Files
PiCloud/crates/manager-core/src/files_repo.rs
MechaCat02 fa79b4ee45 fix(files): check the quota BEFORE the destructive blob write
Self-review of this branch caught a data-loss bug I introduced with the
per-app / group files ceilings: the quota check ran AFTER the blob write.

`write_atomic_at` renames the new bytes over the FINAL path, so by the time
the ceiling refused an update the previous bytes were already gone. The
per-app path then unlinked the blob (row survives, file destroyed — every
read 404s); the group path left the new bytes in place under the old row's
checksum (every read fails `Corrupted`). Either way a user permanently lost
a file merely by exceeding a quota — a strictly worse outcome than the
unchecked-update bypass the ceiling was added to close.

The check now precedes the write on create AND update, per-app and group. As
a bonus this stops an over-quota caller driving unbounded write+unlink disk
churn: the ceiling now bounds I/O, not just stored bytes. The blob still goes
down inside the transaction, under the advisory lock, so a rollback unlinks
it and nothing can reference it in between.

The original test passed against the bug: it asserted the refused update did
not change the stored byte TOTAL — true, while the blob was already
destroyed. The regression test now reads the file back through the
checksum-verifying `FsFilesRepo::get`, and was confirmed to fail with
`Corrupted` against the old ordering.

Also in the KV writer (same file): drop the redundant pre-read on the hottest
write path. `set`/`set_if` did a SELECT purely to learn whether the write
would add a row, when the upsert already returns the previous value. Check
after the insert instead (`>` not `>=`) and let the transaction roll back on
refusal — identical outcome, one round-trip fewer, and an update pays nothing
at all. `kv_repo::get_on` and `FsFilesRepo::final_path` are now unused and
deleted; `FilesRepo::delete` delegates to the `delete_meta_on` + `unlink_blob`
helpers rather than re-implementing them.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-14 21:11:49 +02:00

950 lines
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//! `FilesRepo` — the metadata row (Postgres) + blob bytes (filesystem)
//! storage layer for the v1.1.5 `files::*` SDK.
//!
//! Unlike KV/docs, this repo owns BOTH halves of a file: the `files`
//! row (metadata + SHA-256 checksum) and the bytes on disk at
//! `<root>/files/<app_id>/<collection>/<id[0:2]>/<id>`.
//! It owns both because the write must be atomic across them — a crash
//! mid-write must never leave a readable half-written file.
//!
//! ## Atomic write protocol (`create` / `update`)
//! 1. Validate (collection path-safety; caps live one layer up).
//! 2. `create_dir_all` the shard dir with `0o700`.
//! 3. SHA-256 the in-memory bytes (single pass) while writing to
//! `<final>.tmp.<unique>`.
//! 4. `fsync` the temp file.
//! 5. `rename` temp → final (atomic on POSIX).
//! 6. `fsync` the parent dir (so the rename is durable).
//! 7. INSERT / UPDATE the DB row.
//!
//! A crash between 15 leaves an orphan `*.tmp.*` (never read). A crash
//! between 57 leaves a file with no row — never reachable via the SDK
//! (reads start from the row). Both are reclaimed by a future orphan
//! sweep (deferred to v1.1.6+; see HANDBACK §7).
//!
//! ## Atomic delete protocol
//! 1. SELECT + DELETE the row inside one transaction; commit.
//! 2. `unlink` the file (outside the tx). A failure here leaves an
//! orphan; a failure before the commit changes nothing.
//!
//! ## Checksum-on-read
//! `get` reads the file, hashes it, and compares against the stored
//! checksum — returning `FilesError::Corrupted` (and logging the path
//! at error level) on a mismatch. It never auto-deletes; the operator
//! decides what to do with a metadata-vs-bytes divergence.
use std::env;
use std::path::{Path, PathBuf};
use std::sync::atomic::{AtomicU64, Ordering};
use async_trait::async_trait;
use base64::engine::general_purpose::URL_SAFE_NO_PAD;
use base64::Engine as _;
use chrono::{DateTime, Utc};
use picloud_shared::{AppId, FileMeta, FileUpdate, FilesListPage, NewFile};
use sha2::{Digest, Sha256};
use sqlx::PgPool;
use uuid::Uuid;
/// 100 MB default per-file cap.
