//! §9.4 Service Interceptors, end to end via `pic` — the KV allow/deny slice.
//!
//! A `[[interceptors]]` marker binds a script to run BEFORE `kv::set`/`delete`.
//! The interceptor reads the operation context (`ctx.request.body` — service,
//! action, collection, key, value) and returns `#{ allowed: bool, reason }`; a
//! `false` denies the op (the write never happens, the caller gets an error).
//! Registration is nearest-owner-wins on the calling app's chain, so a group's
//! interceptor is inherited by a descendant app (and an app can override it).

use std::fs;

use tempfile::TempDir;

use crate::common;
use crate::common::cleanup::{AppGuard, GroupGuard};

fn manifest_dir() -> TempDir {
    let dir = TempDir::new().expect("tempdir");
    fs::create_dir_all(dir.path().join("scripts")).expect("scripts dir");
    dir
}

fn app_script_id(env: &common::TestEnv, app: &str, name: &str) -> String {
    let ls = common::pic_as(env)
        .args(["scripts", "ls", "--app", app])
        .output()
        .expect("scripts ls");
    let table = String::from_utf8(ls.stdout).unwrap();
    table
        .lines()
        .map(common::cells)
        .find(|c| c.get(2) == Some(&name))
        .and_then(|c| c.first().map(|s| (*s).to_string()))
        .unwrap_or_else(|| panic!("script `{name}` not found:\n{table}"))
}

fn invoke_body(env: &common::TestEnv, id: &str) -> serde_json::Value {
    let out = common::pic_as(env)
        .args(["scripts", "invoke", id])
        .output()
        .expect("scripts invoke");
    assert!(
        out.status.success(),
        "invoke failed: {}",
        String::from_utf8_lossy(&out.stderr)
    );
    serde_json::from_slice(&out.stdout).expect("invoke body is JSON")
}

/// A guard that denies a `kv::set` of the key `"secret"` and allows everything
/// else, reading the op context from `ctx.request.body`.
const GUARD: &str = r#"
let op = ctx.request.body;
if op.action == "set" && op.key == "secret" {
    #{ allowed: false, reason: "the `secret` key is protected" }
} else {
    #{ allowed: true }
}
"#;

/// A writer that tries a denied set (caught), then a permitted set.
const WRITER: &str = r#"
let denied = false;
try { kv::collection("c").set("secret", 1); } catch(e) { denied = true; }
kv::collection("c").set("ok", 2);
#{ denied: denied }
"#;

/// A permissive guard an app might define to try to SHADOW a group's guard by
/// re-using its script name. The seal must make the group's guard win anyway.
const PERMISSIVE_GUARD: &str = r#"#{ allowed: true }"#;

/// A guard that returns a map WITHOUT an `allowed` key — a malformed verdict.
/// The fail-closed contract must treat this as a deny.
const NO_VERDICT_GUARD: &str = r#"#{ note: "forgot to return allowed" }"#;

/// A writer over a group SHARED collection (finding 1: the shared handle must
/// be intercepted too, not just `kv::collection`).
const SHARED_WRITER: &str = r#"
let denied = false;
try { kv::shared_collection("catalog").set("secret", 1); } catch(e) { denied = true; }
kv::shared_collection("catalog").set("ok", 2);
#{ denied: denied }
"#;

/// A writer that only tries a single (guarded) set.
const ANY_WRITER: &str = r#"
let denied = false;
try { kv::collection("c").set("anything", 1); } catch(e) { denied = true; }
#{ denied: denied }
"#;

#[ignore = "needs DATABASE_URL pointing at a running Postgres"]
#[test]
fn app_interceptor_denies_a_guarded_kv_write_and_allows_others() {
    let Some(fx) = common::fixture_or_skip() else {
        return;
    };
    let env = common::admin_env(fx);
    let app = common::unique_slug("ic-app");
    let _a = AppGuard::new(&env.url, &env.token, &app);
    common::pic_as(&env)
        .args(["apps", "create", &app])
        .assert()
        .success();

    // One apply deploys the guard + writer scripts AND registers the marker.
    let dir = manifest_dir();
    fs::write(dir.path().join("scripts/guard.rhai"), GUARD).unwrap();
    fs::write(dir.path().join("scripts/writer.rhai"), WRITER).unwrap();
    fs::write(
        dir.path().join("picloud.toml"),
        format!(
            "[app]\nslug = \"{app}\"\nname = \"IC\"\n\n\
             [[scripts]]\nname = \"guard\"\nfile = \"scripts/guard.rhai\"\n\n\
             [[scripts]]\nname = \"writer\"\nfile = \"scripts/writer.rhai\"\n\n\
             [[interceptors]]\nscript = \"guard\"\nops = [\"set\"]\n"
        ),
    )
    .unwrap();
    common::pic_as(&env)
        .args(["apply", "--file"])
        .arg(dir.path().join("picloud.toml"))
        .assert()
        .success();

    // The writer's guarded set is denied (caught), the permitted set goes through.
    let body = invoke_body(&env, &app_script_id(&env, &app, "writer"));
    assert_eq!(
        body,
        serde_json::json!({ "denied": true }),
        "the `secret` set must be denied by the interceptor"
    );

