (topo loop with cycle/unresolved-parent detection) and reparent
existing ones, then Phase A/B reconcile content as before. A to-create group
reconciles against an empty CurrentState (all-Create) — so it needs no DB read
and sidesteps the pool-vs-tx coupling. The bound-plan token folds a
declared-absent marker, so a group created out-of-band between plan and apply
trips StateMoved.
authz (apply_api `authz_tree`): a to-create group mirrors the interactive create
gate — root-level needs `InstanceCreateGroup`, a subgroup under an existing
parent needs only `GroupAdmin(parent)`; a reparent needs `GroupAdmin` at the
group, the SOURCE parent, and the DESTINATION parent (§5.6, parity with
`reparent_group`). No 404 on a to-create node.
CLI: `[group] parent` manifest key (else the parent is inferred from the nearest
ancestor directory's group); `build_tree` emits `parent_slug` + `name` per group
node; the apply report shows a `groups +N reparented M` line.
Reviewed by subagent (core mechanism verified sound: topo termination, empty-
CurrentState reconcile, in-tx cycle guard, atomicity, StateMoved, idempotency);
fixed the two authz-parity gaps it found (missing source-parent check on
reparent; over-gated subgroup create). Tests: a new `tree_shape` journey
(create + reparent + no-op re-plan); 393 manager-core lib + the Phase-5 tree/
group/ext journeys all green; clippy -D warnings clean.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
M1 of the remaining-hierarchies work. An extension point lets a PARENT/group
node opt a module name out of sealed lexical resolution: a parent script's
`import "x"` then resolves against the INHERITING app's module (with a declared
default body as fallback) instead of the parent's sealed chain — so each
descendant app supplies its own `x`. Only the declaring parent can open the
inversion; a descendant can never make a parent's sealed import dynamic or
hijack one (the "is this an extension point" decision keys on the importer's
trusted defining node, never a script-passed value).
Resolver (executor-core):
- `ModuleSource` gains `resolve_extension_point(origin, name)` and a
chain-constrained `resolve_by_id(origin, id)`. The resolve seam checks for an
ext point on the importer's chain first; on a hit it resolves against
`App(cx.app_id)`, else the declared default, else ModuleNotFound. The Postgres
query returns Some only when the NEAREST declaration of the name is an ext
point (a peer/nearer concrete module shadows it). A group origin can't reach
app-owned rows — the trust boundary holds. Cache stays id-keyed (no bleed).
Apply (manager-core, mirrors the `vars` pattern):
- migration 0051: owner-polymorphic `extension_points` table (group XOR app),
optional `default_script_id` FK ON DELETE SET NULL, per-owner LOWER(name)
unique indexes.
- Bundle/Plan/CurrentState gain extension_points; `diff_extension_points`
(name-based, default change = Update), reconcile (upsert after scripts so the
default resolves) + prune, `validate_bundle` (module-name shape; default must
be a local module), `check_imports_resolve` (a declared/on-chain ext point
satisfies an import), and the state_token fold. Writes gate on the
script-write capability (AppWriteScript / GroupScriptsWrite).
- GET /apps|groups/{id}/extension-points so `pic pull` round-trips them — a
re-applied pulled manifest is all-NoOp, so `--prune` can't silently drop one.
CLI: `[[extension_points]]` manifest table; plan/apply build + render; pull
exports them.
Tests: 5 resolver units (inversion, default fallback, no-provider error,
no-hijack of a sealed import, no cross-tenant cache bleed), 2 diff/state-token
units, 2 journeys (per-app resolution + default fallback via invoke; pull
round-trip). Schema golden re-blessed.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Two journeys against a live server + Postgres:
- `group_module_is_lexically_sealed_under_inheritance`: a group module +
a group endpoint that imports it, inherited by an app — proves the §5.5
trust boundary (a leaf's same-named module does NOT shadow the inherited
endpoint's import) and app-origin CoW (an app endpoint's import resolves
the app's module).
- `dangling_import_is_rejected_by_plan`: a manifest script importing a
non-existent module is a `pic plan` error.