pub const DEFAULT_MAX_FILE_SIZE_BYTES: usize = 100 * 1024 * 1024;
/// Default filesystem root (relative to the process CWD).
pub const DEFAULT_FILES_ROOT: &str = "./data";
const FILES_LIST_MAX_LIMIT: u32 = 1_000;
const FILES_LIST_DEFAULT_LIMIT: u32 = 100;
/// Monotonic counter feeding unique temp-file suffixes (combined with
/// the pid). Avoids `rand` in the storage layer per the brief.
static TMP_COUNTER: AtomicU64 = AtomicU64::new(0);
#[derive(Debug, thiserror::Error)]
pub enum FilesRepoError {
#[error("database error: {0}")]
Db(#[from] sqlx::Error),
#[error("filesystem error: {0}")]
Io(String),
#[error("invalid collection name: {0}")]
InvalidCollection(String),
/// The bytes on disk no longer match the stored checksum (or are
/// missing entirely while the row persists).
#[error("file content corrupted (checksum mismatch)")]
Corrupted,
#[error("invalid pagination cursor")]
InvalidCursor,
}
/// Outbound-files tunables. Env-overridable following the same pattern
/// as `HttpConfig::from_env`.
#[derive(Debug, Clone)]
pub struct FilesConfig {
pub root: PathBuf,
pub max_file_size_bytes: usize,
}
impl FilesConfig {
#[must_use]
pub fn conservative() -> Self {
Self {
root: PathBuf::from(DEFAULT_FILES_ROOT),
max_file_size_bytes: DEFAULT_MAX_FILE_SIZE_BYTES,
}
}
#[must_use]
pub fn from_env() -> Self {
let mut c = Self::conservative();
if let Ok(v) = env::var("PICLOUD_FILES_ROOT") {
if !v.trim().is_empty() {
c.root = PathBuf::from(v);
}
}
if let Ok(v) = env::var("PICLOUD_FILES_MAX_FILE_SIZE_BYTES") {
match v.parse::<usize>() {
Ok(n) => c.max_file_size_bytes = n,
Err(e) => {
tracing::warn!(error = %e, "ignoring invalid PICLOUD_FILES_MAX_FILE_SIZE_BYTES");
}
}
}
c
}
}
impl Default for FilesConfig {
fn default() -> Self {
Self::conservative()
}
}
/// The new+prior metadata returned from a successful `update`, so the
/// service can emit a `ServiceEvent` with the change-data-capture
/// surface (`old_payload`).
#[derive(Debug, Clone)]
pub struct FileUpdated {
pub new: FileMeta,
pub prev: FileMeta,
}
#[async_trait]
pub trait FilesRepo: Send + Sync {
async fn create(
&self,
app_id: AppId,
collection: &str,
new: NewFile,
) -> Result<FileMeta, FilesRepoError>;
async fn head(
&self,
app_id: AppId,
collection: &str,
id: Uuid,
) -> Result<Option<FileMeta>, FilesRepoError>;
/// Reads + checksum-verifies the bytes. `Ok(None)` when no row
/// exists; `Err(Corrupted)` when the row exists but the bytes are
/// missing or mismatched.
async fn get(
&self,
app_id: AppId,
collection: &str,
id: Uuid,
) -> Result<Option<Vec<u8>>, FilesRepoError>;
/// `Ok(None)` when no row exists (the SDK turns this into
/// `FilesError::NotFound`).
async fn update(
&self,
app_id: AppId,
collection: &str,
id: Uuid,
upd: FileUpdate,
) -> Result<Option<FileUpdated>, FilesRepoError>;
/// Returns the deleted row's metadata if present, `None` otherwise.
async fn delete(
&self,
app_id: AppId,
collection: &str,
id: Uuid,
) -> Result<Option<FileMeta>, FilesRepoError>;
async fn list(
&self,
app_id: AppId,
collection: &str,
cursor: Option<&str>,
limit: u32,
) -> Result<FilesListPage, FilesRepoError>;
}
/// Filesystem-bytes + Postgres-metadata repo.
