Files
PiCloud/crates/shared/src/users.rs
MechaCat02 a91b134285 fix(review): harden the E2E-gap fixes after security/regression review
Addresses findings from an independent review of the gap-closing commits:

- R1 (regression): add #[serde(default)] to HttpDispatchPayload.method so
  async-HTTP outbox rows enqueued before the field existed still decode
  after upgrade instead of dead-lettering on "missing field `method`".
  Adds a regression test for the missing-key path.
- method case: uppercase ctx.request.method at the orchestrator boundary
  so it honors its documented "uppercased" contract for extension verbs.
  Route matching is already case-insensitive, so matching is unaffected.
- CLI hardening: percent-encode free-form path segments (app slug, topic
  name, ids, secret name) in the reqwest client so a value containing
  `/ ? #` can't break out of its URL segment. Adds a `seg()` helper +
  unit test and applies it uniformly across all path-interpolating
  methods (new and pre-existing).
- S1 (docs): correct the users::email_available enumeration framing — it
  adds no new vector vs. create's uniqueness error, but is cheaper and
  unthrottled; there is no built-in throttle/CAPTCHA primitive, so the
  honest mitigation is a kv-based counter. Updated SDK doc-comments,
  trait docs, and stdlib-reference.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-06-13 09:59:24 +02:00

561 lines
18 KiB
Rust

//! `UsersService` — the v1.1.8 data-plane user management contract.
//!
//! Scripts get `users::*` for CRUD on per-app end-users (distinct from
//! the control-plane operators in `admin_users`), session-based auth
//! (`login` / `verify` / `logout`), email verification, password reset,
//! invitations, and string-tagged per-app roles.
//!
//! Lives in `picloud-shared` so the Rhai bridge in `executor-core` and
//! the impl in `manager-core` share one trait. The impl
//! (`manager-core::users_service::UsersServiceImpl`) wires the
//! Postgres-backed repos; `picloud-shared` stays free of the sqlx
//! dependency.
//!
//! Every method that takes `&SdkCallCx` derives `app_id` from
//! `cx.app_id` — never from a script-passed argument. The
//! `verify_session_for_realtime` method takes `app_id` explicitly
//! because it's invoked from the realtime authority (no script
//! execution context).
use async_trait::async_trait;
use chrono::{DateTime, Utc};
use serde::{Deserialize, Serialize};
use thiserror::Error;
use crate::{AppId, AppUserId, InvitationId, Principal, SdkCallCx};
/// Public app-user record returned by `get` / `find_by_email` / `verify`
/// / `list` / etc. Never carries the password hash. The `roles` field
/// is populated from `app_user_roles` (v1.1.8 commit 9 adds the storage;
/// pre-commit-9 it's always empty).
#[derive(Debug, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Serialize, Deserialize)]
pub struct AppUser {
pub id: AppUserId,
pub app_id: AppId,
pub email: String,
pub display_name: Option<String>,
pub email_verified_at: Option<DateTime<Utc>>,
pub last_login_at: Option<DateTime<Utc>>,
pub created_at: DateTime<Utc>,
pub updated_at: DateTime<Utc>,
pub roles: Vec<String>,
}
/// Pending invitation row returned by the admin invitations API.
#[derive(Debug, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Serialize, Deserialize)]
pub struct Invitation {
pub id: InvitationId,
pub app_id: AppId,
pub email: String,
pub display_name: Option<String>,
pub roles: Vec<String>,
pub created_at: DateTime<Utc>,
pub expires_at: DateTime<Utc>,
}
/// Input for `users::create` and the admin POST endpoint.
#[derive(Debug, Clone)]
pub struct CreateUserInput {
pub email: String,
pub password: String,
pub display_name: Option<String>,
}
/// Input for `users::update` / admin PATCH. v1.1.8 patches only
/// display_name; password changes go through password reset, email is
/// immutable post-create (a v1.2 concern).
