Commit Graph

4 Commits

Author SHA1 Message Date
MechaCat02
11ac168839 test(secrets): group-secret inheritance + masked-read journeys
Two end-to-end journeys via `pic` against a real server:

* `group_secret_is_injected_then_app_value_overrides` — a group-owned
  secret is injected into a descendant app's script through `secrets::get`
  (decrypted under the group AAD), then an app-owned secret of the same
  name shadows it (decrypted under the app AAD). Drives the resolver + both
  owner-AAD open paths against Postgres.
* `group_secret_value_is_masked_from_app_devs` — the §5.3 boundary: an app
  dev (editor on the app, no group role) is denied the secret VALUE (403)
  yet still sees it EXISTS, masked, in `config/effective` (status set,
  owner group, no value); a group_admin reads the value. Proves an app
  runs with config its own devs cannot read.

Also updates the existing app-secrets `ls` journey for the new `env`
column (group secrets are env-scoped).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-06-24 22:09:14 +02:00
MechaCat02
9ee85993d8 feat(vars): admin CRUD API + pic vars CLI
Completes the vars half of Phase 3 end-to-end:
- vars_repo: VarOwner{Group|App} upsert/delete/list (owner-kind-specific
  SQL; ON CONFLICT restates the partial-index predicate).
- vars_api: GET/PUT/DELETE under /apps/{id}/vars and /groups/{id}/vars,
  resolve-then-require gated on App/GroupVars{Read,Write}, secrets-style
  error mapping + key/env-scope validation.
- pic vars ls/set/rm (--group|--app, --env, --json, --tombstone).
- journey test: a group var is inherited by a descendant app's
  vars::get(), and an app-level value overrides it (proximity) — green.

386 manager-core lib tests + the vars journey pass; clippy clean.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-06-24 21:11:46 +02:00
MechaCat02
c73e3c80c0 test(cli): focused journey suite + cover new commands + tighten asserts
Replace the single bare-metal `integration.rs` test with focused
modules driven by the shared `LazyLock<Fixture>` server. Each module
owns one journey:

* `auth.rs` — login (both bearer and username+password paths),
  logout (local file + server-side session invalidation), env-vars
  overriding the on-disk credentials file, role-label rendering.
* `apps.rs` — create / ls / show / delete (with and without
  `--force`), invalid-slug rejection, conflict on duplicate slug.
* `scripts.rs` — deploy (create + update), name override, version
  bumping, `ls` (with and without `--app`), delete.
* `invoke.rs` — body sources (inline, `@file`, `@-`), header
  propagation, non-2xx exit semantics, top-level `pic invoke` alias.
* `logs.rs` — emptiness, status labels, `--limit`, summary truncation.
* `roles.rs` — Member RBAC: app-list filtering, viewer-vs-editor on
  deploy, member can hit the unguarded data plane, non-member 403
  on logs.
* `output.rs` — TSV column headers, stdout/stderr separation, RFC3339
  shape, and the `--output json` invariants for apps / scripts /
  logs / whoami.
* `api_keys.rs` — mint emits `raw_token` once, `ls` omits it, the
  minted token works as a real bearer, `rm` invalidates server-side.

Bug-bug-fix-bug-fix:

* The 5× retry loop in `ls_without_app_walks_every_accessible_app`
  was masking the abort-on-first-404 walk in the CLI. Now that the
  CLI uses a single server call, the retry is gone — the test runs
  one `pic scripts ls` and asserts.
* Six `predicate::str::contains("HTTP 4")` assertions tightened to
  the specific status code: 422 for invalid-slug, 404 for unknown
  app/script/log id, 403 for role denials. Loose `HTTP 4` would
  have silently matched a regressed 401 from broken auth.
* `tests/integration.rs` deleted — every step it covered is in one
  of the focused modules above.
* Members module exposes `MEMBER_PASSWORD` so auth tests can drive
  the real username+password flow over stdin.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-05-29 23:34:03 +02:00
MechaCat02
ca278bddc8 test(cli): bare-metal end-to-end integration test
Spawns the pre-built `picloud` binary against DATABASE_URL on a
private port, logs in over HTTP to mint a bearer token, then drives
`pic` through the full edit-deploy-invoke-tail loop with a unique
app slug per run and a `Drop`-based cleanup. Gated on DATABASE_URL
and tagged `#[ignore]` to match the existing integration-test
pattern in `crates/picloud/tests/api.rs`.

The test uses the dev `admin/admin` credentials (overridable via
PICLOUD_CLI_E2E_USERNAME / _PASSWORD) because the bootstrap env
vars are inert once the DB has any admin row.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-05-28 20:53:56 +02:00