pub struct FsFilesRepo {
pool: PgPool,
config: FilesConfig,
}
impl FsFilesRepo {
#[must_use]
pub fn new(pool: PgPool, config: FilesConfig) -> Self {
Self { pool, config }
}
/// Defensive path-component guard. The service already validates the
/// collection at the SDK boundary; this is belt-and-suspenders so a
/// future caller can't smuggle a traversal sequence onto disk.
fn guard_collection(collection: &str) -> Result<(), FilesRepoError> {
if collection.is_empty()
|| collection.contains('/')
|| collection.contains('\\')
|| collection.contains("..")
|| collection.contains('\0')
{
return Err(FilesRepoError::InvalidCollection(collection.to_string()));
}
Ok(())
}
fn write_atomic(
&self,
app_id: AppId,
collection: &str,
id: Uuid,
bytes: &[u8],
) -> Result<String, FilesRepoError> {
write_atomic_at(
&self.config.root,
&app_owner_dir(app_id),
collection,
id,
bytes,
)
}
}
/// The owner-relative subdirectory of an **app**'s blobs under `<root>/files/`:
/// just `<app_id>`. Group-shared blobs (§11.6) shard at `groups/<group_id>`
/// instead (see `group_files_repo::group_owner_dir`) — a disjoint subtree under
/// the same `files/` base, so the orphan sweeper covers both with one walk.
pub(crate) fn app_owner_dir(app_id: AppId) -> PathBuf {
PathBuf::from(app_id.into_inner().to_string())
}
/// `<root>/files/<owner_rel>/<collection>/<id[0:2]>/`. `owner_rel` is built
/// by the caller from a server-generated id (`<app_id>` or `groups/<group_id>`)
/// — never user input — and `collection` is path-guarded one layer up, so no
/// component can escape the `files/` base.
pub(crate) fn shard_dir_at(
root: &Path,
owner_rel: &Path,
collection: &str,
id_str: &str,
) -> PathBuf {
root.join("files")
.join(owner_rel)
.join(collection)
.join(&id_str[..2])
}
pub(crate) fn final_path_at(root: &Path, owner_rel: &Path, collection: &str, id: Uuid) -> PathBuf {
let id_str = id.to_string();
shard_dir_at(root, owner_rel, collection, &id_str).join(&id_str)
}
/// Steps 26 of the atomic-write protocol. Returns the lowercase hex
/// SHA-256 of the bytes (computed in a single pass over the in-memory
/// buffer — the file is never re-read). `pub(crate)` + owner-relative so the
/// app and group-shared (§11.6) repos share this single source for the
/// security-sensitive write+checksum mechanics, unit-testable without a pool.
pub(crate) fn write_atomic_at(
root: &Path,
owner_rel: &Path,
collection: &str,
id: Uuid,
bytes: &[u8],
) -> Result<String, FilesRepoError> {
use std::io::Write as _;
let id_str = id.to_string();
let dir = shard_dir_at(root, owner_rel, collection, &id_str);
create_dir_all_secure(&dir)?;
// Single-pass checksum over the in-memory buffer.
let mut hasher = Sha256::new();
hasher.update(bytes);
let checksum = hex_lower(&hasher.finalize());
let seq = TMP_COUNTER.fetch_add(1, Ordering::Relaxed);
let tmp = dir.join(format!("{id_str}.tmp.{}-{seq}", std::process::id()));
let final_path = dir.join(&id_str);
{
let mut f = std::fs::File::create(&tmp).map_err(io_err)?;
f.write_all(bytes).map_err(io_err)?;
f.sync_all().map_err(io_err)?; // fsync temp
}
std::fs::rename(&tmp, &final_path).map_err(io_err)?; // atomic
// fsync the parent dir so the rename is durable.
if let Ok(dirf) = std::fs::File::open(&dir) {
let _ = dirf.sync_all();
}
Ok(checksum)
}
/// Read + checksum-verify the bytes at the given path-set. Free
/// function mirror of the `get` read path. Returns `Corrupted` when the
/// bytes are missing or don't match `expected_checksum`. `pub(crate)` +
/// owner-relative — shared with the group-files (§11.6) repo.
