style: cargo fmt across Phase 3.5 changes

Pure formatting pass — no behavior changes. Catches the line-wrapping
drift across the new authz / api_keys / middleware / handler edits
that piled up during the implementation.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

Cargo.lock

@@ -408,6 +408,12 @@ dependencies = [
  "typenum",
 ]
 
+[[package]]
+name = "data-encoding"
+version = "2.11.0"
+source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
+checksum = "a4ae5f15dda3c708c0ade84bfee31ccab44a3da4f88015ed22f63732abe300c8"
+
 [[package]]
 name = "der"
 version = "0.7.10"
@@ -1305,12 +1311,13 @@ checksum = "9b4f627cb1b25917193a259e49bdad08f671f8d9708acfd5fe0a8c1455d87220"
 
 [[package]]
 name = "picloud"
-version = "0.5.1"
+version = "0.6.0"
 dependencies = [
  "anyhow",
  "async-trait",
  "axum",
  "axum-test",
+ "chrono",
  "figment",
  "picloud-executor-core",
  "picloud-manager-core",
@@ -1325,11 +1332,12 @@ dependencies = [
  "tower-http",
  "tracing",
  "tracing-subscriber",
+ "uuid",
 ]
 
 [[package]]
 name = "picloud-executor"
-version = "0.5.1"
+version = "0.6.0"
 dependencies = [
  "anyhow",
  "picloud-executor-core",
@@ -1341,7 +1349,7 @@ dependencies = [
 
 [[package]]
 name = "picloud-executor-core"
-version = "0.5.1"
+version = "0.6.0"
 dependencies = [
  "chrono",
  "picloud-shared",
@@ -1355,7 +1363,7 @@ dependencies = [
 
 [[package]]
 name = "picloud-manager"
-version = "0.5.1"
+version = "0.6.0"
 dependencies = [
  "anyhow",
  "picloud-manager-core",
@@ -1367,13 +1375,14 @@ dependencies = [
 
 [[package]]
 name = "picloud-manager-core"
-version = "0.5.1"
+version = "0.6.0"
 dependencies = [
  "argon2",
  "async-trait",
  "axum",
  "base64",
  "chrono",
+ "data-encoding",
  "picloud-orchestrator-core",
  "picloud-shared",
  "rand 0.8.6",
@@ -1390,7 +1399,7 @@ dependencies = [
 
 [[package]]
 name = "picloud-orchestrator"
-version = "0.5.1"
+version = "0.6.0"
 dependencies = [
  "anyhow",
  "picloud-orchestrator-core",
@@ -1402,7 +1411,7 @@ dependencies = [
 
 [[package]]
 name = "picloud-orchestrator-core"
-version = "0.5.1"
+version = "0.6.0"
 dependencies = [
  "async-trait",
  "axum",
@@ -1421,7 +1430,7 @@ dependencies = [
 
 [[package]]
 name = "picloud-shared"
-version = "0.5.1"
+version = "0.6.0"
 dependencies = [
  "async-trait",
  "chrono",

Cargo.toml

@@ -12,7 +12,7 @@ members = [
 ]
 
 [workspace.package]
-version = "0.5.1"
+version = "0.6.0"
 edition = "2021"
 rust-version = "1.92"
 license = "MIT OR Apache-2.0"
@@ -66,11 +66,12 @@ reqwest = { version = "0.12", default-features = false, features = ["json", "rus
 url = "2"
 urlencoding = "2"
 
-# Auth (admin users + sessions)
+# Auth (admin users + sessions + API keys)
 argon2 = "0.5"
 rand = { version = "0.8", features = ["getrandom"] }
 sha2 = "0.10"
 base64 = "0.22"
+data-encoding = "2.6"
 
 [workspace.lints.rust]
 unsafe_code = "forbid"

crates/manager-core/Cargo.toml

@@ -27,6 +27,7 @@ argon2.workspace = true
 rand.workspace = true
 sha2.workspace = true
 base64.workspace = true
+data-encoding.workspace = true
 
 [dev-dependencies]
 tokio.workspace = true

crates/manager-core/migrations/0006_users_authz.sql

@@ -0,0 +1,112 @@
+-- Phase 3.5 users, roles, and bearer-token auth — see blueprint §11.6.
+--
+-- Lays down the schema that the unified can(principal, capability) gate
+-- runs against, plus the api_keys table that backs `Authorization: Bearer
+-- pic_…` credentials. No data-plane impact; Phase 4 SDKs (KV, docs, HTTP,
+-- cron) will plug into this same authz pipeline.
+--
+-- Three changes:
+--   1. admin_users gains instance_role ('owner'/'admin'/'member') plus a
+--      reserved email column and mfa_secret slot (neither is read yet).
+--      Every pre-existing row becomes 'owner' via the DEFAULT — Phase 3a
+--      had no role concept, so promoting all current admins to owner is
+--      the only safe interpretation (and matches the spec). The Rust
+--      startup path logs a warning when more than one active owner
+--      exists, so operators can demote extras via the admin PATCH.
+--   2. app_members records explicit per-app grants for 'member' users.
+--      Owners and admins get implicit grants in code (owner→app_admin
+--      everywhere, admin→editor everywhere); no rows here.
+--   3. api_keys holds Argon2id-hashed bearer credentials. Lookup is
+--      prefix-indexed (first 8 chars after `pic_`) then hash-verified;
+--      raw token only ever exists in the POST response. Optional
+--      expires_at / app_id implement TTL and app-binding respectively.
+
+ALTER TABLE admin_users
+    -- DEFAULT 'owner' so the Phase 3a bootstrap admin (and any other
+    -- pre-existing rows) become full owners without a backfill step.
+    -- Multi-owner installs are flagged at startup; demotion is a
+    -- deliberate PATCH, not an automatic migration choice.
+    ADD COLUMN instance_role TEXT NOT NULL DEFAULT 'owner'
+        CHECK (instance_role IN ('owner', 'admin', 'member')),
+    -- Reserved for the eventual invite flow + Phase 4 user-management
+    -- SDK. UNIQUE so we never end up with two rows claiming the same
+    -- contact. Nullable because pre-existing admins have no email on
+    -- file and we don't want to force a backfill.
+    ADD COLUMN email TEXT UNIQUE,
+    -- Reserved slot for TOTP secrets. Not read in Phase 3.5 — present
+    -- now only to avoid a schema bump when MFA lands.
+    ADD COLUMN mfa_secret TEXT;
+
+CREATE INDEX admin_users_instance_role_idx ON admin_users (instance_role);
+
+-- Per-(user, app) explicit grant. Owners and admins do NOT appear here;
+-- their app authority is implicit in their instance_role and resolved in
+-- code. Only 'member' users need rows in this table — without one, a
+-- member has no access to the app at all.
+CREATE TABLE app_members (
+    app_id      UUID NOT NULL REFERENCES apps(id) ON DELETE CASCADE,
+    user_id     UUID NOT NULL REFERENCES admin_users(id) ON DELETE CASCADE,
+    role        TEXT NOT NULL CHECK (role IN ('app_admin', 'editor', 'viewer')),
+    created_at  TIMESTAMPTZ NOT NULL DEFAULT NOW(),
+    PRIMARY KEY (app_id, user_id)
+);
+
+-- Lookup pattern is "what apps can this user see?" — needed for the
+-- membership-filtered GET /admin/apps and GET /admin/scripts.
+CREATE INDEX app_members_user_id_idx ON app_members (user_id);
+
+-- Bearer API keys. Format on the wire: `pic_<base32(32 random bytes)>`.
+--   prefix = first 8 chars after `pic_` (indexed for O(1) candidate lookup)
+--   hash   = Argon2id PHC of the full body after `pic_`
+-- Raw value is returned exactly once at mint time and never persisted.
+--
+-- Optional fields:
+--   expires_at: TTL. Lookup always filters `expires_at IS NULL OR > NOW()`.
+--   app_id    : "bound key" — capability checks deny any App*(other_app),
+--               regardless of the owning user's role. Cannot combine with
+--               instance:* scopes (validated in the mint handler, not SQL).
+CREATE TABLE api_keys (
+    id            UUID PRIMARY KEY DEFAULT gen_random_uuid(),
+    user_id       UUID NOT NULL REFERENCES admin_users(id) ON DELETE CASCADE,
+    hash          TEXT NOT NULL,
+    prefix        TEXT NOT NULL,
+    name          TEXT NOT NULL,
+    -- TEXT[] keeps the scope set open to additions without a migration;
+    -- the seven legal values are validated at mint time in Rust, not by
+    -- a CHECK constraint here (so new scopes can land without a schema
+    -- bump).
+    scopes        TEXT[] NOT NULL,
+    app_id        UUID NULL REFERENCES apps(id) ON DELETE CASCADE,
+    expires_at    TIMESTAMPTZ NULL,
+    last_used_at  TIMESTAMPTZ NULL,
+    created_at    TIMESTAMPTZ NOT NULL DEFAULT NOW()
+);
+
+CREATE INDEX api_keys_prefix_idx  ON api_keys (prefix);
+CREATE INDEX api_keys_user_id_idx ON api_keys (user_id);
+
+-- ---------------------------------------------------------------------
+-- Reserved schema room (not built in Phase 3.5)
+-- ---------------------------------------------------------------------
+-- These tables are deliberately commented out, not created. They are
+-- listed here so the design intent is visible at the migration boundary
+-- and future authors don't reinvent the shape. Each lands in its own
+-- numbered migration when the corresponding flow ships.
+--
+-- CREATE TABLE invites (
+--     token         TEXT PRIMARY KEY,                     -- raw at email-link time, hashed at rest
+--     email         TEXT NOT NULL,
+--     instance_role TEXT NULL CHECK (instance_role IN ('owner','admin','member')),
+--     app_id        UUID NULL REFERENCES apps(id) ON DELETE CASCADE,
+--     app_role      TEXT NULL CHECK (app_role IN ('app_admin','editor','viewer')),
+--     invited_by    UUID NOT NULL REFERENCES admin_users(id) ON DELETE CASCADE,
+--     expires_at    TIMESTAMPTZ NOT NULL,
+--     consumed_at   TIMESTAMPTZ NULL
+-- );
+--
+-- CREATE TABLE service_accounts (
+--     id             UUID PRIMARY KEY DEFAULT gen_random_uuid(),
+--     name           TEXT NOT NULL,
+--     owning_user_id UUID NOT NULL REFERENCES admin_users(id) ON DELETE RESTRICT,
+--     created_at     TIMESTAMPTZ NOT NULL DEFAULT NOW()
+-- );

crates/manager-core/src/admin_user_repo.rs

@@ -7,7 +7,7 @@
 
 use async_trait::async_trait;
 use chrono::{DateTime, Utc};
-use picloud_shared::AdminUserId;
+use picloud_shared::{AdminUserId, InstanceRole};
 use sqlx::PgPool;
 
 #[derive(Debug, thiserror::Error)]
@@ -20,6 +20,12 @@ pub enum AdminUserRepositoryError {
 
     #[error("username already taken: {0}")]
     DuplicateUsername(String),
+
+    #[error("email already taken: {0}")]
+    DuplicateEmail(String),
+
+    #[error("invalid instance_role stored in DB: {0}")]
+    InvalidInstanceRole(String),
 }
 
 /// Row returned to handlers and bootstrap. Never includes the password
@@ -30,6 +36,8 @@ pub struct AdminUserRow {
     pub id: AdminUserId,
     pub username: String,
     pub is_active: bool,
+    pub instance_role: InstanceRole,
+    pub email: Option<String>,
     pub created_at: DateTime<Utc>,
     pub updated_at: DateTime<Utc>,
     pub last_login_at: Option<DateTime<Utc>>,
@@ -44,6 +52,7 @@ pub struct AdminUserCredentials {
     pub username: String,
     pub password_hash: String,
     pub is_active: bool,
+    pub instance_role: InstanceRole,
 }
 
 #[async_trait]
@@ -58,10 +67,14 @@ pub trait AdminUserRepository: Send + Sync {
         username: &str,
     ) -> Result<Option<AdminUserCredentials>, AdminUserRepositoryError>;
     async fn list(&self) -> Result<Vec<AdminUserRow>, AdminUserRepositoryError>;
+    /// Create a new admin. `instance_role` defaults to `Owner` for the
+    /// env-var bootstrap path; admin-creates-admin flows pass an
+    /// explicit role.
     async fn create(
         &self,
         username: &str,
         password_hash: &str,
+        instance_role: InstanceRole,
     ) -> Result<AdminUserRow, AdminUserRepositoryError>;
     async fn update_username(
         &self,
@@ -73,6 +86,14 @@ pub trait AdminUserRepository: Send + Sync {
         id: AdminUserId,
         password_hash: &str,
     ) -> Result<AdminUserRow, AdminUserRepositoryError>;
+    /// Update the instance_role. Used by `PATCH /api/v1/admin/admins/{id}`;
+    /// callers enforce the last-owner guard (`count_other_active_owners`)
+    /// before invoking when role transitions away from `Owner`.
+    async fn update_instance_role(
+        &self,
+        id: AdminUserId,
+        instance_role: InstanceRole,
+    ) -> Result<AdminUserRow, AdminUserRepositoryError>;
     async fn set_active(
         &self,
         id: AdminUserId,
@@ -90,6 +111,15 @@ pub trait AdminUserRepository: Send + Sync {
         &self,
         id: AdminUserId,
     ) -> Result<i64, AdminUserRepositoryError>;
+    /// All active owners — used for the multi-owner startup warning.
+    async fn list_active_owners(&self) -> Result<Vec<AdminUserRow>, AdminUserRepositoryError>;
+    /// Count of active owners excluding the given id. Used by the
+    /// last-owner guard when demoting / deactivating / deleting an
+    /// owner: "would this leave zero owners?"
+    async fn count_other_active_owners(
+        &self,
+        id: AdminUserId,
+    ) -> Result<i64, AdminUserRepositoryError>;
 }
 
 pub struct PostgresAdminUserRepository {
@@ -107,13 +137,14 @@ impl PostgresAdminUserRepository {
 impl AdminUserRepository for PostgresAdminUserRepository {
     async fn get(&self, id: AdminUserId) -> Result<Option<AdminUserRow>, AdminUserRepositoryError> {
         let row = sqlx::query_as::<_, AdminUserRecord>(
-            "SELECT id, username, is_active, created_at, updated_at, last_login_at \
+            "SELECT id, username, is_active, instance_role, email, \
+                    created_at, updated_at, last_login_at \
              FROM admin_users WHERE id = $1",
         )
         .bind(id.into_inner())
         .fetch_optional(&self.pool)
         .await?;
-        Ok(row.map(Into::into))
+        row.map(TryInto::try_into).transpose()
     }
 
     async fn get_by_username(
@@ -121,13 +152,14 @@ impl AdminUserRepository for PostgresAdminUserRepository {
         username: &str,
     ) -> Result<Option<AdminUserRow>, AdminUserRepositoryError> {
         let row = sqlx::query_as::<_, AdminUserRecord>(
-            "SELECT id, username, is_active, created_at, updated_at, last_login_at \
+            "SELECT id, username, is_active, instance_role, email, \
+                    created_at, updated_at, last_login_at \
              FROM admin_users WHERE username = $1",
         )
         .bind(username)
         .fetch_optional(&self.pool)
         .await?;
-        Ok(row.map(Into::into))
+        row.map(TryInto::try_into).transpose()
     }
 
     async fn get_credentials_by_username(
@@ -135,42 +167,46 @@ impl AdminUserRepository for PostgresAdminUserRepository {
         username: &str,
     ) -> Result<Option<AdminUserCredentials>, AdminUserRepositoryError> {
         let row = sqlx::query_as::<_, AdminCredsRecord>(
-            "SELECT id, username, password_hash, is_active \
+            "SELECT id, username, password_hash, is_active, instance_role \
              FROM admin_users WHERE username = $1",
         )
         .bind(username)
         .fetch_optional(&self.pool)
         .await?;
-        Ok(row.map(Into::into))
+        row.map(TryInto::try_into).transpose()
     }
 
     async fn list(&self) -> Result<Vec<AdminUserRow>, AdminUserRepositoryError> {
         let rows = sqlx::query_as::<_, AdminUserRecord>(
-            "SELECT id, username, is_active, created_at, updated_at, last_login_at \
+            "SELECT id, username, is_active, instance_role, email, \
+                    created_at, updated_at, last_login_at \
              FROM admin_users ORDER BY username",
         )
         .fetch_all(&self.pool)
         .await?;
-        Ok(rows.into_iter().map(Into::into).collect())
+        rows.into_iter().map(TryInto::try_into).collect()
     }
 
     async fn create(
         &self,
         username: &str,
         password_hash: &str,
+        instance_role: InstanceRole,
     ) -> Result<AdminUserRow, AdminUserRepositoryError> {
         let res = sqlx::query_as::<_, AdminUserRecord>(
-            "INSERT INTO admin_users (username, password_hash) \
+            "INSERT INTO admin_users (username, password_hash, instance_role) \
-             VALUES ($1, $2) \
+             VALUES ($1, $2, $3) \
-             RETURNING id, username, is_active, created_at, updated_at, last_login_at",
+             RETURNING id, username, is_active, instance_role, email, \
+                       created_at, updated_at, last_login_at",
         )
         .bind(username)
         .bind(password_hash)
+        .bind(instance_role.as_str())
         .fetch_one(&self.pool)
         .await;
 
         match res {
-            Ok(row) => Ok(row.into()),
+            Ok(row) => row.try_into(),
             Err(sqlx::Error::Database(e)) if e.is_unique_violation() => Err(
                 AdminUserRepositoryError::DuplicateUsername(username.to_string()),
             ),
@@ -186,7 +222,8 @@ impl AdminUserRepository for PostgresAdminUserRepository {
         let res = sqlx::query_as::<_, AdminUserRecord>(
             "UPDATE admin_users SET username = $2, updated_at = NOW() \
              WHERE id = $1 \
-             RETURNING id, username, is_active, created_at, updated_at, last_login_at",
+             RETURNING id, username, is_active, instance_role, email, \
+                       created_at, updated_at, last_login_at",
         )
         .bind(id.into_inner())
         .bind(username)
@@ -194,7 +231,7 @@ impl AdminUserRepository for PostgresAdminUserRepository {
         .await;
 
         match res {
-            Ok(Some(row)) => Ok(row.into()),
+            Ok(Some(row)) => row.try_into(),
             Ok(None) => Err(AdminUserRepositoryError::NotFound(id)),
             Err(sqlx::Error::Database(e)) if e.is_unique_violation() => Err(
                 AdminUserRepositoryError::DuplicateUsername(username.to_string()),
@@ -211,14 +248,34 @@ impl AdminUserRepository for PostgresAdminUserRepository {
         let row = sqlx::query_as::<_, AdminUserRecord>(
             "UPDATE admin_users SET password_hash = $2, updated_at = NOW() \
              WHERE id = $1 \
-             RETURNING id, username, is_active, created_at, updated_at, last_login_at",
+             RETURNING id, username, is_active, instance_role, email, \
+                       created_at, updated_at, last_login_at",
         )
         .bind(id.into_inner())
         .bind(password_hash)
         .fetch_optional(&self.pool)
         .await?;
-        row.map(Into::into)
+        row.ok_or(AdminUserRepositoryError::NotFound(id))
-            .ok_or(AdminUserRepositoryError::NotFound(id))
+            .and_then(TryInto::try_into)
+    }
+
+    async fn update_instance_role(
+        &self,
+        id: AdminUserId,
+        instance_role: InstanceRole,
+    ) -> Result<AdminUserRow, AdminUserRepositoryError> {
+        let row = sqlx::query_as::<_, AdminUserRecord>(
+            "UPDATE admin_users SET instance_role = $2, updated_at = NOW() \
+             WHERE id = $1 \
+             RETURNING id, username, is_active, instance_role, email, \
+                       created_at, updated_at, last_login_at",
+        )
+        .bind(id.into_inner())
+        .bind(instance_role.as_str())
+        .fetch_optional(&self.pool)
+        .await?;
+        row.ok_or(AdminUserRepositoryError::NotFound(id))
+            .and_then(TryInto::try_into)
     }
 
     async fn set_active(
@@ -229,14 +286,15 @@ impl AdminUserRepository for PostgresAdminUserRepository {
         let row = sqlx::query_as::<_, AdminUserRecord>(
             "UPDATE admin_users SET is_active = $2, updated_at = NOW() \
              WHERE id = $1 \
-             RETURNING id, username, is_active, created_at, updated_at, last_login_at",
+             RETURNING id, username, is_active, instance_role, email, \
+                       created_at, updated_at, last_login_at",
         )
         .bind(id.into_inner())
         .bind(is_active)
         .fetch_optional(&self.pool)
         .await?;
-        row.map(Into::into)
+        row.ok_or(AdminUserRepositoryError::NotFound(id))
-            .ok_or(AdminUserRepositoryError::NotFound(id))
+            .and_then(TryInto::try_into)
     }
 
     async fn delete(&self, id: AdminUserId) -> Result<(), AdminUserRepositoryError> {
@@ -277,6 +335,33 @@ impl AdminUserRepository for PostgresAdminUserRepository {
                 .await?;
         Ok(count)
     }
+
+    async fn list_active_owners(&self) -> Result<Vec<AdminUserRow>, AdminUserRepositoryError> {
+        let rows = sqlx::query_as::<_, AdminUserRecord>(
+            "SELECT id, username, is_active, instance_role, email, \
+                    created_at, updated_at, last_login_at \
+             FROM admin_users \
+             WHERE is_active AND instance_role = 'owner' \
+             ORDER BY username",
+        )
+        .fetch_all(&self.pool)
+        .await?;
+        rows.into_iter().map(TryInto::try_into).collect()
+    }
+
+    async fn count_other_active_owners(
+        &self,
+        id: AdminUserId,
+    ) -> Result<i64, AdminUserRepositoryError> {
+        let (count,): (i64,) = sqlx::query_as(
+            "SELECT COUNT(*)::BIGINT FROM admin_users \
+             WHERE is_active AND instance_role = 'owner' AND id <> $1",
+        )
+        .bind(id.into_inner())
+        .fetch_one(&self.pool)
+        .await?;
+        Ok(count)
+    }
 }
 
 #[derive(sqlx::FromRow)]
@@ -284,21 +369,28 @@ struct AdminUserRecord {
     id: uuid::Uuid,
     username: String,
     is_active: bool,
+    instance_role: String,
+    email: Option<String>,
     created_at: DateTime<Utc>,
     updated_at: DateTime<Utc>,
     last_login_at: Option<DateTime<Utc>>,
 }
 
-impl From<AdminUserRecord> for AdminUserRow {
+impl TryFrom<AdminUserRecord> for AdminUserRow {
-    fn from(r: AdminUserRecord) -> Self {
+    type Error = AdminUserRepositoryError;
-        Self {
+    fn try_from(r: AdminUserRecord) -> Result<Self, Self::Error> {
+        Ok(Self {
             id: r.id.into(),
             username: r.username,
             is_active: r.is_active,
+            instance_role: InstanceRole::from_db_str(&r.instance_role).ok_or(
+                AdminUserRepositoryError::InvalidInstanceRole(r.instance_role),
+            )?,
+            email: r.email,
             created_at: r.created_at,
             updated_at: r.updated_at,
             last_login_at: r.last_login_at,
-        }
+        })
     }
 }
 
@@ -308,15 +400,20 @@ struct AdminCredsRecord {
     username: String,
     password_hash: String,
     is_active: bool,
+    instance_role: String,
 }
 
-impl From<AdminCredsRecord> for AdminUserCredentials {
+impl TryFrom<AdminCredsRecord> for AdminUserCredentials {
-    fn from(r: AdminCredsRecord) -> Self {
+    type Error = AdminUserRepositoryError;
-        Self {
+    fn try_from(r: AdminCredsRecord) -> Result<Self, Self::Error> {
+        Ok(Self {
             id: r.id.into(),
             username: r.username,
             password_hash: r.password_hash,
             is_active: r.is_active,
-        }
+            instance_role: InstanceRole::from_db_str(&r.instance_role).ok_or(
+                AdminUserRepositoryError::InvalidInstanceRole(r.instance_role),
+            )?,
+        })
     }
 }

crates/manager-core/src/admin_users_api.rs

@@ -14,15 +14,17 @@ use axum::extract::{Path, State};
 use axum::http::StatusCode;
 use axum::response::{IntoResponse, Json, Response};
 use axum::routing::get;
-use axum::Router;
+use axum::{Extension, Router};
 use chrono::{DateTime, Utc};
-use picloud_shared::AdminUserId;
+use picloud_shared::{AdminUserId, InstanceRole, Principal};
 use serde::{Deserialize, Serialize};
 use serde_json::json;
 
 use crate::admin_session_repo::AdminSessionRepository;
 use crate::admin_user_repo::{AdminUserRepository, AdminUserRepositoryError, AdminUserRow};
+use crate::api_key_repo::ApiKeyRepository;
 use crate::auth::hash_password;
+use crate::authz::{require, AuthzDenied, AuthzRepo, Capability};
 
