Files
PiCloud/crates/manager-core/src/admin_session_repo.rs
MechaCat02 86448beb06 fix(security): server-authoritative approval gate + auth/session/file hardening
Remediate the HIGH and security-relevant findings from the 2026-07-11 audit.

H1 — the per-env approval gate is now server-authoritative. The governing
project is resolved from the target node's nearest-claimed ancestor
(`governing_env_policy`/`_tree` + `governing_project_id` +
`ProjectRepository::get_environments_by_id`), independent of the client-supplied
`[project]`. Omitting or spoofing the project block can no longer skip a gate the
owning project established; a to-create group resolves its declared parent's
chain so a fresh subtree node inherits the gate. Fails closed on any read error.

H2 — the API-key prefix slice (`&rest[..8]`) is now the boundary-safe
`rest.get(..8)`, so an attacker-supplied multibyte bearer can't panic the request
task (unauthenticated per-request DoS). Regression test added.

C1 — admin sessions gain an absolute lifetime cap (migration 0070,
`PICLOUD_SESSION_ABSOLUTE_TTL_HOURS`, default 30d): `lookup` filters it, `touch`
clamps the sliding bump to it, so a continuously-used or stolen-but-warm token
self-expires. Mirrors the data-plane app-user cap.

C2 — `Cache-Control: no-store` on the login and API-key-mint responses (the two
that return a raw credential), so a proxy/CDN/browser cache can't retain it.

B8 — file downloads are header-safe: `sanitize_stored_filename` guarantees a
valid `HeaderValue` (no panic on a control-char name) and BOTH the per-app and
group download paths now set attachment + `X-Content-Type-Options: nosniff` +
a restrictive CSP, closing a group-path stored-XSS gap.

Also folds in the server-side plan-warning plumbing (`plan_warnings`,
`PlanResult::warnings`) and the `app_only_reject` message helper that the CLI
plan-preview change builds on, plus operator security notes (reads-open shared-
topic SSE; the `--env` label is advisory, not a boundary).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-11 23:47:35 +02:00

163 lines
5.3 KiB
Rust

//! CRUD over the `admin_sessions` table.
//!
//! The token never appears in this module — only its SHA-256 hash. The
//! raw value lives in `auth::GeneratedToken` long enough to hit the
//! cookie and the JSON response, then is forgotten. Lookups also filter
//! expired rows at query time so a delayed prune sweep can never extend
//! a session's life.
use async_trait::async_trait;
use chrono::{DateTime, Utc};
use picloud_shared::AdminUserId;
use sqlx::PgPool;
#[derive(Debug, thiserror::Error)]
pub enum AdminSessionRepositoryError {
#[error("database error: {0}")]
Db(#[from] sqlx::Error),
}
/// Result of a session lookup. Includes the user id (for auth context),
/// the existing `expires_at` (so the middleware can decide whether the
/// sliding-window bump is worth a write), and the `absolute_expires_at`
/// hard cap the bump must clamp at (C1).
#[derive(Debug, Clone)]
pub struct AdminSessionLookup {
pub user_id: AdminUserId,
pub expires_at: DateTime<Utc>,
pub absolute_expires_at: DateTime<Utc>,
}
#[async_trait]
pub trait AdminSessionRepository: Send + Sync {
async fn create(
&self,
user_id: AdminUserId,
token_hash: &str,
expires_at: DateTime<Utc>,
absolute_expires_at: DateTime<Utc>,
) -> Result<(), AdminSessionRepositoryError>;
/// Look up a session by token hash. Returns `None` for missing or
/// already-expired rows — either the sliding `expires_at` OR the
/// absolute cap having passed (the query filters both).
async fn lookup(
&self,
token_hash: &str,
) -> Result<Option<AdminSessionLookup>, AdminSessionRepositoryError>;
/// Sliding-window bump. Sets `last_used_at = NOW()` and `expires_at`
/// to the supplied value.
async fn touch(
&self,
token_hash: &str,
new_expires_at: DateTime<Utc>,
) -> Result<(), AdminSessionRepositoryError>;
async fn delete(&self, token_hash: &str) -> Result<(), AdminSessionRepositoryError>;
/// Delete every session belonging to a user. Used when the user is
/// deactivated or has their password reset out-of-band — both
/// invalidate all current logins for that account.
async fn delete_for_user(
&self,
user_id: AdminUserId,
) -> Result<u64, AdminSessionRepositoryError>;
/// Sweep expired rows. The auth middleware filters expired rows on
/// lookup, so this is just bounded-growth hygiene, not correctness.
async fn prune_expired(&self) -> Result<u64, AdminSessionRepositoryError>;
}
pub struct PostgresAdminSessionRepository {
pool: PgPool,
}
impl PostgresAdminSessionRepository {
#[must_use]
pub fn new(pool: PgPool) -> Self {
Self { pool }
}
}
#[async_trait]
impl AdminSessionRepository for PostgresAdminSessionRepository {
async fn create(
&self,
user_id: AdminUserId,
token_hash: &str,
expires_at: DateTime<Utc>,
absolute_expires_at: DateTime<Utc>,
) -> Result<(), AdminSessionRepositoryError> {
sqlx::query(
"INSERT INTO admin_sessions (token_hash, user_id, expires_at, absolute_expires_at) \
VALUES ($1, $2, $3, $4)",
)
.bind(token_hash)
.bind(user_id.into_inner())
.bind(expires_at)
.bind(absolute_expires_at)
.execute(&self.pool)
.await?;
Ok(())
}
async fn lookup(
&self,
token_hash: &str,
) -> Result<Option<AdminSessionLookup>, AdminSessionRepositoryError> {
let row: Option<(uuid::Uuid, DateTime<Utc>, DateTime<Utc>)> = sqlx::query_as(
"SELECT user_id, expires_at, absolute_expires_at FROM admin_sessions \
WHERE token_hash = $1 AND expires_at > NOW() AND absolute_expires_at > NOW()",
)
.bind(token_hash)
.fetch_optional(&self.pool)
.await?;
Ok(row.map(|(uid, exp, abs)| AdminSessionLookup {
user_id: uid.into(),
expires_at: exp,
absolute_expires_at: abs,
}))
}
async fn touch(
&self,
token_hash: &str,
new_expires_at: DateTime<Utc>,
) -> Result<(), AdminSessionRepositoryError> {
sqlx::query(
"UPDATE admin_sessions SET last_used_at = NOW(), expires_at = $2 \
WHERE token_hash = $1",
)
.bind(token_hash)
.bind(new_expires_at)
.execute(&self.pool)
.await?;
Ok(())
}
async fn delete(&self, token_hash: &str) -> Result<(), AdminSessionRepositoryError> {
sqlx::query("DELETE FROM admin_sessions WHERE token_hash = $1")
.bind(token_hash)
.execute(&self.pool)
.await?;
Ok(())
}
async fn delete_for_user(
&self,
user_id: AdminUserId,
) -> Result<u64, AdminSessionRepositoryError> {
let res = sqlx::query("DELETE FROM admin_sessions WHERE user_id = $1")
.bind(user_id.into_inner())
.execute(&self.pool)
.await?;
Ok(res.rows_affected())
}
async fn prune_expired(&self) -> Result<u64, AdminSessionRepositoryError> {
let res = sqlx::query(
"DELETE FROM admin_sessions \
WHERE expires_at <= NOW() OR absolute_expires_at <= NOW()",
)
.execute(&self.pool)
.await?;
Ok(res.rows_affected())
}
}