pub(crate) fn read_verify_at(
root: &Path,
owner_rel: &Path,
collection: &str,
id: Uuid,
expected_checksum: &str,
) -> Result<Vec<u8>, FilesRepoError> {
let path = final_path_at(root, owner_rel, collection, id);
let bytes = match std::fs::read(&path) {
Ok(b) => b,
Err(e) => {
tracing::error!(
path = %path.display(), error = %e,
"files: row exists but bytes are unreadable — treating as corrupted"
);
return Err(FilesRepoError::Corrupted);
}
};
let mut hasher = Sha256::new();
hasher.update(&bytes);
let actual = hex_lower(&hasher.finalize());
if actual != expected_checksum {
tracing::error!(
path = %path.display(), expected = %expected_checksum, actual = %actual,
"files: checksum mismatch on read — content corrupted"
);
return Err(FilesRepoError::Corrupted);
}
Ok(bytes)
}
#[async_trait]
impl FilesRepo for FsFilesRepo {
async fn create(
&self,
app_id: AppId,
collection: &str,
new: NewFile,
) -> Result<FileMeta, FilesRepoError> {
Self::guard_collection(collection)?;
let id = Uuid::new_v4();
let size = i64::try_from(new.data.len()).unwrap_or(i64::MAX);
let checksum = self.write_atomic(app_id, collection, id, &new.data)?;
let row: FileRow = sqlx::query_as(
"INSERT INTO files \
(app_id, collection, id, name, content_type, size_bytes, checksum_sha256) \
VALUES ($1, $2, $3, $4, $5, $6, $7) \
RETURNING id, collection, name, content_type, size_bytes, \
checksum_sha256, created_at, updated_at",
)
.bind(app_id.into_inner())
.bind(collection)
.bind(id)
.bind(&new.name)
.bind(&new.content_type)
.bind(size)
.bind(&checksum)
.fetch_one(&self.pool)
.await?;
Ok(row.into_meta())
}
async fn head(
&self,
app_id: AppId,
collection: &str,
id: Uuid,
) -> Result<Option<FileMeta>, FilesRepoError> {
Self::guard_collection(collection)?;
let row: Option<FileRow> = sqlx::query_as(
"SELECT id, collection, name, content_type, size_bytes, \
checksum_sha256, created_at, updated_at \
FROM files WHERE app_id = $1 AND collection = $2 AND id = $3",
)
.bind(app_id.into_inner())
.bind(collection)
.bind(id)
.fetch_optional(&self.pool)
.await?;
Ok(row.map(FileRow::into_meta))
}
async fn get(
&self,
app_id: AppId,
collection: &str,
id: Uuid,
) -> Result<Option<Vec<u8>>, FilesRepoError> {
Self::guard_collection(collection)?;
let row: Option<(String,)> = sqlx::query_as(
"SELECT checksum_sha256 FROM files \
WHERE app_id = $1 AND collection = $2 AND id = $3",
)
.bind(app_id.into_inner())
.bind(collection)
.bind(id)
.fetch_optional(&self.pool)
.await?;
let Some((stored_checksum,)) = row else {
return Ok(None);
};
let bytes = read_verify_at(
&self.config.root,
&app_owner_dir(app_id),
collection,
id,
&stored_checksum,
)?;
Ok(Some(bytes))
}
async fn update(
&self,
app_id: AppId,
collection: &str,
id: Uuid,
upd: FileUpdate,
) -> Result<Option<FileUpdated>, FilesRepoError> {
Self::guard_collection(collection)?;
// Read the prior row first (existence check + CDC surface).
let Some(prev) = self.head(app_id, collection, id).await? else {
return Ok(None);
};
let size = i64::try_from(upd.data.len()).unwrap_or(i64::MAX);
let checksum = self.write_atomic(app_id, collection, id, &upd.data)?;
let row: FileRow = sqlx::query_as(
"UPDATE files SET \
name = COALESCE($4, name), \
content_type = COALESCE($5, content_type), \
size_bytes = $6, \
checksum_sha256 = $7, \
updated_at = NOW() \
WHERE app_id = $1 AND collection = $2 AND id = $3 \
RETURNING id, collection, name, content_type, size_bytes, \
checksum_sha256, created_at, updated_at",
)
.bind(app_id.into_inner())
.bind(collection)
.bind(id)
.bind(upd.name.as_deref())
.bind(upd.content_type.as_deref())
.bind(size)
.bind(&checksum)
.fetch_one(&self.pool)
.await?;
Ok(Some(FileUpdated {
new: row.into_meta(),
prev,
}))
}
async fn delete(
&self,
app_id: AppId,
collection: &str,
id: Uuid,
) -> Result<Option<FileMeta>, FilesRepoError> {
Self::guard_collection(collection)?;
// `DELETE ... RETURNING` is one statement, so the old SELECT-FOR-UPDATE
// + DELETE pair is unnecessary. Unlink only AFTER the row is gone: the
// reverse order would destroy the bytes of a row that a failure keeps.