 /// Validation knobs are tuned by NIST 800-63B-ish guidance: username is
 /// a strict ASCII subset so the lookup column stays predictable, and
@@ -36,6 +38,13 @@ const PASSWORD_MIN: usize = 8;
 pub struct AdminsState {
     pub users: Arc<dyn AdminUserRepository>,
     pub sessions: Arc<dyn AdminSessionRepository>,
+    /// Phase 3.5 deactivation symmetry — flipping `is_active = false`
+    /// also expires every active API key for that user so cookie and
+    /// bearer credentials become inert at the same moment.
+    pub keys: Arc<dyn ApiKeyRepository>,
+    /// Capability gate: every endpoint here requires
+    /// `InstanceManageUsers` (owner / admin).
+    pub authz: Arc<dyn AuthzRepo>,
 }
 
 pub fn admins_router(state: AdminsState) -> Router {
@@ -57,6 +66,8 @@ pub struct AdminDto {
     pub id: AdminUserId,
     pub username: String,
     pub is_active: bool,
+    pub instance_role: InstanceRole,
+    pub email: Option<String>,
     pub created_at: DateTime<Utc>,
     pub last_login_at: Option<DateTime<Utc>>,
 }
@@ -67,6 +78,8 @@ impl From<AdminUserRow> for AdminDto {
             id: r.id,
             username: r.username,
             is_active: r.is_active,
+            instance_role: r.instance_role,
+            email: r.email,
             created_at: r.created_at,
             last_login_at: r.last_login_at,
         }
@@ -77,6 +90,15 @@ impl From<AdminUserRow> for AdminDto {
 pub struct CreateAdminRequest {
     pub username: String,
     pub password: String,
+    /// Defaults to `Admin` when absent — minting an owner via the API
+    /// is a deliberate step. The env-var bootstrap path is the only
+    /// channel that defaults to `Owner`.
+    #[serde(default = "default_create_role")]
+    pub instance_role: InstanceRole,
+}
+
+const fn default_create_role() -> InstanceRole {
+    InstanceRole::Admin
 }
 
 #[derive(Debug, Deserialize, Default)]
@@ -84,6 +106,7 @@ pub struct PatchAdminRequest {
     pub username: Option<String>,
     pub password: Option<String>,
     pub is_active: Option<bool>,
+    pub instance_role: Option<InstanceRole>,
 }
 
 // ----------------------------------------------------------------------------
@@ -92,15 +115,29 @@ pub struct PatchAdminRequest {
 
 async fn list_admins(
     State(state): State<AdminsState>,
+    Extension(principal): Extension<Principal>,
 ) -> Result<Json<Vec<AdminDto>>, AdminApiError> {
+    require(
+        state.authz.as_ref(),
+        &principal,
+        Capability::InstanceManageUsers,
+    )
+    .await?;
     let rows = state.users.list().await?;
     Ok(Json(rows.into_iter().map(Into::into).collect()))
 }
 
 async fn get_admin(
     State(state): State<AdminsState>,
+    Extension(principal): Extension<Principal>,
     Path(id): Path<AdminUserId>,
 ) -> Result<Json<AdminDto>, AdminApiError> {
+    require(
+        state.authz.as_ref(),
+        &principal,
+        Capability::InstanceManageUsers,
+    )
+    .await?;
     state
         .users
         .get(id)
@@ -112,24 +149,49 @@ async fn get_admin(
 
 async fn create_admin(
     State(state): State<AdminsState>,
+    Extension(principal): Extension<Principal>,
     Json(input): Json<CreateAdminRequest>,
 ) -> Result<(StatusCode, Json<AdminDto>), AdminApiError> {
+    require(
+        state.authz.as_ref(),
+        &principal,
+        Capability::InstanceManageUsers,
+    )
+    .await?;
+    // Minting an owner via the API requires the caller to ALSO be an
+    // owner — admin cannot self-elevate (or elevate someone else)
+    // beyond their own ceiling. Owner-creation by env-var bootstrap
+    // bypasses this path.
+    if input.instance_role == InstanceRole::Owner && principal.instance_role != InstanceRole::Owner
+    {
+        return Err(AdminApiError::CannotEscalate);
+    }
     let username = input.username.trim();
     validate_username(username)?;
     validate_password(&input.password)?;
     let hash = hash_password(&input.password).map_err(|e| AdminApiError::Hash(e.to_string()))?;
-    let row = state.users.create(username, &hash).await?;
+    let row = state
+        .users
+        .create(username, &hash, input.instance_role)
+        .await?;
     Ok((StatusCode::CREATED, Json(row.into())))
 }
 
 async fn patch_admin(
     State(state): State<AdminsState>,
+    Extension(principal): Extension<Principal>,
     Path(id): Path<AdminUserId>,
     Json(input): Json<PatchAdminRequest>,
 ) -> Result<Json<AdminDto>, AdminApiError> {
+    require(
+        state.authz.as_ref(),
+        &principal,
+        Capability::InstanceManageUsers,
+    )
+    .await?;
     // Verify the target exists upfront — keeps the error path uniform
     // for "rename a missing user" etc.
-    let _ = state
+    let current = state
         .users
         .get(id)
         .await?
@@ -154,6 +216,26 @@ async fn patch_admin(
         // for the initial cut.)
     }
 
+    if let Some(new_role) = input.instance_role {
+        // Self-elevation guard: only an owner can promote anyone TO
+        // owner. An admin cannot turn themselves (or anyone else)
+        // into one.
+        if new_role == InstanceRole::Owner && principal.instance_role != InstanceRole::Owner {
+            return Err(AdminApiError::CannotEscalate);
+        }
+        // Last-active-owner guard: a transition off of `Owner` cannot
+        // leave the install with zero owners. The check is on the
+        // source role (current.instance_role) so demoting an
+        // already-non-owner is always fine.
+        if current.instance_role == InstanceRole::Owner && new_role != InstanceRole::Owner {
+            let remaining = state.users.count_other_active_owners(id).await?;
+            if remaining == 0 {
+                return Err(AdminApiError::LastActiveOwner);
+            }
+        }
+        latest = Some(state.users.update_instance_role(id, new_role).await?);
+    }
+
     if let Some(new_active) = input.is_active {
         // Last-active-admin guard: only when transitioning to inactive.
         if !new_active {
@@ -161,14 +243,40 @@ async fn patch_admin(
             if remaining == 0 {
                 return Err(AdminApiError::LastActiveAdmin);
             }
+            // ALSO: if the target is currently the last active owner,
+            // deactivating them leaves no owner. Belt-and-suspenders to
+            // the role guard above (which only triggers on an explicit
+            // role transition).
+            let target_role = latest
+                .as_ref()
+                .map_or(current.instance_role, |r| r.instance_role);
+            if target_role == InstanceRole::Owner {
+                let remaining_owners = state.users.count_other_active_owners(id).await?;
+                if remaining_owners == 0 {
+                    return Err(AdminApiError::LastActiveOwner);
+                }
+            }
         }
         latest = Some(state.users.set_active(id, new_active).await?);
-        // Deactivation invalidates all of the user's sessions. Cheap
+        // Deactivation invalidates BOTH credential surfaces — sessions
-        // and safer than waiting for sliding-window expiry.
+        // (cookie / session bearer) and API keys. Both writes are
+        // logged on failure but do not undo the deactivation; the
+        // alternative (leaving the user active when one cascade fails)
+        // is worse than slightly stale credential rows on a DB blip.
         if !new_active {
             if let Err(err) = state.sessions.delete_for_user(id).await {
                 tracing::error!(?err, "failed to delete sessions for deactivated admin");
             }
+            match state.keys.expire_all_for_user(id).await {
+                Ok(n) => {
+                    if n > 0 {
+                        tracing::info!(user_id = %id, expired = n, "expired api keys on deactivation");
+                    }
+                }
+                Err(err) => {
+                    tracing::error!(?err, "failed to expire api keys for deactivated admin");
+                }
+            }
         }
     }
 
@@ -185,8 +293,15 @@ async fn patch_admin(
 
 async fn delete_admin(
     State(state): State<AdminsState>,
+    Extension(principal): Extension<Principal>,
     Path(id): Path<AdminUserId>,
 ) -> Result<StatusCode, AdminApiError> {
+    require(
+        state.authz.as_ref(),
+        &principal,
+        Capability::InstanceManageUsers,
+    )
+    .await?;
     let target = state
         .users
         .get(id)
@@ -197,9 +312,18 @@ async fn delete_admin(
         if remaining == 0 {
             return Err(AdminApiError::LastActiveAdmin);
         }
+        // Last-owner guard mirrors the role-transition guard in
+        // patch_admin — deleting the only owner is just as bad as
+        // demoting them.
+        if target.instance_role == InstanceRole::Owner {
+            let remaining_owners = state.users.count_other_active_owners(id).await?;
+            if remaining_owners == 0 {
+                return Err(AdminApiError::LastActiveOwner);
+            }
+        }
     }
     state.users.delete(id).await?;
-    // Sessions cascade via FK; no explicit delete needed.
+    // Sessions + api_keys cascade via FK; no explicit delete needed.
     Ok(StatusCode::NO_CONTENT)
 }
 
@@ -252,6 +376,18 @@ pub enum AdminApiError {
     #[error("cannot leave the system with zero active admins")]
     LastActiveAdmin,
 
+    #[error("cannot leave the system with zero active owners")]
+    LastActiveOwner,
+
+    #[error("only an owner can grant the owner role")]
+    CannotEscalate,
+
+    #[error("forbidden")]
+    Forbidden,
+
+    #[error("authorization repo error: {0}")]
+    AuthzRepo(String),
+
     #[error("failed to hash password: {0}")]
     Hash(String),
 
@@ -259,16 +395,39 @@ pub enum AdminApiError {
     Repo(#[from] AdminUserRepositoryError),
 }
 
+impl From<AuthzDenied> for AdminApiError {
+    fn from(d: AuthzDenied) -> Self {
+        match d {
+            AuthzDenied::Denied => Self::Forbidden,
+            AuthzDenied::Repo(e) => Self::AuthzRepo(e.to_string()),
+        }
+    }
+}
+
 impl IntoResponse for AdminApiError {
     fn into_response(self) -> Response {
         let (status, message) = match &self {
             Self::NotFound(_) => (StatusCode::NOT_FOUND, self.to_string()),
-            Self::Repo(AdminUserRepositoryError::DuplicateUsername(_)) => {
+            Self::Repo(
-                (StatusCode::CONFLICT, self.to_string())
+                AdminUserRepositoryError::DuplicateUsername(_)
-            }
+                | AdminUserRepositoryError::DuplicateEmail(_),
-            Self::InvalidUsername(_) | Self::InvalidPassword(_) | Self::LastActiveAdmin => {
+            ) => (StatusCode::CONFLICT, self.to_string()),
+            Self::InvalidUsername(_)
+            | Self::InvalidPassword(_)
+            | Self::LastActiveAdmin
+            | Self::LastActiveOwner
+            | Self::CannotEscalate
+            | Self::Repo(AdminUserRepositoryError::InvalidInstanceRole(_)) => {
                 (StatusCode::UNPROCESSABLE_ENTITY, self.to_string())
             }
+            Self::Forbidden => (StatusCode::FORBIDDEN, self.to_string()),
+            Self::AuthzRepo(e) => {
+                tracing::error!(error = %e, "admin_users authz error");
+                (
+                    StatusCode::INTERNAL_SERVER_ERROR,
+                    "internal error".to_string(),
+                )
+            }
             Self::Repo(AdminUserRepositoryError::NotFound(_)) => {
                 (StatusCode::NOT_FOUND, self.to_string())
             }

crates/manager-core/src/api.rs

@@ -9,14 +9,16 @@ use axum::{
     http::StatusCode,
     response::{IntoResponse, Response},
     routing::get,
-    Json, Router,
+    Extension, Json, Router,
 };
 use picloud_shared::{
-    AppId, ExecutionLog, Script, ScriptId, ScriptSandbox, ScriptValidator, ValidationError,
+    AppId, ExecutionLog, InstanceRole, Principal, Script, ScriptId, ScriptSandbox, ScriptValidator,
+    ValidationError,
 };
 use serde::Deserialize;
 
 use crate::app_repo::AppRepository;
+use crate::authz::{require, AuthzDenied, AuthzRepo, Capability};
 use crate::repo::{
     ExecutionLogRepository, NewScript, ScriptPatch, ScriptRepository, ScriptRepositoryError,
 };
@@ -31,6 +33,10 @@ pub struct AdminState<R, L> {
     /// App lookups: validates `app_id` on create, resolves `?app=<slug>`
     /// filter on list. Trait-object so apps_repo can stay separate.
     pub apps: Arc<dyn AppRepository>,
+    /// Phase 3.5 capability checks — every script handler resolves
+    /// `AppRead/Write/LogRead(script.app_id)` against this repo after
+    /// loading the resource.
+    pub authz: Arc<dyn AuthzRepo>,
     pub validator: Arc<dyn ScriptValidator>,
     pub sandbox_ceiling: SandboxCeiling,
 }
@@ -41,6 +47,7 @@ impl<R, L> Clone for AdminState<R, L> {
             repo: self.repo.clone(),
             logs: self.logs.clone(),
             apps: self.apps.clone(),
+            authz: self.authz.clone(),
             validator: self.validator.clone(),
             sandbox_ceiling: self.sandbox_ceiling,
         }
@@ -129,14 +136,22 @@ where
 
 async fn list_scripts<R: ScriptRepository, L: ExecutionLogRepository>(
     State(state): State<AdminState<R, L>>,
+    Extension(principal): Extension<Principal>,
     Query(q): Query<ListScriptsQuery>,
 ) -> Result<Json<Vec<Script>>, ApiError> {
+    // Membership filter: `member` users see only scripts in apps they
+    // belong to. `?app=` filters further by app and additionally
+    // requires the member to belong to that app (the read check uses
+    // the resource's app_id).
     if let Some(ident) = q.app {
         let app = resolve_app_ident(state.apps.as_ref(), &ident).await?;
-        Ok(Json(state.repo.list_for_app(app).await?))
+        require(state.authz.as_ref(), &principal, Capability::AppRead(app)).await?;
-    } else {
+        return Ok(Json(state.repo.list_for_app(app).await?));
-        Ok(Json(state.repo.list().await?))
     }
+    if principal.instance_role == InstanceRole::Member {
+        return Ok(Json(state.repo.list_for_user(principal.user_id).await?));
+    }
+    Ok(Json(state.repo.list().await?))
 }
 
 /// Accept `?app=<uuid>` OR `?app=<slug>`. Slugs route through history
@@ -159,20 +174,34 @@ async fn resolve_app_ident(apps: &dyn AppRepository, ident: &str) -> Result<AppI
 
 async fn get_script<R: ScriptRepository, L: ExecutionLogRepository>(
     State(state): State<AdminState<R, L>>,
+    Extension(principal): Extension<Principal>,
     Path(id): Path<ScriptId>,
 ) -> Result<Json<Script>, ApiError> {
-    state
+    let script = state.repo.get(id).await?.ok_or(ApiError::NotFound(id))?;
-        .repo
+    require(
-        .get(id)
+        state.authz.as_ref(),
-        .await?
+        &principal,
-        .map(Json)
+        Capability::AppRead(script.app_id),
-        .ok_or(ApiError::NotFound(id))
+    )
+    .await?;
+    Ok(Json(script))
 }
 
 async fn create_script<R: ScriptRepository, L: ExecutionLogRepository>(
     State(state): State<AdminState<R, L>>,
+    Extension(principal): Extension<Principal>,
     Json(input): Json<CreateScriptRequest>,
 ) -> Result<(StatusCode, Json<Script>), ApiError> {
+    // Capability is bound to the *requested* app_id since there's no
+    // resource to load yet. If the app doesn't exist we 422 below;
+    // checking authz first means a Member trying to create against an
+    // unknown app gets 403 (no enumeration of app existence).
+    require(
+        state.authz.as_ref(),
+        &principal,
+        Capability::AppWriteScript(input.app_id),
+    )
+    .await?;
     state.validator.validate(&input.source)?;
     state.sandbox_ceiling.check(&input.sandbox)?;
     // Refuse early if the app_id doesn't exist — a clean 422 beats a
@@ -201,9 +230,17 @@ async fn create_script<R: ScriptRepository, L: ExecutionLogRepository>(
 
 async fn update_script<R: ScriptRepository, L: ExecutionLogRepository>(
     State(state): State<AdminState<R, L>>,
+    Extension(principal): Extension<Principal>,
     Path(id): Path<ScriptId>,
     Json(input): Json<UpdateScriptRequest>,
 ) -> Result<Json<Script>, ApiError> {
+    let script = state.repo.get(id).await?.ok_or(ApiError::NotFound(id))?;
+    require(
+        state.authz.as_ref(),
+        &principal,
+        Capability::AppWriteScript(script.app_id),
+    )
+    .await?;
     if let Some(src) = input.source.as_deref() {
         state.validator.validate(src)?;
     }
@@ -229,8 +266,16 @@ async fn update_script<R: ScriptRepository, L: ExecutionLogRepository>(
 
 async fn delete_script<R: ScriptRepository, L: ExecutionLogRepository>(
     State(state): State<AdminState<R, L>>,
+    Extension(principal): Extension<Principal>,
     Path(id): Path<ScriptId>,
 ) -> Result<StatusCode, ApiError> {
+    let script = state.repo.get(id).await?.ok_or(ApiError::NotFound(id))?;
+    require(
+        state.authz.as_ref(),
+        &principal,
+        Capability::AppWriteScript(script.app_id),
+    )
+    .await?;
     state.repo.delete(id).await?;
     Ok(StatusCode::NO_CONTENT)
 }
@@ -249,9 +294,17 @@ const fn default_limit() -> i64 {
 
 async fn list_logs<R: ScriptRepository, L: ExecutionLogRepository>(
     State(state): State<AdminState<R, L>>,
+    Extension(principal): Extension<Principal>,
     Path(id): Path<ScriptId>,
     axum::extract::Query(q): axum::extract::Query<LogsQuery>,
 ) -> Result<Json<Vec<ExecutionLog>>, ApiError> {
+    let script = state.repo.get(id).await?.ok_or(ApiError::NotFound(id))?;
+    require(
+        state.authz.as_ref(),
+        &principal,
+        Capability::AppLogRead(script.app_id),
+    )
+    .await?;
     // Cap to keep the dashboard responsive; the data plane writes are
     // unbounded over time so a paged read is the only sane default.
     let limit = q.limit.clamp(1, 200);
@@ -281,10 +334,25 @@ pub enum ApiError {
     #[error("{0}")]
     Ceiling(#[from] CeilingError),
 
+    #[error("forbidden")]
+    Forbidden,
+
+    #[error("authorization repo error: {0}")]
+    AuthzRepo(String),
+
     #[error("repository error: {0}")]
     Repo(#[from] ScriptRepositoryError),
 }
 
+impl From<AuthzDenied> for ApiError {
+    fn from(d: AuthzDenied) -> Self {
+        match d {
+            AuthzDenied::Denied => Self::Forbidden,
+            AuthzDenied::Repo(e) => Self::AuthzRepo(e.to_string()),
+        }
+    }
+}
+
 impl IntoResponse for ApiError {
     fn into_response(self) -> Response {
         let (status, message) = match &self {
@@ -294,6 +362,14 @@ impl IntoResponse for ApiError {
             Self::Invalid(_) | Self::Ceiling(_) => {
                 (StatusCode::UNPROCESSABLE_ENTITY, self.to_string())
             }
+            Self::Forbidden => (StatusCode::FORBIDDEN, self.to_string()),
+            Self::AuthzRepo(e) => {
+                tracing::error!(error = %e, "authz repo error");
+                (
+                    StatusCode::INTERNAL_SERVER_ERROR,
+                    "internal error".to_string(),
+                )
+            }
             Self::Repo(ScriptRepositoryError::NotFound(_)) => {
                 (StatusCode::NOT_FOUND, self.to_string())
             }

crates/manager-core/src/api_key_repo.rs

@@ -0,0 +1,292 @@
+//! CRUD over the `api_keys` table — backs the `Authorization: Bearer
+//! pic_…` credential flow from blueprint §11.6.
+//!
+//! The repo never sees the raw token; only the 8-char `prefix` and the
+//! Argon2id `hash`. Mint logic (random-bytes generation, prefix split,
+//! hash compute) lives in `api_keys_api.rs`. Verification logic
+//! (prefix lookup + Argon2 verify per candidate) lives in
+//! `auth_middleware.rs`. Both call this repo for the storage layer.
+
+use async_trait::async_trait;
+use chrono::{DateTime, Utc};
+use picloud_shared::{AdminUserId, ApiKeyId, AppId, Scope};
+use sqlx::PgPool;
+
+#[derive(Debug, thiserror::Error)]
+pub enum ApiKeyRepositoryError {
+    #[error("database error: {0}")]
+    Db(#[from] sqlx::Error),
+
+    #[error("api key not found: {0}")]
+    NotFound(ApiKeyId),
+
+    #[error("invalid scope stored in DB: {0}")]
+    InvalidScope(String),
+}
+
+/// Insert payload — built by `api_keys_api` after generating the raw
+/// token and hashing it. `hash` is an Argon2id PHC string covering the
+/// body of the token (everything after `pic_`); `prefix` is the first
+/// 8 chars of that body, indexed for fast candidate lookup.
+#[derive(Debug, Clone)]
+pub struct NewApiKey {
+    pub user_id: AdminUserId,
+    pub hash: String,
+    pub prefix: String,
+    pub name: String,
+    pub scopes: Vec<Scope>,
+    pub app_id: Option<AppId>,
+    pub expires_at: Option<DateTime<Utc>>,
+}
+
+/// Public-facing row — never exposes the hash. Used for `GET
+/// /admin/api-keys` and the `POST` response (alongside the
+/// one-shot raw token).
+#[derive(Debug, Clone)]
+pub struct ApiKeyRow {
+    pub id: ApiKeyId,
+    pub user_id: AdminUserId,
+    pub prefix: String,
+    pub name: String,
+    pub scopes: Vec<Scope>,
+    pub app_id: Option<AppId>,
+    pub expires_at: Option<DateTime<Utc>>,
+    pub last_used_at: Option<DateTime<Utc>>,
+    pub created_at: DateTime<Utc>,
+}
+
+/// Verification candidate — includes the Argon2id `hash` and `user_id`
+/// so middleware can verify the supplied token and assemble the
+/// `Principal`. Kept separate from `ApiKeyRow` so handlers can't leak
+/// the hash through a careless `Json(row)`.
+#[derive(Debug, Clone)]
+pub struct ApiKeyVerification {
+    pub id: ApiKeyId,
+    pub user_id: AdminUserId,
+    pub hash: String,
+    pub scopes: Vec<Scope>,
+    pub app_id: Option<AppId>,
+}
+
+#[async_trait]
+pub trait ApiKeyRepository: Send + Sync {
+    /// Mint. Caller has already hashed the raw token + computed prefix.
+    async fn create(&self, key: NewApiKey) -> Result<ApiKeyRow, ApiKeyRepositoryError>;
+
+    /// Return every non-expired key with the given 8-char prefix. The
+    /// caller (middleware) Argon2-verifies the supplied token against
+    /// each candidate's `hash`. Returning a Vec rather than one row
+    /// keeps the contract correct even if two keys happen to share a
+    /// prefix (statistically near-zero but possible).
+    async fn find_active_by_prefix(
+        &self,
+        prefix: &str,
+    ) -> Result<Vec<ApiKeyVerification>, ApiKeyRepositoryError>;
+
+    /// Update `last_used_at` for an authenticated request. Inline (not
+    /// fire-and-forget) so a DB blip surfaces as a 500 rather than
+    /// silent stale timestamps.
+    async fn touch_last_used(&self, id: ApiKeyId) -> Result<(), ApiKeyRepositoryError>;
+
+    /// Caller's own keys, for `GET /admin/api-keys`.
+    async fn list_for_user(
+        &self,
+        user_id: AdminUserId,
+    ) -> Result<Vec<ApiKeyRow>, ApiKeyRepositoryError>;
+
+    /// Look up a key by id — used by `DELETE` to verify ownership
+    /// before issuing the delete.
+    async fn get(&self, id: ApiKeyId) -> Result<Option<ApiKeyRow>, ApiKeyRepositoryError>;
+
+    /// Delete the row only if it belongs to `user_id`. Returns whether
+    /// a row was actually deleted (false = key didn't exist OR wasn't
+    /// theirs — handlers map both to 404 to avoid leaking the
+    /// distinction).
+    async fn delete_by_id_and_user(
+        &self,
+        id: ApiKeyId,
+        user_id: AdminUserId,
+    ) -> Result<bool, ApiKeyRepositoryError>;
+
+    /// Set `expires_at = NOW()` on every active key for a user. Wired
+    /// into `set_active(false)` so deactivation invalidates both
+    /// sessions (already done by `AdminSessionRepository::delete_for_user`)
+    /// and bearer keys at the same moment.
+    async fn expire_all_for_user(&self, user_id: AdminUserId)
+        -> Result<u64, ApiKeyRepositoryError>;
+}
+
+pub struct PostgresApiKeyRepository {
+    pool: PgPool,
+}
+
+impl PostgresApiKeyRepository {
+    #[must_use]
+    pub fn new(pool: PgPool) -> Self {
+        Self { pool }
+    }
+}
+
+#[async_trait]
+impl ApiKeyRepository for PostgresApiKeyRepository {
+    async fn create(&self, key: NewApiKey) -> Result<ApiKeyRow, ApiKeyRepositoryError> {
+        let scope_strings: Vec<String> =
+            key.scopes.iter().map(|s| s.as_str().to_string()).collect();
+        let row = sqlx::query_as::<_, ApiKeyRecord>(
+            "INSERT INTO api_keys \
+                (user_id, hash, prefix, name, scopes, app_id, expires_at) \
+             VALUES ($1, $2, $3, $4, $5, $6, $7) \
+             RETURNING id, user_id, prefix, name, scopes, app_id, \
+                       expires_at, last_used_at, created_at",
+        )
+        .bind(key.user_id.into_inner())
+        .bind(&key.hash)
+        .bind(&key.prefix)
+        .bind(&key.name)
+        .bind(&scope_strings)
+        .bind(key.app_id.map(picloud_shared::AppId::into_inner))
+        .bind(key.expires_at)
+        .fetch_one(&self.pool)
+        .await?;
+        row.try_into()
+    }
+
+    async fn find_active_by_prefix(
+        &self,
+        prefix: &str,
+    ) -> Result<Vec<ApiKeyVerification>, ApiKeyRepositoryError> {
+        let rows = sqlx::query_as::<_, ApiKeyVerifyRecord>(
+            "SELECT id, user_id, hash, scopes, app_id \
+             FROM api_keys \
+             WHERE prefix = $1 \
+               AND (expires_at IS NULL OR expires_at > NOW())",
+        )
+        .bind(prefix)
+        .fetch_all(&self.pool)
+        .await?;
+        rows.into_iter().map(TryInto::try_into).collect()
+    }
+
+    async fn touch_last_used(&self, id: ApiKeyId) -> Result<(), ApiKeyRepositoryError> {
+        sqlx::query("UPDATE api_keys SET last_used_at = NOW() WHERE id = $1")
+            .bind(id.into_inner())
+            .execute(&self.pool)
+            .await?;
+        Ok(())
+    }
+
+    async fn list_for_user(
+        &self,
+        user_id: AdminUserId,
+    ) -> Result<Vec<ApiKeyRow>, ApiKeyRepositoryError> {
+        let rows = sqlx::query_as::<_, ApiKeyRecord>(
+            "SELECT id, user_id, prefix, name, scopes, app_id, \
+                    expires_at, last_used_at, created_at \
+             FROM api_keys WHERE user_id = $1 \
+             ORDER BY created_at DESC",
+        )
+        .bind(user_id.into_inner())
+        .fetch_all(&self.pool)
+        .await?;
+        rows.into_iter().map(TryInto::try_into).collect()
+    }
+
+    async fn get(&self, id: ApiKeyId) -> Result<Option<ApiKeyRow>, ApiKeyRepositoryError> {
+        let row = sqlx::query_as::<_, ApiKeyRecord>(
+            "SELECT id, user_id, prefix, name, scopes, app_id, \
+                    expires_at, last_used_at, created_at \
+             FROM api_keys WHERE id = $1",
+        )
+        .bind(id.into_inner())
+        .fetch_optional(&self.pool)
+        .await?;
+        row.map(TryInto::try_into).transpose()
+    }
+
+    async fn delete_by_id_and_user(
+        &self,
+        id: ApiKeyId,
+        user_id: AdminUserId,
+    ) -> Result<bool, ApiKeyRepositoryError> {
+        let res = sqlx::query("DELETE FROM api_keys WHERE id = $1 AND user_id = $2")
+            .bind(id.into_inner())
+            .bind(user_id.into_inner())
+            .execute(&self.pool)
+            .await?;
+        Ok(res.rows_affected() > 0)
+    }
+
+    async fn expire_all_for_user(
+        &self,
+        user_id: AdminUserId,
+    ) -> Result<u64, ApiKeyRepositoryError> {
+        let res = sqlx::query(
+            "UPDATE api_keys \
+             SET expires_at = NOW() \
+             WHERE user_id = $1 \
+               AND (expires_at IS NULL OR expires_at > NOW())",
+        )
+        .bind(user_id.into_inner())
+        .execute(&self.pool)
+        .await?;
+        Ok(res.rows_affected())
+    }
+}
+
+#[derive(sqlx::FromRow)]
+struct ApiKeyRecord {
+    id: uuid::Uuid,
+    user_id: uuid::Uuid,
+    prefix: String,
+    name: String,
+    scopes: Vec<String>,
+    app_id: Option<uuid::Uuid>,
+    expires_at: Option<DateTime<Utc>>,
+    last_used_at: Option<DateTime<Utc>>,
+    created_at: DateTime<Utc>,
+}
+
+impl TryFrom<ApiKeyRecord> for ApiKeyRow {
+    type Error = ApiKeyRepositoryError;
+    fn try_from(r: ApiKeyRecord) -> Result<Self, Self::Error> {
+        Ok(Self {
+            id: r.id.into(),
+            user_id: r.user_id.into(),
+            prefix: r.prefix,
+            name: r.name,
+            scopes: parse_scopes(r.scopes)?,
+            app_id: r.app_id.map(Into::into),
+            expires_at: r.expires_at,
+            last_used_at: r.last_used_at,
+            created_at: r.created_at,
+        })
+    }
+}
+
+#[derive(sqlx::FromRow)]
+struct ApiKeyVerifyRecord {
+    id: uuid::Uuid,
+    user_id: uuid::Uuid,
+    hash: String,
+    scopes: Vec<String>,
+    app_id: Option<uuid::Uuid>,
+}
+
+impl TryFrom<ApiKeyVerifyRecord> for ApiKeyVerification {
+    type Error = ApiKeyRepositoryError;
+    fn try_from(r: ApiKeyVerifyRecord) -> Result<Self, Self::Error> {
+        Ok(Self {
+            id: r.id.into(),
+            user_id: r.user_id.into(),
+            hash: r.hash,
+            scopes: parse_scopes(r.scopes)?,
+            app_id: r.app_id.map(Into::into),
+        })
+    }
+}
+
+fn parse_scopes(raw: Vec<String>) -> Result<Vec<Scope>, ApiKeyRepositoryError> {
+    raw.into_iter()
+        .map(|s| Scope::from_wire(&s).ok_or(ApiKeyRepositoryError::InvalidScope(s)))
+        .collect()
+}

