Findings from a 3-lens end-to-end review (correctness, security, tests).
Security review came back clean (cross-repo authz sound, isolation intact,
M5 gate sound modulo the documented manifest-trust boundary). No behavior
changes here — only accuracy + coverage:
- apply_service Phase B2: correct the descendant-expansion comment. The chain
is COMMITTED ancestry (ancestors() reads the pool), so a reparent in the same
apply takes effect next apply — same "one more apply" shape the in-tree path
and group-create reparenting already have. Authz stays sound: the gate and the
expansion consume the SAME chain (checked == written).
- doc §4.5: document the two known "one more apply / no data risk" limitations
— reparent-in-same-apply template resolution, and the `{env}` source split
(declared apps use --env; cross-repo descendants use apps.environment).
- approval journey: give the app real (`[vars]`) content so the editor member's
AppVarsWrite is actually exercised — the admin-gate test now proves approval
is ABOVE editor-write, not just "any non-admin is refused". (Vars cascade with
the app; scripts are ON DELETE RESTRICT and would break AppGuard teardown.)
- templates journey: assert descendant expansions are idempotent (stable row
ids on re-apply — no churn), matching the in-tree guarantee.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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