let meta = delete_meta_on(&self.pool, app_id, collection, id).await?;
if meta.is_some() {
unlink_blob(&self.config.root, &app_owner_dir(app_id), collection, id);
}
Ok(meta)
}
async fn list(
&self,
app_id: AppId,
collection: &str,
cursor: Option<&str>,
limit: u32,
) -> Result<FilesListPage, FilesRepoError> {
Self::guard_collection(collection)?;
let limit = if limit == 0 {
FILES_LIST_DEFAULT_LIMIT
} else {
limit.min(FILES_LIST_MAX_LIMIT)
};
let last_id = match cursor {
Some(c) => Some(decode_cursor(c)?),
None => None,
};
let take = i64::from(limit) + 1;
let rows: Vec<FileRow> = sqlx::query_as(
"SELECT id, collection, name, content_type, size_bytes, \
checksum_sha256, created_at, updated_at \
FROM files \
WHERE app_id = $1 AND collection = $2 \
AND ($3::uuid IS NULL OR id > $3) \
ORDER BY id ASC \
LIMIT $4",
)
.bind(app_id.into_inner())
.bind(collection)
.bind(last_id)
.bind(take)
.fetch_all(&self.pool)
.await?;
let mut files: Vec<FileMeta> = rows.into_iter().map(FileRow::into_meta).collect();
let next_cursor = if files.len() > limit as usize {
files.truncate(limit as usize);
files.last().map(|m| encode_cursor(m.id))
} else {
None
};
Ok(FilesListPage { files, next_cursor })
}
}
// ----------------------------------------------------------------------------
// Helpers
// ----------------------------------------------------------------------------
fn io_err(e: std::io::Error) -> FilesRepoError {
FilesRepoError::Io(e.to_string())
}
/// `create_dir_all` with `0o700` on the created tree (Unix). On other
/// platforms it falls back to the default permissions.
fn create_dir_all_secure(dir: &Path) -> Result<(), FilesRepoError> {
#[cfg(unix)]
{
use std::os::unix::fs::DirBuilderExt as _;
std::fs::DirBuilder::new()
.recursive(true)
.mode(0o700)
.create(dir)
.map_err(io_err)
}
#[cfg(not(unix))]
{
std::fs::create_dir_all(dir).map_err(io_err)
}
}
fn hex_lower(bytes: &[u8]) -> String {
let mut s = String::with_capacity(bytes.len() * 2);
for b in bytes {
use std::fmt::Write as _;
let _ = write!(s, "{b:02x}");
}
s
}
pub(crate) fn encode_cursor(last_id: Uuid) -> String {
URL_SAFE_NO_PAD.encode(last_id.to_string().as_bytes())
}
pub(crate) fn decode_cursor(cursor: &str) -> Result<Uuid, FilesRepoError> {
let bytes = URL_SAFE_NO_PAD
.decode(cursor)
.map_err(|_| FilesRepoError::InvalidCursor)?;
let s = String::from_utf8(bytes).map_err(|_| FilesRepoError::InvalidCursor)?;
Uuid::parse_str(&s).map_err(|_| FilesRepoError::InvalidCursor)
}
#[derive(sqlx::FromRow)]
pub(crate) struct FileRow {
id: Uuid,
collection: String,
name: String,
content_type: String,
size_bytes: i64,
checksum_sha256: String,
created_at: DateTime<Utc>,
updated_at: DateTime<Utc>,
}
impl FileRow {
pub(crate) fn into_meta(self) -> FileMeta {
FileMeta {
id: self.id,
collection: self.collection,
name: self.name,
content_type: self.content_type,
size: u64::try_from(self.size_bytes).unwrap_or(0),
checksum: self.checksum_sha256,
created_at: self.created_at,
updated_at: self.updated_at,
}
}
}
// ----------------------------------------------------------------------------
// Connection-scoped metadata operations
//
// The BYTES are written to disk outside any transaction (they are not
// transactional and cannot be). What these give `crate::atomic_write` is a way
// to commit the metadata row and the trigger fan-out it produces TOGETHER, so a
// committed file row always has its event enqueued.