Docs: mark §5.5 residual resolved + §11 Phase 4b ✅ in the design doc;
update CLAUDE.md current-focus (extension points are the remaining §5.5
piece).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Phase 5 C5. Three `pic ... --dir` tree journeys:
* a group + a nested app apply atomically as one tree (the app's route binds
the group's same-apply `shared` script); the group node's script is
created; re-plan is all-noop (idempotent),
* one invalid node aborts the whole tree — the valid group node's script is
NOT created (true all-or-nothing),
* a `pic groups reparent` between `pic plan --dir` and `pic apply --dir` trips
the bound-plan (StateMoved) check via the tree's structure version.
Docs: `groups-and-project-tool.md` §11.5 status (✅ shipped — single-repo
nested tree apply; multi-repo single-owner + per-env approval gating deferred
per §11.1) + CLAUDE.md current-focus.
Gates: fmt, clippy -D warnings, cargo test --workspace, check-versioning (50
migrations — Phase 5 added none), schema snapshot unchanged, full journey suite
108/108. (Pre-existing flake `queue_e2e::queue_receive_acks_on_success` — a
racy immediate `count==0` after the async ack; flaky at the pre-Phase-5
baseline too, unrelated to this work.)
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Phase 4-lite C5. Two `pic` journeys:
* `group_script_is_inherited_with_cow_and_isolation` — a group endpoint
`shared` is invoked by name from an app under the group; the app's own
`shared` then shadows it (CoW); an app outside the group cannot reach it.
* `manifest_binds_route_to_inherited_group_script_idempotently` — a manifest
that declares no `greet` script binds a route to the inherited group
`greet`; plan shows a route create (no script create), apply succeeds, and
re-plan is a clean no-op.
Adds a `ScriptGuard` (deletes a script by id on drop) since a group-owned
script blocks its group's deletion (ON DELETE RESTRICT) — it must drop before
the GroupGuard.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Two end-to-end journeys via `pic` against a real server:
* `group_secret_is_injected_then_app_value_overrides` — a group-owned
secret is injected into a descendant app's script through `secrets::get`
(decrypted under the group AAD), then an app-owned secret of the same
name shadows it (decrypted under the app AAD). Drives the resolver + both
owner-AAD open paths against Postgres.
* `group_secret_value_is_masked_from_app_devs` — the §5.3 boundary: an app
dev (editor on the app, no group role) is denied the secret VALUE (403)
yet still sees it EXISTS, masked, in `config/effective` (status set,
owner group, no value); a group_admin reads the value. Proves an app
runs with config its own devs cannot read.
Also updates the existing app-secrets `ls` journey for the new `env`
column (group secrets are env-scoped).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Completes the vars half of Phase 3 end-to-end:
- vars_repo: VarOwner{Group|App} upsert/delete/list (owner-kind-specific
SQL; ON CONFLICT restates the partial-index predicate).
- vars_api: GET/PUT/DELETE under /apps/{id}/vars and /groups/{id}/vars,
resolve-then-require gated on App/GroupVars{Read,Write}, secrets-style
error mapping + key/env-scope validation.
- pic vars ls/set/rm (--group|--app, --env, --json, --tombstone).
- journey test: a group var is inherited by a descendant app's
vars::get(), and an app-level value overrides it (proximity) — green.
386 manager-core lib tests + the vars journey pass; clippy clean.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Adds the `pic groups` command family over /api/v1/admin/groups:
ls/tree, create (--parent), show (path + subgroups + apps), rename
(name/description; slug frozen), reparent (--to), rm (--recursive,
leaf-first; never auto-deletes apps), and members add/set/rm/ls. Also
`pic apps create --group <slug>` to place an app under a group.
End-to-end journey tests (tests/groups.rs, DB-gated) cover tree CRUD,
delete=RESTRICT (409 on a non-empty group), reparent cycle rejection, and
the headline invariant: a group_admin on an ancestor group can deploy to
an app it is NOT a direct member of (inherited membership), and loses that
access immediately on revoke — all green against a live server.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
The §4.1 base+overlay model for the single-app world: a base `picloud.toml`
holds the shared scripts/routes/triggers; a sparse `picloud.<env>.toml`
carries the per-environment slug (+ extra secret names). `pic plan/apply
--env <E>` merges the overlay onto the base before diffing/applying, so an
environment deploys to its own app ("an environment is an app", §2)
without duplicating the shared definitions.