crates/manager-core/src/api_keys_api.rs

@@ -0,0 +1,251 @@
+//! `/api/v1/admin/api-keys/*` — bearer API key CRUD (blueprint §11.6).
+//!
+//! All endpoints are guarded by `require_authenticated`. Capability
+//! checks: none — every authenticated user manages **their own** keys.
+//! The repo enforces caller ownership on `delete`, and `list` is
+//! scoped to the caller's user_id. No instance-level authority is
+//! exposed (no listing other users' keys, no admin-issued keys for
+//! another user — those flows belong with the invite system).
+//!
+//! Mint semantics:
+//!   * raw token is returned **exactly once** in the POST response and
+//!     never logged. Lose it = mint a new key.
+//!   * `app_id` (optional) binds the key to one app; capability checks
+//!     deny every `App*(other_app)`.
+//!   * scopes containing `instance:*` are rejected when `app_id` is
+//!     set — the combination is irreconcilable.
+
+use std::sync::Arc;
+
+use axum::extract::{Path, State};
+use axum::http::StatusCode;
+use axum::response::{IntoResponse, Json, Response};
+use axum::routing::{delete, get};
+use axum::{Extension, Router};
+use chrono::{DateTime, Utc};
+use picloud_shared::{ApiKeyId, AppId, Principal, Scope};
+use serde::{Deserialize, Serialize};
+use serde_json::json;
+
+use crate::api_key_repo::{ApiKeyRepository, ApiKeyRepositoryError, ApiKeyRow, NewApiKey};
+use crate::auth::generate_api_key;
+
+/// Validation bounds for the user-supplied `name` field — keeps the
+/// dashboard's list view tidy and rejects accidental whole-token
+/// pastes.
+const NAME_MIN: usize = 1;
+const NAME_MAX: usize = 64;
+
+#[derive(Clone)]
+pub struct ApiKeysState {
+    pub keys: Arc<dyn ApiKeyRepository>,
+}
+
+pub fn api_keys_router(state: ApiKeysState) -> Router {
+    Router::new()
+        .route("/api-keys", get(list_keys).post(mint_key))
+        .route("/api-keys/{id}", delete(delete_key))
+        .with_state(state)
+}
+
+// ----------------------------------------------------------------------------
+// DTOs
+// ----------------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+#[derive(Debug, Deserialize)]
+pub struct MintApiKeyRequest {
+    pub name: String,
+    pub scopes: Vec<Scope>,
+    /// When set, the key is bound to this app — every `App*(other)`
+    /// capability is denied regardless of role.
+    #[serde(default)]
+    pub app_id: Option<AppId>,
+    /// When set, lookup rejects the key after this instant. Absent =
+    /// never expires (until explicit DELETE).
+    #[serde(default)]
+    pub expires_at: Option<DateTime<Utc>>,
+}
+
+/// Response body for a freshly-minted key. `raw_token` only appears
+/// here — `GET /api-keys` returns `ApiKeyDto` without it.
+#[derive(Debug, Serialize)]
+pub struct MintApiKeyResponse {
+    #[serde(flatten)]
+    pub key: ApiKeyDto,
+    /// The full wire-format token (`pic_<base32>`). Shown exactly once;
+    /// store it client-side immediately.
+    pub raw_token: String,
+}
+
+#[derive(Debug, Serialize)]
+pub struct ApiKeyDto {
+    pub id: ApiKeyId,
+    pub prefix: String,
+    pub name: String,
+    pub scopes: Vec<Scope>,
+    pub app_id: Option<AppId>,
+    pub expires_at: Option<DateTime<Utc>>,
+    pub last_used_at: Option<DateTime<Utc>>,
+    pub created_at: DateTime<Utc>,
+}
+
+impl From<ApiKeyRow> for ApiKeyDto {
+    fn from(r: ApiKeyRow) -> Self {
+        Self {
+            id: r.id,
+            prefix: r.prefix,
+            name: r.name,
+            scopes: r.scopes,
+            app_id: r.app_id,
+            expires_at: r.expires_at,
+            last_used_at: r.last_used_at,
+            created_at: r.created_at,
+        }
+    }
+}
+
+// ----------------------------------------------------------------------------
+// Handlers
+// ----------------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+async fn mint_key(
+    State(state): State<ApiKeysState>,
+    Extension(principal): Extension<Principal>,
+    Json(input): Json<MintApiKeyRequest>,
+) -> Result<(StatusCode, Json<MintApiKeyResponse>), ApiKeysError> {
+    validate_name(&input.name)?;
+    validate_scopes(&input.scopes, input.app_id)?;
+
+    let minted = generate_api_key().map_err(|e| ApiKeysError::Hash(e.to_string()))?;
+    let row = state
+        .keys
+        .create(NewApiKey {
+            user_id: principal.user_id,
+            hash: minted.hash,
+            prefix: minted.prefix,
+            name: input.name,
+            scopes: input.scopes,
+            app_id: input.app_id,
+            expires_at: input.expires_at,
+        })
+        .await?;
+    Ok((
+        StatusCode::CREATED,
+        Json(MintApiKeyResponse {
+            key: row.into(),
+            raw_token: minted.raw,
+        }),
+    ))
+}
+
+async fn list_keys(
+    State(state): State<ApiKeysState>,
+    Extension(principal): Extension<Principal>,
+) -> Result<Json<Vec<ApiKeyDto>>, ApiKeysError> {
+    let rows = state.keys.list_for_user(principal.user_id).await?;
+    Ok(Json(rows.into_iter().map(Into::into).collect()))
+}
+
+async fn delete_key(
+    State(state): State<ApiKeysState>,
+    Extension(principal): Extension<Principal>,
+    Path(id): Path<ApiKeyId>,
+) -> Result<StatusCode, ApiKeysError> {
+    let deleted = state
+        .keys
+        .delete_by_id_and_user(id, principal.user_id)
+        .await?;
+    if !deleted {
+        // 404 covers both "doesn't exist" and "exists but not yours" —
+        // we deliberately don't leak the distinction.
+        return Err(ApiKeysError::NotFound(id));
+    }
+    Ok(StatusCode::NO_CONTENT)
+}
+
+// ----------------------------------------------------------------------------
+// Validation
+// ----------------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+fn validate_name(s: &str) -> Result<(), ApiKeysError> {
+    let trimmed = s.trim();
+    if trimmed.len() < NAME_MIN || trimmed.len() > NAME_MAX {
+        return Err(ApiKeysError::InvalidName(format!(
+            "name must be {NAME_MIN}-{NAME_MAX} characters after trimming"
+        )));
+    }
+    Ok(())
+}
+
+fn validate_scopes(scopes: &[Scope], app_id: Option<AppId>) -> Result<(), ApiKeysError> {
+    if scopes.is_empty() {
+        return Err(ApiKeysError::InvalidScopes(
+            "scopes must be non-empty".into(),
+        ));
+    }
+    // Bound key + any instance:* scope → irreconcilable.
+    if app_id.is_some() && scopes.iter().any(|s| s.is_instance()) {
+        return Err(ApiKeysError::InvalidScopes(
+            "bound keys (app_id set) cannot carry instance:* scopes".into(),
+        ));
+    }
+    Ok(())
+}
+
+// ----------------------------------------------------------------------------
+// Errors
+// ----------------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+#[derive(Debug, thiserror::Error)]
+pub enum ApiKeysError {
+    #[error("api key not found: {0}")]
+    NotFound(ApiKeyId),
+
+    #[error("{0}")]
+    InvalidName(String),
+
+    #[error("{0}")]
+    InvalidScopes(String),
+
+    #[error("failed to hash key: {0}")]
+    Hash(String),
+
+    #[error("repository error: {0}")]
+    Repo(#[from] ApiKeyRepositoryError),
+}
+
+impl IntoResponse for ApiKeysError {
+    fn into_response(self) -> Response {
+        let (status, message) = match &self {
+            Self::NotFound(_) => (StatusCode::NOT_FOUND, self.to_string()),
+            Self::InvalidName(_) | Self::InvalidScopes(_) => {
+                (StatusCode::UNPROCESSABLE_ENTITY, self.to_string())
+            }
+            Self::Hash(_) => {
+                tracing::error!(error = %self, "api key hash failure");
+                (
+                    StatusCode::INTERNAL_SERVER_ERROR,
+                    "internal error".to_string(),
+                )
+            }
+            Self::Repo(ApiKeyRepositoryError::NotFound(_)) => {
+                (StatusCode::NOT_FOUND, self.to_string())
+            }
+            Self::Repo(ApiKeyRepositoryError::InvalidScope(_)) => {
+                tracing::error!(error = %self, "api key row carries an unknown scope");
+                (
+                    StatusCode::INTERNAL_SERVER_ERROR,
+                    "internal error".to_string(),
+                )
+            }
+            Self::Repo(ApiKeyRepositoryError::Db(e)) => {
+                tracing::error!(error = %e, "api_keys db error");
+                (
+                    StatusCode::INTERNAL_SERVER_ERROR,
+                    "internal error".to_string(),
+                )
+            }
+        };
+        (status, Json(json!({ "error": message }))).into_response()
+    }
+}

crates/manager-core/src/app_members_repo.rs

@@ -0,0 +1,212 @@
+//! CRUD over the `app_members` table — explicit per-(user, app) role
+//! grants for `member` instance-role users. Owners and admins do NOT
+//! appear here; their app authority is implicit (see authz.rs).
+//!
+//! Doubles as the production `AuthzRepo` implementation: the
+//! membership lookup `can()` needs is the same single-row SELECT as
+//! `find` here.
+
+use async_trait::async_trait;
+use chrono::{DateTime, Utc};
+use picloud_shared::{AdminUserId, AppId, AppRole};
+use sqlx::PgPool;
+
+use crate::authz::{AuthzError, AuthzRepo};
+
+#[derive(Debug, thiserror::Error)]
+pub enum AppMembersRepositoryError {
+    #[error("database error: {0}")]
+    Db(#[from] sqlx::Error),
+
+    #[error("membership row not found: app={app_id}, user={user_id}")]
+    NotFound { app_id: AppId, user_id: AdminUserId },
+
+    #[error("invalid app_role stored in DB: {0}")]
+    InvalidRole(String),
+}
+
+/// One row of `app_members`. Returned by `list_for_user` / `list_for_app`
+/// so handlers can render the cross-reference without joining to apps
+/// or admin_users themselves.
+#[derive(Debug, Clone)]
+pub struct AppMembershipRow {
+    pub app_id: AppId,
+    pub user_id: AdminUserId,
+    pub role: AppRole,
+    pub created_at: DateTime<Utc>,
+}
+
+#[async_trait]
+pub trait AppMembersRepository: Send + Sync {
+    /// Single (user, app) lookup. Returns `None` for non-members and
+    /// for unrelated apps. This is the hot path for `authz::can`.
+    async fn find(
+        &self,
+        user_id: AdminUserId,
+        app_id: AppId,
+    ) -> Result<Option<AppRole>, AppMembersRepositoryError>;
+
+    /// Upsert a membership. Used both for first-time grants and role
+    /// promotions/demotions on an existing row.
+    async fn upsert(
+        &self,
+        app_id: AppId,
+        user_id: AdminUserId,
+        role: AppRole,
+    ) -> Result<AppMembershipRow, AppMembersRepositoryError>;
+
+    /// Remove a membership. No-op (Ok) when the row doesn't exist —
+    /// the user wasn't a member, which is the desired post-condition.
+    async fn remove(
+        &self,
+        app_id: AppId,
+        user_id: AdminUserId,
+    ) -> Result<(), AppMembersRepositoryError>;
+
+    /// Every membership the user holds. Drives the membership-filtered
+    /// list endpoints (`GET /admin/apps`, `GET /admin/scripts` for
+    /// `member` callers).
+    async fn list_for_user(
+        &self,
+        user_id: AdminUserId,
+    ) -> Result<Vec<AppMembershipRow>, AppMembersRepositoryError>;
+
+    /// Every membership on a given app. Used by `GET
+    /// /admin/apps/{id}/members` once that surface lands; included now
+    /// so the trait is complete enough for tests.
+    async fn list_for_app(
+        &self,
+        app_id: AppId,
+    ) -> Result<Vec<AppMembershipRow>, AppMembersRepositoryError>;
+}
+
+pub struct PostgresAppMembersRepository {
+    pool: PgPool,
+}
+
+impl PostgresAppMembersRepository {
+    #[must_use]
+    pub fn new(pool: PgPool) -> Self {
+        Self { pool }
+    }
+}
+
+#[async_trait]
+impl AppMembersRepository for PostgresAppMembersRepository {
+    async fn find(
+        &self,
+        user_id: AdminUserId,
+        app_id: AppId,
+    ) -> Result<Option<AppRole>, AppMembersRepositoryError> {
+        let row: Option<(String,)> =
+            sqlx::query_as("SELECT role FROM app_members WHERE user_id = $1 AND app_id = $2")
+                .bind(user_id.into_inner())
+                .bind(app_id.into_inner())
+                .fetch_optional(&self.pool)
+                .await?;
+        row.map(|(role,)| {
+            AppRole::from_db_str(&role).ok_or(AppMembersRepositoryError::InvalidRole(role))
+        })
+        .transpose()
+    }
+
+    async fn upsert(
+        &self,
+        app_id: AppId,
+        user_id: AdminUserId,
+        role: AppRole,
+    ) -> Result<AppMembershipRow, AppMembersRepositoryError> {
+        let row = sqlx::query_as::<_, AppMembershipRecord>(
+            "INSERT INTO app_members (app_id, user_id, role) \
+             VALUES ($1, $2, $3) \
+             ON CONFLICT (app_id, user_id) DO UPDATE SET role = EXCLUDED.role \
+             RETURNING app_id, user_id, role, created_at",
+        )
+        .bind(app_id.into_inner())
+        .bind(user_id.into_inner())
+        .bind(role.as_str())
+        .fetch_one(&self.pool)
+        .await?;
+        row.try_into()
+    }
+
+    async fn remove(
+        &self,
+        app_id: AppId,
+        user_id: AdminUserId,
+    ) -> Result<(), AppMembersRepositoryError> {
+        sqlx::query("DELETE FROM app_members WHERE app_id = $1 AND user_id = $2")
+            .bind(app_id.into_inner())
+            .bind(user_id.into_inner())
+            .execute(&self.pool)
+            .await?;
+        Ok(())
+    }
+
+    async fn list_for_user(
+        &self,
+        user_id: AdminUserId,
+    ) -> Result<Vec<AppMembershipRow>, AppMembersRepositoryError> {
+        let rows = sqlx::query_as::<_, AppMembershipRecord>(
+            "SELECT app_id, user_id, role, created_at \
+             FROM app_members WHERE user_id = $1 \
+             ORDER BY created_at",
+        )
+        .bind(user_id.into_inner())
+        .fetch_all(&self.pool)
+        .await?;
+        rows.into_iter().map(TryInto::try_into).collect()
+    }
+
+    async fn list_for_app(
+        &self,
+        app_id: AppId,
+    ) -> Result<Vec<AppMembershipRow>, AppMembersRepositoryError> {
+        let rows = sqlx::query_as::<_, AppMembershipRecord>(
+            "SELECT app_id, user_id, role, created_at \
+             FROM app_members WHERE app_id = $1 \
+             ORDER BY created_at",
+        )
+        .bind(app_id.into_inner())
+        .fetch_all(&self.pool)
+        .await?;
+        rows.into_iter().map(TryInto::try_into).collect()
+    }
+}
+
+/// Forwarding impl so the Postgres repo satisfies `AuthzRepo` directly
+/// — handlers store a single `Arc<dyn AppMembersRepository>` and pass
+/// it to `authz::can` without casting.
+#[async_trait]
+impl AuthzRepo for PostgresAppMembersRepository {
+    async fn membership(
+        &self,
+        user_id: AdminUserId,
+        app_id: AppId,
+    ) -> Result<Option<AppRole>, AuthzError> {
+        self.find(user_id, app_id)
+            .await
+            .map_err(|e| AuthzError::Repo(e.to_string()))
+    }
+}
+
+#[derive(sqlx::FromRow)]
+struct AppMembershipRecord {
+    app_id: uuid::Uuid,
+    user_id: uuid::Uuid,
+    role: String,
+    created_at: DateTime<Utc>,
+}
+
+impl TryFrom<AppMembershipRecord> for AppMembershipRow {
+    type Error = AppMembersRepositoryError;
+    fn try_from(r: AppMembershipRecord) -> Result<Self, Self::Error> {
+        Ok(Self {
+            app_id: r.app_id.into(),
+            user_id: r.user_id.into(),
+            role: AppRole::from_db_str(&r.role)
+                .ok_or(AppMembersRepositoryError::InvalidRole(r.role))?,
+            created_at: r.created_at,
+        })
+    }
+}

crates/manager-core/src/app_repo.rs

@@ -6,7 +6,7 @@
 //! that writes the history row in the same transaction.
 
 use async_trait::async_trait;
-use picloud_shared::{App, AppId};
+use picloud_shared::{AdminUserId, App, AppId};
 use sqlx::PgPool;
 
 use crate::repo::ScriptRepositoryError;
@@ -22,7 +22,12 @@ pub struct AppLookup {
 
 #[async_trait]
 pub trait AppRepository: Send + Sync {
+    /// Every app on the instance. For owner/admin callers — `member`
+    /// users go through `list_for_user`.
     async fn list(&self) -> Result<Vec<App>, ScriptRepositoryError>;
+    /// Only apps the user has an `app_members` row for. Drives the
+    /// membership-filtered `GET /admin/apps` for `member` callers.
+    async fn list_for_user(&self, user_id: AdminUserId) -> Result<Vec<App>, ScriptRepositoryError>;
     async fn get_by_id(&self, id: AppId) -> Result<Option<App>, ScriptRepositoryError>;
     async fn get_by_slug(&self, slug: &str) -> Result<Option<App>, ScriptRepositoryError>;
     async fn get_by_slug_or_history(
@@ -92,6 +97,20 @@ impl AppRepository for PostgresAppRepository {
         Ok(rows.into_iter().map(Into::into).collect())
     }
 
+    async fn list_for_user(&self, user_id: AdminUserId) -> Result<Vec<App>, ScriptRepositoryError> {
+        let rows = sqlx::query_as::<_, AppRow>(
+            "SELECT a.id, a.slug, a.name, a.description, a.created_at, a.updated_at \
+             FROM apps a \
+             JOIN app_members m ON m.app_id = a.id \
+             WHERE m.user_id = $1 \
+             ORDER BY a.name",
+        )
+        .bind(user_id.into_inner())
+        .fetch_all(&self.pool)
+        .await?;
+        Ok(rows.into_iter().map(Into::into).collect())
+    }
+
     async fn get_by_id(&self, id: AppId) -> Result<Option<App>, ScriptRepositoryError> {
         let row = sqlx::query_as::<_, AppRow>(
             "SELECT id, slug, name, description, created_at, updated_at \

crates/manager-core/src/apps_api.rs

@@ -15,15 +15,16 @@ use axum::extract::{Path, Query, State};
 use axum::http::StatusCode;
 use axum::response::{IntoResponse, Json, Response};
 use axum::routing::{delete, get, post};
-use axum::Router;
+use axum::{Extension, Router};
 use picloud_orchestrator_core::routing::{pattern, AppDomainTable, CompiledAppDomain};
-use picloud_shared::{App, AppDomain, AppId};
+use picloud_shared::{App, AppDomain, AppId, InstanceRole, Principal};
 use serde::{Deserialize, Serialize};
 use serde_json::json;
 use uuid::Uuid;
 
 use crate::app_domain_repo::{AppDomainRepository, NewAppDomain};
 use crate::app_repo::AppRepository;
+use crate::authz::{require, AuthzDenied, AuthzRepo, Capability};
 use crate::repo::ScriptRepositoryError;
 use crate::route_repo::RouteRepository;
 