//
// A rollback after the bytes are on disk leaves an orphan blob. That hazard is
// not new — the pre-existing repo already wrote the blob, then inserted the row
// in a separate statement that could fail — and the writer now explicitly
// unlinks the blob on the rollback path, so the window is strictly smaller than
// it was.
// ----------------------------------------------------------------------------
/// The four metadata columns a blob write sets. Bundled so the `*_meta_on`
/// helpers take a target (owner, collection, id) plus one payload, rather than a
/// long positional tail it would be easy to transpose.
#[derive(Clone, Copy)]
pub(crate) struct MetaFields<'a> {
pub name: &'a str,
pub content_type: &'a str,
pub size: i64,
pub checksum: &'a str,
}
/// The same, for an update: `name`/`content_type` are `None` to keep the stored
/// value (`COALESCE`), while the bytes always change.
#[derive(Clone, Copy)]
pub(crate) struct MetaPatch<'a> {
pub name: Option<&'a str>,
pub content_type: Option<&'a str>,
pub size: i64,
pub checksum: &'a str,
}
const FILE_COLS: &str = "id, collection, name, content_type, size_bytes, \
checksum_sha256, created_at, updated_at";
pub(crate) async fn head_on<'c, E>(
exec: E,
app_id: AppId,
collection: &str,
id: Uuid,
) -> Result<Option<FileMeta>, FilesRepoError>
where
E: sqlx::PgExecutor<'c>,
{
let row: Option<FileRow> = sqlx::query_as(&format!(
"SELECT {FILE_COLS} FROM files \
WHERE app_id = $1 AND collection = $2 AND id = $3"
))
.bind(app_id.into_inner())
.bind(collection)
.bind(id)
.fetch_optional(exec)
.await?;
Ok(row.map(FileRow::into_meta))
}
pub(crate) async fn insert_meta_on<'c, E>(
exec: E,
app_id: AppId,
collection: &str,
id: Uuid,
meta: MetaFields<'_>,
) -> Result<FileMeta, FilesRepoError>
where
E: sqlx::PgExecutor<'c>,
{
let row: FileRow = sqlx::query_as(&format!(
"INSERT INTO files \
(app_id, collection, id, name, content_type, size_bytes, checksum_sha256) \
VALUES ($1, $2, $3, $4, $5, $6, $7) \
RETURNING {FILE_COLS}"
))
.bind(app_id.into_inner())
.bind(collection)
.bind(id)
.bind(meta.name)
.bind(meta.content_type)
.bind(meta.size)
.bind(meta.checksum)
.fetch_one(exec)
.await?;
Ok(row.into_meta())
}
/// `None` when the file row is gone (the caller maps that to `NotFound`).
pub(crate) async fn update_meta_on<'c, E>(
exec: E,
app_id: AppId,
collection: &str,
id: Uuid,
meta: MetaPatch<'_>,
) -> Result<Option<FileMeta>, FilesRepoError>
where
E: sqlx::PgExecutor<'c>,
{
let row: Option<FileRow> = sqlx::query_as(&format!(
"UPDATE files SET \
name = COALESCE($4, name), \
content_type = COALESCE($5, content_type), \
size_bytes = $6, \
checksum_sha256 = $7, \
updated_at = NOW() \
WHERE app_id = $1 AND collection = $2 AND id = $3 \
RETURNING {FILE_COLS}"
))
.bind(app_id.into_inner())
.bind(collection)
.bind(id)
.bind(meta.name)
.bind(meta.content_type)
.bind(meta.size)
.bind(meta.checksum)
.fetch_optional(exec)
.await?;
Ok(row.map(FileRow::into_meta))
}
/// `DELETE ... RETURNING` — one statement, so no `SELECT ... FOR UPDATE` dance.