Merge is sparse: overlay `app.slug`/`name` replace the base's; secret
names union. Scripts/routes/triggers always come from the base. Rich
per-key `vars` resolution stays Phase 3.
Tested: unit tests for the merge + overlay-path derivation; a journey
proving `apply --env staging` deploys to the staging app and leaves the
base app untouched.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
The §11 Phase-1 `config --effective` surface. Single-app today, "config"
= the app's secrets, so it cross-references the manifest's declared
secret names against what's set on the server and renders each masked:
`<set>` (managed / on-server-not-in-manifest) or `<unset>` (declared but
not pushed). Values are never fetched or shown (§4.6). Shaped to grow an
`--explain` mode and inherited `vars` when groups/vars arrive (Phase 3).
Tested: a journey verifying declared-but-unset → `<unset>`, post-`secret
set` → `<set>`/managed, and the value never appears in output.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
- §4.7 warning: `apply` now reports when an enabled route or trigger is
bound to a disabled script — deployed but unreachable (route 404s,
trigger won't fire). A warning, not an error: it's valid desired state,
the operator just shouldn't be surprised by the silent 404.
- E2E journey (`tests/enabled.rs`): apply an active script and confirm
`/api/v1/execute/{id}` 200s; flip `enabled = false` in the manifest and
re-apply → 404; re-enable → 200. Exercises the whole path: manifest →
diff → apply → runtime honoring.
Tested: manager-core lib 367 + cli bins 31 + 15 project-tool journeys
(incl. the new enabled e2e) green; clippy -D warnings clean; versioning
gate passes (migration 0045).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
`pic plan` now records a fingerprint of the live state it diffed against;
`pic apply` replays it and the server refuses (HTTP 409) if the app
changed underneath the reviewed plan — the §4.2 "apply exactly what you
reviewed" guarantee, in its content-addressed form (no migration, no
changes to interactive write paths).
Server (manager-core):
- `state_token(CurrentState)`: deterministic FNV-1a fingerprint over what
the diff keys on — script name+version (version bumps on any edit),
route identity+binding/attrs, trigger membership+enabled, secret names.
Order-independent; a collision can only yield a false "unchanged", never
a false refusal.
- `plan` returns it (flattened onto the plan JSON, so the wire stays
additive); `apply` takes an optional `expected_token` and, under the
apply lock before any write, returns `StateMoved` (409) on mismatch.
CLI:
- `.picloud/` link state (`linkstate`): `pic plan` writes the token scoped
to the app slug; `pic apply` replays it, then clears it on success (the
token is single-use — the next apply re-plans). `--force` skips the
check; apply with no recorded plan still works standalone (today's
behavior). `.picloud/` is already gitignored by `pic init`.
The tree-structure version (the other half of §4.2's counter) stays a
deliberate no-op until groups exist — it only guards reparent/structural
moves, which don't exist single-app.
Tested: state_token unit test (stable/order-independent/sensitive) + a
staleness journey (plan → out-of-band deploy → apply refuses → --force
applies); manager-core lib 363 + cli bins 31 + 13 journeys green; clippy
-D warnings clean.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Offline project scaffolding — the on-ramp to pull/plan/apply. Writes a
`picloud.toml` describing a minimal *working* app (a `hello` endpoint
bound to GET /hello) plus commented examples for the other blocks,
`scripts/hello.rhai`, and a `.gitignore` that pre-ignores the project
tool's `.picloud/` link-state directory (the home for the bound-plan
state token, landing next). Refuses to overwrite an existing manifest
without `--force`; derives the app slug from the directory name when not
given (validated against the canonical slug rule).
The active manifest is rendered through the same `to_toml` model the rest
of the tool uses, so a freshly-init'd project is guaranteed valid and
immediately `pic plan`-able. Offline — no server contact, so the journey
tests need no DATABASE_URL.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Add a server-side, atomic, declarative reconcile loop for a single app —
the foundation of the project-tool design. Developers describe an app's
scripts, routes, triggers, and secret-names in `picloud.toml`, then
`pic pull / plan / apply [--prune]` to converge live state to the manifest.