#[derive(Debug, Clone, Default)]
pub struct UpdateUserInput {
pub display_name: Option<Option<String>>,
}
/// Pagination knobs for `users::list`. The cursor is an opaque
/// `<rfc3339>_<uuid>` string from a previous page's `next_cursor`;
/// `None` is "first page". F-P-012: the id half is the tiebreaker that
/// prevents skip/duplicate at a created_at-equal page boundary.
#[derive(Debug, Clone, Default)]
pub struct UsersListOpts {
pub cursor: Option<String>,
pub limit: Option<i64>,
}
#[derive(Debug, Clone)]
pub struct UsersListPage {
pub items: Vec<AppUser>,
pub next_cursor: Option<String>,
}
/// Newly-minted session — returned exactly once by `users::login` and
/// `users::accept_invite`. The raw token goes back to the caller; only
/// the hash hits storage.
#[derive(Debug, Clone)]
pub struct GeneratedSession {
pub token: String,
pub user: AppUser,
pub expires_at: DateTime<Utc>,
}
/// Outcome of `users::accept_invite`: the freshly-created user plus a
/// session token so the script can return both in one round-trip.
#[derive(Debug, Clone)]
pub struct GeneratedAccept {
pub user: AppUser,
pub session: GeneratedSession,
}
/// Email template fields supplied by the script to v1.1.8 email-tied
/// flows (`send_verification_email`, `request_password_reset`, `invite`).
/// The script owns the body; PiCloud only injects `?token=<token>` into
/// the `link_base`.
///
/// `from` is required because the underlying `EmailService::send` needs
/// an envelope sender — the brief example omitted it for brevity, but
/// the service can't synthesize a sensible default. Documented as a
/// shape deviation in HANDBACK §7.
#[derive(Debug, Clone)]
pub struct EmailTemplateOpts {
pub link_base: String,
pub from: String,
pub subject: String,
/// Body template with `{link}` substituted for the
/// `link_base?token=<token>` URL. Plain text body — the v1.1.7
/// hybrid email design lets richer templates land in userland.
pub body_template: String,
}
/// Extra fields for `users::invite` on top of the email template:
/// optional pre-staged display name + roles applied on accept.
#[derive(Debug, Clone, Default)]
pub struct InviteOpts {
pub template: Option<EmailTemplateOpts>,
pub display_name: Option<String>,
pub roles: Vec<String>,
}
/// Failure modes surfaced to the Rhai bridge and the admin HTTP layer.
/// Variants are mapped to stable string codes by the SDK bridge so
/// scripts can `try`/`catch` and switch on the code; admin handlers
/// map to HTTP status codes.
#[derive(Debug, Error)]
pub enum UsersError {
/// Caller principal lacked the required capability. Only raised
/// when `cx.principal.is_some()` (script-as-gate semantics).
#[error("forbidden")]
Forbidden,
/// Looked-up user does not exist (or, more precisely, is not
/// visible from `cx.app_id`).
#[error("not found")]
NotFound,
/// `users::create` collided with an existing `(app_id, lower(email))`
/// row. Surfaced to script-land as a distinguishable code so a
/// sign-up form can react; never distinguishes "exists" vs
/// "doesn't exist" through any timing-observable side channel.
#[error("email already in use")]
DuplicateEmail,
/// Input field failed validation (e.g., empty email, password
/// shorter than 8 characters, malformed shape).
#[error("invalid: {0}")]
Invalid(String),
/// Email-tied flow attempted but no SMTP relay is configured. Maps
/// to the same script-side code as `EmailError::NotConfigured` so
/// scripts already handling the email-disabled mode don't need
/// special cases.
#[error("email is not configured")]
EmailNotConfigured,
/// Underlying email send failed (transport rejected, bad address,
/// too large). Wraps the EmailError message for diagnostics.
#[error("email transport: {0}")]
EmailTransport(String),
/// Email-tied surface (verification / password reset / invite) was
/// rate-limited. Either the per-(app, recipient) burst limit or the
/// per-app daily cap was exceeded. Surfaces silently to script-land
/// in the reset path (to avoid an existence-leak side channel) but
/// is raised explicitly to admin-mediated callers.