/// The caller unlinks the bytes AFTER the transaction commits: unlinking first
/// would destroy the blob of a row that a rollback then keeps.
pub(crate) async fn delete_meta_on<'c, E>(
exec: E,
app_id: AppId,
collection: &str,
id: Uuid,
) -> Result<Option<FileMeta>, FilesRepoError>
where
E: sqlx::PgExecutor<'c>,
{
let row: Option<FileRow> = sqlx::query_as(&format!(
"DELETE FROM files \
WHERE app_id = $1 AND collection = $2 AND id = $3 \
RETURNING {FILE_COLS}"
))
.bind(app_id.into_inner())
.bind(collection)
.bind(id)
.fetch_optional(exec)
.await?;
Ok(row.map(FileRow::into_meta))
}
/// Best-effort unlink of a blob whose metadata write was rolled back (or whose
/// row was just deleted). A failure leaves an orphan — logged, never fatal.
pub(crate) fn unlink_blob(root: &Path, owner_rel: &Path, collection: &str, id: Uuid) {
let path = final_path_at(root, owner_rel, collection, id);
if let Err(e) = std::fs::remove_file(&path) {
if e.kind() != std::io::ErrorKind::NotFound {
tracing::warn!(
path = %path.display(), error = %e,
"files: unlink failed (orphan blob left on disk)"
);
}
}
}
/// The PROJECTED total stored bytes for the app AFTER this write — the current
/// SUM, minus the bytes of the file being replaced (`replacing = Some(id)` on
/// update, `None` on create), plus the incoming blob's. Backs the per-app disk
/// ceiling; the subtraction is what lets an update near the cap still go through.
pub(crate) async fn projected_total_bytes_on<'c, E>(
exec: E,
app_id: AppId,
replacing: Option<Uuid>,
incoming: i64,
) -> Result<u64, FilesRepoError>
where
E: sqlx::PgExecutor<'c>,
{
let (n,): (i64,) = sqlx::query_as(
"SELECT ( \
COALESCE((SELECT SUM(size_bytes) FROM files WHERE app_id = $1), 0) \
- COALESCE((SELECT size_bytes FROM files WHERE app_id = $1 AND id = $2), 0) \
+ $3 \
)::BIGINT",
)
.bind(app_id.into_inner())
.bind(replacing)
.bind(incoming)
.fetch_one(exec)
.await?;
Ok(u64::try_from(n).unwrap_or(0))
}
#[cfg(test)]
mod tests {
use super::*;
#[test]
fn hex_lower_matches_known_sha256_vector() {
// SHA-256("abc") — NIST known-answer vector.
let mut h = Sha256::new();
h.update(b"abc");
assert_eq!(
hex_lower(&h.finalize()),
"ba7816bf8f01cfea414140de5dae2223b00361a396177a9cb410ff61f20015ad"
);
}
#[test]
fn hex_lower_of_empty_is_known_vector() {
let mut h = Sha256::new();
h.update(b"");
assert_eq!(
hex_lower(&h.finalize()),
"e3b0c44298fc1c149afbf4c8996fb92427ae41e4649b934ca495991b7852b855"
);
}
#[test]
fn cursor_round_trips() {
let id = Uuid::new_v4();
let enc = encode_cursor(id);
assert_eq!(decode_cursor(&enc).unwrap(), id);
assert!(matches!(
decode_cursor("!!not-base64!!"),
Err(FilesRepoError::InvalidCursor)
));
}
#[test]
fn guard_collection_rejects_traversal() {
assert!(FsFilesRepo::guard_collection("avatars").is_ok());
assert!(FsFilesRepo::guard_collection("a/b").is_err());
assert!(FsFilesRepo::guard_collection("..").is_err());
assert!(FsFilesRepo::guard_collection("a..b").is_err());
assert!(FsFilesRepo::guard_collection("").is_err());
assert!(FsFilesRepo::guard_collection("a\0b").is_err());
}
#[test]
fn config_from_env_defaults_are_conservative() {
let c = FilesConfig::conservative();
assert_eq!(c.max_file_size_bytes, DEFAULT_MAX_FILE_SIZE_BYTES);
assert_eq!(c.root, PathBuf::from(DEFAULT_FILES_ROOT));
}
// ------------------------------------------------------------------
// Tempdir-backed filesystem mechanics — exercise the atomic write,
// single-pass checksum, and checksum-on-read tamper detection
// without needing a Postgres pool.