Server (manager-core):
- apply_service: a pure diff engine (compute_diff) shared by plan and
apply, plus an ApplyService that composes the existing per-repo writes
into ONE Postgres transaction. Identity keys mirror the DB UNIQUE
constraints (script=lower(name); route=(method,host_kind,host,
path_kind,path); trigger=per-kind semantic tuple; secret=name).
Apply takes a per-app advisory lock, recomputes the diff in-tx, applies
scripts -> routes -> triggers, prunes dependents-first, commits, then
refreshes the route table once post-commit.
- apply_api: POST /apps/{id}/plan (AppRead) and /apps/{id}/apply.
Apply requires the per-kind write caps the bundle exercises (all three
when --prune), plus AppSecretsRead when it binds an email trigger.
- tx-accepting repo siblings (insert/update/delete *_tx) so the existing
create/update/delete delegate to one SQL definition each.
- email triggers reference an inbound secret by NAME; the value is
resolved, decrypted (AAD-bound), and re-sealed server-side at apply —
it never travels in the manifest.
CLI (picloud-cli):
- manifest.rs (picloud.toml model), client plan/apply, and the pull/plan/
apply commands. pull rejects filesystem-unsafe script names up front.
Safety properties enforced and tested:
- idempotent: a freshly-pulled manifest re-applies as all-NoOp.
- atomic: a mid-bundle failure rolls back with nothing written.
- routes delete-before-insert so a freed binding is reusable in one apply.
- queue one-consumer invariant held inside the shared tx.
- email triggers are never pruned, and a script that still owns an
email/dead-letter trigger can't be pruned (the FK cascade would destroy
the sealed secret) — refused with a pointer to `pic triggers rm`.
- plan and apply agree on unset email-secret references.
No migration: the existing schema's UNIQUE constraints serve as identity
keys. Groups, env-scoping, and the `enabled` toggle are later milestones.
Tested: manager-core lib (360) + CLI bins (27) + 8 project-tool journeys
(pull/plan/apply/prune/email+queue), all green; clippy -D warnings clean.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Closes the audit's High-severity CLI coverage gap, raising the count
from ~25 to ~40+ subcommands and bringing the integration test count
from 63 to 73.
- pic triggers {ls, rm, create-kv, create-cron, create-dead-letter,
create-from-json}: three per-kind wrappers cover the most common
trigger shapes; the generic create-from-json is the escape hatch
for docs/files/pubsub/email/queue and any future advanced retry
knobs — body JSON inline, via @<file>, or "-" for stdin.
- pic dead-letters {ls, show, replay, resolve}: full operator
workflow for the dispatcher's dead_letters rows, including the
--unresolved filter and the per-row replay + manual-resolve actions.
- pic secrets {ls, set, rm}: list names + updated_at, set values
via stdin (the only secure channel — inline values would leak
into shell history), and delete by name. --json on set treats
stdin as raw JSON for non-string values.
Ten new integration tests follow the established #[ignore] pattern,
gated on DATABASE_URL. All 73 ignored tests pass against the local
dev stack.
The `pic admin reset-password` server-binary subcommand exists on
the picloud binary side already; the audit's "surface it in pic
--help" note is a one-line addition deferred to Stage 6 with the
other small UX touches.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Closes the audit's Critical "operator can't deploy a serverless endpoint
end-to-end from the CLI" finding. Two new subcommand families bring the
CLI coverage from 14 commands to ~25:
- pic routes {ls, create, rm, check, match}: full route CRUD plus the
dry-run conflict checker and the URL matcher already exposed by the
dashboard. The create form accepts --path-kind, --host-kind, and
--dispatch (sync|async) so async routes can finally be created
headlessly. The ls output adds a dispatch column.
- pic admins {ls, create, show, set, rm}: per-instance admin user
management. Create reads passwords from stdin via --password - so
shell history never sees the cleartext. Set is a JSON-Merge-Patch
shape that lets operators deactivate accounts or rotate roles
without touching the dashboard.
Six new ignored integration tests follow the established #[ignore]
pattern (DATABASE_URL gates them). They cover the happy-path round
trip, the async-dispatch persistence path, the password-required
error path, and the capability gate (a Member sees HTTP 403). All
pass against the local dev stack with PICLOUD_DEV_MODE=true +
PICLOUD_DEV_INSECURE_KEY=i-understand-this-is-insecure.
