Commit Graph

6 Commits

Author SHA1 Message Date
MechaCat02
b3f05dfe2a fix(enabled): close disabled-script execution on the async paths (review)
Holistic Phase-1 review found the "a disabled script can't execute via
any path" guarantee (§4.3) held only for the sync user-route, the
execute-by-id bypass, and the trigger outbox arm — three paths still ran
disabled scripts:

- Queue arm: `list_active_queue_consumers` filtered the trigger's
  `enabled` but not the bound script's. Add `JOIN scripts … AND
  s.enabled = TRUE` so a disabled script's queue trigger stops consuming.
- Async-HTTP (202) + queued invoke() arms: `build_http_request` /
  `build_invoke_request` hardcoded `active: true`. Set it to
  `script.enabled`, and MOVE the dispatcher's fire-time `active` drop to
  after the source-kind match so it covers all three arms uniformly
  (previously trigger-only).
- `invoke()` (script-to-script): `resolve_id`/`resolve_name` checked
  cross-app isolation but not `enabled`. A disabled target now resolves
  to NotFound (indistinguishable from absent), matching the data plane.

Also (review LOW/§4.7):
- The route-on/script-off 404 returned `NotFound(script_id)`, leaking the
  internal id and distinguishable from absent. Return the same flat "no
  route matches" 404 as the unmatched case.
- Add the §4.7 "enabled endpoint with no route and no trigger" reachability
  warning (was unimplemented; only disabled-target shipped).

Tested: manager-core lib 368 + orchestrator 75 + 22 project-tool journeys
(incl. a new enabled-route→disabled-script flat-404 e2e) green; clippy
-D warnings clean.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-06-23 21:59:50 +02:00
MechaCat02
55cf995eda feat(enabled): scripts/routes enabled column + declarative data path
Phase-1 `enabled` three-state lifecycle (§4.3), data-model half. Triggers
already carried `enabled`; this adds it to scripts and routes and threads
it through the declarative project tool. Runtime honoring (disabled route
404 / script non-invocable / dispatcher fire-time re-check) is the next
commit — this change only stores and reconciles the flag.

- Migration 0045: `enabled BOOLEAN NOT NULL DEFAULT TRUE` on scripts +
  routes. Default true ⇒ no behavior change on migrate.
- `Script`/`Route` (shared) gain `enabled` (serde default true via the new
  `picloud_shared::default_true`); repos' SELECT/INSERT/UPDATE SQL, row
  structs, `NewScript`/`NewRoute`/`ScriptPatch` all carry it.
- Apply diff treats `enabled` as a declarative field (omitted ⇒ active):
  `script_update_reason` + `diff_routes` detect a toggle as an Update, and
  the create/update/insert paths persist it. The bound-plan `state_token`
  re-includes script/route `enabled` (removed in the earlier review fix
  precisely because the diff didn't key on it yet — now it does).
- CLI manifest model + `build_bundle` + `pull` round-trip `enabled`
  (serialized only when false; omitted ⇒ active). `pic init` scaffold and
  the interactive script/route create paths default active.

Tested: manager-core lib 365 (incl. enabled diff + token sensitivity) +
cli bins 31 (incl. manifest skip-serialize) green; clippy -D warnings
clean.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-06-23 19:36:40 +02:00
MechaCat02
f2b16da2b5 fix(manager-core): F-S-012 add AppInvoke capability + gate invoke() / invoke_async()
invoke_service::resolve and enqueue_async performed no authz check —
no AppInvoke capability existed. Same-app isolation was preserved
(cross-app guards work), but within one app an anonymous public-HTTP
script could trigger any other script (e.g. an admin-only worker that
hits secrets/files/external HTTP). Worse: invoke_async runs the
callee with principal: None, so the callee could hold capabilities
the original public caller shouldn't.

- Add Capability::AppInvoke(AppId). app_id() / scope_for_capability
  (script:write) / role_satisfies (editor+) are all updated.
- InvokeServiceImpl gains an optional `authz: Option<Arc<dyn AuthzRepo>>`
  + a `with_authz` builder. When set, resolve() runs script_gate on
  AppInvoke before doing the cross-app id check.
- picloud/src/lib.rs wires it: `InvokeServiceImpl::new(...).with_authz(...)`.
- Anonymous callers (cx.principal == None) continue to skip the check
  via script_gate, preserving the public-HTTP convention.

Existing 5 invoke_service unit tests still pass (the tests use the
authz-less constructor, so the gate is a no-op there).