#[error("email send rate-limited")]
EmailRateLimited,
/// Underlying storage error. Surfaces to script-land as a generic
/// runtime error; the message is logged server-side for forensics.
#[error("backend error: {0}")]
Backend(String),
}
#[async_trait]
pub trait UsersService: Send + Sync {
// ---- CRUD ----
async fn create(&self, cx: &SdkCallCx, input: CreateUserInput) -> Result<AppUser, UsersError>;
async fn get(&self, cx: &SdkCallCx, id: AppUserId) -> Result<Option<AppUser>, UsersError>;
async fn find_by_email(
&self,
cx: &SdkCallCx,
email: &str,
) -> Result<Option<AppUser>, UsersError>;
/// Anonymous-safe existence probe for self-serve registration.
/// Returns `true` when the email is free to register, `false` when
/// it's taken. Unlike [`find_by_email`](Self::find_by_email) (which
/// requires an authenticated principal to prevent user enumeration),
/// this leaks only a single boolean — no id, profile, or timing
/// distinction beyond "exists / doesn't" — so a public registration
/// script can pre-check before calling `create`.
///
/// Enumeration note: that bit is the same one a register form already
/// leaks ("email taken"), but this probe is cheaper (no password hash),
/// has no side effect (a `create` miss writes a junk row), and is not
/// rate limited (there is no built-in throttle/CAPTCHA primitive). A
/// script exposing it on an anonymous route inherits account-enumeration
/// risk and must add its own `kv`-based throttle if that matters.
async fn email_available(&self, cx: &SdkCallCx, email: &str) -> Result<bool, UsersError>;
async fn update(
&self,
cx: &SdkCallCx,
id: AppUserId,
patch: UpdateUserInput,
) -> Result<AppUser, UsersError>;
async fn delete(&self, cx: &SdkCallCx, id: AppUserId) -> Result<bool, UsersError>;
async fn list(&self, cx: &SdkCallCx, opts: UsersListOpts) -> Result<UsersListPage, UsersError>;
// ---- Auth ----
/// Email + password login. Returns `Some(session)` on success,
/// `None` on bad credentials (same wall-clock cost on bad-email
/// vs bad-password via the timing-flat dummy Argon2 path).
async fn login(
&self,
cx: &SdkCallCx,
email: &str,
password: &str,
) -> Result<Option<GeneratedSession>, UsersError>;
/// Verify a session token. Returns the owning user on success,
/// `None` on missing / expired / revoked / cross-app token. Bumps
/// the sliding-window TTL on success (capped at the absolute cap).
async fn verify(&self, cx: &SdkCallCx, token: &str) -> Result<Option<AppUser>, UsersError>;
/// Logout — revokes the session. No-op for already-revoked /
/// already-expired tokens.
async fn logout(&self, cx: &SdkCallCx, token: &str) -> Result<(), UsersError>;
/// Realtime SSE entry point. Same DB lookup + sliding-window bump
/// as `verify`, but takes `app_id` explicitly because the
/// `RealtimeAuthority` is not inside a script execution. Returns
/// `None` on missing / expired / revoked / cross-app token.
async fn verify_session_for_realtime(
&self,
app_id: AppId,
token: &str,
) -> Result<Option<AppUser>, UsersError>;
// ---- Email verification (commit 5) ----
async fn send_verification_email(
&self,
cx: &SdkCallCx,
user_id: AppUserId,
opts: EmailTemplateOpts,
) -> Result<(), UsersError>;
async fn verify_email(
&self,
cx: &SdkCallCx,
token: &str,
) -> Result<Option<AppUser>, UsersError>;
// ---- Password reset (commit 6) ----
async fn request_password_reset(
&self,
cx: &SdkCallCx,
email: &str,
opts: EmailTemplateOpts,
) -> Result<(), UsersError>;
async fn complete_password_reset(
&self,
cx: &SdkCallCx,
token: &str,
new_password: &str,
) -> Result<Option<AppUser>, UsersError>;
// ---- Invitations (commit 7) ----
async fn invite(&self, cx: &SdkCallCx, email: &str, opts: InviteOpts)
-> Result<(), UsersError>;
async fn accept_invite(
&self,
cx: &SdkCallCx,
token: &str,
password: &str,
display_name: Option<String>,
) -> Result<Option<GeneratedAccept>, UsersError>;
// ---- Roles (commit 8) ----
async fn add_role(
&self,
cx: &SdkCallCx,
user_id: AppUserId,
role: &str,
) -> Result<(), UsersError>;
async fn remove_role(
&self,
cx: &SdkCallCx,
user_id: AppUserId,
role: &str,
) -> Result<bool, UsersError>;
async fn has_role(
&self,
cx: &SdkCallCx,
user_id: AppUserId,
role: &str,
) -> Result<bool, UsersError>;
// ---- Admin-mediated (no cx; called from the admin HTTP layer
// with an explicit principal) ----
/// Admin clicks "reset password"; returns a one-shot token the
/// admin can paste into a manual reset link. Does NOT send an
/// email — that's the SDK's `request_password_reset` path.