    // `ok` was written; `secret` was not (the write never ran).
    let ok = String::from_utf8(
        common::pic_as(&env)
            .args(["kv", "get", "--app", &app, "--collection", "c", "ok"])
            .output()
            .unwrap()
            .stdout,
    )
    .unwrap();
    assert!(ok.contains('2'), "the allowed write must persist:\n{ok}");
    let secret = common::pic_as(&env)
        .args(["kv", "get", "--app", &app, "--collection", "c", "secret"])
        .output()
        .unwrap();
    let secret_out = String::from_utf8_lossy(&secret.stdout);
    assert!(
        secret_out.trim() == "null" || secret_out.trim() == "()" || secret_out.trim().is_empty(),
        "the denied write must NOT persist, got: {secret_out}"
    );
}

#[ignore = "needs DATABASE_URL pointing at a running Postgres"]
#[test]
fn a_group_interceptor_is_inherited_by_a_descendant_app() {
    let Some(fx) = common::fixture_or_skip() else {
        return;
    };
    let env = common::admin_env(fx);
    let group = common::unique_slug("icg-grp");
    let app = common::unique_slug("icg-app");
    let _g = GroupGuard::new(&env.url, &env.token, &group);
    common::pic_as(&env)
        .args(["groups", "create", &group])
        .assert()
        .success();

    // The GROUP owns the guard script + the interceptor marker.
    let dir = manifest_dir();
    fs::write(dir.path().join("scripts/guard.rhai"), GUARD).unwrap();
    fs::write(
        dir.path().join("group.toml"),
        format!(
            "[group]\nslug = \"{group}\"\nname = \"ICG\"\n\n\
             [[scripts]]\nname = \"guard\"\nfile = \"scripts/guard.rhai\"\n\n\
             [[interceptors]]\nscript = \"guard\"\nops = [\"set\"]\n"
        ),
    )
    .unwrap();
    common::pic_as(&env)
        .args(["apply", "--file"])
        .arg(dir.path().join("group.toml"))
        .assert()
        .success();

    // An app UNDER the group inherits the interceptor (nearest-owner-wins), even
    // though the marker + guard live on the group.
    let _a = AppGuard::new(&env.url, &env.token, &app);
    common::pic_as(&env)
        .args(["apps", "create", &app, "--group", &group])
        .assert()
        .success();
    fs::write(dir.path().join("scripts/writer.rhai"), WRITER).unwrap();
    fs::write(
        dir.path().join("app.toml"),
        format!(
            "[app]\nslug = \"{app}\"\nname = \"ICApp\"\n\n\
             [[scripts]]\nname = \"writer\"\nfile = \"scripts/writer.rhai\"\n"
        ),
    )
    .unwrap();
    common::pic_as(&env)
        .args(["apply", "--file"])
        .arg(dir.path().join("app.toml"))
        .assert()
        .success();

    let body = invoke_body(&env, &app_script_id(&env, &app, "writer"));
    assert_eq!(
        body,
        serde_json::json!({ "denied": true }),
        "a descendant app must inherit the group's interceptor"
    );
}

/// The seal (finding 2): a group's interceptor script is resolved AT THE GROUP,
/// so a descendant app cannot defeat a mandatory guard by defining a permissive
/// script of the same name. The app declares no interceptor of its own — it just
/// shadows the script name — and the group's strict guard must still win.
#[ignore = "needs DATABASE_URL pointing at a running Postgres"]
#[test]
fn a_descendant_cannot_shadow_a_group_interceptor_by_reusing_the_script_name() {
    let Some(fx) = common::fixture_or_skip() else {
        return;
    };
    let env = common::admin_env(fx);
    let group = common::unique_slug("seal-grp");
    let app = common::unique_slug("seal-app");
    let _g = GroupGuard::new(&env.url, &env.token, &group);
    common::pic_as(&env)
        .args(["groups", "create", &group])
        .assert()
        .success();

    // The group owns the strict guard + the interceptor marker.
    let dir = manifest_dir();
    fs::write(dir.path().join("scripts/guard.rhai"), GUARD).unwrap();
    fs::write(
        dir.path().join("group.toml"),
        format!(
            "[group]\nslug = \"{group}\"\nname = \"Seal\"\n\n\
             [[scripts]]\nname = \"guard\"\nfile = \"scripts/guard.rhai\"\n\n\
             [[interceptors]]\nscript = \"guard\"\nops = [\"set\"]\n"
        ),
    )
    .unwrap();
    common::pic_as(&env)
        .args(["apply", "--file"])
        .arg(dir.path().join("group.toml"))
        .assert()
        .success();