// ------------------------------------------------------------------
use picloud_shared::AppId;
/// Process-unique scratch dir under the system temp dir. Cleaned up
/// by each test via `remove_dir_all`.
fn unique_tmp_root() -> PathBuf {
let seq = TMP_COUNTER.fetch_add(1, Ordering::Relaxed);
let dir =
std::env::temp_dir().join(format!("picloud-files-test-{}-{seq}", std::process::id()));
std::fs::create_dir_all(&dir).unwrap();
dir
}
#[test]
fn write_atomic_then_read_verify_round_trips() {
let root = unique_tmp_root();
let app = AppId::new();
let id = Uuid::new_v4();
let bytes = b"hello picloud files".to_vec();
let checksum = write_atomic_at(&root, &app_owner_dir(app), "avatars", id, &bytes).unwrap();
// Single-pass checksum matches an independent hash of the bytes.
let mut h = Sha256::new();
h.update(&bytes);
assert_eq!(checksum, hex_lower(&h.finalize()));
let read = read_verify_at(&root, &app_owner_dir(app), "avatars", id, &checksum).unwrap();
assert_eq!(read, bytes);
std::fs::remove_dir_all(&root).ok();
}
#[test]
fn read_verify_detects_tampering_as_corrupted() {
let root = unique_tmp_root();
let app = AppId::new();
let id = Uuid::new_v4();
let checksum = write_atomic_at(&root, &app_owner_dir(app), "c", id, b"original").unwrap();
// Mutate the bytes behind the repo's back.
let path = final_path_at(&root, &app_owner_dir(app), "c", id);
std::fs::write(&path, b"tampered").unwrap();
let err = read_verify_at(&root, &app_owner_dir(app), "c", id, &checksum).unwrap_err();
assert!(matches!(err, FilesRepoError::Corrupted));
std::fs::remove_dir_all(&root).ok();
}
#[test]
fn read_verify_missing_bytes_is_corrupted() {
let root = unique_tmp_root();
let app = AppId::new();
let id = Uuid::new_v4();
// No write — the file never existed.
let err = read_verify_at(&root, &app_owner_dir(app), "c", id, "deadbeef").unwrap_err();
assert!(matches!(err, FilesRepoError::Corrupted));
std::fs::remove_dir_all(&root).ok();
}
#[test]
fn atomic_write_leaves_no_tmp_file_after_success() {
let root = unique_tmp_root();
let app = AppId::new();
let id = Uuid::new_v4();
write_atomic_at(&root, &app_owner_dir(app), "c", id, b"data").unwrap();
let id_str = id.to_string();
let dir = shard_dir_at(&root, &app_owner_dir(app), "c", &id_str);
let entries: Vec<_> = std::fs::read_dir(&dir)
.unwrap()
.filter_map(Result::ok)
.map(|e| e.file_name().to_string_lossy().into_owned())
.collect();
// Exactly the final file is visible — no `*.tmp.*` orphan.
assert_eq!(entries, vec![id_str]);
assert!(!entries.iter().any(|n| n.contains(".tmp.")));
std::fs::remove_dir_all(&root).ok();
}
#[test]
fn id_shard_uses_first_two_chars() {
let root = PathBuf::from("/tmp/x");
let app = AppId::new();
let id = Uuid::new_v4();
let id_str = id.to_string();
let path = final_path_at(&root, &app_owner_dir(app), "col", id);
let shard = &id_str[..2];
assert!(path
.to_string_lossy()
.contains(&format!("/col/{shard}/{id_str}")));
}
#[cfg(unix)]
#[test]
fn shard_tree_created_with_0700() {
use std::os::unix::fs::PermissionsExt as _;
let root = unique_tmp_root();
let app = AppId::new();
let id = Uuid::new_v4();
write_atomic_at(&root, &app_owner_dir(app), "c", id, b"data").unwrap();
let id_str = id.to_string();
let dir = shard_dir_at(&root, &app_owner_dir(app), "c", &id_str);
let mode = std::fs::metadata(&dir).unwrap().permissions().mode();
assert_eq!(mode & 0o777, 0o700, "shard dir should be 0o700");
std::fs::remove_dir_all(&root).ok();
}
}