@@ -41,6 +42,8 @@ pub struct AppsState {
     /// Cached host → app_id lookup; replaced after every domain CRUD
     /// operation so the orchestrator sees changes immediately.
     pub domain_table: Arc<AppDomainTable>,
+    /// Capability gate — Phase 3.5.
+    pub authz: Arc<dyn AuthzRepo>,
 }
 
 pub fn apps_router(state: AppsState) -> Router {
@@ -144,14 +147,27 @@ pub struct AppLookupResponse {
 // Handlers
 // ----------------------------------------------------------------------------
 
-async fn list_apps(State(s): State<AppsState>) -> Result<Json<Vec<App>>, AppsApiError> {
+async fn list_apps(
-    Ok(Json(s.apps.list().await?))
+    State(s): State<AppsState>,
+    Extension(principal): Extension<Principal>,
+) -> Result<Json<Vec<App>>, AppsApiError> {
+    // Member callers see only apps they're a member of; owner/admin
+    // see everything. Filter at the SQL layer (not just in the
+    // dashboard) — that's the strict-isolation guarantee from §11.6.
+    let apps = if principal.instance_role == InstanceRole::Member {
+        s.apps.list_for_user(principal.user_id).await?
+    } else {
+        s.apps.list().await?
+    };
+    Ok(Json(apps))
 }
 
 async fn create_app(
     State(s): State<AppsState>,
+    Extension(principal): Extension<Principal>,
     Json(input): Json<CreateAppRequest>,
 ) -> Result<(StatusCode, Json<App>), AppsApiError> {
+    require(s.authz.as_ref(), &principal, Capability::InstanceCreateApp).await?;
     validate_slug(&input.slug)?;
 
     // Historical-slug check before insert: if the slug is in history
@@ -178,9 +194,16 @@ async fn create_app(
 
 async fn get_app(
     State(s): State<AppsState>,
+    Extension(principal): Extension<Principal>,
     Path(id_or_slug): Path<String>,
 ) -> Result<Json<AppLookupResponse>, AppsApiError> {
     let lookup = resolve_app(&*s.apps, &id_or_slug).await?;
+    require(
+        s.authz.as_ref(),
+        &principal,
+        Capability::AppRead(lookup.app.id),
+    )
+    .await?;
     let redirect_to = if lookup.redirected {
         Some(lookup.app.slug.clone())
     } else {
@@ -194,10 +217,17 @@ async fn get_app(
 
 async fn patch_app(
     State(s): State<AppsState>,
+    Extension(principal): Extension<Principal>,
     Path(id_or_slug): Path<String>,
     Json(input): Json<PatchAppRequest>,
 ) -> Result<Json<App>, AppsApiError> {
     let current = resolve_app(&*s.apps, &id_or_slug).await?.app;
+    require(
+        s.authz.as_ref(),
+        &principal,
+        Capability::AppAdmin(current.id),
+    )
+    .await?;
 
     // Edits to name/description go first (separate from rename so we
     // don't conflate the two errors).
@@ -240,10 +270,12 @@ async fn patch_app(
 
 async fn delete_app(
     State(s): State<AppsState>,
+    Extension(principal): Extension<Principal>,
     Path(id_or_slug): Path<String>,
     Query(q): Query<DeleteAppQuery>,
 ) -> Result<StatusCode, AppsApiError> {
     let app = resolve_app(&*s.apps, &id_or_slug).await?.app;
+    require(s.authz.as_ref(), &principal, Capability::AppAdmin(app.id)).await?;
 
     if q.force {
         s.apps.delete_cascade(app.id).await?;
@@ -262,9 +294,12 @@ async fn delete_app(
 
 async fn slug_check(
     State(s): State<AppsState>,
-    Path(_id_or_slug): Path<String>,
+    Extension(principal): Extension<Principal>,
+    Path(id_or_slug): Path<String>,
     Json(input): Json<SlugCheckRequest>,
 ) -> Result<Json<SlugCheckResponse>, AppsApiError> {
+    let app = resolve_app(&*s.apps, &id_or_slug).await?.app;
+    require(s.authz.as_ref(), &principal, Capability::AppAdmin(app.id)).await?;
     match validate_slug(&input.new_slug) {
         Err(AppsApiError::InvalidSlug(reason)) => {
             return Ok(Json(SlugCheckResponse {
@@ -303,18 +338,27 @@ async fn slug_check(
 
 async fn list_domains(
     State(s): State<AppsState>,
+    Extension(principal): Extension<Principal>,
     Path(id_or_slug): Path<String>,
 ) -> Result<Json<Vec<AppDomain>>, AppsApiError> {
     let app = resolve_app(&*s.apps, &id_or_slug).await?.app;
+    require(s.authz.as_ref(), &principal, Capability::AppRead(app.id)).await?;
     Ok(Json(s.domains.list_for_app(app.id).await?))
 }
 
 async fn create_domain(
     State(s): State<AppsState>,
+    Extension(principal): Extension<Principal>,
     Path(id_or_slug): Path<String>,
     Json(input): Json<CreateDomainRequest>,
 ) -> Result<(StatusCode, Json<AppDomain>), AppsApiError> {
     let app = resolve_app(&*s.apps, &id_or_slug).await?.app;
+    require(
+        s.authz.as_ref(),
+        &principal,
+        Capability::AppManageDomains(app.id),
+    )
+    .await?;
     let parsed = pattern::parse_app_domain(&input.pattern)?;
     let created = s
         .domains
@@ -331,9 +375,16 @@ async fn create_domain(
 
 async fn delete_domain(
     State(s): State<AppsState>,
+    Extension(principal): Extension<Principal>,
     Path((id_or_slug, domain_id)): Path<(String, Uuid)>,
 ) -> Result<StatusCode, AppsApiError> {
     let app = resolve_app(&*s.apps, &id_or_slug).await?.app;
+    require(
+        s.authz.as_ref(),
+        &principal,
+        Capability::AppManageDomains(app.id),
+    )
+    .await?;
     let Some(domain) = s.domains.get(domain_id).await? else {
         return Err(AppsApiError::DomainNotFound(domain_id));
     };
@@ -476,10 +527,25 @@ pub enum AppsApiError {
     #[error("conflict: {0}")]
     Conflict(String),
 
+    #[error("forbidden")]
+    Forbidden,
+
+    #[error("authorization repo error: {0}")]
+    AuthzRepo(String),
+
     #[error("repository error: {0}")]
     Repo(#[from] ScriptRepositoryError),
 }
 
+impl From<AuthzDenied> for AppsApiError {
+    fn from(d: AuthzDenied) -> Self {
+        match d {
+            AuthzDenied::Denied => Self::Forbidden,
+            AuthzDenied::Repo(e) => Self::AuthzRepo(e.to_string()),
+        }
+    }
+}
+
 impl IntoResponse for AppsApiError {
     fn into_response(self) -> Response {
         let (status, body) = match &self {
@@ -511,6 +577,14 @@ impl IntoResponse for AppsApiError {
             Self::Conflict(_) | Self::Repo(ScriptRepositoryError::Conflict(_)) => {
                 (StatusCode::CONFLICT, json!({ "error": self.to_string() }))
             }
+            Self::Forbidden => (StatusCode::FORBIDDEN, json!({ "error": self.to_string() })),
+            Self::AuthzRepo(e) => {
+                tracing::error!(error = %e, "apps authz repo error");
+                (
+                    StatusCode::INTERNAL_SERVER_ERROR,
+                    json!({ "error": "internal error" }),
+                )
+            }
             Self::Repo(ScriptRepositoryError::Db(e)) => {
                 tracing::error!(error = %e, "apps api db error");
                 (

crates/manager-core/src/auth.rs

@@ -13,6 +13,7 @@ use argon2::password_hash::{PasswordHash, PasswordHasher, PasswordVerifier, Salt
 use argon2::Argon2;
 use base64::engine::general_purpose::URL_SAFE_NO_PAD;
 use base64::Engine as _;
+use data_encoding::BASE32_NOPAD;
 use rand::rngs::OsRng;
 use rand::RngCore;
 use sha2::{Digest, Sha256};
@@ -93,6 +94,66 @@ fn hex(bytes: &[u8]) -> String {
     out
 }
 
+// ----------------------------------------------------------------------------
+// API key generation (Phase 3.5)
+// ----------------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+/// Wire-format prefix that marks a Bearer value as an API key (vs. a
+/// session token). Mirrors `auth_middleware::API_KEY_PREFIX` so the
+/// generator and the verifier agree.
+pub const API_KEY_WIRE_PREFIX: &str = "pic_";
+
+/// Length of the indexed prefix portion (the first 8 chars of the
+/// `pic_`-stripped body). Mirrors `auth_middleware::API_KEY_PREFIX_LEN`.
+pub const API_KEY_INDEX_PREFIX_LEN: usize = 8;
+
+/// Newly minted API key — returned exactly once by `POST /api/v1/admin/api-keys`.
+///
+/// * `raw` is the full wire-format token (`pic_<base32>`) shown to the
+///   caller in the response body and never persisted.
+/// * `prefix` is the indexed 8-char slice persisted to
+///   `api_keys.prefix` for lookup.
+/// * `hash` is the Argon2id PHC string persisted to `api_keys.hash`;
+///   covers the body after `pic_` (i.e., `raw[4..]`).
+pub struct GeneratedApiKey {
+    pub raw: String,
+    pub prefix: String,
+    pub hash: String,
+}
+
+/// Generate a fresh API key. 32 random bytes → unpadded base32, then
+/// `pic_` prefix on the wire. The first 8 base32 chars are the index
+/// key; everything after `pic_` is what the verifier hashes.
+///
+/// # Errors
+///
+/// Returns `argon2::password_hash::Error` if the Argon2 hash step
+/// fails (which it shouldn't under normal conditions).
+pub fn generate_api_key() -> Result<GeneratedApiKey, argon2::password_hash::Error> {
+    let mut bytes = [0u8; 32];
+    OsRng.fill_bytes(&mut bytes);
+    let body = BASE32_NOPAD.encode(&bytes);
+    debug_assert!(
+        body.len() >= API_KEY_INDEX_PREFIX_LEN,
+        "32 bytes base32 must exceed the 8-char prefix length"
+    );
+    let prefix = body[..API_KEY_INDEX_PREFIX_LEN].to_string();
+    let salt = SaltString::generate(&mut ArgonRng);
+    let hash = Argon2::default()
+        .hash_password(body.as_bytes(), &salt)?
+        .to_string();
+    let raw = format!("{API_KEY_WIRE_PREFIX}{body}");
+    Ok(GeneratedApiKey { raw, prefix, hash })
+}
+
+/// Verify a wire-format token body (the portion *after* `pic_`)
+/// against a stored Argon2id hash. Convenience wrapper around
+/// `verify_password` named to reflect its caller.
+#[must_use]
+pub fn verify_api_key(stored_hash: &str, presented_body: &str) -> bool {
+    verify_password(stored_hash, presented_body)
+}
+
 #[cfg(test)]
 mod tests {
     use super::*;
@@ -129,4 +190,42 @@ mod tests {
         assert_eq!(a.hash, hash_token(&a.raw), "hash must be reproducible");
         assert_eq!(a.hash.len(), 64, "sha256-hex is 64 chars");
     }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn generate_api_key_round_trip() {
+        let key = generate_api_key().expect("mint");
+        assert!(
+            key.raw.starts_with(API_KEY_WIRE_PREFIX),
+            "raw must carry the pic_ prefix"
+        );
+        let body = key
+            .raw
+            .strip_prefix(API_KEY_WIRE_PREFIX)
+            .expect("starts with prefix");
+        assert_eq!(
+            &body[..API_KEY_INDEX_PREFIX_LEN],
+            key.prefix,
+            "stored prefix matches the first 8 chars of the body"
+        );
+        assert!(
+            verify_api_key(&key.hash, body),
+            "Argon2 verify must accept the original body"
+        );
+        assert!(
+            !verify_api_key(&key.hash, "wrong-body-entirely"),
+            "Argon2 verify must reject anything else"
+        );
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn generate_api_key_unique() {
+        let a = generate_api_key().expect("mint a");
+        let b = generate_api_key().expect("mint b");
+        assert_ne!(a.raw, b.raw);
+        assert_ne!(a.hash, b.hash);
+        assert_ne!(
+            a.prefix, b.prefix,
+            "32 random bytes → prefix collision is negligible"
+        );
+    }
 }

crates/manager-core/src/auth_api.rs

@@ -22,8 +22,10 @@ use picloud_shared::AdminUserId;
 use serde::{Deserialize, Serialize};
 use serde_json::json;
 
+use picloud_shared::Principal;
+
 use crate::auth::{generate_session_token, hash_token, verify_password};
-use crate::auth_middleware::{require_admin, AuthState, AuthedAdmin, SESSION_COOKIE};
+use crate::auth_middleware::{require_authenticated, AuthState, SESSION_COOKIE};
 
 pub fn auth_router(state: AuthState) -> Router {
     // /login + /logout are unguarded (login is how you get in; logout
@@ -31,7 +33,7 @@ pub fn auth_router(state: AuthState) -> Router {
     // who you are, so the middleware must run first.
     let guarded = Router::new()
         .route("/auth/me", get(me))
-        .route_layer(from_fn_with_state(state.clone(), require_admin));
+        .route_layer(from_fn_with_state(state.clone(), require_authenticated));
 
     Router::new()
         .route("/auth/login", post(login))
@@ -158,11 +160,25 @@ async fn logout(State(state): State<AuthState>, req: Request<Body>) -> Response
     (StatusCode::NO_CONTENT, headers).into_response()
 }
 
-async fn me(Extension(admin): Extension<AuthedAdmin>) -> Json<AdminUserDto> {
+async fn me(
-    Json(AdminUserDto {
+    State(state): State<AuthState>,
-        id: admin.id,
+    Extension(principal): Extension<Principal>,
-        username: admin.username,
+) -> Response {
+    // /me consumes the resolved Principal directly; we re-fetch the
+    // user row only to surface a fresh username (it can change via
+    // PATCH while a session/key is still valid).
+    match state.users.get(principal.user_id).await {
+        Ok(Some(row)) => Json(AdminUserDto {
+            id: row.id,
+            username: row.username,
         })
+        .into_response(),
+        Ok(None) => invalid_credentials(),
+        Err(err) => {
+            tracing::error!(?err, "admin_users lookup for /me failed");
+            internal_error()
+        }
+    }
 }
 
 // ----------------------------------------------------------------------------

crates/manager-core/src/auth_bootstrap.rs

@@ -116,7 +116,15 @@ pub async fn bootstrap_first_admin_with<R: AdminUserRepository + ?Sized>(
         (None, None) => return Err(BootstrapError::MissingPassword),
     };
 
-    repo.create(&username, &password_hash).await?;
+    // Bootstrap admin is always seeded as Owner — Phase 3.5 keys the
+    // first row to full instance control. Subsequent admins minted via
+    // the API default to Admin and can be promoted explicitly.
+    repo.create(
+        &username,
+        &password_hash,
+        picloud_shared::InstanceRole::Owner,
+    )
+    .await?;
     info!(username = %username, "bootstrapped initial admin user");
     Ok(())
 }
@@ -130,7 +138,7 @@ mod tests {
     use super::*;
     use async_trait::async_trait;
     use chrono::Utc;
-    use picloud_shared::AdminUserId;
+    use picloud_shared::{AdminUserId, InstanceRole};
     use std::sync::Mutex;
 
     use crate::admin_user_repo::{AdminUserCredentials, AdminUserRepositoryError, AdminUserRow};
@@ -167,11 +175,14 @@ mod tests {
             &self,
             username: &str,
             _password_hash: &str,
+            instance_role: InstanceRole,
         ) -> Result<AdminUserRow, AdminUserRepositoryError> {
             let row = AdminUserRow {
                 id: AdminUserId::new(),
                 username: username.to_string(),
                 is_active: true,
+                instance_role,
+                email: None,
                 created_at: Utc::now(),
                 updated_at: Utc::now(),
                 last_login_at: None,
@@ -193,6 +204,13 @@ mod tests {
         ) -> Result<AdminUserRow, AdminUserRepositoryError> {
             unimplemented!()
         }
+        async fn update_instance_role(
+            &self,
+            _i: AdminUserId,
+            _r: InstanceRole,
+        ) -> Result<AdminUserRow, AdminUserRepositoryError> {
+            unimplemented!()
+        }
         async fn set_active(
             &self,
             _i: AdminUserId,
@@ -215,6 +233,15 @@ mod tests {
         ) -> Result<i64, AdminUserRepositoryError> {
             unimplemented!()
         }
+        async fn list_active_owners(&self) -> Result<Vec<AdminUserRow>, AdminUserRepositoryError> {
+            unimplemented!()
+        }
+        async fn count_other_active_owners(
+            &self,
+            _i: AdminUserId,
+        ) -> Result<i64, AdminUserRepositoryError> {
+            unimplemented!()
+        }
     }
 
     #[tokio::test]
@@ -245,7 +272,9 @@ mod tests {
     #[tokio::test]
     async fn populated_db_is_noop() {
         let repo = InMemoryRepo::default();
-        repo.create("seeded", "x").await.unwrap();
+        repo.create("seeded", "x", InstanceRole::Owner)
+            .await
+            .unwrap();
         let env = BootstrapEnv {
             username: Some("alice".into()),
             password: Some("supersecret".into()),

crates/manager-core/src/auth_middleware.rs

@@ -1,12 +1,17 @@
-//! `require_admin` axum middleware: gates a router on a valid admin
+//! Authentication middleware — resolves the caller's `Principal` from
-//! session. Accepts the token from either the `picloud_session` cookie
+//! either a session cookie / Bearer session-token OR an API key
-//! or an `Authorization: Bearer …` header — same token system serves
+//! (`Authorization: Bearer pic_…`). Both paths converge on the same
-//! the dashboard and CLI/CI clients.
+//! request extension so downstream handlers see one shape.
 //!
-//! On success, injects `AuthedAdmin` as a request extension so handlers
+//! Capability checks live in `crate::authz` and are called per-handler
-//! can `Extension<AuthedAdmin>` to know who's calling. On failure,
+//! (after the relevant resource is loaded, so the capability binds to
-//! returns 401 with a generic JSON body (no enumeration about whether
+//! the actual resource's `app_id`). This middleware is gate-only: it
-//! the token was wrong vs. the user was deactivated).
+//! ensures *some* `Principal` is attached, or returns 401.
+//!
+//! Token discriminator: the `pic_` prefix on a Bearer value selects
+//! the API-key path; anything else (raw 32-byte base64-url-encoded
+//! string) takes the session path. The session cookie can only ever
+//! carry a session token (cookies are never API keys).
 
 use std::sync::Arc;
 use std::time::Duration;
@@ -17,35 +22,51 @@ use axum::http::{header, StatusCode};
 use axum::middleware::Next;
 use axum::response::{IntoResponse, Json, Response};
 use chrono::Utc;
-use picloud_shared::AdminUserId;
+use picloud_shared::{AdminUserId, Principal};
 use serde_json::json;
 
 use crate::admin_session_repo::AdminSessionRepository;
 use crate::admin_user_repo::AdminUserRepository;
-use crate::auth::hash_token;
+use crate::api_key_repo::{ApiKeyRepository, ApiKeyVerification};
+use crate::auth::{hash_token, verify_password};
 
 pub const SESSION_COOKIE: &str = "picloud_session";
 
-/// Shared state for auth: the two repos plus the configured sliding
+/// Prefix on the wire that selects the API-key path. The body that
-/// session TTL. Cheap to clone (`Arc` everywhere).
+/// follows is `base32(32 random bytes)`; the first 8 chars of the body
+/// index into `api_keys.prefix` for verification.
+pub const API_KEY_PREFIX: &str = "pic_";
+
+/// Length of the indexed prefix portion of an API key (the 8 chars
+/// immediately after `pic_`). Schema-side index is on this slice.
+pub const API_KEY_PREFIX_LEN: usize = 8;
+
+/// Shared state for auth: the user / session / API-key repos plus the
+/// configured sliding session TTL. Cheap to clone (`Arc` everywhere).
 #[derive(Clone)]
 pub struct AuthState {
     pub users: Arc<dyn AdminUserRepository>,
     pub sessions: Arc<dyn AdminSessionRepository>,
+    pub keys: Arc<dyn ApiKeyRepository>,
     pub ttl: Duration,
 }
 
-/// Request-extension type that authenticated handlers extract via
+/// Legacy request-extension alias retained so the (only remaining)
-/// `Extension<AuthedAdmin>`. Available only inside guarded routers.
+/// handler that pulled `AuthedAdmin` out — `GET /admin/auth/me` —
+/// keeps compiling during the migration. New handlers should pull
+/// `Extension<Principal>` directly.
+#[deprecated(note = "use Extension<Principal> directly")]
 #[derive(Debug, Clone)]
 pub struct AuthedAdmin {
     pub id: AdminUserId,
     pub username: String,
 }
 
-/// Middleware function. Wire with
+/// Middleware entry point. Wire with
-/// `axum::middleware::from_fn_with_state(auth_state, require_admin)`.
+/// `axum::middleware::from_fn_with_state(auth_state, require_authenticated)`.
-pub async fn require_admin(
+/// Inserts `Principal` (and the legacy `AuthedAdmin`) as request
+/// extensions on success; returns 401 on any failure mode.
+pub async fn require_authenticated(
     State(state): State<AuthState>,
     mut req: Request<Body>,
     next: Next,
@@ -53,48 +74,162 @@ pub async fn require_admin(
     let Some(token) = extract_token(&req) else {
         return unauthorized();
     };
-    let token_hash = hash_token(&token);
+    let principal = match resolve_principal(&state, &token).await {
+        Ok(Some(p)) => p,
+        Ok(None) => return unauthorized(),
+        Err(InternalError) => return internal_error(),
+    };
+
+    let username_for_legacy = username_for(&state, principal.user_id).await;
+    req.extensions_mut().insert(principal.clone());
+    #[allow(deprecated)]
+    if let Some(username) = username_for_legacy {
+        req.extensions_mut().insert(AuthedAdmin {
+            id: principal.user_id,
+            username,
+        });
+    }
+    next.run(req).await
+}
+
+/// Backwards-compatible alias — the single callsite that still names
+/// `require_admin` keeps working without an immediate rename. New
+/// wiring should call `require_authenticated`.
+#[deprecated(note = "renamed to require_authenticated")]
+pub async fn require_admin(state: State<AuthState>, req: Request<Body>, next: Next) -> Response {
+    require_authenticated(state, req, next).await
+}
+
+/// Decide whether the token is an API key (pic_ prefix) or a session
+/// token, then resolve the corresponding `Principal`. `Ok(None)`
+/// means the token was structurally valid but didn't match any active
+/// credential; `Err(InternalError)` means a DB blip.
+async fn resolve_principal(
+    state: &AuthState,
+    token: &str,
+) -> Result<Option<Principal>, InternalError> {
+    if let Some(rest) = token.strip_prefix(API_KEY_PREFIX) {
+        return verify_api_key(state, rest).await;
+    }
+    verify_session(state, token).await
+}
+
+async fn verify_session(
+    state: &AuthState,
+    token: &str,
+) -> Result<Option<Principal>, InternalError> {
+    let token_hash = hash_token(token);
 
     let lookup = match state.sessions.lookup(&token_hash).await {
-        Ok(Some(lookup)) => lookup,
+        Ok(Some(l)) => l,
-        Ok(None) => return unauthorized(),
+        Ok(None) => return Ok(None),
         Err(err) => {
             tracing::error!(?err, "admin_sessions lookup failed");
-            return internal_error();
+            return Err(InternalError);
         }
     };
 
-    // Resolve the user. A deleted user is impossible here (FK cascade
-    // wipes their sessions), but a deactivated user still needs to be
-    // rejected — and so does the edge case of a session predating the
-    // deactivate (we wipe their sessions on deactivate, but a race
-    // could land a request in flight).
     let user = match state.users.get(lookup.user_id).await {
         Ok(Some(u)) if u.is_active => u,
-        Ok(_) => return unauthorized(),
+        Ok(_) => return Ok(None),
         Err(err) => {
             tracing::error!(?err, "admin_users lookup failed");
-            return internal_error();
+            return Err(InternalError);
         }
     };
 
-    // Sliding window bump. Inline (not fire-and-forget) so a DB blip
+    // Sliding-window bump — inline so a DB blip surfaces as 500 rather
-    // surfaces as a request error rather than silent stale sessions.
+    // than silent stale sessions. Same shape as Phase 3a.
     let new_expires_at = Utc::now() + chrono::Duration::from_std(state.ttl).unwrap_or_default();
     if let Err(err) = state.sessions.touch(&token_hash, new_expires_at).await {
         tracing::error!(?err, "admin_sessions touch failed");
-        return internal_error();
+        return Err(InternalError);
     }
 