The `pic members` and `pic domains` subcommands the audit mentioned
are deferred — the apps_api shape may shift in v1.2 with per-app
roles and rebuilding the CLI surface twice would be churn.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Replace the single bare-metal `integration.rs` test with focused
modules driven by the shared `LazyLock<Fixture>` server. Each module
owns one journey:
* `auth.rs` — login (both bearer and username+password paths),
logout (local file + server-side session invalidation), env-vars
overriding the on-disk credentials file, role-label rendering.
* `apps.rs` — create / ls / show / delete (with and without
`--force`), invalid-slug rejection, conflict on duplicate slug.
* `scripts.rs` — deploy (create + update), name override, version
bumping, `ls` (with and without `--app`), delete.
* `invoke.rs` — body sources (inline, `@file`, `@-`), header
propagation, non-2xx exit semantics, top-level `pic invoke` alias.
* `logs.rs` — emptiness, status labels, `--limit`, summary truncation.
* `roles.rs` — Member RBAC: app-list filtering, viewer-vs-editor on
deploy, member can hit the unguarded data plane, non-member 403
on logs.
* `output.rs` — TSV column headers, stdout/stderr separation, RFC3339
shape, and the `--output json` invariants for apps / scripts /
logs / whoami.
* `api_keys.rs` — mint emits `raw_token` once, `ls` omits it, the
minted token works as a real bearer, `rm` invalidates server-side.
Bug-bug-fix-bug-fix:
* The 5× retry loop in `ls_without_app_walks_every_accessible_app`
was masking the abort-on-first-404 walk in the CLI. Now that the
CLI uses a single server call, the retry is gone — the test runs
one `pic scripts ls` and asserts.
* Six `predicate::str::contains("HTTP 4")` assertions tightened to
the specific status code: 422 for invalid-slug, 404 for unknown
app/script/log id, 403 for role denials. Loose `HTTP 4` would
have silently matched a regressed 401 from broken auth.
* `tests/integration.rs` deleted — every step it covered is in one
of the focused modules above.
* Members module exposes `MEMBER_PASSWORD` so auth tests can drive
the real username+password flow over stdin.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
The single bare-metal integration test now reuses a `LazyLock<Fixture>`
that spawns picloud once on a private port and shares it across every
test in the binary. Sets the stage for per-surface journey modules
(auth, apps, scripts, invoke, logs, roles, output) without each one
paying for its own server spawn — same trick the dashboard Playwright
suite uses with global-setup.
Notes:
- `tests/cli.rs` becomes a tiny module list; the seed flow moved to
`tests/integration.rs`. The seed slug now goes through
`common::unique_slug` so parallel/serial reruns can't collide.
- `autotests = false` + an explicit `[[test]] name = "cli"` keeps Cargo
from auto-promoting future `tests/*.rs` files into their own binaries
(which would each respawn picloud).
- Subprocess cleanup uses `libc::atexit` to SIGTERM picloud when the
test binary exits. PR_SET_PDEATHSIG was tried and rejected: it fires
when the *thread* that forked dies, and cargo's per-test worker
threads exit between tests, which killed the fixture mid-suite.
- New helpers: AppGuard/UserGuard (RAII teardown), member_user /
grant_membership / update_membership (direct API for role tests),
unique_slug / unique_username, pic_as / pic_no_env.
- Two `fixture_url_is_shared_*` tests prove the LazyLock is actually
shared, not respawned per test.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
A trailing fmt drift on tests/cli.rs:95 — `format!()` arg was wrapped
across three lines where rustfmt wants one. Running `cargo fmt --all`
collapses it; no behavior change.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Spawns the pre-built `picloud` binary against DATABASE_URL on a
private port, logs in over HTTP to mint a bearer token, then drives
`pic` through the full edit-deploy-invoke-tail loop with a unique
app slug per run and a `Drop`-based cleanup. Gated on DATABASE_URL
and tagged `#[ignore]` to match the existing integration-test
pattern in `crates/picloud/tests/api.rs`.
The test uses the dev `admin/admin` credentials (overridable via
PICLOUD_CLI_E2E_USERNAME / _PASSWORD) because the bootstrap env
vars are inert once the DB has any admin row.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