async fn admin_reset_password_token(
&self,
principal: &Principal,
app_id: AppId,
user_id: AppUserId,
) -> Result<String, UsersError>;
/// Admin clicks "revoke all sessions"; returns the count of
/// sessions revoked (zero for already-quiet users).
async fn admin_revoke_all_sessions(
&self,
principal: &Principal,
app_id: AppId,
user_id: AppUserId,
) -> Result<u64, UsersError>;
/// Admin issues an invitation from the dashboard (distinct from
/// the SDK `users::invite` path, which takes an SdkCallCx tied to
/// the calling script). Returns the created invitation so the
/// admin UI can render it without a re-fetch.
async fn admin_create_invitation(
&self,
principal: &Principal,
app_id: AppId,
email: &str,
opts: InviteOpts,
) -> Result<Invitation, UsersError>;
/// Admin lists pending invitations for the app's invitations tab.
async fn list_invitations(
&self,
principal: &Principal,
app_id: AppId,
) -> Result<Vec<Invitation>, UsersError>;
/// Admin revokes a pending invitation (the row is deleted; the
/// already-mailed link becomes inert).
async fn revoke_invitation(
&self,
principal: &Principal,
app_id: AppId,
invite_id: InvitationId,
) -> Result<bool, UsersError>;
}
/// Stub used by tests that build a `Services` bundle without a backing
/// users impl. Every call returns `UsersError::Backend("noop users
/// service")` so tests fail loudly instead of silently passing through.
#[derive(Debug, Default, Clone, Copy)]
pub struct NoopUsersService;
const NOOP_MSG: &str = "noop users service";
#[async_trait]
impl UsersService for NoopUsersService {
async fn create(
&self,
_cx: &SdkCallCx,
_input: CreateUserInput,
) -> Result<AppUser, UsersError> {
Err(UsersError::Backend(NOOP_MSG.into()))
}
async fn get(&self, _cx: &SdkCallCx, _id: AppUserId) -> Result<Option<AppUser>, UsersError> {
Err(UsersError::Backend(NOOP_MSG.into()))
}
async fn find_by_email(
&self,
_cx: &SdkCallCx,
_email: &str,
) -> Result<Option<AppUser>, UsersError> {
Err(UsersError::Backend(NOOP_MSG.into()))
}
async fn email_available(&self, _cx: &SdkCallCx, _email: &str) -> Result<bool, UsersError> {
Err(UsersError::Backend(NOOP_MSG.into()))
}
async fn update(
&self,
_cx: &SdkCallCx,
_id: AppUserId,
_patch: UpdateUserInput,
) -> Result<AppUser, UsersError> {
Err(UsersError::Backend(NOOP_MSG.into()))
}
async fn delete(&self, _cx: &SdkCallCx, _id: AppUserId) -> Result<bool, UsersError> {
Err(UsersError::Backend(NOOP_MSG.into()))
}
async fn list(
&self,
_cx: &SdkCallCx,
_opts: UsersListOpts,
) -> Result<UsersListPage, UsersError> {
Err(UsersError::Backend(NOOP_MSG.into()))
}
async fn login(
&self,
_cx: &SdkCallCx,
_email: &str,
_password: &str,
) -> Result<Option<GeneratedSession>, UsersError> {
Err(UsersError::Backend(NOOP_MSG.into()))
}