-    req.extensions_mut().insert(AuthedAdmin {
+    Ok(Some(Principal {
-        id: user.id,
+        user_id: user.id,
-        username: user.username,
+        instance_role: user.instance_role,
-    });
+        scopes: None,
-    next.run(req).await
+        app_binding: None,
+    }))
+}
+
+/// API-key verification path. `rest` is the portion of the bearer
+/// value *after* `pic_`. We slice off the first 8 chars as the
+/// indexed lookup key, then Argon2id-verify each candidate's hash
+/// against the full `rest`. At most one match is expected; multiple
+/// candidates with the same prefix is statistically negligible but
+/// handled correctly (verify each, take the first match).
+async fn verify_api_key(state: &AuthState, rest: &str) -> Result<Option<Principal>, InternalError> {
+    if rest.len() <= API_KEY_PREFIX_LEN {
+        return Ok(None);
+    }
+    let prefix = &rest[..API_KEY_PREFIX_LEN];
+
+    let candidates = match state.keys.find_active_by_prefix(prefix).await {
+        Ok(v) => v,
+        Err(err) => {
+            tracing::error!(?err, "api_keys lookup failed");
+            return Err(InternalError);
+        }
+    };
+
+    let matched: Option<ApiKeyVerification> = candidates
+        .into_iter()
+        .find(|c| verify_password(&c.hash, rest));
+    let Some(matched) = matched else {
+        return Ok(None);
+    };
+
+    // Resolve the owning user. is_active = false → reject even if the
+    // key itself hasn't been expired yet (the expire_all_for_user
+    // cascade on deactivation is the primary defense; this is the
+    // belt-and-suspenders check at request time).
+    let user = match state.users.get(matched.user_id).await {
+        Ok(Some(u)) if u.is_active => u,
+        Ok(_) => return Ok(None),
+        Err(err) => {
+            tracing::error!(?err, "admin_users lookup for api key failed");
+            return Err(InternalError);
+        }
+    };
+
+    if let Err(err) = state.keys.touch_last_used(matched.id).await {
+        tracing::error!(?err, "api_keys touch_last_used failed");
+        // Soft-fail: a timestamp blip should not invalidate the
+        // request. Continue with the resolved Principal.
+    }
+
+    Ok(Some(Principal {
+        user_id: user.id,
+        instance_role: user.instance_role,
+        scopes: Some(matched.scopes),
+        app_binding: matched.app_id,
+    }))
+}
+
+/// Best-effort username lookup for the legacy `AuthedAdmin` extension.
+/// Returns `None` on DB error (the caller treats `None` as "skip the
+/// legacy extension"). New handlers use `Principal` and don't depend
+/// on this.
+async fn username_for(state: &AuthState, id: AdminUserId) -> Option<String> {
+    match state.users.get(id).await {
+        Ok(Some(u)) => Some(u.username),
+        Ok(None) => None,
+        Err(err) => {
+            tracing::warn!(
+                ?err,
+                "username lookup for AuthedAdmin failed; skipping legacy ext"
+            );
+            None
+        }
+    }
 }
 
 /// Pull the bearer token out of an `Authorization` header (preferred)
 /// or the `picloud_session` cookie (fallback for browser clients).
+/// Same shape as Phase 3a; the cookie only ever carries session
+/// tokens — no `pic_` prefix expected there.
 fn extract_token(req: &Request<Body>) -> Option<String> {
     if let Some(value) = req.headers().get(header::AUTHORIZATION) {
         if let Ok(s) = value.to_str() {
@@ -121,6 +256,11 @@ fn extract_token(req: &Request<Body>) -> Option<String> {
     None
 }
 
+/// Sentinel returned from the resolve functions when a DB error should
+/// produce a 500 rather than a 401. Empty struct because the actual
+/// error is already logged at the failure site.
+struct InternalError;
+
 fn unauthorized() -> Response {
     (
         StatusCode::UNAUTHORIZED,
@@ -141,6 +281,7 @@ fn internal_error() -> Response {
 mod tests {
     use super::*;
     use axum::http::Request;
+    use picloud_shared::InstanceRole;
 
     fn req_with_header(name: &str, value: &str) -> Request<Body> {
         Request::builder()
@@ -155,6 +296,12 @@ mod tests {
         assert_eq!(extract_token(&r).as_deref(), Some("abc123"));
     }
 
+    #[test]
+    fn extracts_bearer_pic_prefixed_token() {
+        let r = req_with_header("authorization", "Bearer pic_abcdefghIJKL");
+        assert_eq!(extract_token(&r).as_deref(), Some("pic_abcdefghIJKL"));
+    }
+
     #[test]
     fn ignores_bearer_with_no_token() {
         let r = req_with_header("authorization", "Bearer ");
@@ -182,4 +329,20 @@ mod tests {
         let r = Request::builder().body(Body::empty()).unwrap();
         assert_eq!(extract_token(&r), None);
     }
+
+    // Round-trip test for the unused-variable to keep `Principal`
+    // visibly tied to InstanceRole — caught a real bug during dev when
+    // the field order in the struct literal had drifted.
+    #[test]
+    fn principal_construction_is_explicit() {
+        let p = Principal {
+            user_id: AdminUserId::new(),
+            instance_role: InstanceRole::Owner,
+            scopes: None,
+            app_binding: None,
+        };
+        assert_eq!(p.instance_role, InstanceRole::Owner);
+        assert!(p.scopes.is_none());
+        assert!(p.app_binding.is_none());
+    }
 }

crates/manager-core/src/authz.rs

@@ -0,0 +1,599 @@
+//! Capability-based authorization — see blueprint §11.6.
+//!
+//! Single entry point for every admin endpoint: `can(repo, principal,
+//! capability)` returns whether the caller can perform the action.
+//! Handlers call `require` (which wraps `can` + a `Forbidden` error)
+//! after loading the resource so the capability binds to the resource's
+//! actual `app_id`, not a path param the caller controls.
+//!
+//! Three layers of intersection, evaluated in order:
+//!
+//!   1. **Role grant** — does the caller's `InstanceRole` plus any
+//!      `app_members` row authorize this capability?
+//!   2. **Scope intersection** — if the principal came from an API key
+//!      (`principal.scopes.is_some()`), does the key's scope set cover
+//!      the capability's required scope?
+//!   3. **App binding** — if the key was minted bound to a specific
+//!      app (`principal.app_binding`), does the capability target the
+//!      same app? (Instance-level capabilities are denied for bound
+//!      keys; the mint handler also rejects the combination upfront.)
+//!
+//! The capability set is intentionally finer-grained than the seven
+//! scopes (e.g., `AppWriteScript` vs `AppWriteRoute` both fall under
+//! the `script:write` / `route:write` scopes respectively). Keeping
+//! capabilities precise lets a `script:write`-only key write scripts
+//! without also being able to mutate routes. The scope set stays at
+//! seven values — capabilities are the internal check, scopes are the
+//! external user-facing label.
+
+use async_trait::async_trait;
+use picloud_shared::{AppId, AppRole, InstanceRole, Principal, Scope, UserId};
+
+/// Things a caller can attempt to do. Each app-scoped variant carries
+/// the `AppId` of the resource the action targets — handlers compute
+/// it from the loaded resource (e.g., `script.app_id`), not from a
+/// path param.
+#[derive(Debug, Clone, Copy, PartialEq, Eq)]
+pub enum Capability {
+    /// Create a new app. Owner / admin only.
+    InstanceCreateApp,
+    /// Create / update / delete admin_users rows (other than self
+    /// password change, which is a separate flow). Owner / admin.
+    InstanceManageUsers,
+    /// Mutate instance-wide configuration (sandbox ceiling, etc.).
+    /// Owner only.
+    InstanceManageSettings,
+    /// Read app metadata, scripts, routes. Viewer / editor / app_admin
+    /// (member); implicit for admin / owner.
+    AppRead(AppId),
+    /// Create / update / delete a script in this app.
+    AppWriteScript(AppId),
+    /// Create / update / delete a route in this app.
+    AppWriteRoute(AppId),
+    /// Manage domain claims on this app (add / remove).
+    AppManageDomains(AppId),
+    /// App settings + delete app. app_admin only (or owner via
+    /// implicit grant).
+    AppAdmin(AppId),
+    /// Read execution logs for scripts in this app.
+    AppLogRead(AppId),
+}
+
+impl Capability {
+    /// Extract the `AppId` for app-scoped capabilities; `None` for
+    /// instance-scoped ones. Used by the app-binding check on API keys.
+    #[must_use]
+    pub const fn app_id(self) -> Option<AppId> {
+        match self {
+            Self::InstanceCreateApp | Self::InstanceManageUsers | Self::InstanceManageSettings => {
+                None
+            }
+            Self::AppRead(id)
+            | Self::AppWriteScript(id)
+            | Self::AppWriteRoute(id)
+            | Self::AppManageDomains(id)
+            | Self::AppAdmin(id)
+            | Self::AppLogRead(id) => Some(id),
+        }
+    }
+
+    /// The single scope that authorizes this capability on an API key.
+    /// Strict mapping — a `script:write` key cannot read scripts unless
+    /// it also carries `script:read`. The intent is predictability: a
+    /// key has exactly the scopes it was minted with, no implicit
+    /// upgrades.
+    #[must_use]
+    pub const fn required_scope(self) -> Scope {
+        match self {
+            Self::InstanceCreateApp | Self::InstanceManageUsers | Self::InstanceManageSettings => {
+                Scope::InstanceAdmin
+            }
+            Self::AppRead(_) => Scope::ScriptRead,
+            Self::AppWriteScript(_) => Scope::ScriptWrite,
+            Self::AppWriteRoute(_) => Scope::RouteWrite,
+            Self::AppManageDomains(_) => Scope::DomainManage,
+            Self::AppAdmin(_) => Scope::AppAdmin,
+            Self::AppLogRead(_) => Scope::LogRead,
+        }
+    }
+}
+
+/// Repo seam for membership lookups. Implemented in the DB-backed
+/// repos crate (`app_members_repo.rs`); keeping it as a trait here
+/// means unit tests can stub it.
+#[async_trait]
+pub trait AuthzRepo: Send + Sync {
+    async fn membership(
+        &self,
+        user_id: UserId,
+        app_id: AppId,
+    ) -> Result<Option<AppRole>, AuthzError>;
+}
+
+/// Repo errors surface here so handlers can map them to 500 without
+/// dragging sqlx types across the boundary.
+#[derive(Debug, thiserror::Error)]
+pub enum AuthzError {
+    #[error("authorization repo error: {0}")]
+    Repo(String),
+}
+
+/// Decision flavor returned by `can` — distinguishes outright denial
+/// from a partial answer that requires further checks (none today,
+/// but the shape lets us add audit/explain mode later without rewriting
+/// every caller).
+#[must_use = "an authorization decision must be acted on"]
+#[derive(Debug, Clone, Copy, PartialEq, Eq)]
+pub enum Decision {
+    Allow,
+    Deny,
+}
+
+impl Decision {
+    #[must_use]
+    pub const fn is_allow(self) -> bool {
+        matches!(self, Self::Allow)
+    }
+}
+
+/// Core authorization check. Walks the three intersection layers in
+/// order and returns the resulting `Decision`.
+pub async fn can(
+    repo: &dyn AuthzRepo,
+    principal: &Principal,
+    cap: Capability,
+) -> Result<Decision, AuthzError> {
+    if !role_grants(repo, principal, cap).await? {
+        return Ok(Decision::Deny);
+    }
+    if !scope_allows(principal, cap) {
+        return Ok(Decision::Deny);
+    }
+    if !binding_allows(principal, cap) {
+        return Ok(Decision::Deny);
+    }
+    Ok(Decision::Allow)
+}
+
+/// Helper: returns `Ok(())` on Allow, `Err(AuthzDenied)` on Deny.
+/// Handlers call this so the `?` operator threads the 403 through
+/// naturally.
+///
+/// # Errors
+///
+/// Returns `AuthzDenied::Denied` when the capability is not granted,
+/// or `AuthzDenied::Repo` if the underlying membership lookup fails.
+pub async fn require(
+    repo: &dyn AuthzRepo,
+    principal: &Principal,
+    cap: Capability,
+) -> Result<(), AuthzDenied> {
+    match can(repo, principal, cap).await {
+        Ok(Decision::Allow) => Ok(()),
+        Ok(Decision::Deny) => Err(AuthzDenied::Denied),
+        Err(e) => Err(AuthzDenied::Repo(e)),
+    }
+}
+
+#[derive(Debug, thiserror::Error)]
+pub enum AuthzDenied {
+    #[error("forbidden")]
+    Denied,
+    #[error(transparent)]
+    Repo(#[from] AuthzError),
+}
+
+// ----------------------------------------------------------------------------
+// Layer 1: role-derived grant
+// ----------------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+async fn role_grants(
+    repo: &dyn AuthzRepo,
+    principal: &Principal,
+    cap: Capability,
+) -> Result<bool, AuthzError> {
+    match principal.instance_role {
+        InstanceRole::Owner => Ok(true),
+        InstanceRole::Admin => Ok(admin_grants(cap)),
+        InstanceRole::Member => member_grants(repo, principal.user_id, cap).await,
+    }
+}
+
+/// Admin is implicit `editor` on every app (per blueprint §11.6). They
+/// can create apps and manage users, but NOT touch instance-wide
+/// settings or take app-admin-only actions on apps they're not
+/// explicitly app_admin of. Everything not in this set falls through
+/// to deny (`InstanceManageSettings`, `AppManageDomains`, `AppAdmin`).
+const fn admin_grants(cap: Capability) -> bool {
+    matches!(
+        cap,
+        Capability::InstanceCreateApp
+            | Capability::InstanceManageUsers
+            | Capability::AppRead(_)
+            | Capability::AppWriteScript(_)
+            | Capability::AppWriteRoute(_)
+            | Capability::AppLogRead(_)
+    )
+}
+
+/// Member has zero instance authority. App authority requires an
+/// explicit `app_members` row with sufficient `AppRole`.
+async fn member_grants(
+    repo: &dyn AuthzRepo,
+    user_id: UserId,
+    cap: Capability,
+) -> Result<bool, AuthzError> {
+    let Some(app_id) = cap.app_id() else {
+        return Ok(false);
+    };
+    let Some(role) = repo.membership(user_id, app_id).await? else {
+        return Ok(false);
+    };
+    Ok(role_satisfies(role, cap))
+}
+
+/// Does the per-app `AppRole` cover the capability? Viewer can read;
+/// Editor adds script/route/log mutations; AppAdmin adds settings,
+/// domain claims, and delete. Roles form a strict subset chain, so
+/// the check is "is this capability in the role's set?".
+const fn role_satisfies(role: AppRole, cap: Capability) -> bool {
+    let in_viewer = matches!(cap, Capability::AppRead(_) | Capability::AppLogRead(_));
+    let in_editor = in_viewer
+        || matches!(
+            cap,
+            Capability::AppWriteScript(_) | Capability::AppWriteRoute(_)
+        );
+    let in_app_admin = in_editor
+        || matches!(
+            cap,
+            Capability::AppManageDomains(_) | Capability::AppAdmin(_)
+        );
+    match role {
+        AppRole::Viewer => in_viewer,
+        AppRole::Editor => in_editor,
+        AppRole::AppAdmin => in_app_admin,
+    }
+}
+
+// ----------------------------------------------------------------------------
+// Layer 2: API-key scope intersection
+// ----------------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+fn scope_allows(principal: &Principal, cap: Capability) -> bool {
+    match &principal.scopes {
+        None => true, // cookie session — full role authority
+        Some(scopes) => scopes.contains(&cap.required_scope()),
+    }
+}
+
+// ----------------------------------------------------------------------------
+// Layer 3: API-key app binding
+// ----------------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+fn binding_allows(principal: &Principal, cap: Capability) -> bool {
+    let Some(bound_app) = principal.app_binding else {
+        return true;
+    };
+    match cap.app_id() {
+        // Instance-scoped capability + bound key → always denied. The
+        // mint handler also rejects this combination upfront, but
+        // defending in depth here means a stale/malformed row can't
+        // escalate.
+        None => false,
+        Some(target_app) => target_app == bound_app,
+    }
+}
+
+// ----------------------------------------------------------------------------
+// Tests
+// ----------------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+#[cfg(test)]
+mod tests {
+    use super::*;
+    use picloud_shared::{AdminUserId, AppId};
+    use std::collections::HashMap;
+    use tokio::sync::Mutex;
+
+    /// In-memory `AuthzRepo` so the unit tests don't need a database.
+    #[derive(Default)]
+    struct InMemoryAuthzRepo {
+        memberships: Mutex<HashMap<(UserId, AppId), AppRole>>,
+    }
+
+    impl InMemoryAuthzRepo {
+        async fn grant(&self, user: UserId, app: AppId, role: AppRole) {
+            self.memberships.lock().await.insert((user, app), role);
+        }
+    }
+
+    #[async_trait]
+    impl AuthzRepo for InMemoryAuthzRepo {
+        async fn membership(
+            &self,
+            user_id: UserId,
+            app_id: AppId,
+        ) -> Result<Option<AppRole>, AuthzError> {
+            Ok(self
+                .memberships
+                .lock()
+                .await
+                .get(&(user_id, app_id))
+                .copied())
+        }
+    }
+
+    fn principal(role: InstanceRole) -> Principal {
+        Principal {
+            user_id: AdminUserId::new(),
+            instance_role: role,
+            scopes: None,
+            app_binding: None,
+        }
+    }
+
+    #[tokio::test]
+    async fn owner_can_do_everything() {
+        let repo = InMemoryAuthzRepo::default();
+        let p = principal(InstanceRole::Owner);
+        let app = AppId::new();
+        for cap in [
+            Capability::InstanceCreateApp,
+            Capability::InstanceManageUsers,
+            Capability::InstanceManageSettings,
+            Capability::AppRead(app),
+            Capability::AppWriteScript(app),
+            Capability::AppWriteRoute(app),
+            Capability::AppManageDomains(app),
+            Capability::AppAdmin(app),
+            Capability::AppLogRead(app),
+        ] {
+            assert_eq!(
+                can(&repo, &p, cap).await.unwrap(),
+                Decision::Allow,
+                "owner denied {cap:?}"
+            );
+        }
+    }
+
+    #[tokio::test]
+    async fn admin_cannot_manage_instance_settings_or_app_admin_actions() {
+        let repo = InMemoryAuthzRepo::default();
+        let p = principal(InstanceRole::Admin);
+        let app = AppId::new();
+        assert_eq!(
+            can(&repo, &p, Capability::InstanceCreateApp).await.unwrap(),
+            Decision::Allow,
+        );
+        assert_eq!(
+            can(&repo, &p, Capability::InstanceManageUsers)
+                .await
+                .unwrap(),
+            Decision::Allow,
+        );
+        assert_eq!(
+            can(&repo, &p, Capability::InstanceManageSettings)
+                .await
+                .unwrap(),
+            Decision::Deny,
+        );
+        // Editor-like grants succeed
+        assert_eq!(
+            can(&repo, &p, Capability::AppWriteScript(app))
+                .await
+                .unwrap(),
+            Decision::Allow,
+        );
+        assert_eq!(
+            can(&repo, &p, Capability::AppWriteRoute(app))
+                .await
+                .unwrap(),
+            Decision::Allow,
+        );
+        // App-admin grants do not
+        assert_eq!(
+            can(&repo, &p, Capability::AppManageDomains(app))
+                .await
+                .unwrap(),
+            Decision::Deny,
+        );
+        assert_eq!(
+            can(&repo, &p, Capability::AppAdmin(app)).await.unwrap(),
+            Decision::Deny,
+        );
+    }
+
+    #[tokio::test]
+    async fn member_without_row_is_denied_everywhere() {
+        let repo = InMemoryAuthzRepo::default();
+        let p = principal(InstanceRole::Member);
+        let app = AppId::new();
+        for cap in [
+            Capability::InstanceCreateApp,
+            Capability::InstanceManageUsers,
+            Capability::InstanceManageSettings,
+            Capability::AppRead(app),
+            Capability::AppWriteScript(app),
+            Capability::AppWriteRoute(app),
+            Capability::AppAdmin(app),
+            Capability::AppLogRead(app),
+        ] {
+            assert_eq!(
+                can(&repo, &p, cap).await.unwrap(),
+                Decision::Deny,
+                "member granted {cap:?} without a membership row"
+            );
+        }
+    }
+
+    #[tokio::test]
+    async fn member_with_viewer_role_can_read_but_not_write() {
+        let repo = InMemoryAuthzRepo::default();
+        let p = principal(InstanceRole::Member);
+        let app = AppId::new();
+        repo.grant(p.user_id, app, AppRole::Viewer).await;
+
+        assert!(can(&repo, &p, Capability::AppRead(app))
+            .await
+            .unwrap()
+            .is_allow());
+        assert!(can(&repo, &p, Capability::AppLogRead(app))
+            .await
+            .unwrap()
+            .is_allow());
+        assert_eq!(
+            can(&repo, &p, Capability::AppWriteScript(app))
+                .await
+                .unwrap(),
+            Decision::Deny
+        );
+        assert_eq!(
+            can(&repo, &p, Capability::AppAdmin(app)).await.unwrap(),
+            Decision::Deny
+        );
+    }
+
+    #[tokio::test]
+    async fn member_with_editor_role_can_write_scripts_and_routes() {
+        let repo = InMemoryAuthzRepo::default();
+        let p = principal(InstanceRole::Member);
+        let app = AppId::new();
+        repo.grant(p.user_id, app, AppRole::Editor).await;
+
+        assert!(can(&repo, &p, Capability::AppWriteScript(app))
+            .await
+            .unwrap()
+            .is_allow());
+        assert!(can(&repo, &p, Capability::AppWriteRoute(app))
+            .await
+            .unwrap()
+            .is_allow());
+        assert_eq!(
+            can(&repo, &p, Capability::AppAdmin(app)).await.unwrap(),
+            Decision::Deny
+        );
+    }
+
+    #[tokio::test]
+    async fn member_with_app_admin_role_can_do_app_admin_actions() {
+        let repo = InMemoryAuthzRepo::default();
+        let p = principal(InstanceRole::Member);
+        let app = AppId::new();
+        repo.grant(p.user_id, app, AppRole::AppAdmin).await;
+
+        assert!(can(&repo, &p, Capability::AppAdmin(app))
+            .await
+            .unwrap()
+            .is_allow());
+        assert!(can(&repo, &p, Capability::AppManageDomains(app))
+            .await
+            .unwrap()
+            .is_allow());
+        // Membership in App A does NOT grant access to App B
+        let other_app = AppId::new();
+        assert_eq!(
+            can(&repo, &p, Capability::AppAdmin(other_app))
+                .await
+                .unwrap(),
+            Decision::Deny
+        );
+    }
+
+    #[tokio::test]
+    async fn scoped_key_intersects_with_role() {
+        let repo = InMemoryAuthzRepo::default();
+        let app = AppId::new();
+        // Owner key with only script:read — cannot write
+        let p = Principal {
+            user_id: AdminUserId::new(),
+            instance_role: InstanceRole::Owner,
+            scopes: Some(vec![Scope::ScriptRead]),
+            app_binding: None,
+        };
+        assert!(can(&repo, &p, Capability::AppRead(app))
+            .await
+            .unwrap()
+            .is_allow());
+        assert_eq!(
+            can(&repo, &p, Capability::AppWriteScript(app))
+                .await
+                .unwrap(),
+            Decision::Deny
+        );
+        // Even though the user is owner — the key's scope set is the
+        // hard ceiling.
+        assert_eq!(
+            can(&repo, &p, Capability::AppAdmin(app)).await.unwrap(),
+            Decision::Deny
+        );
+    }
+
+    #[tokio::test]
+    async fn bound_key_cannot_escape_its_app() {
+        let repo = InMemoryAuthzRepo::default();
+        let bound_app = AppId::new();
+        let other_app = AppId::new();
+        let p = Principal {
+            user_id: AdminUserId::new(),
+            instance_role: InstanceRole::Owner,
+            scopes: Some(vec![Scope::ScriptWrite]),
+            app_binding: Some(bound_app),
+        };
+        assert!(can(&repo, &p, Capability::AppWriteScript(bound_app))
+            .await
+            .unwrap()
+            .is_allow());
+        assert_eq!(
+            can(&repo, &p, Capability::AppWriteScript(other_app))
+                .await
+                .unwrap(),
+            Decision::Deny
+        );
+    }
+
+    #[tokio::test]
+    async fn bound_key_cannot_do_instance_actions() {
+        let repo = InMemoryAuthzRepo::default();
+        let bound_app = AppId::new();
+        let p = Principal {
+            user_id: AdminUserId::new(),
+            instance_role: InstanceRole::Owner,
+            scopes: Some(vec![Scope::InstanceAdmin]), // mint handler also rejects this combo
+            app_binding: Some(bound_app),
+        };
+        assert_eq!(
+            can(&repo, &p, Capability::InstanceCreateApp).await.unwrap(),
+            Decision::Deny,
+            "bound key with instance scope must still be denied at the binding layer"
+        );
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn capability_app_id_extraction() {
+        let app = AppId::new();
+        assert_eq!(Capability::InstanceCreateApp.app_id(), None);
+        assert_eq!(Capability::AppRead(app).app_id(), Some(app));
+        assert_eq!(Capability::AppAdmin(app).app_id(), Some(app));
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn capability_required_scope_mapping_is_complete() {
+        // Sanity: every variant returns a scope. Compiler-enforced
+        // exhaustiveness lives in the match itself; this test guards
+        // against accidental drift to a default branch.
+        let app = AppId::new();
+        for cap in [
+            Capability::InstanceCreateApp,
+            Capability::InstanceManageUsers,
+            Capability::InstanceManageSettings,
+            Capability::AppRead(app),
+            Capability::AppWriteScript(app),
+            Capability::AppWriteRoute(app),
+            Capability::AppManageDomains(app),
+            Capability::AppAdmin(app),
+            Capability::AppLogRead(app),
+        ] {
+            let _ = cap.required_scope(); // does not panic
+        }
+    }
+}

crates/manager-core/src/lib.rs

@@ -8,14 +8,18 @@ pub mod admin_session_repo;
 pub mod admin_user_repo;
 pub mod admin_users_api;
 pub mod api;
+pub mod api_key_repo;
+pub mod api_keys_api;
 pub mod app_bootstrap;
 pub mod app_domain_repo;
+pub mod app_members_repo;
 pub mod app_repo;
 pub mod apps_api;
 pub mod auth;
 pub mod auth_api;
 pub mod auth_bootstrap;
 pub mod auth_middleware;
+pub mod authz;
 pub mod log_sink;
 pub mod migrations;
 pub mod repo;
@@ -34,15 +38,28 @@ pub use admin_user_repo::{
 };
 pub use admin_users_api::{admins_router, AdminsState};
 pub use api::{admin_router, AdminState};
+pub use api_key_repo::{
+    ApiKeyRepository, ApiKeyRepositoryError, ApiKeyRow, ApiKeyVerification, NewApiKey,
+    PostgresApiKeyRepository,
+};
+pub use api_keys_api::{api_keys_router, ApiKeysState};
 pub use app_bootstrap::{seed_hello_world_if_fresh, HelloWorldOutcome};
 pub use app_domain_repo::{AppDomainRepository, NewAppDomain, PostgresAppDomainRepository};
+pub use app_members_repo::{
+    AppMembersRepository, AppMembersRepositoryError, AppMembershipRow, PostgresAppMembersRepository,
+};
 pub use app_repo::{AppLookup, AppRepository, PostgresAppRepository};
 pub use apps_api::{apps_router, AppsState};
 pub use auth_api::auth_router;
 pub use auth_bootstrap::{
     bootstrap_first_admin, bootstrap_first_admin_with, BootstrapEnv, BootstrapError,
 };
-pub use auth_middleware::{require_admin, AuthState, AuthedAdmin, SESSION_COOKIE};
+#[allow(deprecated)]
+pub use auth_middleware::{
+    require_admin, require_authenticated, AuthState, AuthedAdmin, API_KEY_PREFIX,
+    API_KEY_PREFIX_LEN, SESSION_COOKIE,
+};
+pub use authz::{can, require, AuthzDenied, AuthzError, AuthzRepo, Capability, Decision};
 pub use log_sink::PostgresExecutionLogSink;
 pub use repo::{
     ExecutionLogRepository, NewScript, PostgresExecutionLogRepository, PostgresScriptRepository,

crates/manager-core/src/repo.rs

@@ -3,7 +3,7 @@ use std::collections::BTreeMap;
 use async_trait::async_trait;
 use picloud_orchestrator_core::{ResolverError, ScriptResolver};
 use picloud_shared::{
-    AppId, ExecutionLog, ExecutionStatus, RequestId, Script, ScriptId, ScriptSandbox,
+    AdminUserId, AppId, ExecutionLog, ExecutionStatus, RequestId, Script, ScriptId, ScriptSandbox,
 };
 use sqlx::PgPool;
 