    // The app under the group defines its OWN script named `guard` (permissive)
    // but declares NO interceptor. The seal must keep the group's guard in force.
    let _a = AppGuard::new(&env.url, &env.token, &app);
    common::pic_as(&env)
        .args(["apps", "create", &app, "--group", &group])
        .assert()
        .success();
    fs::write(
        dir.path().join("scripts/guard_permissive.rhai"),
        PERMISSIVE_GUARD,
    )
    .unwrap();
    fs::write(dir.path().join("scripts/writer.rhai"), WRITER).unwrap();
    fs::write(
        dir.path().join("app.toml"),
        format!(
            "[app]\nslug = \"{app}\"\nname = \"SealApp\"\n\n\
             [[scripts]]\nname = \"guard\"\nfile = \"scripts/guard_permissive.rhai\"\n\n\
             [[scripts]]\nname = \"writer\"\nfile = \"scripts/writer.rhai\"\n"
        ),
    )
    .unwrap();
    common::pic_as(&env)
        .args(["apply", "--file"])
        .arg(dir.path().join("app.toml"))
        .assert()
        .success();

    let body = invoke_body(&env, &app_script_id(&env, &app, "writer"));
    assert_eq!(
        body,
        serde_json::json!({ "denied": true }),
        "the group's guard is sealed — a same-named app script must NOT shadow it"
    );
}

/// Finding 1: a `(kv, set)` interceptor covers group SHARED-collection writes,
/// not just `kv::collection`. Otherwise `kv::shared_collection(...).set(...)`
/// would be a silent bypass of the guard.
#[ignore = "needs DATABASE_URL pointing at a running Postgres"]
#[test]
fn an_interceptor_guards_shared_collection_writes() {
    let Some(fx) = common::fixture_or_skip() else {
        return;
    };
    let env = common::admin_env(fx);
    let group = common::unique_slug("shc-grp");
    let app = common::unique_slug("shc-app");
    let _g = GroupGuard::new(&env.url, &env.token, &group);
    common::pic_as(&env)
        .args(["groups", "create", &group])
        .assert()
        .success();

    // The group owns a shared `catalog` collection, the guard, and the marker.
    let dir = manifest_dir();
    fs::write(dir.path().join("scripts/guard.rhai"), GUARD).unwrap();
    fs::write(
        dir.path().join("group.toml"),
        format!(
            "[group]\nslug = \"{group}\"\nname = \"Shc\"\n\ncollections = [\"catalog\"]\n\n\
             [[scripts]]\nname = \"guard\"\nfile = \"scripts/guard.rhai\"\n\n\
             [[interceptors]]\nscript = \"guard\"\nops = [\"set\"]\n"
        ),
    )
    .unwrap();
    common::pic_as(&env)
        .args(["apply", "--file"])
        .arg(dir.path().join("group.toml"))
        .assert()
        .success();

    let _a = AppGuard::new(&env.url, &env.token, &app);
    common::pic_as(&env)
        .args(["apps", "create", &app, "--group", &group])
        .assert()
        .success();
    fs::write(dir.path().join("scripts/shared_writer.rhai"), SHARED_WRITER).unwrap();
    fs::write(
        dir.path().join("app.toml"),
        format!(
            "[app]\nslug = \"{app}\"\nname = \"ShcApp\"\n\n\
             [[scripts]]\nname = \"shared_writer\"\nfile = \"scripts/shared_writer.rhai\"\n"
        ),
    )
    .unwrap();
    common::pic_as(&env)
        .args(["apply", "--file"])
        .arg(dir.path().join("app.toml"))
        .assert()
        .success();

    let body = invoke_body(&env, &app_script_id(&env, &app, "shared_writer"));
    assert_eq!(
        body,
        serde_json::json!({ "denied": true }),
        "the shared-collection write of `secret` must be denied by the interceptor"
    );
}

/// Finding 4: the verdict is fail-closed. An interceptor that returns a map with
/// no `allowed` key (a malformed verdict) DENIES the op — a guard must never
/// allow by omission.
#[ignore = "needs DATABASE_URL pointing at a running Postgres"]
#[test]
fn a_malformed_verdict_fails_closed() {
    let Some(fx) = common::fixture_or_skip() else {
        return;
    };
    let env = common::admin_env(fx);
    let app = common::unique_slug("fc-app");
    let _a = AppGuard::new(&env.url, &env.token, &app);
    common::pic_as(&env)
        .args(["apps", "create", &app])
        .assert()
        .success();

    let dir = manifest_dir();
    fs::write(dir.path().join("scripts/guard.rhai"), NO_VERDICT_GUARD).unwrap();
    fs::write(dir.path().join("scripts/writer.rhai"), ANY_WRITER).unwrap();
    fs::write(
        dir.path().join("picloud.toml"),
        format!(
            "[app]\nslug = \"{app}\"\nname = \"FC\"\n\n\
             [[scripts]]\nname = \"guard\"\nfile = \"scripts/guard.rhai\"\n\n\
             [[scripts]]\nname = \"writer\"\nfile = \"scripts/writer.rhai\"\n\n\
             [[interceptors]]\nscript = \"guard\"\nops = [\"set\"]\n"
        ),
    )
    .unwrap();
    common::pic_as(&env)
        .args(["apply", "--file"])
        .arg(dir.path().join("picloud.toml"))
        .assert()
        .success();

    let body = invoke_body(&env, &app_script_id(&env, &app, "writer"));
    assert_eq!(
        body,
        serde_json::json!({ "denied": true }),
        "a verdict map with no `allowed` key must fail closed (deny)"
    );
}