async fn verify(&self, _cx: &SdkCallCx, _token: &str) -> Result<Option<AppUser>, UsersError> {
Err(UsersError::Backend(NOOP_MSG.into()))
}
async fn logout(&self, _cx: &SdkCallCx, _token: &str) -> Result<(), UsersError> {
Err(UsersError::Backend(NOOP_MSG.into()))
}
async fn verify_session_for_realtime(
&self,
_app_id: AppId,
_token: &str,
) -> Result<Option<AppUser>, UsersError> {
Err(UsersError::Backend(NOOP_MSG.into()))
}
async fn send_verification_email(
&self,
_cx: &SdkCallCx,
_user_id: AppUserId,
_opts: EmailTemplateOpts,
) -> Result<(), UsersError> {
Err(UsersError::Backend(NOOP_MSG.into()))
}
async fn verify_email(
&self,
_cx: &SdkCallCx,
_token: &str,
) -> Result<Option<AppUser>, UsersError> {
Err(UsersError::Backend(NOOP_MSG.into()))
}
async fn request_password_reset(
&self,
_cx: &SdkCallCx,
_email: &str,
_opts: EmailTemplateOpts,
) -> Result<(), UsersError> {
Err(UsersError::Backend(NOOP_MSG.into()))
}
async fn complete_password_reset(
&self,
_cx: &SdkCallCx,
_token: &str,
_new_password: &str,
) -> Result<Option<AppUser>, UsersError> {
Err(UsersError::Backend(NOOP_MSG.into()))
}
async fn invite(
&self,
_cx: &SdkCallCx,
_email: &str,
_opts: InviteOpts,
) -> Result<(), UsersError> {
Err(UsersError::Backend(NOOP_MSG.into()))
}
async fn accept_invite(
&self,
_cx: &SdkCallCx,
_token: &str,
_password: &str,
_display_name: Option<String>,
) -> Result<Option<GeneratedAccept>, UsersError> {
Err(UsersError::Backend(NOOP_MSG.into()))
}
async fn add_role(
&self,
_cx: &SdkCallCx,
_user_id: AppUserId,
_role: &str,
) -> Result<(), UsersError> {
Err(UsersError::Backend(NOOP_MSG.into()))
}
async fn remove_role(
&self,
_cx: &SdkCallCx,
_user_id: AppUserId,
_role: &str,
) -> Result<bool, UsersError> {
Err(UsersError::Backend(NOOP_MSG.into()))
}
async fn has_role(
&self,
_cx: &SdkCallCx,
_user_id: AppUserId,
_role: &str,
) -> Result<bool, UsersError> {
Err(UsersError::Backend(NOOP_MSG.into()))
}
async fn admin_reset_password_token(
&self,
_principal: &Principal,
_app_id: AppId,
_user_id: AppUserId,
) -> Result<String, UsersError> {
Err(UsersError::Backend(NOOP_MSG.into()))
}
async fn admin_revoke_all_sessions(
&self,
_principal: &Principal,
_app_id: AppId,
_user_id: AppUserId,
) -> Result<u64, UsersError> {
Err(UsersError::Backend(NOOP_MSG.into()))
}
async fn admin_create_invitation(
&self,
_principal: &Principal,
_app_id: AppId,
_email: &str,
_opts: InviteOpts,
) -> Result<Invitation, UsersError> {
Err(UsersError::Backend(NOOP_MSG.into()))
}
async fn list_invitations(
&self,
_principal: &Principal,
_app_id: AppId,
) -> Result<Vec<Invitation>, UsersError> {
Err(UsersError::Backend(NOOP_MSG.into()))
}
async fn revoke_invitation(
&self,
_principal: &Principal,
_app_id: AppId,
_invite_id: InvitationId,
) -> Result<bool, UsersError> {
Err(UsersError::Backend(NOOP_MSG.into()))
}
}