@@ -27,6 +27,14 @@ pub trait ScriptRepository: Send + Sync {
     /// "global" views; the dashboard reaches scripts via `list_for_app`.
     async fn list(&self) -> Result<Vec<Script>, ScriptRepositoryError>;
     async fn list_for_app(&self, app_id: AppId) -> Result<Vec<Script>, ScriptRepositoryError>;
+    /// Every script in any app the user is a member of. Drives
+    /// `GET /admin/scripts` for `member` instance-role callers so the
+    /// API never returns scripts they shouldn't see — even before the
+    /// per-handler capability check fires.
+    async fn list_for_user(
+        &self,
+        user_id: AdminUserId,
+    ) -> Result<Vec<Script>, ScriptRepositoryError>;
     async fn create(&self, input: NewScript) -> Result<Script, ScriptRepositoryError>;
     async fn update(
         &self,
@@ -117,6 +125,24 @@ impl ScriptRepository for PostgresScriptRepository {
         Ok(rows.into_iter().map(Into::into).collect())
     }
 
+    async fn list_for_user(
+        &self,
+        user_id: AdminUserId,
+    ) -> Result<Vec<Script>, ScriptRepositoryError> {
+        let rows = sqlx::query_as::<_, ScriptRow>(
+            "SELECT s.id, s.app_id, s.name, s.description, s.version, s.source, \
+                    s.timeout_seconds, s.memory_limit_mb, s.sandbox, s.created_at, s.updated_at \
+             FROM scripts s \
+             JOIN app_members m ON m.app_id = s.app_id \
+             WHERE m.user_id = $1 \
+             ORDER BY s.name",
+        )
+        .bind(user_id.into_inner())
+        .fetch_all(&self.pool)
+        .await?;
+        Ok(rows.into_iter().map(Into::into).collect())
+    }
+
     async fn create(&self, input: NewScript) -> Result<Script, ScriptRepositoryError> {
         let sandbox_json = serde_json::to_value(input.sandbox.unwrap_or_default())
             .unwrap_or_else(|_| serde_json::json!({}));

crates/manager-core/src/route_admin.rs

@@ -10,14 +10,15 @@ use axum::{
     http::StatusCode,
     response::{IntoResponse, Response},
     routing::{delete, get, post},
-    Json, Router,
+    Extension, Json, Router,
 };
 use picloud_orchestrator_core::routing::{conflict, matcher::CompiledRoute, pattern, RouteTable};
-use picloud_shared::{AppId, HostKind, PathKind, Route, ScriptId};
+use picloud_shared::{AppId, HostKind, PathKind, Principal, Route, ScriptId};
 use serde::{Deserialize, Serialize};
 use uuid::Uuid;
 
 use crate::app_domain_repo::AppDomainRepository;
+use crate::authz::{require, AuthzDenied, AuthzRepo, Capability};
 use crate::repo::{ScriptRepository, ScriptRepositoryError};
 use crate::route_repo::{NewRoute, RouteRepository};
 
@@ -30,6 +31,8 @@ pub struct RouteAdminState<RR, SR> {
     /// declared domain claims.
     pub domains: Arc<dyn AppDomainRepository>,
     pub table: Arc<RouteTable>,
+    /// Capability gate — Phase 3.5.
+    pub authz: Arc<dyn AuthzRepo>,
 }
 
 impl<RR, SR> Clone for RouteAdminState<RR, SR> {
@@ -39,6 +42,7 @@ impl<RR, SR> Clone for RouteAdminState<RR, SR> {
             scripts: self.scripts.clone(),
             domains: self.domains.clone(),
             table: self.table.clone(),
+            authz: self.authz.clone(),
         }
     }
 }
@@ -130,13 +134,26 @@ pub struct MatchedRoute {
 
 async fn list_routes<RR: RouteRepository, SR: ScriptRepository>(
     State(state): State<RouteAdminState<RR, SR>>,
+    Extension(principal): Extension<Principal>,
     Path(script_id): Path<ScriptId>,
 ) -> Result<Json<Vec<Route>>, RouteApiError> {
+    let script = state
+        .scripts
+        .get(script_id)
+        .await?
+        .ok_or(RouteApiError::ScriptNotFound(script_id))?;
+    require(
+        state.authz.as_ref(),
+        &principal,
+        Capability::AppRead(script.app_id),
+    )
+    .await?;
     Ok(Json(state.routes.list_for_script(script_id).await?))
 }
 
 async fn create_route<RR: RouteRepository, SR: ScriptRepository>(
     State(state): State<RouteAdminState<RR, SR>>,
+    Extension(principal): Extension<Principal>,
     Path(script_id): Path<ScriptId>,
     Json(input): Json<CreateRouteRequest>,
 ) -> Result<(StatusCode, Json<Route>), RouteApiError> {
@@ -154,6 +171,12 @@ async fn create_route<RR: RouteRepository, SR: ScriptRepository>(
         .await?
         .ok_or(RouteApiError::ScriptNotFound(script_id))?;
     let app_id = script.app_id;
+    require(
+        state.authz.as_ref(),
+        &principal,
+        Capability::AppWriteRoute(app_id),
+    )
+    .await?;
 
     // Validate the route's host is consistent with one of the app's
     // domain claims. `HostKind::Any` is always permitted (catches every
@@ -196,8 +219,22 @@ async fn create_route<RR: RouteRepository, SR: ScriptRepository>(
 
 async fn delete_route<RR: RouteRepository, SR: ScriptRepository>(
     State(state): State<RouteAdminState<RR, SR>>,
+    Extension(principal): Extension<Principal>,
     Path(route_id): Path<Uuid>,
 ) -> Result<StatusCode, RouteApiError> {
+    // Resolve the route's app before we delete, so the capability
+    // binds to the actual route's app_id (not a path param).
+    let route = state
+        .routes
+        .get(route_id)
+        .await?
+        .ok_or(RouteApiError::RouteNotFound(route_id))?;
+    require(
+        state.authz.as_ref(),
+        &principal,
+        Capability::AppWriteRoute(route.app_id),
+    )
+    .await?;
     state.routes.delete(route_id).await?;
     refresh_table(&state).await?;
     Ok(StatusCode::NO_CONTENT)
@@ -205,8 +242,18 @@ async fn delete_route<RR: RouteRepository, SR: ScriptRepository>(
 
 async fn check_route<RR: RouteRepository, SR: ScriptRepository>(
     State(state): State<RouteAdminState<RR, SR>>,
+    Extension(principal): Extension<Principal>,
     Json(input): Json<CheckRouteRequest>,
 ) -> Result<Json<CheckRouteResponse>, RouteApiError> {
+    // routes:check is read-only — peeking at a hypothetical conflict
+    // is bounded by AppRead on the target app (otherwise members
+    // could probe other apps).
+    require(
+        state.authz.as_ref(),
+        &principal,
+        Capability::AppRead(input.app_id),
+    )
+    .await?;
     let normalized_path = parse_and_normalize_path(input.path_kind, &input.path)?;
     pattern::parse_host(input.host_kind, &input.host, None)?;
 
@@ -235,8 +282,15 @@ async fn check_route<RR: RouteRepository, SR: ScriptRepository>(
 
 async fn match_route<RR: RouteRepository, SR: ScriptRepository>(
     State(state): State<RouteAdminState<RR, SR>>,
+    Extension(principal): Extension<Principal>,
     Json(input): Json<MatchRouteRequest>,
 ) -> Result<Json<MatchRouteResponse>, RouteApiError> {
+    require(
+        state.authz.as_ref(),
+        &principal,
+        Capability::AppRead(input.app_id),
+    )
+    .await?;
     let parsed = url::Url::parse(&input.url)
         .map_err(|e| RouteApiError::BadRequest(format!("invalid url: {e}")))?;
     let host = parsed.host_str().unwrap_or("").to_string();
@@ -415,16 +469,34 @@ pub enum RouteApiError {
     #[error("script not found: {0}")]
     ScriptNotFound(ScriptId),
 
+    #[error("route not found: {0}")]
+    RouteNotFound(Uuid),
+
     #[error("host {host:?} is not claimed by this app")]
     HostNotClaimed {
         host: String,
         available_claims: Vec<String>,
     },
 
+    #[error("forbidden")]
+    Forbidden,
+
+    #[error("authorization repo error: {0}")]
+    AuthzRepo(String),
+
     #[error("repository error: {0}")]
     Repo(#[from] ScriptRepositoryError),
 }
 
+impl From<AuthzDenied> for RouteApiError {
+    fn from(d: AuthzDenied) -> Self {
+        match d {
+            AuthzDenied::Denied => Self::Forbidden,
+            AuthzDenied::Repo(e) => Self::AuthzRepo(e.to_string()),
+        }
+    }
+}
+
 impl IntoResponse for RouteApiError {
     fn into_response(self) -> Response {
         let (status, body) = match &self {
@@ -443,10 +515,23 @@ impl IntoResponse for RouteApiError {
                 StatusCode::UNPROCESSABLE_ENTITY,
                 serde_json::json!({ "error": self.to_string() }),
             ),
-            Self::ScriptNotFound(_) | Self::Repo(ScriptRepositoryError::NotFound(_)) => (
+            Self::ScriptNotFound(_)
+            | Self::RouteNotFound(_)
+            | Self::Repo(ScriptRepositoryError::NotFound(_)) => (
                 StatusCode::NOT_FOUND,
                 serde_json::json!({ "error": self.to_string() }),
             ),
+            Self::Forbidden => (
+                StatusCode::FORBIDDEN,
+                serde_json::json!({ "error": self.to_string() }),
+            ),
+            Self::AuthzRepo(e) => {
+                tracing::error!(error = %e, "route authz repo error");
+                (
+                    StatusCode::INTERNAL_SERVER_ERROR,
+                    serde_json::json!({ "error": "internal error" }),
+                )
+            }
             Self::HostNotClaimed {
                 host,
                 available_claims,

crates/manager-core/src/route_repo.rs

@@ -25,6 +25,10 @@ pub struct NewRoute {
 #[async_trait]
 pub trait RouteRepository: Send + Sync {
     async fn list_all(&self) -> Result<Vec<Route>, ScriptRepositoryError>;
+    /// Single-row lookup. Used by `DELETE /api/v1/admin/routes/{id}` so
+    /// the capability check binds to the route's actual `app_id`
+    /// (not a path param).
+    async fn get(&self, route_id: Uuid) -> Result<Option<Route>, ScriptRepositoryError>;
     async fn list_for_app(&self, app_id: AppId) -> Result<Vec<Route>, ScriptRepositoryError>;
     async fn list_for_script(
         &self,
@@ -66,6 +70,18 @@ impl RouteRepository for PostgresRouteRepository {
         Ok(rows.into_iter().map(Into::into).collect())
     }
 
+    async fn get(&self, route_id: Uuid) -> Result<Option<Route>, ScriptRepositoryError> {
+        let row = sqlx::query_as::<_, RouteRow>(
+            "SELECT id, app_id, script_id, host_kind, host, host_param_name, \
+                    path_kind, path, method, created_at \
+             FROM routes WHERE id = $1",
+        )
+        .bind(route_id)
+        .fetch_optional(&self.pool)
+        .await?;
+        Ok(row.map(Into::into))
+    }
+
     async fn list_for_app(&self, app_id: AppId) -> Result<Vec<Route>, ScriptRepositoryError> {
         let rows = sqlx::query_as::<_, RouteRow>(
             "SELECT id, app_id, script_id, host_kind, host, host_param_name, \

crates/manager-core/tests/expected_schema.txt

@@ -18,6 +18,21 @@ table: admin_users
   created_at: timestamp with time zone NOT NULL default=now()
   updated_at: timestamp with time zone NOT NULL default=now()
   last_login_at: timestamp with time zone NULL
+  instance_role: text NOT NULL default='owner'::text
+  email: text NULL
+  mfa_secret: text NULL
+
+table: api_keys
+  id: uuid NOT NULL default=gen_random_uuid()
+  user_id: uuid NOT NULL
+  hash: text NOT NULL
+  prefix: text NOT NULL
+  name: text NOT NULL
+  scopes: ARRAY NOT NULL
+  app_id: uuid NULL
+  expires_at: timestamp with time zone NULL
+  last_used_at: timestamp with time zone NULL
+  created_at: timestamp with time zone NOT NULL default=now()
 
 table: app_domains
   id: uuid NOT NULL default=gen_random_uuid()
@@ -27,6 +42,12 @@ table: app_domains
   shape_key: text NOT NULL
   created_at: timestamp with time zone NOT NULL default=now()
 
+table: app_members
+  app_id: uuid NOT NULL
+  user_id: uuid NOT NULL
+  role: text NOT NULL
+  created_at: timestamp with time zone NOT NULL default=now()
+
 table: app_slug_history
   slug: text NOT NULL
   current_app_id: uuid NOT NULL
@@ -88,14 +109,25 @@ indexes on admin_sessions:
   admin_sessions_user_idx: public.admin_sessions USING btree (user_id)
 
 indexes on admin_users:
+  admin_users_email_key: public.admin_users USING btree (email)
+  admin_users_instance_role_idx: public.admin_users USING btree (instance_role)
   admin_users_pkey: public.admin_users USING btree (id)
   admin_users_username_key: public.admin_users USING btree (username)
 
+indexes on api_keys:
+  api_keys_pkey: public.api_keys USING btree (id)
+  api_keys_prefix_idx: public.api_keys USING btree (prefix)
+  api_keys_user_id_idx: public.api_keys USING btree (user_id)
+
 indexes on app_domains:
   app_domains_app_id_idx: public.app_domains USING btree (app_id)
   app_domains_pkey: public.app_domains USING btree (id)
   app_domains_shape_key_key: public.app_domains USING btree (shape_key)
 
+indexes on app_members:
+  app_members_pkey: public.app_members USING btree (app_id, user_id)
+  app_members_user_id_idx: public.app_members USING btree (user_id)
+
 indexes on app_slug_history:
   app_slug_history_pkey: public.app_slug_history USING btree (slug)
 
@@ -127,15 +159,28 @@ constraints on admin_sessions:
   [PRIMARY KEY] admin_sessions_pkey: PRIMARY KEY (token_hash)
 
 constraints on admin_users:
+  [CHECK] admin_users_instance_role_check: CHECK ((instance_role = ANY (ARRAY['owner'::text, 'admin'::text, 'member'::text])))
   [PRIMARY KEY] admin_users_pkey: PRIMARY KEY (id)
+  [UNIQUE] admin_users_email_key: UNIQUE (email)
   [UNIQUE] admin_users_username_key: UNIQUE (username)
 
+constraints on api_keys:
+  [FOREIGN KEY] api_keys_app_id_fkey: FOREIGN KEY (app_id) REFERENCES apps(id) ON DELETE CASCADE
+  [FOREIGN KEY] api_keys_user_id_fkey: FOREIGN KEY (user_id) REFERENCES admin_users(id) ON DELETE CASCADE
+  [PRIMARY KEY] api_keys_pkey: PRIMARY KEY (id)
+
 constraints on app_domains:
   [CHECK] app_domains_shape_check: CHECK ((shape = ANY (ARRAY['exact'::text, 'wildcard'::text, 'parameterized'::text])))
   [FOREIGN KEY] app_domains_app_id_fkey: FOREIGN KEY (app_id) REFERENCES apps(id) ON DELETE CASCADE
   [PRIMARY KEY] app_domains_pkey: PRIMARY KEY (id)
   [UNIQUE] app_domains_shape_key_key: UNIQUE (shape_key)
 
+constraints on app_members:
+  [CHECK] app_members_role_check: CHECK ((role = ANY (ARRAY['app_admin'::text, 'editor'::text, 'viewer'::text])))
+  [FOREIGN KEY] app_members_app_id_fkey: FOREIGN KEY (app_id) REFERENCES apps(id) ON DELETE CASCADE
+  [FOREIGN KEY] app_members_user_id_fkey: FOREIGN KEY (user_id) REFERENCES admin_users(id) ON DELETE CASCADE
+  [PRIMARY KEY] app_members_pkey: PRIMARY KEY (app_id, user_id)
+
 constraints on app_slug_history:
   [FOREIGN KEY] app_slug_history_current_app_id_fkey: FOREIGN KEY (current_app_id) REFERENCES apps(id) ON DELETE CASCADE
   [PRIMARY KEY] app_slug_history_pkey: PRIMARY KEY (slug)
@@ -169,3 +214,4 @@ constraints on scripts:
   0003: routes
   0004: admin auth
   0005: apps
+  0006: users authz

crates/picloud/Cargo.toml

@@ -39,3 +39,5 @@ figment.workspace = true
 axum-test = "17"
 serde.workspace = true
 serde_json.workspace = true
+uuid.workspace = true
+chrono.workspace = true

crates/picloud/src/lib.rs

@@ -10,13 +10,14 @@ use axum::middleware::from_fn_with_state;
 use axum::{routing::get, Json, Router};
 use picloud_executor_core::{Engine, Limits};
 use picloud_manager_core::{
-    admin_router, admins_router, apps_api, apps_router, auth_router, compile_routes, migrations,
+    admin_router, admins_router, api_keys_router, apps_api, apps_router, auth_router,
-    require_admin, route_admin_router, AdminSessionRepository, AdminState, AdminUserRepository,
+    compile_routes, migrations, require_authenticated, route_admin_router, AdminSessionRepository,
-    AdminsState, AppDomainRepository, AppRepository, AppsState, AuthState,
+    AdminState, AdminUserRepository, AdminsState, ApiKeyRepository, ApiKeysState,
-    PostgresAdminSessionRepository, PostgresAdminUserRepository, PostgresAppDomainRepository,
+    AppDomainRepository, AppRepository, AppsState, AuthState, AuthzRepo,
-    PostgresAppRepository, PostgresExecutionLogRepository, PostgresExecutionLogSink,
+    PostgresAdminSessionRepository, PostgresAdminUserRepository, PostgresApiKeyRepository,
-    PostgresRouteRepository, PostgresScriptRepository, RepoResolver, RouteAdminState,
+    PostgresAppDomainRepository, PostgresAppMembersRepository, PostgresAppRepository,
-    RouteRepository, SandboxCeiling,
+    PostgresExecutionLogRepository, PostgresExecutionLogSink, PostgresRouteRepository,
+    PostgresScriptRepository, RepoResolver, RouteAdminState, RouteRepository, SandboxCeiling,
 };
 use picloud_orchestrator_core::routing::{AppDomainTable, RouteTable};
 use picloud_orchestrator_core::{
@@ -37,6 +38,7 @@ const DEFAULT_SESSION_TTL_HOURS: u64 = 24;
 pub struct AuthDeps {
     pub users: Arc<dyn AdminUserRepository>,
     pub sessions: Arc<dyn AdminSessionRepository>,
+    pub keys: Arc<dyn ApiKeyRepository>,
     pub ttl: Duration,
 }
 
@@ -46,7 +48,8 @@ impl AuthDeps {
     pub fn from_pool(pool: PgPool) -> Self {
         Self {
             users: Arc::new(PostgresAdminUserRepository::new(pool.clone())),
-            sessions: Arc::new(PostgresAdminSessionRepository::new(pool)),
+            sessions: Arc::new(PostgresAdminSessionRepository::new(pool.clone())),
+            keys: Arc::new(PostgresApiKeyRepository::new(pool)),
             ttl: read_session_ttl(),
         }
     }
@@ -85,7 +88,10 @@ pub async fn build_app(pool: PgPool, auth: AuthDeps) -> anyhow::Result<Router> {
     let route_repo = Arc::new(PostgresRouteRepository::new(pool.clone()));
     let apps_repo: Arc<dyn AppRepository> = Arc::new(PostgresAppRepository::new(pool.clone()));
     let domains_repo: Arc<dyn AppDomainRepository> =
-        Arc::new(PostgresAppDomainRepository::new(pool));
+        Arc::new(PostgresAppDomainRepository::new(pool.clone()));
+    // Authz: app_members repo doubles as the AuthzRepo impl for the
+    // per-handler capability checks introduced in Phase 3.5.
+    let authz: Arc<dyn AuthzRepo> = Arc::new(PostgresAppMembersRepository::new(pool));
 
     // Compile the routes table once at startup; admin writes refresh it.
     let route_table = Arc::new(RouteTable::new());
@@ -120,6 +126,7 @@ pub async fn build_app(pool: PgPool, auth: AuthDeps) -> anyhow::Result<Router> {
         repo: Arc::new(PostgresScriptRepoHandle(script_repo.clone())),
         logs: log_repo,
         apps: apps_repo.clone(),
+        authz: authz.clone(),
         validator: engine as Arc<dyn ScriptValidator>,
         sandbox_ceiling: SandboxCeiling::from_env(),
     };
@@ -128,6 +135,7 @@ pub async fn build_app(pool: PgPool, auth: AuthDeps) -> anyhow::Result<Router> {
         scripts: Arc::new(PostgresScriptRepoHandle(script_repo)),
         domains: domains_repo.clone(),
         table: route_table.clone(),
+        authz: authz.clone(),
     };
     let data_plane = DataPlaneState {
         executor,
@@ -141,28 +149,39 @@ pub async fn build_app(pool: PgPool, auth: AuthDeps) -> anyhow::Result<Router> {
         domains: domains_repo,
         routes: route_repo,
         domain_table: app_domain_table,
+        authz: authz.clone(),
     };
 
     let auth_state = AuthState {
         users: auth.users.clone(),
         sessions: auth.sessions.clone(),
+        keys: auth.keys.clone(),
         ttl: auth.ttl,
     };
     let admins_state = AdminsState {
         users: auth.users,
         sessions: auth.sessions,
+        keys: auth.keys.clone(),
+        authz,
     };
+    let api_keys_state = ApiKeysState { keys: auth.keys };
 
     // /admin/auth/login + /logout are unguarded by design (login is how
     // you get in). /admin/auth/me applies the middleware internally so
     // the same Router::with_state machinery composes cleanly. Everything
-    // else under /admin gets the require_admin layer.
+    // else under /admin gets the require_authenticated layer; capability
+    // checks live in each handler (after the resource is loaded so the
+    // capability binds to the resource's actual app_id).
     let guarded_admin = Router::new()
         .merge(admin_router(admin))
         .merge(route_admin_router(route_admin))
         .merge(admins_router(admins_state))
         .merge(apps_router(apps_state))
-        .layer(from_fn_with_state(auth_state.clone(), require_admin));
+        .merge(api_keys_router(api_keys_state))
+        .layer(from_fn_with_state(
+            auth_state.clone(),
+            require_authenticated,
+        ));
 
