An app's OWN store had no ceiling of any kind — only the group-SHARED
collections did, which is the inversion of what you'd expect. And
`authz::script_gate` returns `Ok(())` when there is no principal, so a
PUBLIC UNAUTHENTICATED route could reach `files::collection(..).create(..)`
and write blobs in a loop until the disk filled. `PICLOUD_FILES_MAX_FILE_SIZE_BYTES`
caps ONE file at 100 MB; nothing capped the count. Same for KV keys and docs
against Postgres.
Ceilings: `PICLOUD_APP_KV_MAX_ROWS` / `PICLOUD_APP_DOCS_MAX_ROWS` (100k) and
`PICLOUD_APP_FILES_MAX_TOTAL_BYTES` (10 GiB).
They are enforced DIFFERENTLY from the group ones, on purpose — porting the
group design as-is would have been a serious regression:
* KV/docs check a ROW count, on INSERT only, with NO lock. `kv::set` is the
hottest write path in the system; taking a per-app advisory lock on every
set would serialize an app's entire data plane, and a `SUM(...)` scan would
make write cost grow with the app's stored size. What the lock buys is
small — unlocked overshoot is bounded by write concurrency (32) against a
ceiling of 100k, ~0.03%. These are anti-DoS rails, not billing. An update
adds no row and is bounded by the per-value cap, so it pays nothing at all.
* No per-app BYTE ceiling for KV/docs: every value is already capped at
`PICLOUD_KV_MAX_VALUE_BYTES`, so `max_rows x max_value_bytes` is ALREADY a
finite bound. A second scan would buy nothing.
* FILES are the exception and DO lock + sum: one blob may be 100 MB, so 32
racing uploads could overshoot by gigabytes of real disk, and a file write
is heavy enough that the lock and the SUM are lost in the noise. Checked on
create AND update — an update that skipped the ceiling would be a free
bypass (the same bug just fixed for group files: grow a 1-byte file to
100 MB, repeat).
`group_quota` is renamed `quota`: it now serves both owners, and the module
doc is where the two enforcement strategies are contrasted.
Pinned by tests/atomic_write.rs: the key ceiling refuses a new key while
still allowing an update at the ceiling (rejecting updates would brick an app
the moment it filled up — worse than the DoS the rail exists to stop), and 10
concurrent uploads cannot exceed the disk ceiling, nor can an update grow past it.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
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