AUDIT.md anchor: F-S-012.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-06-07 21:13:45 +02:00
MechaCat02
b192cf2cc9 fix(shared): F-Q-004 unify error variants — Forbidden on QueueError, rename Unavailable→Backend
Brings QueueError / PubsubError / InvokeError in line with sibling
shape used by KvError / DocsError / FilesError / SecretsError:

- QueueError gains an explicit Forbidden variant (previously authz
  denial was squashed into Rejected("forbidden") in queue_service.rs:68,
  losing the structured variant a 403-translation layer would need).
- QueueError::Unavailable renamed → Backend.
- PubsubError::Unavailable renamed → Backend.
- InvokeError::Unavailable renamed → Backend.
- Call sites updated (queue_service, pubsub_service, invoke_service,
  Noop* stubs, From<PubsubRepoError> impl, one test assertion).
- New unit test verifying authed-denied → QueueError::Forbidden.

AUDIT.md anchor: F-Q-004.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-06-07 19:44:23 +02:00
MechaCat02
c3baa87415 chore(v1.1.9): clippy clean — workspace -D warnings
Surfaced + fixed during the F3 attestation:

- executor-core/sdk/queue.rs: drop redundant .map(|()| ()) call sites;
  enqueue_blocking discards QueueMessageId via .map(|_id| ()) (intentional)
- executor-core/sdk/retry.rs: hoist use std::collections::hash_map::DefaultHasher
  + use std::hash::Hasher to the top of the file (clippy::items_after_statements);
  replace `as i64` casts with i64::try_from + clear comment about jitter
  bound (clippy::cast_possible_wrap)
- executor-core/sdk/invoke.rs: move _LIMITS_IS_COPY const before #[cfg(test)]
  mod tests (clippy::items_after_test_module)
- manager-core/dispatcher.rs: dispatch_one_queue gains #[allow(too_many_lines)]
  (it's the queue tick's whole logic — split makes it less readable than
  the lint); .map(...).unwrap_or(default) → .map_or(default, ...)
- picloud/lib.rs: Limits { trigger_depth_max, ..Limits::default() } via
  struct-update instead of let-mut-assign (clippy::field_reassign_with_default)
- tests: r#"..."# → r"..." where there are no `"` inside (clippy::needless_raw_string_hashes);
  combine InvokeTarget::Name | InvokeTarget::Path arms with identical bodies
  in sdk_invoke.rs (clippy::match_same_arms)

cargo fmt --all -- --check 2>&1 | tail -3: no output (exit 0)
cargo clippy --workspace --all-targets --all-features -- -D warnings:
  Finished `dev` profile [unoptimized + debuginfo] target(s) in 0.41s
Workspace lib smoke: 432 passing (306 manager-core + 74 executor-core + 34 shared + 18 orchestrator-core).
DB-gated E2E (against docker compose postgres on localhost:15432):
  queue_e2e: 4 ok / invoke_e2e: 4 ok / retry_e2e: 3 ok / migration_queue_messages: 4 ok / schema_snapshot: 1 ok

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-06-07 11:02:22 +02:00
MechaCat02
563c44ad95 feat(v1.1.9): InvokeServiceImpl + RouteTable wiring in picloud binary
manager-core/invoke_service.rs implements InvokeService over:
  - ScriptRepository (for Id + Name resolution)
  - RouteTable (for Path resolution via the orchestrator's matcher)
  - OutboxRepo (for invoke_async)

Same-app guard runs at the service entry point: resolve_id() always
verifies resolved.app_id == cx.app_id and returns InvokeError::CrossApp
otherwise. resolve_name() reads cx.app_id when querying (so a wrong
app_id from somewhere else couldn't slip through), but defense-in-depth
won't hurt — future hardening if it surfaces.

resolve_path() runs the matcher against this app's routes only
(RouteTable::snapshot_for_app). Method assumed POST→GET fallback for
v1.1.9 — surfacing method via the SDK is a future addition.

enqueue_async() resolves the target, then writes one outbox row with
source_kind = 'invoke'. The payload carries script_id, script_name,
args, fresh execution_id, root_execution_id (inherited from caller),
trigger_depth + 1. caller principal recorded as origin_principal
(forensic only — the executing script runs with no principal). One
shot — no retry policy on the row; users wrap in retry::with() if
they want retries.

picloud/lib.rs:
  - route_table construction moved BEFORE Services::new so the invoke
    service can hold it. populates from route_repo as before.
  - InvokeServiceImpl wired into Services::new in place of the
    NoopInvokeService placeholder.

Unit tests cover: resolve by Id same-app, cross-app rejected, resolve
by Name finds + not-found, enqueue_async writes Invoke outbox row with
trigger_depth=1.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-06-06 19:48:53 +02:00