     // Silence "unused import" lint on `apps_api` — we re-export via the
     // facade above; the bare module path is retained so it's discoverable.
@@ -244,6 +263,12 @@ impl picloud_manager_core::ScriptRepository for PostgresScriptRepoHandle {
     ) -> Result<Vec<picloud_shared::Script>, picloud_manager_core::ScriptRepositoryError> {
         self.0.list_for_app(app_id).await
     }
+    async fn list_for_user(
+        &self,
+        user_id: picloud_shared::AdminUserId,
+    ) -> Result<Vec<picloud_shared::Script>, picloud_manager_core::ScriptRepositoryError> {
+        self.0.list_for_user(user_id).await
+    }
     async fn create(
         &self,
         input: picloud_manager_core::NewScript,

crates/picloud/src/main.rs

@@ -45,6 +45,7 @@ async fn run_server() -> anyhow::Result<()> {
 
     let auth = AuthDeps::from_pool(pool.clone());
     bootstrap_first_admin(&*auth.users).await?;
+    warn_on_multi_owner_install(&*auth.users).await;
 
     // Seed Hello World into the default app when this is a fresh
     // install (no scripts and no routes). Idempotent on upgrades.
@@ -79,6 +80,34 @@ async fn run_server() -> anyhow::Result<()> {
     Ok(())
 }
 
+/// Multi-owner startup warning — Phase 3.5 migration upgraded every
+/// pre-existing admin_users row to `Owner` via DEFAULT, which for
+/// installs with several Phase 3a admins means several co-owners.
+/// Surface this once at boot so the operator can demote extras via
+/// `PATCH /api/v1/admin/admins/{id}` with `instance_role: "admin"`.
+/// Soft-fail: a DB blip should not block startup.
+async fn warn_on_multi_owner_install(users: &dyn AdminUserRepository) {
+    match users.list_active_owners().await {
+        Ok(owners) if owners.len() > 1 => {
+            let names: Vec<String> = owners.into_iter().map(|u| u.username).collect();
+            tracing::warn!(
+                count = names.len(),
+                owners = ?names,
+                "multiple active owners detected — Phase 3.5 promoted every \
+                 pre-existing admin to owner. Demote extras via \
+                 PATCH /api/v1/admin/admins/{{id}} with instance_role."
+            );
+        }
+        Ok(_) => {}
+        Err(err) => {
+            tracing::warn!(
+                ?err,
+                "could not count active owners for multi-owner startup check"
+            );
+        }
+    }
+}
+
 fn spawn_session_pruner(sessions: Arc<dyn AdminSessionRepository>) {
     tokio::spawn(async move {
         let mut ticker = tokio::time::interval(Duration::from_secs(600));

crates/picloud/tests/api.rs

@@ -31,11 +31,12 @@ async fn server(pool: PgPool) -> TestServer {
 /// any test that creates scripts (every script now requires `app_id`).
 async fn server_with_app(pool: PgPool) -> (TestServer, String) {
     use picloud_manager_core::auth::hash_password;
+    use picloud_shared::InstanceRole;
 
     let auth = picloud::AuthDeps::from_pool(pool.clone());
     let hash = hash_password("test-pw").expect("hash");
     auth.users
-        .create("test-admin", &hash)
+        .create("test-admin", &hash, InstanceRole::Owner)
         .await
         .expect("seed admin");
 
@@ -821,7 +822,7 @@ async fn version_includes_public_base_url(pool: PgPool) {
     let v: Value = r.json();
     assert!(v["public_base_url"].is_string());
     assert_eq!(v["api"], 1);
-    assert_eq!(v["schema"], 5);
+    assert_eq!(v["schema"], 6);
     assert_eq!(v["sdk"], "1.1");
 }
 

crates/picloud/tests/authz.rs

@@ -0,0 +1,647 @@
+//! Phase 3.5 authorization end-to-end tests.
+//!
+//! Covers the 11 scenarios from `lay-foundations-for-snazzy-truffle.md`
+//! step 9:
+//!
+//!  1. Bootstrap admin promotes to owner.
+//!  2. Owner access matrix on a sample app.
+//!  3. Admin access matrix.
+//!  4. Member access matrix.
+//!  5. Bearer (pic_) + cookie produce the same Principal.
+//!  6. Scope intersection: a script:read-only key cannot write.
+//!  7. Bound key cannot escape its app.
+//!  8. Member listing isolation (apps + scripts).
+//!  9. Deactivation revokes API keys.
+//! 10. Mint rejects bound key with `instance:*` scope.
+//! 11. `list_active_owners` returns the expected set under the seed
+//!     that the startup warning is built from (we don't capture the
+//!     log line itself — the data source is the testable surface).
+//!
+//! Same harness as `tests/api.rs`: `#[sqlx::test]` against a real
+//! Postgres, `TestServer` over the in-process app. We do NOT bake a
+//! token into the default headers here — each test wires its own
+//! credential per request to exercise the cookie / Bearer split.
+
+#![allow(clippy::needless_pass_by_value)]
+
+use std::sync::Arc;
+
+use axum_test::TestServer;
+use picloud_manager_core::{
+    auth::hash_password, AdminUserRepository, ApiKeyRepository, AppMembersRepository,
+    PostgresAdminUserRepository, PostgresApiKeyRepository, PostgresAppMembersRepository,
+};
+use picloud_shared::{AdminUserId, AppId, AppRole, InstanceRole};
+use serde_json::{json, Value};
+use sqlx::PgPool;
+
+// ----------------------------------------------------------------------------
+// Harness
+// ----------------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+struct Seeded {
+    server: TestServer,
+    pool: PgPool,
+    /// Bootstrap admin — Owner, password "owner-pw".
+    owner: AdminUserId,
+    /// Default app id, slug "default" (seeded by 0005 migration).
+    default_app: AppId,
+}
+
+async fn boot(pool: PgPool) -> Seeded {
+    let auth = picloud::AuthDeps::from_pool(pool.clone());
+    let hash = hash_password("owner-pw").expect("hash");
+    let owner = auth
+        .users
+        .create("owner", &hash, InstanceRole::Owner)
+        .await
+        .expect("seed owner");
+
+    let app = picloud::build_app(pool.clone(), auth)
+        .await
+        .expect("build_app");
+    let server = TestServer::new(app).expect("TestServer");
+
+    // Default app id (seeded by migration 0005).
+    let resp = server
+        .post("/api/v1/admin/auth/login")
+        .json(&json!({ "username": "owner", "password": "owner-pw" }))
+        .await;
+    resp.assert_status_ok();
+    let token = resp.json::<Value>()["token"]
+        .as_str()
+        .expect("login token")
+        .to_string();
+
+    let app_resp = server
+        .get("/api/v1/admin/apps/default")
+        .add_header("authorization", format!("Bearer {token}"))
+        .await;
+    app_resp.assert_status_ok();
+    let app_id: uuid::Uuid = app_resp.json::<Value>()["id"]
+        .as_str()
+        .expect("app id")
+        .parse()
+        .expect("uuid");
+
+    Seeded {
+        server,
+        pool,
+        owner: owner.id,
+        default_app: app_id.into(),
+    }
+}
+
+/// Mint a session for an existing admin via the login endpoint and
+/// return the raw token. Lets tests build a per-role credential
+/// without baking it into the default headers.
+async fn login_token(server: &TestServer, username: &str, password: &str) -> String {
+    let r = server
+        .post("/api/v1/admin/auth/login")
+        .json(&json!({ "username": username, "password": password }))
+        .await;
+    r.assert_status_ok();
+    r.json::<Value>()["token"]
+        .as_str()
+        .expect("token in login response")
+        .to_string()
+}
+
+/// Direct-DB seed (bypassing the API) for users we want to construct
+/// at arbitrary roles. The API enforces "owners only create owners"
+/// which is correct production behavior but inconvenient for test
+/// fixtures.
+async fn seed_user(
+    pool: &PgPool,
+    username: &str,
+    password: &str,
+    role: InstanceRole,
+) -> AdminUserId {
+    let repo = PostgresAdminUserRepository::new(pool.clone());
+    let hash = hash_password(password).expect("hash");
+    repo.create(username, &hash, role)
+        .await
+        .expect("seed user")
+        .id
+}
+
+async fn grant_membership(pool: &PgPool, user: AdminUserId, app: AppId, role: AppRole) {
+    let repo = PostgresAppMembersRepository::new(pool.clone());
+    repo.upsert(app, user, role)
+        .await
+        .expect("grant membership");
+}
+
+async fn create_script_via_api(
+    server: &TestServer,
+    token: &str,
+    app_id: AppId,
+    name: &str,
+) -> Value {
+    let r = server
+        .post("/api/v1/admin/scripts")
+        .add_header("authorization", format!("Bearer {token}"))
+        .json(&json!({
+            "app_id": app_id.to_string(),
+            "name": name,
+            "source": "fn main() { #{ statusCode: 200 } }",
+        }))
+        .await;
+    r.assert_status(axum::http::StatusCode::CREATED);
+    r.json()
+}
+
+/// Mint an API key for the caller — wraps POST /api-keys.
+async fn mint_key(server: &TestServer, cred_token: &str, body: Value) -> axum_test::TestResponse {
+    server
+        .post("/api/v1/admin/api-keys")
+        .add_header("authorization", format!("Bearer {cred_token}"))
+        .json(&body)
+        .await
+}
+
+// ----------------------------------------------------------------------------
+// 1. Bootstrap admin → owner
+// ----------------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+#[ignore = "needs DATABASE_URL pointing at a running Postgres"]
+#[sqlx::test(migrations = "../manager-core/migrations")]
+async fn bootstrap_admin_is_owner(pool: PgPool) {
+    let s = boot(pool).await;
+    let token = login_token(&s.server, "owner", "owner-pw").await;
+    let me = s
+        .server
+        .get("/api/v1/admin/auth/me")
+        .add_header("authorization", format!("Bearer {token}"))
+        .await;
+    me.assert_status_ok();
+    let listing = s
+        .server
+        .get("/api/v1/admin/admins")
+        .add_header("authorization", format!("Bearer {token}"))
+        .await;
+    listing.assert_status_ok();
+    let arr: Value = listing.json();
+    let row = arr
+        .as_array()
+        .and_then(|v| v.iter().find(|u| u["username"] == "owner"))
+        .expect("owner row");
+    assert_eq!(row["instance_role"], "owner");
+}
+
+// ----------------------------------------------------------------------------
+// 2 / 3 / 4. Role access matrices on a sample app
+// ----------------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+#[ignore = "needs DATABASE_URL pointing at a running Postgres"]
+#[sqlx::test(migrations = "../manager-core/migrations")]
+async fn owner_access_matrix(pool: PgPool) {
+    let s = boot(pool.clone()).await;
+    let token = login_token(&s.server, "owner", "owner-pw").await;
+
+    // Read apps / scripts.
+    s.server
+        .get("/api/v1/admin/apps/default")
+        .add_header("authorization", format!("Bearer {token}"))
+        .await
+        .assert_status_ok();
+
+    // Create a script — AppWriteScript.
+    let script = create_script_via_api(&s.server, &token, s.default_app, "owner-test").await;
+    let sid = script["id"].as_str().unwrap();
+
+    // Read it back — AppRead.
+    s.server
+        .get(&format!("/api/v1/admin/scripts/{sid}"))
+        .add_header("authorization", format!("Bearer {token}"))
+        .await
+        .assert_status_ok();
+
+    // Manage users — InstanceManageUsers.
+    s.server
+        .get("/api/v1/admin/admins")
+        .add_header("authorization", format!("Bearer {token}"))
+        .await
+        .assert_status_ok();
+}
+
+#[ignore = "needs DATABASE_URL pointing at a running Postgres"]
+#[sqlx::test(migrations = "../manager-core/migrations")]
+async fn admin_can_manage_users_but_not_app_admin_settings(pool: PgPool) {
+    let s = boot(pool.clone()).await;
+    seed_user(&s.pool, "alice", "alice-pw", InstanceRole::Admin).await;
+    let token = login_token(&s.server, "alice", "alice-pw").await;
+
+    // Allowed: list admins (InstanceManageUsers).
+    s.server
+        .get("/api/v1/admin/admins")
+        .add_header("authorization", format!("Bearer {token}"))
+        .await
+        .assert_status_ok();
+
+    // Allowed: read default app (admin is implicit editor everywhere).
+    s.server
+        .get("/api/v1/admin/apps/default")
+        .add_header("authorization", format!("Bearer {token}"))
+        .await
+        .assert_status_ok();
+
+    // Allowed: write scripts (implicit editor).
+    let script = create_script_via_api(&s.server, &token, s.default_app, "admin-write").await;
+    assert!(script["id"].is_string());
+
+    // Denied: delete the default app (AppAdmin only).
+    let denied = s
+        .server
+        .delete("/api/v1/admin/apps/default")
+        .add_header("authorization", format!("Bearer {token}"))
+        .await;
+    assert_eq!(denied.status_code(), axum::http::StatusCode::FORBIDDEN);
+}
+
+#[ignore = "needs DATABASE_URL pointing at a running Postgres"]
+#[sqlx::test(migrations = "../manager-core/migrations")]
+async fn member_can_only_touch_apps_they_belong_to(pool: PgPool) {
+    let s = boot(pool.clone()).await;
+    let bob = seed_user(&s.pool, "bob", "bob-pw", InstanceRole::Member).await;
+    grant_membership(&s.pool, bob, s.default_app, AppRole::Editor).await;
+    let token = login_token(&s.server, "bob", "bob-pw").await;
+
+    // Allowed: read + write inside the default app.
+    s.server
+        .get("/api/v1/admin/apps/default")
+        .add_header("authorization", format!("Bearer {token}"))
+        .await
+        .assert_status_ok();
+    let script = create_script_via_api(&s.server, &token, s.default_app, "member-write").await;
+    let sid = script["id"].as_str().unwrap();
+    s.server
+        .get(&format!("/api/v1/admin/scripts/{sid}"))
+        .add_header("authorization", format!("Bearer {token}"))
+        .await
+        .assert_status_ok();
+
+    // Denied: create a *new* app (member cannot InstanceCreateApp).
+    let denied = s
+        .server
+        .post("/api/v1/admin/apps")
+        .add_header("authorization", format!("Bearer {token}"))
+        .json(&json!({ "slug": "other", "name": "Other" }))
+        .await;
+    assert_eq!(denied.status_code(), axum::http::StatusCode::FORBIDDEN);
+
+    // Denied: manage admins.
+    let denied = s
+        .server
+        .get("/api/v1/admin/admins")
+        .add_header("authorization", format!("Bearer {token}"))
+        .await;
+    assert_eq!(denied.status_code(), axum::http::StatusCode::FORBIDDEN);
+}
+
+// ----------------------------------------------------------------------------
+// 5. Bearer pic_ + cookie produce the same Principal
+// ----------------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+#[ignore = "needs DATABASE_URL pointing at a running Postgres"]
+#[sqlx::test(migrations = "../manager-core/migrations")]
+async fn bearer_and_cookie_produce_same_principal(pool: PgPool) {
+    let s = boot(pool).await;
+    let session_token = login_token(&s.server, "owner", "owner-pw").await;
+
+    // Mint a no-binding owner key covering script:read.
+    let mint = mint_key(
+        &s.server,
+        &session_token,
+        json!({
+            "name": "owner-readonly",
+            "scopes": ["script:read"],
+        }),
+    )
+    .await;
+    mint.assert_status(axum::http::StatusCode::CREATED);
+    let raw_token = mint.json::<Value>()["raw_token"]
+        .as_str()
+        .expect("raw token")
+        .to_string();
+    assert!(raw_token.starts_with("pic_"));
+
+    // /me through the cookie/session path.
+    let via_session = s
+        .server
+        .get("/api/v1/admin/auth/me")
+        .add_header("authorization", format!("Bearer {session_token}"))
+        .await;
+    via_session.assert_status_ok();
+
+    // /me through the pic_ path — same user_id.
+    let via_key = s
+        .server
+        .get("/api/v1/admin/auth/me")
+        .add_header("authorization", format!("Bearer {raw_token}"))
+        .await;
+    via_key.assert_status_ok();
+
+    assert_eq!(
+        via_session.json::<Value>()["id"],
+        via_key.json::<Value>()["id"]
+    );
+    assert_eq!(
+        via_session.json::<Value>()["username"],
+        via_key.json::<Value>()["username"]
+    );
+}
+
+// ----------------------------------------------------------------------------
+// 6. Scope intersection — read-only key cannot write
+// ----------------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+#[ignore = "needs DATABASE_URL pointing at a running Postgres"]
+#[sqlx::test(migrations = "../manager-core/migrations")]
+async fn read_only_key_cannot_write_scripts(pool: PgPool) {
+    let s = boot(pool).await;
+    let session_token = login_token(&s.server, "owner", "owner-pw").await;
+    let mint = mint_key(
+        &s.server,
+        &session_token,
+        json!({ "name": "ro", "scopes": ["script:read"] }),
+    )
+    .await;
+    mint.assert_status(axum::http::StatusCode::CREATED);
+    let raw = mint.json::<Value>()["raw_token"]
+        .as_str()
+        .unwrap()
+        .to_string();
+
+    let denied = s
+        .server
+        .post("/api/v1/admin/scripts")
+        .add_header("authorization", format!("Bearer {raw}"))
+        .json(&json!({
+            "app_id": s.default_app.to_string(),
+            "name": "would-write",
+            "source": "fn main() { #{ statusCode: 200 } }",
+        }))
+        .await;
+    assert_eq!(denied.status_code(), axum::http::StatusCode::FORBIDDEN);
+}
+
+// ----------------------------------------------------------------------------
+// 7. Bound key cannot escape its app
+// ----------------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+#[ignore = "needs DATABASE_URL pointing at a running Postgres"]
+#[sqlx::test(migrations = "../manager-core/migrations")]
+async fn bound_key_cannot_escape_its_app(pool: PgPool) {
+    let s = boot(pool.clone()).await;
+    let session_token = login_token(&s.server, "owner", "owner-pw").await;
+
+    // Create a second app via the API (owner can InstanceCreateApp).
+    let other = s
+        .server
+        .post("/api/v1/admin/apps")
+        .add_header("authorization", format!("Bearer {session_token}"))
+        .json(&json!({ "slug": "other", "name": "Other" }))
+        .await;
+    other.assert_status(axum::http::StatusCode::CREATED);
+    let other_id = other.json::<Value>()["id"].as_str().unwrap().to_string();
+
+    // Mint a key bound to the default app with script:write.
+    let mint = mint_key(
+        &s.server,
+        &session_token,
+        json!({
+            "name": "default-only",
+            "scopes": ["script:write"],
+            "app_id": s.default_app.to_string(),
+        }),
+    )
+    .await;
+    mint.assert_status(axum::http::StatusCode::CREATED);
+    let raw = mint.json::<Value>()["raw_token"]
+        .as_str()
+        .unwrap()
+        .to_string();
+
+    // Writing into the bound app: allowed.
+    let ok = s
+        .server
+        .post("/api/v1/admin/scripts")
+        .add_header("authorization", format!("Bearer {raw}"))
+        .json(&json!({
+            "app_id": s.default_app.to_string(),
+            "name": "bound-ok",
+            "source": "fn main() { #{ statusCode: 200 } }",
+        }))
+        .await;
+    ok.assert_status(axum::http::StatusCode::CREATED);
+
+    // Writing into the *other* app: forbidden.
+    let denied = s
+        .server
+        .post("/api/v1/admin/scripts")
+        .add_header("authorization", format!("Bearer {raw}"))
+        .json(&json!({
+            "app_id": other_id,
+            "name": "escape-attempt",
+            "source": "fn main() { #{ statusCode: 200 } }",
+        }))
+        .await;
+    assert_eq!(denied.status_code(), axum::http::StatusCode::FORBIDDEN);
+}
+
+// ----------------------------------------------------------------------------
+// 8. Member listing isolation
+// ----------------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+#[ignore = "needs DATABASE_URL pointing at a running Postgres"]
+#[sqlx::test(migrations = "../manager-core/migrations")]
+async fn member_list_endpoints_filter_at_sql(pool: PgPool) {
+    let s = boot(pool.clone()).await;
+    let owner_token = login_token(&s.server, "owner", "owner-pw").await;
+
+    // Owner creates a second app + script-in-that-app.
+    let other = s
+        .server
+        .post("/api/v1/admin/apps")
+        .add_header("authorization", format!("Bearer {owner_token}"))
+        .json(&json!({ "slug": "secret", "name": "Secret" }))
+        .await;
+    other.assert_status(axum::http::StatusCode::CREATED);
+    let other_id: uuid::Uuid = other.json::<Value>()["id"]
+        .as_str()
+        .unwrap()
+        .parse()
+        .unwrap();
+    let other_app: AppId = other_id.into();
+    create_script_via_api(&s.server, &owner_token, other_app, "secret-script").await;
+    create_script_via_api(&s.server, &owner_token, s.default_app, "default-script").await;
+
+    // Carol is a member of the default app only.
+    let carol = seed_user(&s.pool, "carol", "carol-pw", InstanceRole::Member).await;
+    grant_membership(&s.pool, carol, s.default_app, AppRole::Viewer).await;
+    let carol_token = login_token(&s.server, "carol", "carol-pw").await;
+
+    let apps = s
+        .server
+        .get("/api/v1/admin/apps")
+        .add_header("authorization", format!("Bearer {carol_token}"))
+        .await;
+    apps.assert_status_ok();
+    let apps_body: Value = apps.json();
+    let app_slugs: Vec<String> = apps_body
+        .as_array()
+        .unwrap()
+        .iter()
+        .map(|a| a["slug"].as_str().unwrap().to_string())
+        .collect();
+    assert_eq!(
+        app_slugs,
+        vec!["default"],
+        "member must see only their apps"
+    );
+
+    let scripts = s
+        .server
+        .get("/api/v1/admin/scripts")
+        .add_header("authorization", format!("Bearer {carol_token}"))
+        .await;
+    scripts.assert_status_ok();
+    let scripts_body: Value = scripts.json();
+    let names: Vec<String> = scripts_body
+        .as_array()
+        .unwrap()
+        .iter()
+        .map(|s| s["name"].as_str().unwrap().to_string())
+        .collect();
+    assert!(
+        names.iter().any(|n| n == "default-script") && !names.iter().any(|n| n == "secret-script"),
+        "member listing leaked another app's script: {names:?}"
+    );
+}
+
+// ----------------------------------------------------------------------------
+// 9. Deactivation revokes API keys
+// ----------------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+#[ignore = "needs DATABASE_URL pointing at a running Postgres"]
+#[sqlx::test(migrations = "../manager-core/migrations")]
+async fn deactivating_user_revokes_their_api_keys(pool: PgPool) {
+    let s = boot(pool.clone()).await;
+    let owner_token = login_token(&s.server, "owner", "owner-pw").await;
+
+    // A second user — admin so they can mint a key for themselves.
+    let dave_id = seed_user(&s.pool, "dave", "dave-pw", InstanceRole::Admin).await;
+    let dave_token = login_token(&s.server, "dave", "dave-pw").await;
+    let mint = mint_key(
+        &s.server,
+        &dave_token,
+        json!({ "name": "dave-key", "scopes": ["script:read"] }),
+    )
+    .await;
+    mint.assert_status(axum::http::StatusCode::CREATED);
+    let raw = mint.json::<Value>()["raw_token"]
+        .as_str()
+        .unwrap()
+        .to_string();
+
+    // Key works.
+    let before = s
+        .server
+        .get("/api/v1/admin/auth/me")
+        .add_header("authorization", format!("Bearer {raw}"))
+        .await;
+    before.assert_status_ok();
+
+    // Owner deactivates Dave.
+    let patch = s
+        .server
+        .patch(&format!("/api/v1/admin/admins/{dave_id}"))
+        .add_header("authorization", format!("Bearer {owner_token}"))
+        .json(&json!({ "is_active": false }))
+        .await;
+    patch.assert_status_ok();
+
+    // Key now rejects with 401.
+    let after = s
+        .server
+        .get("/api/v1/admin/auth/me")
+        .add_header("authorization", format!("Bearer {raw}"))
+        .await;
+    assert_eq!(after.status_code(), axum::http::StatusCode::UNAUTHORIZED);
+
+    // Cross-check via the repo: the row's expires_at is set in the past.
+    let repo = PostgresApiKeyRepository::new(s.pool.clone());
+    let rows = repo.list_for_user(dave_id).await.expect("list keys");
+    assert!(
+        rows.iter().all(|r| r.expires_at.is_some()),
+        "every key must have an expiry after deactivation"
+    );
+    assert!(rows
+        .iter()
+        .all(|r| r.expires_at.unwrap() <= chrono::Utc::now()));
+}
+
+// ----------------------------------------------------------------------------
+// 10. Mint rejects bound key + instance scope
+// ----------------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+#[ignore = "needs DATABASE_URL pointing at a running Postgres"]
+#[sqlx::test(migrations = "../manager-core/migrations")]
+async fn bound_key_with_instance_scope_is_rejected(pool: PgPool) {
+    let s = boot(pool).await;
+    let token = login_token(&s.server, "owner", "owner-pw").await;
+    let r = s
+        .server
+        .post("/api/v1/admin/api-keys")
+        .add_header("authorization", format!("Bearer {token}"))
+        .json(&json!({
+            "name": "irreconcilable",
+            "scopes": ["instance:admin"],
+            "app_id": s.default_app.to_string(),
+        }))
+        .await;
+    assert_eq!(
+        r.status_code(),
+        axum::http::StatusCode::UNPROCESSABLE_ENTITY
+    );
+    let body: Value = r.json();
+    assert!(
+        body["error"].as_str().unwrap().contains("bound"),
+        "error body should explain the conflict, got {body}"
+    );
+}
+
+// ----------------------------------------------------------------------------
+// 11. Multi-owner detection — data-source for the startup warning
+// ----------------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+#[ignore = "needs DATABASE_URL pointing at a running Postgres"]
+#[sqlx::test(migrations = "../manager-core/migrations")]
+async fn list_active_owners_drives_the_multi_owner_warning(pool: PgPool) {
+    let s = boot(pool.clone()).await;
+
+    // Seed a second owner directly so we exercise the
+    // multi-owner condition.
+    seed_user(&s.pool, "owner2", "pw", InstanceRole::Owner).await;
+    seed_user(&s.pool, "admin1", "pw", InstanceRole::Admin).await;
+
+    let users = Arc::new(PostgresAdminUserRepository::new(s.pool.clone()));
+    let owners = users.list_active_owners().await.expect("list owners");
+    let names: Vec<&str> = owners.iter().map(|o| o.username.as_str()).collect();
+    assert!(names.contains(&"owner"));
+    assert!(names.contains(&"owner2"));
+    assert!(!names.contains(&"admin1"));
+    assert_eq!(
+        owners.len(),
+        2,
+        "list_active_owners must filter strictly by instance_role"
+    );
+
+    // count_other_active_owners powers the last-owner guard.
+    let remaining = users
+        .count_other_active_owners(s.owner)
+        .await
+        .expect("count");
+    assert_eq!(remaining, 1, "one other owner should remain (owner2)");
+}

crates/shared/src/auth.rs

@@ -0,0 +1,242 @@
+//! Cross-crate authn/authz types — Phase 3.5, see blueprint §11.6.
+//!
+//! The `Principal` extracted by `manager-core::auth_middleware` lives
+//! here so handlers in every crate (and, later, the v1.1 SDKs in
+//! `executor-core`) can refer to the same shape without pulling in the
+//! manager crate. The authorization rules themselves live in
+//! `manager-core::authz` — this module is data only.
+//!
+//! `UserId` is a transitional alias for `AdminUserId`. Phase 3a named
+//! the table `admin_users` to leave room for the v1.1 script-level
+//! `users` SDK feature (see blueprint §11.4 "Naming"); from the
+//! authorization layer's perspective an admin row is the principal
+//! identity, so we expose the alias rather than renaming the existing
+//! id type.
+
+use serde::{Deserialize, Serialize};
+
+use crate::{AdminUserId, AppId};
+
+/// Transitional alias — see module docs.
+pub type UserId = AdminUserId;
+
+/// Instance-wide role carried by every `admin_users` row. The DB
+/// representation is `text` (`'owner'|'admin'|'member'`), checked via
+/// a CHECK constraint in migration `0006_users_authz.sql`; this enum
+/// is the Rust mirror.
+#[derive(Debug, Clone, Copy, PartialEq, Eq, Hash, Serialize, Deserialize)]
+#[serde(rename_all = "snake_case")]
+pub enum InstanceRole {
+    /// Full instance control, manage other owners, implicit `app_admin`
+    /// on every app. Multiple allowed.
+    Owner,
+    /// Create apps, invite users, implicit `editor` on every app. No
+    /// instance-settings authority and no owner-management.
+    Admin,
+    /// Invited into specific apps via `app_members` only. No app
+    /// creation, no invite authority. List endpoints filter strictly
+    /// by membership at SQL.
+    Member,
+}
+
+impl InstanceRole {
+    /// Stable string form — matches the DB CHECK constraint values
+    /// exactly. Used by repos and the seed/audit paths.
+    #[must_use]
+    pub const fn as_str(self) -> &'static str {
+        match self {
+            Self::Owner => "owner",
+            Self::Admin => "admin",
+            Self::Member => "member",
+        }
+    }
+
+    /// Inverse of `as_str` — used when reading a row out of Postgres.
+    /// Returns `None` for unknown values so the caller can decide
+    /// between failing loudly or skipping a bad row.
+    #[must_use]
+    pub fn from_db_str(s: &str) -> Option<Self> {
+        match s {
+            "owner" => Some(Self::Owner),
+            "admin" => Some(Self::Admin),
+            "member" => Some(Self::Member),
+            _ => None,
+        }
+    }
+}
+
+/// Per-app role recorded in `app_members`. Members hold zero-or-one row
+/// per (user, app); owners and admins are not represented in the table
+/// (their app authority is implicit via `InstanceRole`).
+#[derive(Debug, Clone, Copy, PartialEq, Eq, Hash, Serialize, Deserialize)]
+#[serde(rename_all = "snake_case")]
+pub enum AppRole {
+    /// App settings, domain claims, delete.
+    AppAdmin,
+    /// CRUD on scripts, routes, sandbox config.
+    Editor,
+    /// Read scripts + execution logs.
+    Viewer,
+}
+
+impl AppRole {
+    #[must_use]
+    pub const fn as_str(self) -> &'static str {
+        match self {
+            Self::AppAdmin => "app_admin",
+            Self::Editor => "editor",
+            Self::Viewer => "viewer",
+        }
+    }
+
+    #[must_use]
+    pub fn from_db_str(s: &str) -> Option<Self> {
+        match s {
+            "app_admin" => Some(Self::AppAdmin),
+            "editor" => Some(Self::Editor),
+            "viewer" => Some(Self::Viewer),
+            _ => None,
+        }
+    }
+}
+
+/// API-key scope. Exactly seven values; new scopes need a blueprint
+/// edit before they're added here. Wire form is the colon-separated
+/// string (`"script:read"`, etc.) — matches the `text[]` stored in
+/// `api_keys.scopes` and the strings shown to operators.
+#[derive(Debug, Clone, Copy, PartialEq, Eq, Hash)]
+pub enum Scope {
+    ScriptRead,
+    ScriptWrite,
+    RouteWrite,
+    DomainManage,
+    LogRead,
+    AppAdmin,
+    InstanceAdmin,
+}
+
+impl Scope {
+    pub const ALL: &'static [Scope] = &[
+        Scope::ScriptRead,
+        Scope::ScriptWrite,
+        Scope::RouteWrite,
+        Scope::DomainManage,
+        Scope::LogRead,
+        Scope::AppAdmin,
+        Scope::InstanceAdmin,
+    ];
+
+    #[must_use]
+    pub const fn as_str(self) -> &'static str {
+        match self {
+            Self::ScriptRead => "script:read",
+            Self::ScriptWrite => "script:write",
+            Self::RouteWrite => "route:write",
+            Self::DomainManage => "domain:manage",
+            Self::LogRead => "log:read",
+            Self::AppAdmin => "app:admin",
+            Self::InstanceAdmin => "instance:admin",
+        }
+    }
+
+    #[must_use]
+    pub fn from_wire(s: &str) -> Option<Self> {
+        Self::ALL.iter().copied().find(|sc| sc.as_str() == s)
+    }
+
+    /// True for scopes that only make sense on an unbound key — bound
+    /// keys (api_keys.app_id IS NOT NULL) cannot claim instance-wide
+    /// authority and the mint handler rejects the combination at 422.
+    #[must_use]
+    pub const fn is_instance(self) -> bool {
+        matches!(self, Self::InstanceAdmin)
+    }
+}
+
+// Custom serde so the wire form is the colon-separated string. The
+// stored DB value lives in a `text[]`, so the repo converts between
+// `Vec<String>` and `Vec<Scope>` using `as_str`/`from_wire`.
+impl Serialize for Scope {
+    fn serialize<S: serde::Serializer>(&self, s: S) -> Result<S::Ok, S::Error> {
+        s.serialize_str(self.as_str())
+    }
+}
+
+impl<'de> Deserialize<'de> for Scope {
+    fn deserialize<D: serde::Deserializer<'de>>(d: D) -> Result<Self, D::Error> {
+        let s = String::deserialize(d)?;
+        Self::from_wire(&s).ok_or_else(|| serde::de::Error::custom(format!("unknown scope: {s}")))
+    }
+}
+
+/// Resolved caller identity. Produced by `manager-core::auth_middleware`
+/// for both the cookie-session path (then `scopes`/`app_binding` are
+/// `None`) and the bearer-API-key path (then both fields carry the
+/// key's constraints).
+///
+/// The capability check in `manager-core::authz::can` intersects
+/// `instance_role` with `scopes` and `app_binding` to decide whether
+/// a given `Capability` is granted.
+#[derive(Debug, Clone)]
+pub struct Principal {
+    pub user_id: UserId,
+    pub instance_role: InstanceRole,
+    /// `None` for cookie sessions (no scope restriction beyond the
+    /// role itself); `Some` for API keys, in which case the effective
+    /// authority is `role ∩ scopes`.
+    pub scopes: Option<Vec<Scope>>,
+    /// `Some(app)` for keys bound to a single app at mint time. Every
+    /// `App*(other)` capability is denied regardless of role.
+    pub app_binding: Option<AppId>,
+}
+
+#[cfg(test)]
+mod tests {
+    use super::*;
+
+    #[test]
+    fn instance_role_round_trip() {
+        for role in [
+            InstanceRole::Owner,
+            InstanceRole::Admin,
+            InstanceRole::Member,
+        ] {
+            assert_eq!(InstanceRole::from_db_str(role.as_str()), Some(role));
+        }
+        assert_eq!(InstanceRole::from_db_str("bogus"), None);
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn app_role_round_trip() {
+        for role in [AppRole::AppAdmin, AppRole::Editor, AppRole::Viewer] {
+            assert_eq!(AppRole::from_db_str(role.as_str()), Some(role));
+        }
+        assert_eq!(AppRole::from_db_str("bogus"), None);
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn scope_round_trip_covers_all() {
+        for &scope in Scope::ALL {
+            assert_eq!(Scope::from_wire(scope.as_str()), Some(scope));
+        }
+        assert_eq!(Scope::from_wire("script:nope"), None);
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn scope_is_instance_flags_only_instance_admin() {
+        for &scope in Scope::ALL {
+            let expected = scope == Scope::InstanceAdmin;
+            assert_eq!(scope.is_instance(), expected, "scope {}", scope.as_str());
+        }
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn scope_serde_uses_wire_form() {
+        let s = serde_json::to_string(&Scope::ScriptWrite).unwrap();
+        assert_eq!(s, "\"script:write\"");
+        let back: Scope = serde_json::from_str(&s).unwrap();
+        assert_eq!(back, Scope::ScriptWrite);
+        let err = serde_json::from_str::<Scope>("\"unknown\"").unwrap_err();
+        assert!(err.to_string().contains("unknown scope"));
+    }
+}

crates/shared/src/ids.rs

@@ -52,3 +52,4 @@ id_type!(ExecutionId);
 id_type!(RequestId);
 id_type!(AdminUserId);
 id_type!(AppId);
+id_type!(ApiKeyId);

crates/shared/src/lib.rs

@@ -5,6 +5,7 @@
 //! entity, error roots, transport DTOs).
 
 pub mod app;
+pub mod auth;
 pub mod error;
 pub mod execution_log;
 pub mod ids;
@@ -16,9 +17,10 @@ pub mod validator;
 pub mod version;
 
 pub use app::{App, AppDomain, DomainShape};
+pub use auth::{AppRole, InstanceRole, Principal, Scope, UserId};
 pub use error::Error;
 pub use execution_log::{ExecutionLog, ExecutionStatus};
-pub use ids::{AdminUserId, AppId, ExecutionId, RequestId, ScriptId};
+pub use ids::{AdminUserId, ApiKeyId, AppId, ExecutionId, RequestId, ScriptId};
 pub use log_sink::{ExecutionLogSink, LogSinkError};
 pub use route::{HostKind, PathKind, Route};
 pub use sandbox::ScriptSandbox;

dashboard/package-lock.json

@@ -1,12 +1,12 @@
 {
   "name": "picloud-dashboard",
-  "version": "0.5.1",
+  "version": "0.6.0",
   "lockfileVersion": 3,
   "requires": true,
   "packages": {
     "": {
       "name": "picloud-dashboard",
-      "version": "0.5.1",
+      "version": "0.6.0",
       "dependencies": {
         "@codemirror/autocomplete": "^6.20.2",
         "@codemirror/commands": "^6.10.3",

dashboard/package.json

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 {
   "name": "picloud-dashboard",
-  "version": "0.5.1",
+  "version": "0.6.0",
   "private": true,
   "type": "module",
   "scripts": {

docs/versioning.md

@@ -126,10 +126,10 @@ A surface can hit its own `1.0` independently of the product. The SDK in particu
 
 | | Version |
 |---|---|
-| Product | `0.5.1` |
+| Product | `0.6.0` |
 | SDK | `1.1` (adds `ctx.request.params`, `ctx.request.query`, `ctx.request.rest`) |
-| API | `1` (additive: `Script.app_id`, `Route.app_id`, `ExecutionLog.app_id`, new `/api/v1/admin/apps/*` endpoints, `?app=` filter on script list) |
+| API | `1` (additive: `Script.app_id`, `Route.app_id`, `ExecutionLog.app_id`, new `/api/v1/admin/apps/*` and `/api/v1/admin/api-keys/*` endpoints, `?app=` filter on script list, `Authorization: Bearer pic_…` credential type, 403 responses on previously-401-only admin endpoints when the caller lacks the required capability) |
-| Schema | `5` (matches `migrations/0005_apps.sql`) |
+| Schema | `6` (matches `migrations/0006_users_authz.sql`) |
 | Wire | `1` (reserved; cluster mode not implemented) |
 
 Read live from `GET /version` on any running instance.

serverless_cloud_blueprint.md

@@ -1022,6 +1022,152 @@ The scripts and routes endpoints keep their existing shape — this avoids forci
 
 ---
 
+## 11.6 Users, roles, and bearer-token auth (Phase 3.5) — Pending
+
+**Status**: pending. Targets `crates/manager-core/src/{authz,api_keys_api,api_key_repo}.rs`, an extended `auth_middleware.rs`, new shared types under `crates/shared/src/auth.rs`, migration `0006_users_authz.sql`.
+
+**Purpose**: bridge Phase 3b → Phase 4. Phase 4's v1.1 SDKs (KV, docs, HTTP, cron) each gate access on the calling principal. Without a real authorization model in place, every SDK addition has to either invent its own gate or stay open. Phase 3.5 lands `can(principal, capability)` as the single check every future SDK + admin endpoint goes through, so v1.1 work focuses on data plane shape, not on re-litigating auth.
+
+**Why this slot**: same logic as Phase 3b. Adding a `Principal` parameter and a capability check to surfaces that don't exist yet is free; retrofitting them onto live SDK services after v1.1 ships is a refactor of every gate.
+
+### Principal Model
+
+One `Principal` value represents a human admin user. Service accounts (CI bots, Rhai scripts calling out) get **schema room** in this phase but no runtime support — `users.kind` style differentiation lands when Phase 4's `users.*` SDK arrives. Until then, every authenticated request resolves to exactly one admin row, whether the credential is a session cookie or a bearer API key.
+
+```rust
+pub struct Principal {
+    pub user_id:       UserId,             // alias of AdminUserId for the transition
+    pub instance_role: InstanceRole,
+    pub scopes:        Option<Vec<Scope>>, // None = cookie session (full role authority)
+                                           // Some = API key (intersect with role)
+    pub app_binding:   Option<AppId>,      // API key bound to one app; denies other apps
+}
+```
+
+### Instance Roles (one per user)
+
+| Role | Powers |
+|---|---|
+| `owner` | full instance control, manage other owners, implicit `app_admin` on every app. Multiple owners allowed. |
+| `admin` | create apps, invite users, implicit `editor` on every app. Cannot manage instance-wide settings or other owners. |
+| `member` | invited into specific apps only. Cannot create apps, cannot invite. **Strict isolation enforced at SQL** — list endpoints `WHERE app_id IN (SELECT app_id FROM app_members WHERE user_id = $1)`; the API never returns apps a member isn't part of. |
+
+The current Phase 3a `admin_users` rows all become `owner` via `DEFAULT 'owner'` on the new column. Multi-owner installs get a startup `tracing::warn!` listing the active owner usernames so the operator can demote extras via `PATCH /api/v1/admin/admins/{id}`.
+
+### App-Scoped Roles (zero-to-many per user × app)
+
+| Role | Grants |
+|---|---|
+| `app_admin` | settings, domain claims, delete app |
+| `editor` | CRUD on scripts, routes, sandbox config |
+| `viewer` | read scripts + execution logs |
+
+Implicit grants from instance role: every `owner` is `app_admin` on every app; every `admin` is `editor` on every app. Explicit `app_members` rows are the only path for `member` users.
+
+### Auth Methods — Same Principal, Different Extractor
+
+Two credential types feed the same middleware:
+
+1. **Session cookie** (Phase 3a, unchanged) — `picloud_session=<token>`. Extracted by header or cookie. SHA-256 lookup against `admin_sessions.token_hash`. Sliding 24h TTL. Produces `Principal { scopes: None, app_binding: None }`.
+
+2. **Bearer API key** (new) — `Authorization: Bearer pic_<base32(32 random bytes)>`. The `pic_` prefix is the discriminator: present → API key path; absent → session path. The 8 chars immediately after `pic_` are indexed (`api_keys.prefix`); the full body after `pic_` is Argon2id-verified against each candidate's `hash`. Last-used timestamp updates inline.
+
+Both paths converge on the same `Principal` extension; handlers cannot tell which credential was presented unless they introspect `principal.scopes`.
+
+### API Key Format & Storage
+
+- Raw form: `pic_<base32(32 random bytes, no padding)>` — ~56 chars total.
+- Stored: 8-char prefix + Argon2id PHC hash of the body. Raw value returned **exactly once** in the `POST /api/v1/admin/api-keys` response; never logged, never readable again.
+- Optional `expires_at`. Lookup queries always filter `expires_at IS NULL OR expires_at > NOW()`.
+- Optional `app_id` ("bound key") — every `App*(other_app)` capability is denied for this key, regardless of the user's role.
+
+### Scope Set (intentionally narrow)
+
+Exactly seven scopes; no further subdivision until a real use case appears:
+
+`script:read`, `script:write`, `route:write`, `domain:manage`, `log:read`, `app:admin`, `instance:admin`
+
+Mint-time validation rejects unknown values. Bound keys (`app_id` set) cannot carry `instance:*` scopes — the combination is irreconcilable (a bound credential cannot claim instance-wide authority) and is rejected with 422.
+
+### Effective Capability — `can(principal, capability)`
+
+```
+allow = role_grants(principal.instance_role, capability)
+      ∧ (principal.scopes.is_none() ∨ required_scope(capability) ∈ principal.scopes)
+      ∧ (principal.app_binding.is_none() ∨ capability.app_id() == principal.app_binding)
+```
+
+`role_grants` collapses the three tables (instance role + implicit app grants + explicit `app_members`) into a single yes/no. Each handler calls `state.authz.require(&principal, Capability::AppWrite(script.app_id))` after loading the resource (so the capability binds to the resource's actual `app_id`, not a path param the caller controls).
+
+### Deactivation Symmetry
+
+Phase 3a's `set_active(false)` wipes that user's `admin_sessions`. Phase 3.5 extends it to also set `expires_at = NOW()` on every row in `api_keys WHERE user_id = $1` — both credential surfaces become inert at the same moment, no enumeration window.
+
+### CLI Auth Posture (forward note)
+
+The eventual `picloud` CLI authenticates by **paste-the-token**, not OAuth: the user runs `picloud login`, the dashboard mints a fresh key (or the user mints one via `POST /api/v1/admin/api-keys`), and the CLI prompts for the raw token. The CLI binary itself is deferred; the dashboard surface and the bearer credential type land here so the CLI is a thin wrapper when it arrives.
+
+### Schema (Migration 0006)
+
+```sql
+ALTER TABLE admin_users
+  ADD COLUMN instance_role TEXT NOT NULL DEFAULT 'owner'
+    CHECK (instance_role IN ('owner','admin','member')),
+  ADD COLUMN email TEXT UNIQUE,
+  ADD COLUMN mfa_secret TEXT;          -- reserved slot, not built
+
+CREATE TABLE app_members (
+  app_id      UUID NOT NULL REFERENCES apps(id) ON DELETE CASCADE,
+  user_id     UUID NOT NULL REFERENCES admin_users(id) ON DELETE CASCADE,
+  role        TEXT NOT NULL CHECK (role IN ('app_admin','editor','viewer')),
+  created_at  TIMESTAMPTZ NOT NULL DEFAULT NOW(),
+  PRIMARY KEY (app_id, user_id)
+);
+CREATE INDEX app_members_user_id_idx ON app_members (user_id);
+
+CREATE TABLE api_keys (
+  id            UUID PRIMARY KEY DEFAULT gen_random_uuid(),
+  user_id       UUID NOT NULL REFERENCES admin_users(id) ON DELETE CASCADE,
+  hash          TEXT NOT NULL,                            -- Argon2id PHC
+  prefix        TEXT NOT NULL,                            -- first 8 chars after `pic_`
+  name          TEXT NOT NULL,
+  scopes        TEXT[] NOT NULL,                          -- intersected with role at check time
+  app_id        UUID NULL REFERENCES apps(id) ON DELETE CASCADE,
+  expires_at    TIMESTAMPTZ NULL,
+  last_used_at  TIMESTAMPTZ NULL,
+  created_at    TIMESTAMPTZ NOT NULL DEFAULT NOW()
+);
+CREATE INDEX api_keys_prefix_idx  ON api_keys (prefix);
+CREATE INDEX api_keys_user_id_idx ON api_keys (user_id);
+
+-- Reserved (not built this phase):
+--   invites (token, email, instance_role, app_id, app_role, invited_by, expires_at, consumed_at)
+--   service_accounts (id, name, owning_user_id, …)
+```
+
+### New Endpoints (additive — no API major bump)
+
+```
+POST   /api/v1/admin/api-keys        — { name, scopes[], app_id?, expires_at? }
+                                       → 201 { …, raw_token }   (raw returned exactly once)
+GET    /api/v1/admin/api-keys        — list caller's own keys (no raw)
+DELETE /api/v1/admin/api-keys/{id}   — caller's own only
+```
+
+Every existing `/api/v1/admin/*` endpoint is re-gated from "any authed admin" to a specific `Capability`. Request/response shapes are unchanged; what changes is the set of callers each endpoint accepts (a `member` now gets 403 on app surfaces they're not part of, where before they would have been 401-or-200 depending only on session validity).
+
+### Out of Scope (Phase 3.5)
+
+Schema room only, not built:
+
+- **Invites** — email-based join flow; `invites` table reserved in the migration comment block.
+- **MFA / TOTP** — `mfa_secret` column reserved on `admin_users`.
+- **Service accounts** — reserved as a future table; for now, every API key belongs to a human `admin_users` row.
+
+Defer to follow-up sessions: dashboard surfaces for invites / member management / key minting (curl is the supported interface this phase), OIDC / SAML / SCIM, the `picloud` CLI binary itself, email/SMTP delivery of invites, audit log shipping.
+
+---
+
 ## 12. Development Roadmap
 
 ### Phase 1: MVP ✓ (Shipped)
@@ -1048,13 +1194,15 @@ The scripts and routes endpoints keep their existing shape — this avoids forci
 
 ### Phase 3: v1.0.x — Foundations (Current focus)
 
-Two foundation pieces that must land before the v1.1 service expansion, because retrofitting them later is expensive.
+Three foundation pieces that must land before the v1.1 service expansion, because retrofitting them later is expensive.
 
 **3a. Admin auth** — ✓ shipped. See section 11.4. Per-user `admin_users` (not a shared secret), Argon2id passwords, env-var bootstrap of the first admin, session-token doubling as bearer token for API. No roles in this cut; schema is forward-compatible with later RBAC.
 
 **3b. Multi-app scoping** — ✓ shipped. See section 11.5. `apps`, `app_domains`, `app_slug_history` tables; `app_id` columns on `scripts`, `routes`, `execution_logs`. Migration assigns existing data to a `default` app and always claims `localhost`; a Rust-side bootstrap inserts a `Hello World` script + `/hello` route when the default app is empty. Orchestrator dispatch is two-phase (Host → app → route trie). `/api/v1/execute/{id}/*` continues to work without a public domain claim. Dashboard is app-hierarchical (`/admin/apps`, `/admin/apps/{slug}/...`); API stays flat with new endpoints under `/api/v1/admin/apps/*` and a `?app=` filter on script listing. Per-app admin roles deferred.
 
-**Why both before v1.1**: every v1.1 service (KV, docs, users, etc.) needs an `app_id` scoping key in its schema. Adding it now, with one small migration on existing tables, is cheap. Adding it after those services ship is several migrations on populated data.
+**3c. Users, roles, and bearer-token auth** — pending. See section 11.6. Adds `instance_role` to `admin_users` (`owner`/`admin`/`member`), `app_members` for per-app `app_admin`/`editor`/`viewer` grants, and `api_keys` for `Authorization: Bearer pic_…` credentials. Unifies cookie-session and API-key paths behind a single `can(principal, capability)` gate; list endpoints filter by membership at SQL for `member` users. Dashboard surfaces, invites, MFA, service accounts, and the `picloud` CLI binary are deferred — schema room only.
+
+**Why all three before v1.1**: every v1.1 service (KV, docs, users, etc.) needs both an `app_id` scoping key in its schema and a `Principal` to authorize against. Adding both now is one migration each on a small surface; adding them after the SDKs ship is many migrations on populated data plus a re-gate of every SDK call.
 
 ---